UK EXPORTS OF MBM TO WORLD Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion
aka Mad Cow Disease
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE TSE Prion aka Mad Cow Disease
Subject: UK EXPORTS OF MBM TO WORLD
UK EXPORTS OF MBM TO WORLD
OTHERS
BEEF AND VEAL
LIVE CATTLE
FATS
EMBRYOS
GELATIN ETC
SEMEN
MEAT
Monday, December 1, 2014
Germany Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE CJD TSE Prion disease A Review
December 1, 2014
Friday, November 28, 2014
BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY BSE AKA MAD COW DISEASE PORTUGAL CONFIRMED
nvCJD CONFIRMED TEXAS USA 2014
‘’The completed investigation did not support the patient's having had
extended travel to European countries, including the United Kingdom, or travel
to Saudi Arabia. The specific overseas country where this patient’s infection
occurred is less clear largely because the investigation did not definitely link
him to a country where other known vCJD cases likely had been infected.’’
Confirmed Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (variant CJD) Case in
Texas
Updated: October 7, 2014
CDC and the Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS) have completed
the investigation of the recently reported fourth vCJD case in the United
States. It confirmed that the case was in a US citizen born outside the Americas
and indicated that the patient's exposure to the BSE/vCJD agent most likely
occurred before he moved to the United States; the patient had resided in
Kuwait, Russia and Lebanon. The completed investigation did not support the
patient's having had extended travel to European countries, including the United
Kingdom, or travel to Saudi Arabia. The specific overseas country where this
patient’s infection occurred is less clear largely because the investigation did
not definitely link him to a country where other known vCJD cases likely had
been infected.
Sunday, November 23, 2014
Confirmed Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (variant CJD) Case in Texas in
June 2014 confirmed as USA case NOT European
Monday, November 3, 2014
USA CJD TSE PRION UNIT, TEXAS, SURVEILLANCE UPDATE NOVEMBER 2014
National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined1
(October 7, 2014)
***6 Includes 11 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 19
inconclusive cases;
***7 Includes 12 (11 from 2014) cases with type determination pending in
which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded.
***The sporadic cases include 2660 cases of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease (sCJD),
***50 cases of Variably Protease-Sensitive Prionopathy (VPSPr)
***and 21 cases of sporadic Fatal Insomnia (sFI).
Monday, November 3, 2014
The prion protein protease sensitivity, stability and seeding activity in
variably protease sensitive prionopathy brain tissue suggests molecular overlaps
with sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
Tuesday, November 04, 2014
The pathological and molecular but not clinical phenotypes are maintained
after second passage of experimental atypical bovine spongiform encephalopathy
in cattle
*** Singeltary reply ; Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics
of BSE in Canada Singeltary reply ;
Tuesday, August 12, 2014
MAD COW USDA TSE PRION COVER UP or JUST IGNORANCE, for the record AUGUST
2014
Thursday, October 02, 2014
[Docket No. APHIS-2013-0064] Concurrence With OIE Risk Designations for
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
Saturday, August 14, 2010
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and
VPSPr PRIONPATHY
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN
COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried,
Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-
contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been
manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE
statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot-
Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M
CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B
DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal,
JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT
Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral,
BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC
LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall #
V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with
commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm
initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross
contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear
cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
Sunday, December 15, 2013
*** FDA PART 589 -- SUBSTANCES PROHIBITED FROM USE IN ANIMAL FOOD OR FEED
VIOLATIONS OFFICIAL ACTION INDICATED OIA UPDATE DECEMBER 2013 UPDATE ***
Tuesday, August 12, 2014
MAD COW USDA TSE PRION COVER UP or JUST IGNORANCE, for the record AUGUST
2014
Thursday, June 23, 2011
Experimental H-type bovine spongiform encephalopathy characterized by
plaques and glial- and stellate-type prion protein deposits
Wednesday, April 25, 2012 4th MAD COW DISEASE U.S.A. CALIFORNIA ATYPICAL
L-TYPE BSE 2012
2012 ATYPICAL L-TYPE BSE BASE CALIFORNIA ‘confirmed’ Saturday, August 4,
2012
*** Final Feed Investigation Summary - California BSE Case - July 2012
Monday, November 3, 2014
Persistence of ovine scrapie infectivity in a farm environment following
cleaning and decontamination
*** why do we not want to do TSE transmission studies on chimpanzees $
5. A positive result from a chimpanzee challenged severly would likely
create alarm in some circles even if the result could not be interpreted for
man. I have a view that all these agents could be transmitted provided a large
enough dose by appropriate routes was given and the animals kept long enough.
Until the mechanisms of the species barrier are more clearly understood it might
be best to retain that hypothesis.
snip...
R. BRADLEY
1: J Infect Dis 1980 Aug;142(2):205-8
Oral transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie to
nonhuman primates.
Gibbs CJ Jr, Amyx HL, Bacote A, Masters CL, Gajdusek DC.
Kuru and Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease of humans and scrapie disease of sheep
and goats were transmitted to squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) that were
exposed to the infectious agents only by their nonforced consumption of known
infectious tissues. The asymptomatic incubation period in the one monkey exposed
to the virus of kuru was 36 months; that in the two monkeys exposed to the virus
of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease was 23 and 27 months, respectively; and that in the
two monkeys exposed to the virus of scrapie was 25 and 32 months, respectively.
Careful physical examination of the buccal cavities of all of the monkeys failed
to reveal signs or oral lesions. One additional monkey similarly exposed to kuru
has remained asymptomatic during the 39 months that it has been under
observation.
snip...
The successful transmission of kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, and scrapie
by natural feeding to squirrel monkeys that we have reported provides further
grounds for concern that scrapie-infected meat may occasionally give rise in
humans to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.
PMID: 6997404
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=6997404&dopt=Abstract
Recently the question has again been brought up as to whether scrapie is
transmissible to man. This has followed reports that the disease has been
transmitted to primates. One particularly lurid speculation (Gajdusek 1977)
conjectures that the agents of scrapie, kuru, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and
transmissible encephalopathy of mink are varieties of a single "virus". The U.S.
Department of Agriculture concluded that it could "no longer justify or permit
scrapie-blood line and scrapie-exposed sheep and goats to be processed for human
or animal food at slaughter or rendering plants" (ARC 84/77)" The problem is
emphasised by the finding that some strains of scrapie produce lesions identical
to the once which characterise the human dementias"
Whether true or not. the hypothesis that these agents might be
transmissible to man raises two considerations. First, the safety of laboratory
personnel requires prompt attention. Second, action such as the "scorched meat"
policy of USDA makes the solution of the acrapie problem urgent if the sheep
industry is not to suffer grievously.
snip...
76/10.12/4.6
Nature. 1972 Mar 10;236(5341):73-4.
Transmission of scrapie to the cynomolgus monkey (Macaca fascicularis).
Gibbs CJ Jr, Gajdusek DC.
Nature 236, 73 - 74 (10 March 1972); doi:10.1038/236073a0
Transmission of Scrapie to the Cynomolgus Monkey (Macaca fascicularis)
C. J. GIBBS jun. & D. C. GAJDUSEK
National Institute of Neurological Diseases and Stroke, National Institutes
of Health, Bethesda, Maryland
SCRAPIE has been transmitted to the cynomolgus, or crab-eating, monkey
(Macaca fascicularis) with an incubation period of more than 5 yr from the time
of intracerebral inoculation of scrapie-infected mouse brain. The animal
developed a chronic central nervous system degeneration, with ataxia, tremor and
myoclonus with associated severe scrapie-like pathology of intensive astroglial
hypertrophy and proliferation, neuronal vacuolation and status spongiosus of
grey matter. The strain of scrapie virus used was the eighth passage in Swiss
mice (NIH) of a Compton strain of scrapie obtained as ninth intracerebral
passage of the agent in goat brain, from Dr R. L. Chandler (ARC, Compton,
Berkshire).
Thursday, July 31, 2014
*** EFSA Scrapie reduction unlikely without effective breeding programme
http://efsaopinionbseanimalprotein.blogspot.com/2014/07/efsa-scrapie-reduction-unlikely-without.html
Tuesday, November 04, 2014
*** Six-year follow-up of a point-source exposure to CWD contaminated
venison in an Upstate New York community: risk behaviours and health outcomes
2005–2011
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. on the Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Public Health
Crisis *video*
Jeff Schwan, sporadic cjd, clustering, and BSE aka mad cow type disease, is
there a link ? *video*
1997-11-10: Panorama - The british disease *video*
Sunday, September 6, 2009
MAD COW USA 1997 *video*
Tuesday, November 04, 2014
*** Towards an Age-Dependent Transmission Model of Acquired and Sporadic
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
IT is of my opinion, that the OIE and the USDA et al, are the soul reason,
and responsible parties, for Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE prion
diseases, including typical and atypical BSE, typical and atypical Scrapie, and
all strains of CWD, and human TSE there from, spreading around the globe.
I have lost all confidence of this organization as a regulatory authority
on animal disease, and consider it nothing more than a National Trading
Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE, just to satisfy there commodity. AS i
said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will
buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol,
commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should
do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization.
JUST because of low documented human body count with nvCJD and the long
incubation periods, the lack of sound science being replaced by political and
corporate science in relations with the fact that science has now linked some
sporadic CJD with atypical BSE and atypical scrapie, and the very real threat of
CWD being zoonosis, I believed the O.I.E. has failed terribly and again, I call
for this organization to be dissolved. ...
Tuesday, July 17, 2012
O.I.E. BSE, CWD, SCRAPIE, TSE PRION DISEASE Final Report of the 80th
General Session, 20 - 25 May 2012
Thursday, December 20, 2012
OIE GROUP RECOMMENDS THAT SCRAPE PRION DISEASE BE DELISTED AND SAME OLD BSe
WITH BOVINE MAD COW DISEASE
Monday, November 30, 2009
*** USDA AND OIE COLLABORATE TO EXCLUDE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE NOR-98 ANIMAL
HEALTH CODE, DOES NOT SURPRISE ME $
Sunday, August 24, 2014
USAHA 117TH ANNUAL MEETING USDA-APHIS–VS CWD Herd Certification Program
Goals TSE PRION October 17 – 23, 2013
SNIP...
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE 344 Ewes were experimentally inoculated with brain
homogenate obtained from a U.S. sheep with clinical Nor98-like scrapie.
Recipient ewes are bred annually to examine the placenta for evidence of a
transmissible agent. Placentas shed 2009-2013 were negative.
*** In 2013, one recipient ewe developed an unrelated disease. At
postmortem examination, abundant accumulation of PrPSc was observed only in the
cerebellum of this ewe with much less accumulation in the hindbrain obex. This
confirms that initial inoculation of these ewes has been successful. Monitoring
continues in the remaining ewes of this study.
Sunday, August 24, 2014
USAHA 117TH ANNUAL MEETING USDA-APHIS–VS CWD Herd Certification Program
Goals TSE PRION October 17 – 23, 2013
Sunday, June 29, 2014
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy TSE Prion Disease North America
2014
USA, NORTH AMERICA, MBM (or any potential TSE prion disease) EXPORTS TO THE
WORLD (?) [protected by the BSE MRR policy] $$$
IN my opinion, from the following risk factors i will post below, and the
fact that the OIE and the USDA systematically did away with the BSE GBR system
for the BSE MRR system, for the legal trading all strains of TSE globally, and
the ramifications there from (BSE MRR), MY confidence level of any TSE
regulatory risk assessment is 0...that is ZERO CONFIDENCE LEVEL IN ANY REGARDS
TO THE TSE PRION DISEASES AKA MAD COW DISEASE. The BSE MRR regulations were set
up to fail, and make legal the trading of all strains of TSE prion disease
globally. the consumers were hung out to dry around the globe, and the
ramifications there from will be long and costly thanks to the OIE and the USDA
et al. ...TSS
================================
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment
of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of United States of America (USA)
Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083
Adopted July 2004
Summary of scientific report The European Food Safety Authority and its
Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission
(EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States
of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being
infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific
report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the
period 1980-2003. The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have
reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in
the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led
to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported
meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an
internal challenge in the early nineties. A processing risk developed in the
late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered
or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of
MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when
domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low
stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued
imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries. EFSA concludes that the
current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that
domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent.
As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the
stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be
(pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently
increases.
Key words: BSE, geographical risk assessment, GBR, USA, third
countries
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-17 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of USA - 1 - European Food Safety Authority Scientific
Expert Working Group on GBR Working Group Report on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 2004
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-17 on the Assessment of the
Geographical BSE Risk of USA - 7 - 2.3
Overall assessment of the external challenge
The level of the external challenge that has to be met by the BSE/cattle
system is estimated according to the guidance given by the SSC in its final
opinion on the GBR of July 2000 (as updated in January 2002). Live cattle
imports: In total the country imported 2038 (other sources) or 1128 (CD) live
cattle from BSE risk countries other than Canada, of which 327 (other sources)
or 323 (CD) came from the UK. From Canada the imports were >500,000 animals
per year. The numbers shown in table 1 are the raw import figures and are not
reflecting the adjusted imports for the assessment of the external challenge.
Broken down to 5 year periods the resulting external challenge is as given in
table 3. This assessment takes into account the different aspects discussed
above that allow to assume that certain imported cattle did not enter the
domestic BSE-cattle system, i.e. were not rendered into feed. In the case of the
USA, all the animals for which tracing information showed that they were not
rendered were excluded from the external challenge.
MBM imports:
In total the country imported 689 tons MBM (CD) or 2,230 tons MBM (other
sources) from BSE risk countries other than Canada, of which 5 tons (CD) or 101
tons (other sources) were exported from the UK (UK export data). From Canada,
the imports were about 30 000 tons per year. The numbers shown in table 2 are
the raw import figures and are not reflecting the adjusted imports for the
assessment of the external challenge. Broken down to 5 year periods the
resulting external challenge is as given in table 3. This assessment takes into
account the different aspects discussed above that allow to assume that certain
imported MBM did not enter the domestic BSE/cattle system or did not represent
an external challenge for other reasons. As it was illegal to export mammalian
MBM from UK since 27/03/1996, exports indicated after that date should only have
included non-mammalian MBM. In the case of the USA imported MBM from UK in 1989
and between 1997 and 1999 was not taken into account.
Feeding Use of MBM in cattle feed
• Until 1997 ruminant MBM (RMBM) could legally be included in cattle feed
and was indeed commonly fed to cattle of different age and type. Prior to the
feed ban the US authorities estimated that 10% of all MBM would deliberately
have been fed to cattle. Feed bans
• A ban to feed (several types of) MMBM to ruminants was put in place in
August 1997. Derogation from the ban was granted for pure porcine and equine
protein (MBM) coming from designated (single species) rendering plants. This
MMBM might still be fed to cattle. Therefore this feed ban is a ruminant to
ruminant ban.
• It is planned to prohibit the use of all mammalian and poultry protein in
ruminant feed and prohibiting materials from non-ambulatory disabled cattle and
dead stock from use in all animal feed.
Conclusion on the ability to avoid recycling
• Before 1997, US system would not have been able to avoid recycling of the
BSEagent to any measurable extent. If the BSE-agent was introduced into the feed
chain, it could have reached cattle.
• After the introduction of the 1997 ban in August 1997, the ability to
avoid recycling of BSE-infectivity was somewhat improved. However, the rendering
of ruminant material (including SRM and fallen stock) is inadequate (non
pressurized), and cross-contamination potentials of cattle feed with other feeds
remain.
• Therefore, the system is still unable to avoid recycling of
BSE-infectivity if already present in the system or incoming.
Feeding
Until August 1997, RMBM was legally fed to cattle. Feeding was therefore
"not OK". In August 1997 an RMBM-ban was introduced but feeding of non-ruminant
MBM to cattle remained legal as well as feeding of RMBM to non-ruminant animals
(farm animals and pets). An RMBM ban is difficult to maintain, as only labels
can distinguish the various MMBMs. This makes control of the feed ban very
difficult because analytical differentiation between ruminant and non-ruminant
MBM is difficult if not impossible.
Due to the highly specialised production system in the USA, various
mammalian MBM streams can be separated. Such a feed ban would therefore be
assessed as "reasonably OK", for all regions where this highly specialised
system exists. However, several areas in the USA do have mixed farming and mixed
feed mills, and in such regions an RMBM ban would not suffice. Additionally,
official controls for cattle feeds to control for compliance with the ban
started in 2002. Thus, for the whole country, the assessment of the feeding
after 1997 remains "not OK", but improving.
Rendering
The rendering industry is operating with processes that are not known to
reduce
infectivity. It is therefore concluded that rendering was and is "not
OK".
SRM-removal
SRM were and are still rendered for feed, as are (parts of) the fallen
stock. SRMremoval
is therefore regarded as "not OK".
BSE-surveillance
Before 1989, the ability of the system to identify (and eliminate)
BSE-cases was
limited. Since 1990 this ability is improved, thanks to a specific
(passive) BSE
surveillance. The initiated introduction of active surveillance in risk
populations
should improve the system significantly.
On the basis of the available information, it has to be concluded that the
country's
BSE/cattle system was extremely unstable until today, i.e., it would have
recycled and
amplified BSE-infectivity very fast, should it have entered the system. The
stability of
the BSE/cattle system in the USA overtime is as given in table 4.
The present assessment modifies the stability assessment of the previous
GBR report
in 2000 mainly due to a different perception of the impact of BSE
surveillance on
stability and of the efficiency of the RMBM feed ban.
Interaction of stability and external challenge in the USA
Period Stability External Challenge Internal challenge
1980 to
1985
1986 to
1990
Moderate Possibly present
1991 to 1995
Very high
1996 to
2000
2001 to
2003
Extremely unstable Extremely high Likely to be present and growing
5. CONCLUSION ON THE GEOGRAPHICAL BSE-RISK
5.1 The current GBR as function of the past stability and challenge
• The current geographical BSE risk (GBR) level is III, i.e. it is likely
but not
confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected
with the
BSE-agent.
Note1: It is also worth noting that the current GBR conclusions are not
dependent on
the large exchange of imports between USA and Canada. External challenge
due to
exports to the USA from European countries varied from moderate to high.
These
challenges indicate that it was likely that BSE infectivity was introduced
into the
North American continent.
snip...please see full text ;
EFSA publishes Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) assessments for Australia,
Canada, Mexico, Norway, South Africa, Sweden and the United States of
America
Communiqué de presse 20 août 2004
The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) has issued today seven up-to-date
scientific reports on the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
Risk (GBR) assessments for Australia, Canada, Mexico, Norway, South Africa
Sweden and the United States of America. While Australia’s GBR level I (i.e.
presence of BSE in domestic cattle is highly unlikely) is maintained, that of
Norway has been raised to level II (presence of BSE unlikely but not excluded),
Sweden remains at GBR level II and those of Canada and the United States have
been raised to level III (presence of BSE likely but not confirmed, or confirmed
at a lower level) following a new assessment taking into account the most recent
evidence. EFSA’s Scientific Expert Working Group on geographic BSE risk
assessment also evaluated the status of Mexico and South Africa which were
classified as level III.
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Bacliff, TEXAS USA 77518 MOM DOD 12/14/97 confirmed hvCJD
