UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE WASHINGTON, DC
FSIS NOTICE 80-09 12/1/09
DISTRIBUTION: Electronic
NOTICE EXPIRES: 12/1/10 OPI: OPPD
NOTE: This notice reissues the content of FSIS Notice 88-08 in its entirety
IMPORTATION OF CANADIAN CATTLE, BISON, SHEEP, AND GOATS INTO THE UNITED STATES
I. PURPOSE This notice provides updated information to Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) inspection program personnel (IPP) about the receipt, slaughter, and inspection of cattle, bison, sheep, and goats imported from Canada.
Key Points
- Bovines born after March 1, 1999 arriving from Canada are eligible for slaughter
- Verification of animals coming from the feedlot refers to activities involving sheep and goats only in this notice and no longer involves bovines
- IPP are to conduct another awareness meeting at establishments that have chosen to, or that may choose to, receive ruminants from Canada
- FSIS will no longer hold pregnant bovines. Pregnant cattle and bison are now eligible for slaughter
- Collection of fetal bovine serum from the fetuses of Canadian animals is no longer prohibited
- This notice identifies a new place to send the VS Form 1-27, “Permit for Movement of Restricted Animals”
2
II. BACKGROUND
A. In the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) final regulation entitled, Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines (hereafter referred to as “the Rule”), animals not in compliance with the age and other provisions of the Rule are ineligible for import into the United States and, therefore, ineligible for slaughter. Under this rule, bovines born after March 1, 1999 are now eligible for entry into the United States. APHIS border personnel will make this determination at the border based on certifications by Canadian officials. Should FSIS personnel note any irregularities in this regard, FSIS will hold the affected bovines and will report their findings to the Area Veterinarian in Charge (AVIC) for disposition. For purposes of this notice, bovines will include cattle and bison.
B. The restrictions on sheep and goats in the Rule have not changed. Sheep and goats must be less than 12 months old and must not be pregnant to be eligible for slaughter. IPP will still verify that establishments ensure the eligibility of sheep and goats arriving for immediate slaughter and from feedlots.
III. DEFINITIONS
snip...end
see full text ;
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FSISNotices/80-09.pdf
Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL IMPORTS FROM CANADA
*** SEEMS THE FEDERAL URL FOR MY SUBMISSION IS NOW MUTE...TSS
https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?OpenDocument&AutoFramed
PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT HERE ;
Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL IMPORTS FROM CANADA
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/07/docket-no-03-080-1-usda-issues-proposed.html
http://stanford.wellsphere.com/cjd-article/docket-no-03-080-1-usda-issues-proposed-rule-to-allow-live-animal-imports-from-canada/641254
Subject: Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION
Date: August 24, 2005 at 2:47 pm PST
August 24, 2005
Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION
Greetings APHIS ET AL,
My name is Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006480086ebc&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw6
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder9@verizon.net] Sent: Monday, July 24, 2006 1:09 PM To: FSIS RegulationsComments Subject: [Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Page 1 of 98 8/3/2006 Greetings FSIS, I would kindly like to comment on the following ;
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
Stanley Prusiner Nobel Peace Prize winner for the PRION comments on Importing Canadian Beef to USA
Damning statements...turn it up, please listen.
http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/prusinerclip.html
Monday, November 30, 2009
USDA AND OIE COLLABORATE TO EXCLUDE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE NOR-98 ANIMAL HEALTH CODE
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/11/usda-and-oie-collaborate-to-exclude.html
Monday, November 23, 2009
BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS UPDATE NOVEMBER 23, 2009 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND O.I.E.
http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-gbr-risk-assessments-update.html
Wednesday, November 18, 2009
R-CALF: 40 Groups Disagree With USDA's Latest BSE Court Submission
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/11/r-calf-40-groups-disagree-with-usdas.html
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0006 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary Sr Views Add Comments How To Comment
snip...
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
go figure....
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&d=APHIS-2006-0041-0006
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
To: FREAS@CBER.FDA.GOV
Cc: william.freas@fda.hhs.gov ; rosanna.harvey@fda.hhs.gov
Sent: Friday, December 01, 2006 2:59 PM
Subject: Re: TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006 [TSS SUBMISSION
snip...
ONE FINAL COMMENT PLEASE, (i know this is long Dr. Freas but please bear with me)
THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted blood from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone.
These are the facts as i have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species. ...
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
snip... 48 pages...
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f3413&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
TSS
Tuesday, December 1, 2009
Monday, October 26, 2009
MAD COW DISEASE, AND U.S. BEEF TRADE
look folks, after the BSE MRR policy was shoved down every countries throat, it became legal to trade all strains of mad cow disease, i.e. TSEs LEGALLY. That's just another sad legacy of GW et al. THE USA is doing now, what the U.K. did when they spread BSE around the globe, except GW just made it legal. it's as simple as that, but trade and commerce is the backbone of science. in fact, it broke it's back. if you ban USA beef, the USA will threaten you with trade sanctions. TSE science, trade, and commerce is based on junk science, and so is the O.I.E. Just because of the incubation period, and low _documented_ body bag count, and a diagnostic criteria that goes back to the stone ages, and proven wrong from the very beginning. who will get the last laugh $$$ time will tell, i hope i am wrong, but this goes far beyond the mad cow hamburger, or the beef on bone BSE, it further goes to the 'pass if forward' and or 'friendly fire' modes, there from. you can't deny it, because it has been proven. and who cares if you die old and crazy with a mad cow type TSE disease i.e. CJD anyway. due to the incubation period, by then, nobody cares. your just another number...TSS
AN interesting thread here ;
Posted: Wed Dec 19, 2007 3:47 pm Post subject: OIE
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
xxxxxxxx wrote:
Quote: Maybe familirise yourself with the OIE. The primary concern is animal health of the world they are the animal version of the WHO. It is a long way down from that ivory tower but here we go, until pressured by the USA repesentatives a country could not export animals for 6 years after finding a BSE/BASE positive animal so under the old rules the US would not be able to export anywhere in the world for another 4 1/2 years. Who got the risk levels system put in to allow some trade - your US representatives. You guys want to change rules - OK , but you do not get special rules that only apply to the US. As i have told you before Sand h I market all my own slaughter animals and you know that, so don't do the whole holier than thow act.
With all due respect, it is obvious that you know little about the OIE and how it actually works. Having been to their offices in Paris and talked personally with the Head of the Animal Test Section, you would choke if you knew how many lobby groups attend that office daily. There is a steady stream of paid lobby groups that have one goal in life and that is to sway the Section Heads of each department within the OIE to suit the needs of different juristictions around the world, which curiously enough, also includes the USA and Canada. Anyone can go there and chat with them - providing they can privide valid cause to be let in. To say that the only goal of the OIE is animal health is actually only part of their function. They are more than that and my discussions with Dr. Diaz there has showed me that. But to blindly make a statement regarding what they do when you have no idea what they actually do is like eating the skin of the orange and not knowing what is actually under.
Interstingly you state that the US Government applied pressure (to the OIE) I assume and that is a great example of the lobby groups doing their job. So, at the end of the day, one can safely assume that it is the pressure applied by certain influential lobby groups that will determine a likely aoutcome to an apparent OIE directive. Man alive, isn't it great to live in a democracy wherein the people get to make the choices and not just some "other" interested party or group - say like........Cargyll or Tyson for example?
So, one last question, xxxxxx?
Who wags the tail of that dog?? And for what reason other than one that is purely associated with trade and international agreements and greed?
And you think it is so simply explainable.
http://www.ranchers.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=22833&postdays=0&postorder=asc&highlight=ops&start=36
MAD COW DISEASE, AND U.S. BEEF TRADE
MAD COW DISEASE, CJD, TSE, SOUND SCIENCE, COMMERCE, AND SELLING YOUR SOUL TO THE DEVIL
Mad cow ban lifted amid legal threat Story Added : 23rd October 2009
Trade officials say Australia was at risk of international legal action if it did not change its policy on beef imports from countries affected by mad cow disease.
A blanket ban on imports from those countries will be lifted, but all beef will still be subject to close checks.
The Federal Opposition says it will put Australia's beef industry and disease-free status in jeopardy.
But Tim Yeend from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has told a Senate estimates hearing there were legal risks in leaving the policy unchanged.
"It is worth noting that Canada has just recently initiated a dispute against Korea in this precise area," he said.
"So I would say that there's a high level of risk, given that these countries have been raising the issue repeatedly over a number of years in WTO (World Trade Organisation) disputes."
http://www.efarming.com.au/News/agricultural/23/10/2009/75188/mad-cow-ban-lifted-amid-legal-threat.html
Threats stop 'mad cow' ban
David McKenzie
October 26, 2009
AUSTRALIA has scrapped its blanket ban on beef imports from "mad cow'' countries as a result of trade threats, the beef industry has revealed. ...snip...END
http://www.weeklytimesnow.com.au/article/2009/10/26/126745_national-news.html
Free Trade with Taiwan Is Long Overdue
August 15, 2007
by John J. Tkacik, Jr. and Daniella Markheim Backgrounder #2061
Although Congress has allowed trade promotion authority (TPA) to expire, this paradoxically presents Congress with an opportunity to consider a country-specific initiative that both the majority and minority should find attractive—a free trade agreement (FTA) with Taiwan. Among other things, a U.S.–Taiwan FTA would increase U.S. auto, rice, poultry, and livestock exports and open a significant new market for new research medicines....snip...END
http://www.heritage.org/Research/tradeandeconomicfreedom/bg2061.cfm
Beef Blockade Risks U.S.-Japan Trade War Even as food industry asks for American beef. Compiled by staff Published: May 1, 2006 USA Today reports that a possible trade war looms over the U.S.- Japan beef dispute. Since Japan reimposed a ban on all U.S. beef on Jan. 20 after an improper shipment of veal, frustrations have mounted as officials on both sides work to resume trade.
"It was a stupid mistake, but it's a mistake that's stopped in its tracks a (multi) billion-dollar industry," says J. Thomas Schieffer, U.S. Ambassador to Japan. "You don't want beef to set off a trade war between the United States and Japan... This has the potential for being very damaging to the relationship. It's already had a corrosive effect."
Japanese officials took a hard line on U.S. beef imports, demanding an explanation for the last export error and requiring Japanese inspections of American beef facilities. U.S. lawmakers are losing patience, with one senator demanding trade resumption by June 1....SNIP...END
http://californiafarmer.com/story.aspx?s=8165&c=10
Japan Questions U.S. BSE Firewalls, Trade Resumption Still Far Off Food Safety Commission fears Britain-type situation will occur in U.S. beef since meat and bone meal isn't banned from all animal feed.
Compiled by staff Published: Aug 25, 2005 ' animal feed controls to prevent the spread of bovine spongiform encephalopathy are under fire from and independent panel in Japan.
Japan's Food and Safety Commission says a U.S. regulation allowing for the use of meat-and-bone meal from cattle to be used in other animal feeds is risky. The panel members are tasked with determining the safety of U.S. beef before trade can resume between the two countries.
Reuters reports that panel member Tetsuyuki Kitamo says, "We cannot completely rule out the possibility that the situation in the United States may become similar to what happened in Britain."
"Kazuya Yamanouchi, another panel member, proposed that the panel make a risk assessment on U.S. beef that included the possibility that BSE could spread," Reuters reports. "Yasuhiro Yoshikawa, the panel chairman, said he personally did not expect BSE to spread, but added that he would consider the proposal by next meeting."
The next meeting hasn't been set on when the Commission will again look at the issue.
http://farmfutures.com/story.aspx?s=27087&c=17
Japan suspends US plant's beef amid mad cow fears
The Associated Press
Published: Saturday, October 10, 2009 at 8:50 a.m. Last Modified: Saturday, October 10, 2009 at 8:50 a.m. TOKYO — Japan has suspended beef shipments from an American meatpacking plant after finding cattle parts banned under an agreement to prevent the spread of mad cow disease, the agriculture ministry said Saturday.
Japanese quarantine inspectors found bovine spinal columns in one of 732 boxes sent by Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., which arrived in Japan last month, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries said in a statement. The box contained 35 pounds of chilled short loin with spinal bones, which were not released commercially, said ministry official Goshi Nakata.
The suspension only affects Tyson's factory in Lexington, Neb., one of 46 meatpacking plants approved to export beef to Japan.
It was the second suspension for the Lexington factory, Nakata said. Japan slapped a four-month ban on beef shipments from the same plant in February 2007 after finding two boxes of beef lacking verifications to show they came from cattle that met Japan's safety standards.
The Japanese ministry also asked the U.S. Department of Agriculture to investigate how the box containing the banned parts ended up in Japan.
Japan will await results of a U.S. investigation to determine the penalty for the Tyson factory, the ministry said.
Japan banned all U.S. beef imports in 2003 after the first case of mad cow disease was discovered in the United States. Japan resumed buying American beef in 2006 after a bilateral trade agreement setting new safety standards.
Mad cow disease, formally known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, is a degenerative nerve disease in cattle. In humans, eating meat products contaminated with the illness is linked to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, a rare and fatal malady.
Under the bilateral trade agreement, U.S. exporters must remove spinal columns, brain tissue and other parts considered linked to mad cow disease. U.S. beef shipments to Japan must also come only from cattle age 20 months or younger, which are believed to pose less of a risk.
Washington has repeatedly criticized Japan for its tough import restrictions, which authorities say have no scientific basis.
U.S. officials have urged Japan to allow imports of beef from cattle aged up to 30 months, a widely used safety standard elsewhere.
http://www.gainesville.com/article/20091010/NEWS/910109983?Title=Japan-suspends-US-plant-s-beef-amid-mad-cow-fears-
Korea Trade Deal Lifts Meat Packing Companies Ag and Trade Main Street Economics 04/19/2008
President Bush has been pushing for a new comprehensive trade agreement with South Korea, but negotiations have hung up on the 2003 beef ban. Sen. Max Baucus, a Democrat from Montana, said he would oppose any new South Korean trade deal until the beef restrictions were lifted.
Now that the beef question has been settled, the larger trade deal will become part of the stark disagreement over trade between Republicans and Democrats.
http://www.dailyyonder.com/korea-trade-deal-lifts-meat-packing-companies
Ambassador Portman said, "Although we appreciate this step toward normalized beef trade with Korea, we are extremely disappointed that Korea did not fully open its market to all U.S. beef products. We will continue to urge Korea in the strongest terms to open its market without delay to U.S. bone-in beef, variety meats, and offal. Together these products historically accounted for approximately 50 percent of U.S. beef exports to Korea."
http://americancorners.or.kr/e-infousa/wwwh3298.html
Subject: US Senator Threatens to Block South Korea Deal Date: April 2, 2007 at 8:33 am PST
US Senator Threatens to Block South Korea Deal
U.S. lawmaker threatened to block a major trade deal with South Korea just hours after it was agreed on Monday. Reuters. A senior U.S. lawmaker threatened to block a major trade deal with South Korea just hours after it was agreed on Monday, saying U.S. negotiators failed to ensure sufficient access for U.S. beef exports. "I will not allow it to move through the Senate, unless and until Korea completely lifts its ban on U.S. beef," Sen. Max Baucus, chairman of the influential Senate Finance Committee, said in a statement.
"This is an entirely unacceptable outcome."
A hard line from Baucus and other members of Congress could be trouble for the deal, which officials wrapped up after a marathon negotiating session in Seoul.
Baucus, a Democrat from the cattle state Montana, said South Korea must open its markets to all beef exports, including meat from animals of any age, both bone-in and boneless.
The senator has been a harsh critic of Korean officials' decision to reject three U.S. beef shipments since late last year that contained trace bone chips.
That dispute was not formally part of the negotiating agenda but became a litmus test for U.S. agriculture's support for the pact.
The beef industry is keen to see beef trade resume fully with South Korea, which was the third largest customer for U.S. beef until mad cow disease was discovered in the United States in 2003.
White House spokeswoman Dana Perino was upbeat about the deal's chances, even in a Democratic-controlled Congress that has been skeptical of the administration's trade agenda.
"We're hopeful, it's always difficult to pass trade legislation in Congress ... But because America benefits from trade opportunities, and we believe that, at the end of the day, people will recognize that," she said.
Negotiators were rushing to finish the deal so it can be voted on under the president's current trade negotiating powers, which expire at the end of June. (Additional reporting by Jeremy Pelofsky in Washington)
Published: April 02, 2007 17:11h
http://www.javno.com/en/world/clanak.php?id=32047
Saturday, August 22, 2009
FREE Kim Min-sun, she is correct about mad cow fears from USDA BEEF
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2009/08/free-kim-min-sun-she-is-correct-about.html
NOW, LET'S LOOK AT THE FACTS, AND SOME SOUND SCIENCE THERE FROM ;
Docket APHIS-2006-0026 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Animal Identification and Importation of Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0026-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions, Identification of Ruminants and Processing and Importation of Commodities Public Submission APHIS-2006-0026-0012 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801e47e1
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary
Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY
THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
go figure. ...
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8151
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singletary comment
January 28, 2007
Greetings APHIS,
I would kindly like to submit the following to ;
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
Monday, October 19, 2009
Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/10/atypical-bse-bse-and-other-human-and.html
Sunday, September 6, 2009
MAD COW USA 1997 SECRET VIDEO
http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2009/09/mad-cow-usa-1997-video.html
U.S.A. HIDING MAD COW DISEASE VICTIMS AS SPORADIC CJD ? see video at bottom
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/07/usa-hiding-mad-cow-disease-victims-as.html
DAMNING TESTIMONY FROM STANLEY PRUSINER THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER ON PRIONS SPEAKING ABOUT ANN VENEMAN see video
http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/prusinerclip.html
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html
Monday, October 26, 2009
Similarities between Forms of Sheep Scrapie and Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Are Encoded by Distinct Prion Types
Published online before print October 22, 2009
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/10/similarities-between-forms-of-sheep.html
PLEASE REMEMBER, THE USA INFAMOUS AUGUST 4, 1997, PARTIAL, AND VOLUNTARY RUMINANT TO RUMINANT FEED BAN (MAD COW FEED BAN), WAS NOTHING MORE THAN INK ON PAPER
Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report to Congress FY 2007 - 2nd Half
Two Texas Companies Sentenced and Fined for Misbranding Meat Products In April 2007, two closely held and related Texas companies pled guilty in Federal court and were sentenced to 12 months of probation and ordered to pay $10,250 in fines for misbranding meat products. One of the companies sold adulterated meat products to a retail store in New Mexico. Additionally, portions of the invoices failed to properly and consistently identify the meat products as being from cattle more than 30 months old at time of slaughter. This information is required to be disclosed because of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or "mad cow disease") concerns. No adulterated meat reached consumers.
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc071212.pdf
Thursday, October 15, 2009
Nebraska Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, Oct 15, 2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/10/nebraska-firm-recalls-beef-tongues-that.html
Sunday, October 18, 2009
Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, October 17, 2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/10/wisconsin-firm-recalls-beef-tongues.html
Saturday, August 29, 2009
FOIA REQUEST FEED RECALL 2009 Product may have contained prohibited materials Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/08/foia-request-feed-recall-2009-product.html
Friday, September 4, 2009
FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/09/foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html
THIS recall is not confusing ;
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html
NEW URL
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm
Thursday, March 19, 2009
MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA WITH ONGOING 12 YEARS OF DENIAL
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html
Sunday, October 18, 2009
Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, October 17, 2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/10/wisconsin-firm-recalls-beef-tongues.html
Thursday, October 15, 2009
Nebraska Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, Oct 15, 2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/10/nebraska-firm-recalls-beef-tongues-that.html
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and BSE Red Book Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST
WHERE did we go wrong $$$
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/us-emergency-bovine-spongiform.html
Sunday, December 28, 2008
MAD COW DISEASE USA DECEMBER 28, 2008 an 8 year review of a failed and flawed policy
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html
Wednesday, August 20, 2008
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Mad Cow Disease typical and atypical strains, was there a cover-up ? August 20, 2008
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/08/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-mad.html
Monday, May 11, 2009
Rare BSE mutation raises concerns over risks to public health
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/05/rare-bse-mutation-raises-concerns-over.html
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and BSE Red Book Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST
WHERE did we go wrong $$$
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/us-emergency-bovine-spongiform.html
Sunday, June 07, 2009
L-TYPE-BSE, H-TYPE-BSE, C-TYPE-BSE, IBNC-TYPE-BSE, TME, CWD, SCRAPIE, CJD, NORTH AMERICA
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/06/l-type-bse-h-type-bse-c-type-bse-ibnc.html
Sunday, May 10, 2009
Identification and characterization of bovine spongiform encephalopathy cases diagnosed and NOT diagnosed in the United States
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/05/identification-and-characterization-of.html
Tuesday, August 11, 2009 Characteristics of Established and Proposed Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Variants
Brian S. Appleby, MD; Kristin K. Appleby, MD; Barbara J. Crain, MD, PhD; Chiadi U. Onyike, MD, MHS; Mitchell T. Wallin, MD, MPH; Peter V. Rabins, MD, MPH
Background: The classic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD), Heidenhain, and Oppenheimer-Brownell variants are sporadic CJD (sCJD) phenotypes frequently described in the literature, but many cases present with neuropsychiatric symptoms, suggesting that there may be additional sCJD phenotypes.
Objective: To characterize clinical, diagnostic, and molecular features of 5 sCJD variants.
Design: Retrospective analysis.
Setting: The Johns Hopkins and Veterans Administration health care systems.
Participants: Eighty-eight patients with definite or probable sCJD.
Main Outcome Measures: Differences in age at onset, illness progression, diagnostic test results, and molecular subtype.
Results: The age at onset differed among sCJD variants (P=.03); the affective variant had the youngest mean age at onset (59.7 years). Survival time (P.001) and the time to clinical presentation (P=.003) differed among groups. Patients with the classic CJD phenotype had the shortest median survival time from symptom onset (66 days) and those who met criteria for the affective sCJD variant had the longest (421 days) and presented to clinicians significantly later (median time from onset to presentation, 92 days; P=.004). Cerebrospinal fluid analyses were positive for 14-3-3 protein in all of the affective variants, regardless of illness duration. Periodic sharp-wave complexes were not detected on any of the electroencephalography tracings in the Oppenheimer-Brownell group; basal ganglia hyperintensity was not detected on brain magnetic resonance imaging in this group either. All of the Heidenhain variants were of the methionine/ methionine type 1 molecular subtype.
Conclusions: The classic CJD phenotype and the Heidenhain, Oppenheimer-Brownell, cognitive, and affective sCJD variants differ by age at disease onset, survival time, and diagnostic test results. Characteristics of these 5 phenotypes are provided to facilitate further clinicopathologic investigation that may lead to more reliable and timely diagnoses of sCJD.
Arch Neurol. 2009;66(2):208-215
http://archneur.ama-assn.org/
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/08/characteristics-of-established-and.html
Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States 2003 revisited 2009
August 10, 2009
Greetings,
I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. North America seems to have the most species with documented Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy's, most all of which have been rendered and fed back to food producing animals and to humans for years. If you look at the statistics, sporadic CJD seems to be rising in the USA, and has been, with atypical cases of the sCJD. I find deeply disturbing in the year of 2009, that Human Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy of any strain and or phenotype, of all age groups, and I stress all age groups, because human TSE's do not know age, and they do not know borders. someone 56 years old, that has a human TSE, that has surgery, can pass this TSE agent on i.e. friendly fire, and or passing it forward, and there have been documented nvCJD in a 74 year old. Remembering also that only sporadic CJD has been documented to transmit via iatrogenic routes, until recently with the 4 cases of blood related transmission, of which the origin is thought to be nvCJD donors. However most Iatrogenic CJD cases are nothing more than sporadic CJD, until the source is proven, then it becomes Iatrogenic. An oxymoron of sorts, because all sporadic CJD is, are multiple forms, or strains, or phenotypes of Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease, that the route and source and species have not been confirmed and or documented. When will the myth of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory be put to bed for good. This theory in my opinion, and the following there from, as the GOLD STANDARD, has done nothing more than help spread this agent around the globe. Politics and money have caused the terrible consequences to date, and the fact that TSEs are a slow incubating death, but a death that is 100% certain for those that are exposed and live long enough to go clinical. once clinical, there is no recourse, to date. But, while sub-clinical, how many can one exposed human infect? Can humans exposed to CWD and scrapie strains pass it forward as some form of sporadic CJD in the surgical and medical arenas? why must we wait decades and decades to prove this point, only to expose millions needlessly, only for the sake of the industries involved? would it not have been prudent from the beginning to just include all TSE's, and rule them out from there with transmission studies and change policies there from, as opposed to doing just the opposite? The science of TSE's have been nothing more than a political circus since the beginning, and for anyone to still believe in this one strain, one group of bovines, in one geographical location, with only one age group of human TSE i.e. nvCJD myth, for anyone to believe this today only enhances to spreading of these human and animal TSE's. This is exactly why we have been in this quagmire.
The ones that believe that there is a spontaneous CJD in 85%+ of all cases of human TSE, and the ones that do not believe that cattle can have this same phenomenon, are two of the same, the industry, and so goes the political science aspect of this tobacco and or asbestos scenario i.e. follow the money. I could go into all angles of this man made nightmare, the real facts and science, for instance, the continuing rendering technology and slow cooking with low temps that brewed this stew up, and the fact that THE USA HAD THIS TECHNOLOGY FIRST AND SHIPPED IT TO THE U.K. SOME 5 YEARS BEFORE THE U.S. STARTED USING THE SAME TECHNOLOGY, to save on fuel cost. This is what supposedly amplified the TSE agent via sheep scrapie, and spread via feed in the U.K. bovine, and other countries exporting the tainted product. BUT most everyone ignores this fact, and the fact that the U.S. has been recycling more TSE, from more species with TSEs, than any other country documented, but yet, it's all spontaneous, and the rise in sporadic CJD in the U.S. is a happenstance of bad luck ??? I respectfully disagree. To top that all off, the infamous BSE-FIREWALL that the USDA always brags about was nothing more than ink on paper, and I can prove this. YOU can ignore it, but this is FACT (see source, as late as 2007, in one recall alone, some 10,000,000 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE TO BE FED OUT, and most was never recovered. This was banned blood laced, meat and bone meal. 2006 was a banner year for banned mad cow protein going into commerce in the U.S. (see source of FDA feed ban warning letter below). I stress that the August 4, 1997 USA mad cow feed ban and this infamous BSE firewall, was nothing more than ink on paper, it was never enforceable.
I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route. This would further have to be broken down to strain of species and then the route of transmission would further have to be broken down. Accumulation and Transmission are key to the threshold from sub- clinical to clinical disease, and key to all this, is to stop the amplification and transmission of this agent, the spreading of, no matter what strain. In my opinion, to continue with this myth that the U.K. strain of BSE one strain TSE in cows, and the nv/v CJD one strain TSE humans, and the one geographical location source i.e. U.K., and that all the rest of human TSE are just one single strain i.e. sporadic CJD, a happenstance of bad luck that just happens due to a twisted protein that just twisted the wrong way, IN 85%+ OF ALL HUMAN TSEs, when to date there are 6 different phenotypes of sCJD, and growing per Gambetti et al, and that no other animal TSE transmits to humans ??? With all due respect to all Scientist that believe this, I beg to differ. To continue with this masquerade will only continue to spread, expose, and kill, who knows how many more in the years and decades to come. ONE was enough for me, My Mom, hvCJD i.e. Heidenhain Variant CJD, DOD 12/14/97 confirmed, which is nothing more than another mans name added to CJD, like CJD itself, Jakob and Creutzfeldt, or Gerstmann-Straussler-Scheinker syndrome, just another CJD or human TSE, named after another human. WE are only kidding ourselves with the current diagnostic criteria for human and animal TSE, especially differentiating between the nvCJD vs the sporadic CJD strains and then the GSS strains and also the FFI fatal familial insomnia strains or the ones that mimics one or the other of those TSE? Tissue infectivity and strain typing of the many variants of the human and animal TSEs are paramount in all variants of all TSE. There must be a proper classification that will differentiate between all these human TSE in order to do this. With the CDI and other more sensitive testing coming about, I only hope that my proposal will some day be taken seriously. ...
please see history, and the ever evolving TSE science to date ;
Saturday, June 13, 2009
Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States 2003 revisited 2009
http://cjdusa.blogspot.com/2009/06/monitoring-occurrence-of-emerging-forms.html
JOURNAL OF NEUROLOGY
MARCH 26, 2003
Send Post-Publication Peer Review to journal:
Re: RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease in the United States
Email Terry S. Singeltary:
mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000748/!x-usc:mailto:flounder@wt.net
I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?
http://www.neurology.org/cgi/eletters/60/2/176#535
LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASE JOURNAL
Volume 3, Number 8 01 August 2003
Newsdesk
Tracking spongiform encephalopathies in North America
Xavier Bosch
My name is Terry S Singeltary Sr, and I live in Bacliff, Texas. I lost my mom to hvCJD (Heidenhain variant CJD) and have been searching for answers ever since. What I have found is that we have not been told the truth. CWD in deer and elk is a small portion of a much bigger problem.
49-year-old Singeltary is one of a number of people who have remained largely unsatisfied after being told that a close relative died from a rapidly progressive dementia compatible with spontaneous Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD). So he decided to gather hundreds of documents on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) and realised that if Britons could get variant CJD from bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), Americans might get a similar disorder from chronic wasting disease (CWD)the relative of mad cow disease seen among deer and elk in the USA. Although his feverish search did not lead him to the smoking gun linking CWD to a similar disease in North American people, it did uncover a largely disappointing situation.
Singeltary was greatly demoralised at the few attempts to monitor the occurrence of CJD and CWD in the USA. Only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal TSEs should be reportable nationwide and internationally, he complained in a letter to the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA 2003; 285: 733). I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85% plus of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route or source.
Until recently, CWD was thought to be confined to the wild in a small region in Colorado. But since early 2002, it has been reported in other areas, including Wisconsin, South Dakota, and the Canadian province of Saskatchewan. Indeed, the occurrence of CWD in states that were not endemic previously increased concern about a widespread outbreak and possible transmission to people and cattle.
To date, experimental studies have proven that the CWD agent can be transmitted to cattle by intracerebral inoculation and that it can cross the mucous membranes of the digestive tract to initiate infection in lymphoid tissue before invasion of the central nervous system. Yet the plausibility of CWD spreading to people has remained elusive.
Part of the problem seems to stem from the US surveillance system. CJD is only reported in those areas known to be endemic foci of CWD. Moreover, US authorities have been criticised for not having performed enough prionic tests in farm deer and elk.
Although in November last year the US Food and Drug Administration issued a directive to state public-health and agriculture officials prohibiting material from CWD-positive animals from being used as an ingredient in feed for any animal species, epidemiological control and research in the USA has been quite different from the situation in the
UK and Europe regarding BSE.
Getting data on TSEs in the USA from the government is like pulling teeth, Singeltary argues. You get it when they want you to have it and only what they want you to have.Norman Foster, director of the Cognitive Disorders Clinic at the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor, MI, USA), says that current surveillance of prion disease in people in the USA is inadequate to detect whether CWD is occurring in human beings; adding that, the cases that we know about are reassuring, because they do not suggest the appearance of a new variant of CJD in the USA or atypical features in patients that might be exposed to CWD. However, until we establish a system that identifies and analyses a high proportion of suspected prion disease cases we will not know for sure. The USA should develop a system modelled on that established in the UK, he points out.
Ali Samii, a neurologist at Seattle VA Medical Center who recently reported the cases of three hunterstwo of whom were friendswho died from pathologically confirmed CJD, says that at present there are insufficient data to claim transmission of CWD into humans; adding that [only] by asking [the questions of venison consumption and deer/elk hunting] in every case can we collect suspect cases and look into the plausibility of transmission further. Samii argues that by making both doctors and hunters more aware of the possibility of prions spreading through eating venison, doctors treating hunters with dementia can consider a possible prion disease, and doctors treating CJD patients will know to ask whether they ate venison. CDC spokesman Ermias Belay says that the CDC will not be investigating the [Samii] cases because there is no evidence that the men ate CWD-infected meat. He notes that although the likelihood of CWD jumping the species barrier to infect humans cannot be ruled out 100% and that [we] cannot be 100% sure that CWD does not exist in humans & the data seeking evidence of CWD transmission to humans have been very limited.
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473309903007151/%20fulltext
he complained in a letter to the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA 2003; 285: 733).
I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85% plus of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route or source. <<< href="mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000537/!x-usc:http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/extract/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT">http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/extract/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT
http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT
2 January 2000
British Medical Journal
U.S. Scientist should be concerned with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as well
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/320/7226/8/b#6117
15 November 1999
British Medical Journal
vCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S.
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/319/7220/1312/b#5406
THE PATHOLOGICAL PROTEIN
BY Philip Yam
Yam Philip Yam News Editor Scientific American http://www.sciam.com/
http://www.thepathologicalprotein.com/
SEE REVISITING SPORADIC CJD BY PHILIP YAM THE PATHOLOGICAL PROTEIN
Answering critics like Terry Singeltary, who feels that the U.S. undercounts CJD, Schonberger conceded that the current surveillance system has errors but stated that most of the errors will be confined to the older population. ...
http://books.google.com/books?id=ePbrQNFrHtoC&pg=PA224&lpg=PA224&dq=pathological+protein+philip+yam+singeltary&source=bl&ots=um-LytTT2E&sig=hQVJotGvhvffOsN2fsIDfk2SHXw&hl=en&ei=CaWBSrDLCIKUtgeg_eTVCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1#v=onepage&q=&f=false
Sunday, August 10, 2008
A New Prionopathy OR more of the same old BSe and sporadic CJD
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/08/new-prionopathy-or-more-of-same-old-bse.html
2008
The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.
http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html
Friday, November 30, 2007
CJD QUESTIONNAIRE USA CWRU AND CJD FOUNDATION
http://cjdquestionnaire.blogspot.com/
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
AN interesting thread here ;
Posted: Wed Dec 19, 2007 3:47 pm Post subject: OIE
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
xxxxxxxx wrote:
Quote: Maybe familirise yourself with the OIE. The primary concern is animal health of the world they are the animal version of the WHO. It is a long way down from that ivory tower but here we go, until pressured by the USA repesentatives a country could not export animals for 6 years after finding a BSE/BASE positive animal so under the old rules the US would not be able to export anywhere in the world for another 4 1/2 years. Who got the risk levels system put in to allow some trade - your US representatives. You guys want to change rules - OK , but you do not get special rules that only apply to the US. As i have told you before Sand h I market all my own slaughter animals and you know that, so don't do the whole holier than thow act.
With all due respect, it is obvious that you know little about the OIE and how it actually works. Having been to their offices in Paris and talked personally with the Head of the Animal Test Section, you would choke if you knew how many lobby groups attend that office daily. There is a steady stream of paid lobby groups that have one goal in life and that is to sway the Section Heads of each department within the OIE to suit the needs of different juristictions around the world, which curiously enough, also includes the USA and Canada. Anyone can go there and chat with them - providing they can privide valid cause to be let in. To say that the only goal of the OIE is animal health is actually only part of their function. They are more than that and my discussions with Dr. Diaz there has showed me that. But to blindly make a statement regarding what they do when you have no idea what they actually do is like eating the skin of the orange and not knowing what is actually under.
Interstingly you state that the US Government applied pressure (to the OIE) I assume and that is a great example of the lobby groups doing their job. So, at the end of the day, one can safely assume that it is the pressure applied by certain influential lobby groups that will determine a likely aoutcome to an apparent OIE directive. Man alive, isn't it great to live in a democracy wherein the people get to make the choices and not just some "other" interested party or group - say like........Cargyll or Tyson for example?
So, one last question, xxxxxx?
Who wags the tail of that dog?? And for what reason other than one that is purely associated with trade and international agreements and greed?
And you think it is so simply explainable.
http://www.ranchers.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=22833&postdays=0&postorder=asc&highlight=ops&start=36
MAD COW DISEASE, AND U.S. BEEF TRADE
MAD COW DISEASE, CJD, TSE, SOUND SCIENCE, COMMERCE, AND SELLING YOUR SOUL TO THE DEVIL
Mad cow ban lifted amid legal threat Story Added : 23rd October 2009
Trade officials say Australia was at risk of international legal action if it did not change its policy on beef imports from countries affected by mad cow disease.
A blanket ban on imports from those countries will be lifted, but all beef will still be subject to close checks.
The Federal Opposition says it will put Australia's beef industry and disease-free status in jeopardy.
But Tim Yeend from the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has told a Senate estimates hearing there were legal risks in leaving the policy unchanged.
"It is worth noting that Canada has just recently initiated a dispute against Korea in this precise area," he said.
"So I would say that there's a high level of risk, given that these countries have been raising the issue repeatedly over a number of years in WTO (World Trade Organisation) disputes."
http://www.efarming.com.au/News/agricultural/23/10/2009/75188/mad-cow-ban-lifted-amid-legal-threat.html
Threats stop 'mad cow' ban
David McKenzie
October 26, 2009
AUSTRALIA has scrapped its blanket ban on beef imports from "mad cow'' countries as a result of trade threats, the beef industry has revealed. ...snip...END
http://www.weeklytimesnow.com.au/article/2009/10/26/126745_national-news.html
Free Trade with Taiwan Is Long Overdue
August 15, 2007
by John J. Tkacik, Jr. and Daniella Markheim Backgrounder #2061
Although Congress has allowed trade promotion authority (TPA) to expire, this paradoxically presents Congress with an opportunity to consider a country-specific initiative that both the majority and minority should find attractive—a free trade agreement (FTA) with Taiwan. Among other things, a U.S.–Taiwan FTA would increase U.S. auto, rice, poultry, and livestock exports and open a significant new market for new research medicines....snip...END
http://www.heritage.org/Research/tradeandeconomicfreedom/bg2061.cfm
Beef Blockade Risks U.S.-Japan Trade War Even as food industry asks for American beef. Compiled by staff Published: May 1, 2006 USA Today reports that a possible trade war looms over the U.S.- Japan beef dispute. Since Japan reimposed a ban on all U.S. beef on Jan. 20 after an improper shipment of veal, frustrations have mounted as officials on both sides work to resume trade.
"It was a stupid mistake, but it's a mistake that's stopped in its tracks a (multi) billion-dollar industry," says J. Thomas Schieffer, U.S. Ambassador to Japan. "You don't want beef to set off a trade war between the United States and Japan... This has the potential for being very damaging to the relationship. It's already had a corrosive effect."
Japanese officials took a hard line on U.S. beef imports, demanding an explanation for the last export error and requiring Japanese inspections of American beef facilities. U.S. lawmakers are losing patience, with one senator demanding trade resumption by June 1....SNIP...END
http://californiafarmer.com/story.aspx?s=8165&c=10
Japan Questions U.S. BSE Firewalls, Trade Resumption Still Far Off Food Safety Commission fears Britain-type situation will occur in U.S. beef since meat and bone meal isn't banned from all animal feed.
Compiled by staff Published: Aug 25, 2005 ' animal feed controls to prevent the spread of bovine spongiform encephalopathy are under fire from and independent panel in Japan.
Japan's Food and Safety Commission says a U.S. regulation allowing for the use of meat-and-bone meal from cattle to be used in other animal feeds is risky. The panel members are tasked with determining the safety of U.S. beef before trade can resume between the two countries.
Reuters reports that panel member Tetsuyuki Kitamo says, "We cannot completely rule out the possibility that the situation in the United States may become similar to what happened in Britain."
"Kazuya Yamanouchi, another panel member, proposed that the panel make a risk assessment on U.S. beef that included the possibility that BSE could spread," Reuters reports. "Yasuhiro Yoshikawa, the panel chairman, said he personally did not expect BSE to spread, but added that he would consider the proposal by next meeting."
The next meeting hasn't been set on when the Commission will again look at the issue.
http://farmfutures.com/story.aspx?s=27087&c=17
Japan suspends US plant's beef amid mad cow fears
The Associated Press
Published: Saturday, October 10, 2009 at 8:50 a.m. Last Modified: Saturday, October 10, 2009 at 8:50 a.m. TOKYO — Japan has suspended beef shipments from an American meatpacking plant after finding cattle parts banned under an agreement to prevent the spread of mad cow disease, the agriculture ministry said Saturday.
Japanese quarantine inspectors found bovine spinal columns in one of 732 boxes sent by Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., which arrived in Japan last month, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries said in a statement. The box contained 35 pounds of chilled short loin with spinal bones, which were not released commercially, said ministry official Goshi Nakata.
The suspension only affects Tyson's factory in Lexington, Neb., one of 46 meatpacking plants approved to export beef to Japan.
It was the second suspension for the Lexington factory, Nakata said. Japan slapped a four-month ban on beef shipments from the same plant in February 2007 after finding two boxes of beef lacking verifications to show they came from cattle that met Japan's safety standards.
The Japanese ministry also asked the U.S. Department of Agriculture to investigate how the box containing the banned parts ended up in Japan.
Japan will await results of a U.S. investigation to determine the penalty for the Tyson factory, the ministry said.
Japan banned all U.S. beef imports in 2003 after the first case of mad cow disease was discovered in the United States. Japan resumed buying American beef in 2006 after a bilateral trade agreement setting new safety standards.
Mad cow disease, formally known as bovine spongiform encephalopathy, is a degenerative nerve disease in cattle. In humans, eating meat products contaminated with the illness is linked to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, a rare and fatal malady.
Under the bilateral trade agreement, U.S. exporters must remove spinal columns, brain tissue and other parts considered linked to mad cow disease. U.S. beef shipments to Japan must also come only from cattle age 20 months or younger, which are believed to pose less of a risk.
Washington has repeatedly criticized Japan for its tough import restrictions, which authorities say have no scientific basis.
U.S. officials have urged Japan to allow imports of beef from cattle aged up to 30 months, a widely used safety standard elsewhere.
http://www.gainesville.com/article/20091010/NEWS/910109983?Title=Japan-suspends-US-plant-s-beef-amid-mad-cow-fears-
Korea Trade Deal Lifts Meat Packing Companies Ag and Trade Main Street Economics 04/19/2008
President Bush has been pushing for a new comprehensive trade agreement with South Korea, but negotiations have hung up on the 2003 beef ban. Sen. Max Baucus, a Democrat from Montana, said he would oppose any new South Korean trade deal until the beef restrictions were lifted.
Now that the beef question has been settled, the larger trade deal will become part of the stark disagreement over trade between Republicans and Democrats.
http://www.dailyyonder.com/korea-trade-deal-lifts-meat-packing-companies
Ambassador Portman said, "Although we appreciate this step toward normalized beef trade with Korea, we are extremely disappointed that Korea did not fully open its market to all U.S. beef products. We will continue to urge Korea in the strongest terms to open its market without delay to U.S. bone-in beef, variety meats, and offal. Together these products historically accounted for approximately 50 percent of U.S. beef exports to Korea."
http://americancorners.or.kr/e-infousa/wwwh3298.html
Subject: US Senator Threatens to Block South Korea Deal Date: April 2, 2007 at 8:33 am PST
US Senator Threatens to Block South Korea Deal
U.S. lawmaker threatened to block a major trade deal with South Korea just hours after it was agreed on Monday. Reuters. A senior U.S. lawmaker threatened to block a major trade deal with South Korea just hours after it was agreed on Monday, saying U.S. negotiators failed to ensure sufficient access for U.S. beef exports. "I will not allow it to move through the Senate, unless and until Korea completely lifts its ban on U.S. beef," Sen. Max Baucus, chairman of the influential Senate Finance Committee, said in a statement.
"This is an entirely unacceptable outcome."
A hard line from Baucus and other members of Congress could be trouble for the deal, which officials wrapped up after a marathon negotiating session in Seoul.
Baucus, a Democrat from the cattle state Montana, said South Korea must open its markets to all beef exports, including meat from animals of any age, both bone-in and boneless.
The senator has been a harsh critic of Korean officials' decision to reject three U.S. beef shipments since late last year that contained trace bone chips.
That dispute was not formally part of the negotiating agenda but became a litmus test for U.S. agriculture's support for the pact.
The beef industry is keen to see beef trade resume fully with South Korea, which was the third largest customer for U.S. beef until mad cow disease was discovered in the United States in 2003.
White House spokeswoman Dana Perino was upbeat about the deal's chances, even in a Democratic-controlled Congress that has been skeptical of the administration's trade agenda.
"We're hopeful, it's always difficult to pass trade legislation in Congress ... But because America benefits from trade opportunities, and we believe that, at the end of the day, people will recognize that," she said.
Negotiators were rushing to finish the deal so it can be voted on under the president's current trade negotiating powers, which expire at the end of June. (Additional reporting by Jeremy Pelofsky in Washington)
Published: April 02, 2007 17:11h
http://www.javno.com/en/world/clanak.php?id=32047
Saturday, August 22, 2009
FREE Kim Min-sun, she is correct about mad cow fears from USDA BEEF
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2009/08/free-kim-min-sun-she-is-correct-about.html
NOW, LET'S LOOK AT THE FACTS, AND SOME SOUND SCIENCE THERE FROM ;
Docket APHIS-2006-0026 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Animal Identification and Importation of Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0026-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions, Identification of Ruminants and Processing and Importation of Commodities Public Submission APHIS-2006-0026-0012 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801e47e1
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary
Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY
THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
go figure. ...
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8151
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singletary comment
January 28, 2007
Greetings APHIS,
I would kindly like to submit the following to ;
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
Monday, October 19, 2009
Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/10/atypical-bse-bse-and-other-human-and.html
Sunday, September 6, 2009
MAD COW USA 1997 SECRET VIDEO
http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2009/09/mad-cow-usa-1997-video.html
U.S.A. HIDING MAD COW DISEASE VICTIMS AS SPORADIC CJD ? see video at bottom
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/07/usa-hiding-mad-cow-disease-victims-as.html
DAMNING TESTIMONY FROM STANLEY PRUSINER THE NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WINNER ON PRIONS SPEAKING ABOUT ANN VENEMAN see video
http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/prusinerclip.html
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html
Monday, October 26, 2009
Similarities between Forms of Sheep Scrapie and Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Are Encoded by Distinct Prion Types
Published online before print October 22, 2009
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/10/similarities-between-forms-of-sheep.html
PLEASE REMEMBER, THE USA INFAMOUS AUGUST 4, 1997, PARTIAL, AND VOLUNTARY RUMINANT TO RUMINANT FEED BAN (MAD COW FEED BAN), WAS NOTHING MORE THAN INK ON PAPER
Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report to Congress FY 2007 - 2nd Half
Two Texas Companies Sentenced and Fined for Misbranding Meat Products In April 2007, two closely held and related Texas companies pled guilty in Federal court and were sentenced to 12 months of probation and ordered to pay $10,250 in fines for misbranding meat products. One of the companies sold adulterated meat products to a retail store in New Mexico. Additionally, portions of the invoices failed to properly and consistently identify the meat products as being from cattle more than 30 months old at time of slaughter. This information is required to be disclosed because of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or "mad cow disease") concerns. No adulterated meat reached consumers.
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc071212.pdf
Thursday, October 15, 2009
Nebraska Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, Oct 15, 2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/10/nebraska-firm-recalls-beef-tongues-that.html
Sunday, October 18, 2009
Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, October 17, 2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/10/wisconsin-firm-recalls-beef-tongues.html
Saturday, August 29, 2009
FOIA REQUEST FEED RECALL 2009 Product may have contained prohibited materials Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/08/foia-request-feed-recall-2009-product.html
Friday, September 4, 2009
FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/09/foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html
THIS recall is not confusing ;
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html
NEW URL
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm
Thursday, March 19, 2009
MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA WITH ONGOING 12 YEARS OF DENIAL
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html
Sunday, October 18, 2009
Wisconsin Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, October 17, 2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/10/wisconsin-firm-recalls-beef-tongues.html
Thursday, October 15, 2009
Nebraska Firm Recalls Beef Tongues That Contain Prohibited Materials SRM WASHINGTON, Oct 15, 2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/10/nebraska-firm-recalls-beef-tongues-that.html
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and BSE Red Book Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST
WHERE did we go wrong $$$
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/us-emergency-bovine-spongiform.html
Sunday, December 28, 2008
MAD COW DISEASE USA DECEMBER 28, 2008 an 8 year review of a failed and flawed policy
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html
Wednesday, August 20, 2008
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Mad Cow Disease typical and atypical strains, was there a cover-up ? August 20, 2008
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/08/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-mad.html
Monday, May 11, 2009
Rare BSE mutation raises concerns over risks to public health
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/05/rare-bse-mutation-raises-concerns-over.html
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and BSE Red Book Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST
WHERE did we go wrong $$$
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/us-emergency-bovine-spongiform.html
Sunday, June 07, 2009
L-TYPE-BSE, H-TYPE-BSE, C-TYPE-BSE, IBNC-TYPE-BSE, TME, CWD, SCRAPIE, CJD, NORTH AMERICA
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/06/l-type-bse-h-type-bse-c-type-bse-ibnc.html
Sunday, May 10, 2009
Identification and characterization of bovine spongiform encephalopathy cases diagnosed and NOT diagnosed in the United States
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/05/identification-and-characterization-of.html
Tuesday, August 11, 2009 Characteristics of Established and Proposed Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Variants
Brian S. Appleby, MD; Kristin K. Appleby, MD; Barbara J. Crain, MD, PhD; Chiadi U. Onyike, MD, MHS; Mitchell T. Wallin, MD, MPH; Peter V. Rabins, MD, MPH
Background: The classic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD), Heidenhain, and Oppenheimer-Brownell variants are sporadic CJD (sCJD) phenotypes frequently described in the literature, but many cases present with neuropsychiatric symptoms, suggesting that there may be additional sCJD phenotypes.
Objective: To characterize clinical, diagnostic, and molecular features of 5 sCJD variants.
Design: Retrospective analysis.
Setting: The Johns Hopkins and Veterans Administration health care systems.
Participants: Eighty-eight patients with definite or probable sCJD.
Main Outcome Measures: Differences in age at onset, illness progression, diagnostic test results, and molecular subtype.
Results: The age at onset differed among sCJD variants (P=.03); the affective variant had the youngest mean age at onset (59.7 years). Survival time (P.001) and the time to clinical presentation (P=.003) differed among groups. Patients with the classic CJD phenotype had the shortest median survival time from symptom onset (66 days) and those who met criteria for the affective sCJD variant had the longest (421 days) and presented to clinicians significantly later (median time from onset to presentation, 92 days; P=.004). Cerebrospinal fluid analyses were positive for 14-3-3 protein in all of the affective variants, regardless of illness duration. Periodic sharp-wave complexes were not detected on any of the electroencephalography tracings in the Oppenheimer-Brownell group; basal ganglia hyperintensity was not detected on brain magnetic resonance imaging in this group either. All of the Heidenhain variants were of the methionine/ methionine type 1 molecular subtype.
Conclusions: The classic CJD phenotype and the Heidenhain, Oppenheimer-Brownell, cognitive, and affective sCJD variants differ by age at disease onset, survival time, and diagnostic test results. Characteristics of these 5 phenotypes are provided to facilitate further clinicopathologic investigation that may lead to more reliable and timely diagnoses of sCJD.
Arch Neurol. 2009;66(2):208-215
http://archneur.ama-assn.org/
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/08/characteristics-of-established-and.html
Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States 2003 revisited 2009
August 10, 2009
Greetings,
I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. North America seems to have the most species with documented Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy's, most all of which have been rendered and fed back to food producing animals and to humans for years. If you look at the statistics, sporadic CJD seems to be rising in the USA, and has been, with atypical cases of the sCJD. I find deeply disturbing in the year of 2009, that Human Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy of any strain and or phenotype, of all age groups, and I stress all age groups, because human TSE's do not know age, and they do not know borders. someone 56 years old, that has a human TSE, that has surgery, can pass this TSE agent on i.e. friendly fire, and or passing it forward, and there have been documented nvCJD in a 74 year old. Remembering also that only sporadic CJD has been documented to transmit via iatrogenic routes, until recently with the 4 cases of blood related transmission, of which the origin is thought to be nvCJD donors. However most Iatrogenic CJD cases are nothing more than sporadic CJD, until the source is proven, then it becomes Iatrogenic. An oxymoron of sorts, because all sporadic CJD is, are multiple forms, or strains, or phenotypes of Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease, that the route and source and species have not been confirmed and or documented. When will the myth of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory be put to bed for good. This theory in my opinion, and the following there from, as the GOLD STANDARD, has done nothing more than help spread this agent around the globe. Politics and money have caused the terrible consequences to date, and the fact that TSEs are a slow incubating death, but a death that is 100% certain for those that are exposed and live long enough to go clinical. once clinical, there is no recourse, to date. But, while sub-clinical, how many can one exposed human infect? Can humans exposed to CWD and scrapie strains pass it forward as some form of sporadic CJD in the surgical and medical arenas? why must we wait decades and decades to prove this point, only to expose millions needlessly, only for the sake of the industries involved? would it not have been prudent from the beginning to just include all TSE's, and rule them out from there with transmission studies and change policies there from, as opposed to doing just the opposite? The science of TSE's have been nothing more than a political circus since the beginning, and for anyone to still believe in this one strain, one group of bovines, in one geographical location, with only one age group of human TSE i.e. nvCJD myth, for anyone to believe this today only enhances to spreading of these human and animal TSE's. This is exactly why we have been in this quagmire.
The ones that believe that there is a spontaneous CJD in 85%+ of all cases of human TSE, and the ones that do not believe that cattle can have this same phenomenon, are two of the same, the industry, and so goes the political science aspect of this tobacco and or asbestos scenario i.e. follow the money. I could go into all angles of this man made nightmare, the real facts and science, for instance, the continuing rendering technology and slow cooking with low temps that brewed this stew up, and the fact that THE USA HAD THIS TECHNOLOGY FIRST AND SHIPPED IT TO THE U.K. SOME 5 YEARS BEFORE THE U.S. STARTED USING THE SAME TECHNOLOGY, to save on fuel cost. This is what supposedly amplified the TSE agent via sheep scrapie, and spread via feed in the U.K. bovine, and other countries exporting the tainted product. BUT most everyone ignores this fact, and the fact that the U.S. has been recycling more TSE, from more species with TSEs, than any other country documented, but yet, it's all spontaneous, and the rise in sporadic CJD in the U.S. is a happenstance of bad luck ??? I respectfully disagree. To top that all off, the infamous BSE-FIREWALL that the USDA always brags about was nothing more than ink on paper, and I can prove this. YOU can ignore it, but this is FACT (see source, as late as 2007, in one recall alone, some 10,000,000 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE TO BE FED OUT, and most was never recovered. This was banned blood laced, meat and bone meal. 2006 was a banner year for banned mad cow protein going into commerce in the U.S. (see source of FDA feed ban warning letter below). I stress that the August 4, 1997 USA mad cow feed ban and this infamous BSE firewall, was nothing more than ink on paper, it was never enforceable.
I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route. This would further have to be broken down to strain of species and then the route of transmission would further have to be broken down. Accumulation and Transmission are key to the threshold from sub- clinical to clinical disease, and key to all this, is to stop the amplification and transmission of this agent, the spreading of, no matter what strain. In my opinion, to continue with this myth that the U.K. strain of BSE one strain TSE in cows, and the nv/v CJD one strain TSE humans, and the one geographical location source i.e. U.K., and that all the rest of human TSE are just one single strain i.e. sporadic CJD, a happenstance of bad luck that just happens due to a twisted protein that just twisted the wrong way, IN 85%+ OF ALL HUMAN TSEs, when to date there are 6 different phenotypes of sCJD, and growing per Gambetti et al, and that no other animal TSE transmits to humans ??? With all due respect to all Scientist that believe this, I beg to differ. To continue with this masquerade will only continue to spread, expose, and kill, who knows how many more in the years and decades to come. ONE was enough for me, My Mom, hvCJD i.e. Heidenhain Variant CJD, DOD 12/14/97 confirmed, which is nothing more than another mans name added to CJD, like CJD itself, Jakob and Creutzfeldt, or Gerstmann-Straussler-Scheinker syndrome, just another CJD or human TSE, named after another human. WE are only kidding ourselves with the current diagnostic criteria for human and animal TSE, especially differentiating between the nvCJD vs the sporadic CJD strains and then the GSS strains and also the FFI fatal familial insomnia strains or the ones that mimics one or the other of those TSE? Tissue infectivity and strain typing of the many variants of the human and animal TSEs are paramount in all variants of all TSE. There must be a proper classification that will differentiate between all these human TSE in order to do this. With the CDI and other more sensitive testing coming about, I only hope that my proposal will some day be taken seriously. ...
please see history, and the ever evolving TSE science to date ;
Saturday, June 13, 2009
Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States 2003 revisited 2009
http://cjdusa.blogspot.com/2009/06/monitoring-occurrence-of-emerging-forms.html
JOURNAL OF NEUROLOGY
MARCH 26, 2003
Send Post-Publication Peer Review to journal:
Re: RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease in the United States
Email Terry S. Singeltary:
mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000748/!x-usc:mailto:flounder@wt.net
I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?
http://www.neurology.org/cgi/eletters/60/2/176#535
LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASE JOURNAL
Volume 3, Number 8 01 August 2003
Newsdesk
Tracking spongiform encephalopathies in North America
Xavier Bosch
My name is Terry S Singeltary Sr, and I live in Bacliff, Texas. I lost my mom to hvCJD (Heidenhain variant CJD) and have been searching for answers ever since. What I have found is that we have not been told the truth. CWD in deer and elk is a small portion of a much bigger problem.
49-year-old Singeltary is one of a number of people who have remained largely unsatisfied after being told that a close relative died from a rapidly progressive dementia compatible with spontaneous Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD). So he decided to gather hundreds of documents on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE) and realised that if Britons could get variant CJD from bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), Americans might get a similar disorder from chronic wasting disease (CWD)the relative of mad cow disease seen among deer and elk in the USA. Although his feverish search did not lead him to the smoking gun linking CWD to a similar disease in North American people, it did uncover a largely disappointing situation.
Singeltary was greatly demoralised at the few attempts to monitor the occurrence of CJD and CWD in the USA. Only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal TSEs should be reportable nationwide and internationally, he complained in a letter to the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA 2003; 285: 733). I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85% plus of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route or source.
Until recently, CWD was thought to be confined to the wild in a small region in Colorado. But since early 2002, it has been reported in other areas, including Wisconsin, South Dakota, and the Canadian province of Saskatchewan. Indeed, the occurrence of CWD in states that were not endemic previously increased concern about a widespread outbreak and possible transmission to people and cattle.
To date, experimental studies have proven that the CWD agent can be transmitted to cattle by intracerebral inoculation and that it can cross the mucous membranes of the digestive tract to initiate infection in lymphoid tissue before invasion of the central nervous system. Yet the plausibility of CWD spreading to people has remained elusive.
Part of the problem seems to stem from the US surveillance system. CJD is only reported in those areas known to be endemic foci of CWD. Moreover, US authorities have been criticised for not having performed enough prionic tests in farm deer and elk.
Although in November last year the US Food and Drug Administration issued a directive to state public-health and agriculture officials prohibiting material from CWD-positive animals from being used as an ingredient in feed for any animal species, epidemiological control and research in the USA has been quite different from the situation in the
UK and Europe regarding BSE.
Getting data on TSEs in the USA from the government is like pulling teeth, Singeltary argues. You get it when they want you to have it and only what they want you to have.Norman Foster, director of the Cognitive Disorders Clinic at the University of Michigan (Ann Arbor, MI, USA), says that current surveillance of prion disease in people in the USA is inadequate to detect whether CWD is occurring in human beings; adding that, the cases that we know about are reassuring, because they do not suggest the appearance of a new variant of CJD in the USA or atypical features in patients that might be exposed to CWD. However, until we establish a system that identifies and analyses a high proportion of suspected prion disease cases we will not know for sure. The USA should develop a system modelled on that established in the UK, he points out.
Ali Samii, a neurologist at Seattle VA Medical Center who recently reported the cases of three hunterstwo of whom were friendswho died from pathologically confirmed CJD, says that at present there are insufficient data to claim transmission of CWD into humans; adding that [only] by asking [the questions of venison consumption and deer/elk hunting] in every case can we collect suspect cases and look into the plausibility of transmission further. Samii argues that by making both doctors and hunters more aware of the possibility of prions spreading through eating venison, doctors treating hunters with dementia can consider a possible prion disease, and doctors treating CJD patients will know to ask whether they ate venison. CDC spokesman Ermias Belay says that the CDC will not be investigating the [Samii] cases because there is no evidence that the men ate CWD-infected meat. He notes that although the likelihood of CWD jumping the species barrier to infect humans cannot be ruled out 100% and that [we] cannot be 100% sure that CWD does not exist in humans & the data seeking evidence of CWD transmission to humans have been very limited.
http://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473309903007151/%20fulltext
he complained in a letter to the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA 2003; 285: 733).
I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85% plus of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route or source. <<< href="mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000537/!x-usc:http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/extract/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT">http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/extract/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT
http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT
2 January 2000
British Medical Journal
U.S. Scientist should be concerned with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as well
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/320/7226/8/b#6117
15 November 1999
British Medical Journal
vCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S.
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/319/7220/1312/b#5406
THE PATHOLOGICAL PROTEIN
BY Philip Yam
Yam Philip Yam News Editor Scientific American http://www.sciam.com/
http://www.thepathologicalprotein.com/
SEE REVISITING SPORADIC CJD BY PHILIP YAM THE PATHOLOGICAL PROTEIN
Answering critics like Terry Singeltary, who feels that the U.S. undercounts CJD, Schonberger conceded that the current surveillance system has errors but stated that most of the errors will be confined to the older population. ...
http://books.google.com/books?id=ePbrQNFrHtoC&pg=PA224&lpg=PA224&dq=pathological+protein+philip+yam+singeltary&source=bl&ots=um-LytTT2E&sig=hQVJotGvhvffOsN2fsIDfk2SHXw&hl=en&ei=CaWBSrDLCIKUtgeg_eTVCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1#v=onepage&q=&f=false
Sunday, August 10, 2008
A New Prionopathy OR more of the same old BSe and sporadic CJD
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/08/new-prionopathy-or-more-of-same-old-bse.html
2008
The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.
http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html
Friday, November 30, 2007
CJD QUESTIONNAIRE USA CWRU AND CJD FOUNDATION
http://cjdquestionnaire.blogspot.com/
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
Tuesday, September 1, 2009
Japan's new leaders seen tougher on U.S. beef
Reuters Japan's new leaders seen tougher on U.S. beef 09.01.09, 1:32 PM ET
United States - By Bob Burgdorfer
CHICAGO (Reuters) - Japan's new leadership may be less agreeable to expanding imports of U.S. beef, which fell dramatically after mad cow was reported in the U.S. nearly six years ago, than the previous administration, U.S. meat industry sources said Tuesday.
Japan was once the top export market for U.S. beef but that business dropped sharply after December 2003, when the United States reported its first case of mad cow disease. Now Japan buys about a fifth of its pre-mad cow total but the U.S. meat industry has been working to recover more of that lost business.
The newly elected Democratic Party in Japan may be less agreeable to that effort than previous leaders, U.S. sources said.
"There is certainly a concern that there are hard-line elements in the new ruling party that will be resistant to expanded beef access. How that translates into policy remains to be seen," Joe Schuele, spokesman for the U.S. Meat Export Federation, told Reuters on Tuesday.
The USMEF works to develop overseas markets for U.S. meat.
Japan's new leader Yukio Hatoyama has said he wants a more independent stance with relation to the United States, which investors in Tokyo fear could strain in dealings with Washington.
Japan accepts U.S. beef from cattle 20 months old or younger, but the U.S. beef industry has been trying to bump that to 30 months, which would restore much of the business that was lost.
"I think it is safe to say that the situation surrounding that issue may be more fragile now, but we are not resigned to the idea that it will be more difficult," Schuele said. "We just think that it is a different political climate that might call for a different approach. We are still very hopeful that we can make progress on it."
In 2003, Japan accounted for about 30 percent of U.S. beef exports by volume, but in 2008 took less than 8 percent.
"They are likely to be a bit more protectionist, which I think is going to be more of a problem than an opportunity for us," John Urbanchuk, food economist at the expert services firm LECG, said of Japan. "I suspect that this will probably make it more difficult for the beef industry." (Editing by Christian Wiessner)
Copyright 2009 Reuters
http://www.forbes.com/feeds/reuters/2009/09/01/2009-09-01T173214Z_01_N01392490_RTRIDST_0_BEEF-JAPAN.html
THE PARTY IS OVER FOLKS, these Countries that want to eradicate BSE and other TSE, are not going to put up with the USDA's et al failed SSS BSE TSE policy anymore......
Greetings,
THE myth that no mad cows exist in the USA, and that Canada has a bigger problem with mad cows than the USA, is just that a myth. in fact, it is a flat out lie. all one has to do is read the facts. but most people just don't care. ...bad moove!
they call it MRR, the _legal_ trading of all strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy, GLOBALLY. and that's all that the MRR was about. be nice, the USA covered up 2 cases of mad cow disease just so this stupid policy could get finalized, and 25 years of attempted eradication of this agent got washed down the drain $$$ all we are doing now, is what the UK did when all this BSe first got started, except now, with the MRR, it's simply legal now.
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0006 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary Sr Views Add Comments How To Comment
snip...
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
go figure....
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&d=APHIS-2006-0041-0006
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#documentDetail?R=09000064801f3413
your only fooling yourselves with this stupid ukbsenvcjd only theory, and the BSE mythology of the OIE. most any country that went by those same OIE BSE guidelines all went down with BSE. THE OIE has now shown they are nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE. AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. ...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#documentDetail?R=09000064801e47e1
bottom line, and i say this with full confidence, with the present and past surveillance of BSE/TSE in the USA, and the continued feed violations, in the TONS, no one will ever know the true extent of any strain of mad cow disease in the USA. you don't have to just take my word on it, read the facts. blunder, after blunder, after blunder. they have all been posted here, i would be glad to go over any and or all of them one by one for any that doubts me. i can sum it all up real quick, Canada is looking to find, and the USA has never, EVER, done that. it's been just the opposite for the USA. don't believe me, or the facts, here is what Dr. Paul Brown of the cdc/nih et al ;
CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006
The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.
The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.
These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
http://www.upi.com/
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."
http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0703&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=8125
THE bse mrr policy is nothing more than swapping spit. your just accepting what ever disease that country has, and or what ever that country says it has. it's an honor system of sorts. Canada seems to be Honest, and just the opposite has happened here in the USA.
WE did just what the UK did to the globe ;
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/aug00_last_news.html#fff
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/sep00_news.html#hhh
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/jul00_dont_eat_sheep.html#hhh
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/may00_news.html#aaa
years later, the bush administration made it legal. the body bag count was acceptable for the _documented_ ones. the elderly are expendable, kids and pets are not, and as long as politics plays a role in dictating science i.e. the UKBSEnvCJD ONLY THEORY, we all loose, and the 85%+ of all the other victims, go unaccounted for...officially, but some of us no different, but yet the ignorance of it all, will continue to spread the TSE agent globally, through a multitude of proven routes and sources i.e. friendly fire i.e. and or the pass it forward mode. ...
IN A NUT SHELL ; $$$
(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)
11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries.The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to then Central Bureau............
http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf
full text ;
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2007/10/bse-base-mad-cow-testing-texas-usa-and.html
http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/
Saturday, June 13, 2009
BSE FEED VIOLATIONS USA UPDATE From 01/01/2009 To 06/10/2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/06/bse-feed-violations-usa-update-from.html
Sunday, April 12, 2009
BSE MAD COW TESTING USA 2009 FIGURES Month Number of Tests
Feb 2009 -- 1,891
Jan 2009 -- 4,620
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/surveillance/ongoing_surv_results.shtml
SEE FULL TEXT ;
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/04/bse-mad-cow-testing-usa-2009-figures.html
Monday, May 4, 2009
Back to the Past With New TSE Testing Agricultural Research/May-June 2009
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/05/back-to-past-with-new-tse-testing.html
Sunday, May 10, 2009
Identification and characterization of bovine spongiform encephalopathy cases diagnosed and NOT diagnosed in the United States
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/05/identification-and-characterization-of.html
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and BSE Red Book Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST
WHERE did we go wrong $$$
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/us-emergency-bovine-spongiform.html
Wednesday, July 1, 2009
Nor98 scrapie identified in the United States J Vet Diagn Invest 21:454-463 (2009)
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/07/nor98-scrapie-identified-in-united.html
Monday, June 01, 2009 Biochemical typing of pathological prion protein in aging cattle with BSE
SOMETHING TO PONDER ???
O.K. confusious asks, IF all these new atypical BSEs i.e. new strains of mad cow disease is just an 'OLD COW PRION DISEASE', why then can not the 'old human prion disease' such as the sporadic CJD, be from an 'old cow prion disease', same as the nvCJD 'young people mad cow disease' (which also happens in 74 year old), but why cannot the 'old cow prion diseases', i.e. l-BSE, h-BSE, and ibncBSE, cause the 'old people prion disease', which looks like sporadic CJD. seems that is what some of the pathology is showing ???
OH, that probably makes too much sense, and that the only answer could be that it's all just a happenstance of bad luck and or a spontaneous event, that just happens out of the clear blue sky $$$
IF this is the case, then where are all the SPONTANEOUS BSE CASES OF MAD COW DISEASE IN THE U.S.A., AND WHERE HAVE THEY BEEN BURIED IN THE USA OVER THE LAST 25 YEARS ???
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/06/biochemical-typing-of-pathological.html
Monday, August 17, 2009
FDA asked to ban poultry litter from feed AGAIN 17 Aug 2009 Ban that Poop !
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/08/fda-asked-to-ban-poultry-litter-from.html
Tuesday, August 18, 2009
BSE-The Untold Story - joe gibbs and singeltary 1999 - 2009
http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2009/08/bse-untold-story-joe-gibbs-and.html
Atypical BSE North America Update February 2009
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/atypical-bse-north-america-update.html
Sunday, December 28, 2008
MAD COW DISEASE USA DECEMBER 28, 2008 an 8 year review of a failed and flawed policy
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html
Wednesday, August 20, 2008
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Mad Cow Disease typical and atypical strains, was there a cover-up ?
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/08/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-mad.html
Tuesday, August 11, 2009
Characteristics of Established and Proposed Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Variants
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/08/characteristics-of-established-and.html
Saturday, August 22, 2009
FREE Kim Min-sun, she is correct about mad cow fears from USDA BEEF
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2009/08/free-kim-min-sun-she-is-correct-about.html
TSS
United States - By Bob Burgdorfer
CHICAGO (Reuters) - Japan's new leadership may be less agreeable to expanding imports of U.S. beef, which fell dramatically after mad cow was reported in the U.S. nearly six years ago, than the previous administration, U.S. meat industry sources said Tuesday.
Japan was once the top export market for U.S. beef but that business dropped sharply after December 2003, when the United States reported its first case of mad cow disease. Now Japan buys about a fifth of its pre-mad cow total but the U.S. meat industry has been working to recover more of that lost business.
The newly elected Democratic Party in Japan may be less agreeable to that effort than previous leaders, U.S. sources said.
"There is certainly a concern that there are hard-line elements in the new ruling party that will be resistant to expanded beef access. How that translates into policy remains to be seen," Joe Schuele, spokesman for the U.S. Meat Export Federation, told Reuters on Tuesday.
The USMEF works to develop overseas markets for U.S. meat.
Japan's new leader Yukio Hatoyama has said he wants a more independent stance with relation to the United States, which investors in Tokyo fear could strain in dealings with Washington.
Japan accepts U.S. beef from cattle 20 months old or younger, but the U.S. beef industry has been trying to bump that to 30 months, which would restore much of the business that was lost.
"I think it is safe to say that the situation surrounding that issue may be more fragile now, but we are not resigned to the idea that it will be more difficult," Schuele said. "We just think that it is a different political climate that might call for a different approach. We are still very hopeful that we can make progress on it."
In 2003, Japan accounted for about 30 percent of U.S. beef exports by volume, but in 2008 took less than 8 percent.
"They are likely to be a bit more protectionist, which I think is going to be more of a problem than an opportunity for us," John Urbanchuk, food economist at the expert services firm LECG, said of Japan. "I suspect that this will probably make it more difficult for the beef industry." (Editing by Christian Wiessner)
Copyright 2009 Reuters
http://www.forbes.com/feeds/reuters/2009/09/01/2009-09-01T173214Z_01_N01392490_RTRIDST_0_BEEF-JAPAN.html
THE PARTY IS OVER FOLKS, these Countries that want to eradicate BSE and other TSE, are not going to put up with the USDA's et al failed SSS BSE TSE policy anymore......
Greetings,
THE myth that no mad cows exist in the USA, and that Canada has a bigger problem with mad cows than the USA, is just that a myth. in fact, it is a flat out lie. all one has to do is read the facts. but most people just don't care. ...bad moove!
they call it MRR, the _legal_ trading of all strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy, GLOBALLY. and that's all that the MRR was about. be nice, the USA covered up 2 cases of mad cow disease just so this stupid policy could get finalized, and 25 years of attempted eradication of this agent got washed down the drain $$$ all we are doing now, is what the UK did when all this BSe first got started, except now, with the MRR, it's simply legal now.
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0006 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary Sr Views Add Comments How To Comment
snip...
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
go figure....
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&d=APHIS-2006-0041-0006
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#documentDetail?R=09000064801f3413
your only fooling yourselves with this stupid ukbsenvcjd only theory, and the BSE mythology of the OIE. most any country that went by those same OIE BSE guidelines all went down with BSE. THE OIE has now shown they are nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE. AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. ...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#documentDetail?R=09000064801e47e1
bottom line, and i say this with full confidence, with the present and past surveillance of BSE/TSE in the USA, and the continued feed violations, in the TONS, no one will ever know the true extent of any strain of mad cow disease in the USA. you don't have to just take my word on it, read the facts. blunder, after blunder, after blunder. they have all been posted here, i would be glad to go over any and or all of them one by one for any that doubts me. i can sum it all up real quick, Canada is looking to find, and the USA has never, EVER, done that. it's been just the opposite for the USA. don't believe me, or the facts, here is what Dr. Paul Brown of the cdc/nih et al ;
CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006
The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.
The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.
These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
http://www.upi.com/
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."
http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0703&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=8125
THE bse mrr policy is nothing more than swapping spit. your just accepting what ever disease that country has, and or what ever that country says it has. it's an honor system of sorts. Canada seems to be Honest, and just the opposite has happened here in the USA.
WE did just what the UK did to the globe ;
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/aug00_last_news.html#fff
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/sep00_news.html#hhh
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/jul00_dont_eat_sheep.html#hhh
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/may00_news.html#aaa
years later, the bush administration made it legal. the body bag count was acceptable for the _documented_ ones. the elderly are expendable, kids and pets are not, and as long as politics plays a role in dictating science i.e. the UKBSEnvCJD ONLY THEORY, we all loose, and the 85%+ of all the other victims, go unaccounted for...officially, but some of us no different, but yet the ignorance of it all, will continue to spread the TSE agent globally, through a multitude of proven routes and sources i.e. friendly fire i.e. and or the pass it forward mode. ...
IN A NUT SHELL ; $$$
(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)
11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries.The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to then Central Bureau............
http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf
full text ;
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2007/10/bse-base-mad-cow-testing-texas-usa-and.html
http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/
Saturday, June 13, 2009
BSE FEED VIOLATIONS USA UPDATE From 01/01/2009 To 06/10/2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/06/bse-feed-violations-usa-update-from.html
Sunday, April 12, 2009
BSE MAD COW TESTING USA 2009 FIGURES Month Number of Tests
Feb 2009 -- 1,891
Jan 2009 -- 4,620
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/surveillance/ongoing_surv_results.shtml
SEE FULL TEXT ;
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/04/bse-mad-cow-testing-usa-2009-figures.html
Monday, May 4, 2009
Back to the Past With New TSE Testing Agricultural Research/May-June 2009
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/05/back-to-past-with-new-tse-testing.html
Sunday, May 10, 2009
Identification and characterization of bovine spongiform encephalopathy cases diagnosed and NOT diagnosed in the United States
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/05/identification-and-characterization-of.html
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary and BSE Red Book Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST
WHERE did we go wrong $$$
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/07/us-emergency-bovine-spongiform.html
Wednesday, July 1, 2009
Nor98 scrapie identified in the United States J Vet Diagn Invest 21:454-463 (2009)
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/07/nor98-scrapie-identified-in-united.html
Monday, June 01, 2009 Biochemical typing of pathological prion protein in aging cattle with BSE
SOMETHING TO PONDER ???
O.K. confusious asks, IF all these new atypical BSEs i.e. new strains of mad cow disease is just an 'OLD COW PRION DISEASE', why then can not the 'old human prion disease' such as the sporadic CJD, be from an 'old cow prion disease', same as the nvCJD 'young people mad cow disease' (which also happens in 74 year old), but why cannot the 'old cow prion diseases', i.e. l-BSE, h-BSE, and ibncBSE, cause the 'old people prion disease', which looks like sporadic CJD. seems that is what some of the pathology is showing ???
OH, that probably makes too much sense, and that the only answer could be that it's all just a happenstance of bad luck and or a spontaneous event, that just happens out of the clear blue sky $$$
IF this is the case, then where are all the SPONTANEOUS BSE CASES OF MAD COW DISEASE IN THE U.S.A., AND WHERE HAVE THEY BEEN BURIED IN THE USA OVER THE LAST 25 YEARS ???
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/06/biochemical-typing-of-pathological.html
Monday, August 17, 2009
FDA asked to ban poultry litter from feed AGAIN 17 Aug 2009 Ban that Poop !
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/08/fda-asked-to-ban-poultry-litter-from.html
Tuesday, August 18, 2009
BSE-The Untold Story - joe gibbs and singeltary 1999 - 2009
http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2009/08/bse-untold-story-joe-gibbs-and.html
Atypical BSE North America Update February 2009
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/atypical-bse-north-america-update.html
Sunday, December 28, 2008
MAD COW DISEASE USA DECEMBER 28, 2008 an 8 year review of a failed and flawed policy
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html
Wednesday, August 20, 2008
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Mad Cow Disease typical and atypical strains, was there a cover-up ?
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/08/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-mad.html
Tuesday, August 11, 2009
Characteristics of Established and Proposed Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Variants
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2009/08/characteristics-of-established-and.html
Saturday, August 22, 2009
FREE Kim Min-sun, she is correct about mad cow fears from USDA BEEF
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2009/08/free-kim-min-sun-she-is-correct-about.html
TSS
Friday, March 13, 2009
NAIS comments NCBA and R-Calf Wednesday, March 11, 2009 – 10:30 a.m. Subcommittee on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry — Public Hearing
Wednesday, March 11, 2009 – 10:30 a.m. Subcommittee on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry — Public Hearing. RE: To review animal identification systems.
snip...
Testimony
on behalf of the
National Cattlemen's Beef Association and Georgia Cattlemen's Association with regard to
Reviewing Animal Identification Systems
submitted to the
United States House of Representatives - Committee on Agriculture Subcommittee on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry
The Honorable David Scott, Chairman
submitted by
Bill Nutt President-elect Georgia Cattlemen's Association Member - NCBA Cattle Health and Well-Being Committee
March 11, 2009 Washington, DC
snip...
Our systems currently work effectively in response to competitive market driven forces. These systems were developed, and work well, under the concepts of the voluntary NAIS cooperatively developed by industry and involved agencies. I am very concerned, however, about the effects of the latest USDA proposals and initiatives. Moving to mandatory animal ID will change our system from a flexible, market-driven approach to a rigid bureaucratic system that gets in the way of good business management of our operations and adds additional risks and potential liabilities.
snip...
http://agriculture.house.gov/testimony/111/h031109/Nutt.doc
2. In an attempt to ensure compliance with the health and safety provisions contained in USDA's rule that reopened the Canadian border to imports of live Canadian cattle, despite Canada's ongoing BSE outbreak, USDA required, beginning in July 2005, that all Canadian imports be permanently and individually identified with eartags and brands (cattle imported in sealed trucks for immediate slaughter were exempted). However, the OIG reported that USDA did not adequately meet required health and safety provisions designed to prevent the introduction of BSE. In a March 2008 report, the OIG found that over 142,000 identified cattle and swine from Canada were slaughtered in U.S. slaughtering establishments without USDA ensuring that proper import protocols were in place, that USDA could not ensure that identified Canadian cattle even arrived at approved slaughtering establishments, and that there were 145 indications of non-compliance with the health and safety standards contained in the agency's rule. In addition, another OIG report revealed that USDA was not properly performing and/or enforcing ante-mortem inspections of cattle at slaughter and that a measure crucial to the protection of human health - the removal of specified risk materials (SRMs) - is not being performed properly, even at plants that slaughter cull cattle that have an inherently higher risk for BSE. Thus, while individual animal identification was touted as a mitigation measure to help prevent the introduction and spread of BSE, as well as to prevent human exposure to the disease, the mandatory individual identification of Canadian cattle functioned as a false panacea that has effectively subjected the U.S. cattle herd and consumers to increased health risks.
R-CALF USA fully supports the mandatory identification of all imported cattle with a permanent hot-iron brand that would conspicuously denote the animals' country-of-origin. However, the importation of foreign cattle subject to such mandatory animal identification should only be allowed following a scientific determination that the country-of-origin of the imported cattle presents no known risk for any serious communicable disease. Because mandatory animal identification can neither prevent the introduction of disease, nor even mitigate potential introduction of disease, the purpose of such mandatory animal identification for imported cattle would be to facilitate the location and monitoring of cattle imported from a country that experiences a communicable disease outbreak subsequent to the scientific determination that the disease was not known to exist in that country.
snip...
In other words, USDA decided to impose a national animal identification system on U.S. livestock producers and then it invented the need to achieve 48-hour disease traceback capabilities in order to justify and legitimize its pursuit.
snip...end
http://agriculture.house.gov/testimony/111/h031109/Thornsberry.doc
http://agriculture.house.gov/hearings/statements.html
they put in a 48-hour disease outbreak traceback many many years ago, except to this day, USDA et al have failed, up to one point about 8 months on that Texas mad cow, then 4 months on another suspect BSE that turned out to be negative in part in my opinion negative, due the way the sample was preserved. all this to hold back any other confirmations of BSE in the USA so the infamous OIE/USDA BSE MMR policy could go into effect. that made legal, the exporting of TSE tainted materials.
48 hour traceback for BSE mad cow disease in the USA ???
NOT in your lifetime !
8 YEARS IN REVIEW OF THE MAD COW DEBACLE IN THE USA ;
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Statement May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms
snip...full text ;
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html
PLEASE SEE ;
NOTIFICATION
Because of their responsibility for examining condemned or BSE-suspect animals, NVSL is the organization responsible for activating the notification and BSE response process. It is NVSL that will begin the activation of the BSE Response Plan. From the time a sample is submitted, it takes 14 to 18 days to confirm a diagnosis of BSE In the first 10 to 13 days, pathologists at NVSL have enough information to either rule out BSE or determine the need for additional tests. If it is determined that there is no evidence of BSE, the results are added to the more than 7,500 others that have also been negative. NVSL maintains these data. If additional tests do suggest a presumptive diagnosis of BSE, an NVSL pathologist will hand carry the sample to the United Kingdom for confirmation. It is at this critical point, when NVSL suggests a diagnosis of BSE and is preparing to send the sample to the United Kingdom, that this BSE Response Plan is initiated. The Plan begins the preliminary notification from NVSL to APHIS.
Prelimanary Notification
The director of NVSL is responsible for immediately notifying the APHIS, Veterinary Services (VS) deputy administrator when tests suggest a presumptive diagnosis of BSE. Once NVSL has made a presumptive diagnosis of BSE, APHIS and FSIS field activities will also be initiated. APHIS will receive notification (either confirming or not confirming NVSL's diagnosis) from the United Kingdom anywhere between 24 and 96 hours. (The international animal health community has recognized the United Kingdom's Central Veterinary Laboratory {CVL} as the world's reference laboratory for diagnosing BSE. Other countries, including Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Switzerland, have all sent samples to this lab to confirm their first case of BSE).
NVSL
NVSL will provide all laboratory support in carrying out this BSE Response Plan and serve as the liaison with CVL. NVSL will prepare its facility to receive and process additional samples from the suspect animal's progeny or herdmates or other suspects. NVSL will also coordinate any other assistance from State or university diagnostic laboratories if necessary.
FULL TEXT ;
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. (216-119-138-126.ipset18.wt.net) Subject: U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST
Subject: U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary Date: Tue, 4 May 1999 18:25:12 -0500 From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy To: mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000390/!x-usc:mailto:BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas......
I thought it might be interesting for those of you who have not seen this plan, to do so. So here it is...........
The mission of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is to enhance the quality of life for the American people by supporting production agriculture; ensuring a safe, affordable, nutritious, and accessible food supply; caring for agricultural, forest, and range lands; supporting sound development of rural communities; providing economic opportunities for farm and rural residents; expanding global markets for agricultural and forest products and services; and working to reduce hunger in America and throughout the world.
USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is responsible for ensuring the health and care of animals and plants. APHIS improves agricultural productivity and competitiveness and contributes to the national economy and the public health. USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is responsible for protecting the Nation's meat and poultry supply--making sure it is safe, wholesome, unadulterated, and properly labeled and packaged. These two agencies have come together to lead USDA's actions in the prevention, monitoring, and control of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in the U.S. livestock and food supply. The public knows BSE as "MAD COW DISEASE", a disease linked to human cases of new-variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (nvCJD). USDA knows BSE as the disease that devastated the livestock industry in the United Kingdom and shattered consumer confidence in Europe. BSE has affected international trade and all aspects of the animal and public health communities. It has called even greater attention to the U.S. Government's accountability for a safe food supply. No case of BSE has ever been found in the United States. Since 1989, USDA has had a number of stringent safeguards in place to prevent BSE from entering the country. USDA conducts an ongoing, comprehensive interagency surveillance program for BSE. This surveillance program allows USDA to monitor actively for BSE to ensure immediate detection in the event that BSE were to be introduced into the United States. Immediate detection allows for swift response. As an emergency preparedness measure, USDA has developed this BSE Response Plan to be initiated in the event that a case of BSE is diagnosed in the United States. The Plan details comprehensive instructions for USDA staff as to who is to do what, when, where, and how in the event that BSE were to be diagnosed in the United States.
BACKGROUND
APHIS is responsible for being prepared for potential FOREIGN animal disease outbreaks. The purpose of such preparation is to provide a step-by-step plan of action in the event that a FOREIGN animal disease, such as BSE, is detected in the United States. These plans, often referred to as "RED BOOKS", provide guidance by outlining certain actions that should take place, such as identification of a suspect animal, laboratory confirmation, epidemiologic investigation, and animal and herd disposition activities. Copies of Red Books for specific FOREIGN animal diseases are distributed to agency headquarters and each regional and field office to have in preparation for a disease outbreak.
In 1990, APHIS developed a plan to respond to a confirmation of BSE in the United States. In August 1996, a joint APHIS-FSIS working group updated the BSE Red Book in accordance with current science and research surrounding BSE and the related family of disease called transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE's). The BSE Red Book is officially entitled BSE EMERGENCY DISEASE GUIDELINES. The APHIS-FSIS working group determined that the BSE Red Book, which detailed laboratory and field activities to be carried out in an emergency, needed another component. After the March 1996 announcement by the United Kingdom that BSE was linked to nvCJD, it became apparent to the working group that the Plan needed to address communication issues, both internally within USDA and the Federal Government and externally to the public at large. A confirmed case of BSE would affect such a vast array of stakeholders-consumers, cattle producers, the food animal industry, international trading partners, animal and public health communities, media, and others. Having clear, accurate information readily available would build trust and credibility and facilitate any response measures needed. There needed to be a notification plan. Who was responsible for notifying who, what, when, and how? The plan needed to identify clear channels of communication as to ensure immediate collection and dissemination of accurate information. The joint APHIS--FSIS working group became formally known as the BSE Response Team and is responsible for the development of this BSE Response Response Plan. BSE Response Team members represent a mix of backgrounds and expertise, including veterinary medicine, food safety, public health, epidemiology, pathology, international trade, and public affairs. The Team is coordinatied by two Team Leaders, one each from APHIS and FSIS, who serve as liaisons and technical advisors to their respective agencies on regulations and policies regarding BSE. Over the past 2 years, the BSE Response Plan has been reviewed, edited, revised, and approved by officials at all levels of APHIS, FSIS, and USDA. The Plan has also been shared with other Government agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and other stakeholders, such as the Animal Ag Coalition. The BSE Response Team monitors and assesses all ongoing events and research findings regarding TSE's. The Team leaders are responsible for ensuring that prevention and diagnostic measures are continually revised and adjusted as new information and knowledge become available.
NOTIFICATION: Roles and Responsibilities
Surveillance
As part of USDA's surveillance program for BSE in the United States, veterinary pathologists and field investigators from APHIS and FSIS have received training from British counterparts in diagnosing BSE. FSIS inspects cattle before they go to slaughter; these inspection procedures include identifying animals with central nervous system conditions. Animals with such conditions are considered suspect for BSE, prohibited from slaughter, and referred to APHIS for examination as explained below. Pathologists at APHIS National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) histopathologically examine the brains from these condemned animals. In addition, samples are tested using a technique called immunohistochemistry, which tests for the presence of the protease-resistant prion protein (a marker for BSE). NVSL also examines samples from neurologically ill cattle and nonambulatory ("DOWNER") cattle identified on the farm or at slaughter and from rabies-negative cattle submitted to veterinary diagnostic laboratories and teaching hospitals.
NOTIFICATION
Because of their responsibility for examining condemned or BSE-suspect animals, NVSL is the organization responsible for activating the notification and BSE response process. It is NVSL that will begin the activation of the BSE Response Plan. From the time a sample is submitted, it takes 14 to 18 days to confirm a diagnosis of BSE In the first 10 to 13 days, pathologists at NVSL have enough information to either rule out BSE or determine the need for additional tests. If it is determined that there is no evidence of BSE, the results are added to the more than 7,500 others that have also been negative. NVSL maintains these data. If additional tests do suggest a presumptive diagnosis of BSE, an NVSL pathologist will hand carry the sample to the United Kingdom for confirmation. It is at this critical point, when NVSL suggests a diagnosis of BSE and is preparing to send the sample to the United Kingdom, that this BSE Response Plan is initiated. The Plan begins the preliminary notification from NVSL to APHIS.
Prelimanary Notification
The director of NVSL is responsible for immediately notifying the APHIS, Veterinary Services (VS) deputy administrator when tests suggest a presumptive diagnosis of BSE. Once NVSL has made a presumptive diagnosis of BSE, APHIS and FSIS field activities will also be initiated. APHIS will receive notification (either confirming or not confirming NVSL's diagnosis) from the United Kingdom anywhere between 24 and 96 hours. (The international animal health community has recognized the United Kingdom's Central Veterinary Laboratory {CVL} as the world's reference laboratory for diagnosing BSE. Other countries, including Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Switzerland, have all sent samples to this lab to confirm their first case of BSE).
NVSL
NVSL will provide all laboratory support in carrying out this BSE Response Plan and serve as the liaison with CVL. NVSL will prepare its facility to receive and process additional samples from the suspect animal's progeny or herdmates or other suspects. NVSL will also coordinate any other assistance from State or university diagnostic laboratories if necessary.
APHIS, VS DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
Veterinary Services is the animal health arm of APHIS and the program responsible for carrying out field actions in response to BSE. Upon notifiction of a presumptive diagnosis from NVSL, the APHIS, VS deputy administrator immediately notifies the FSIS, Office of Public Health and Science (OPHS) deputy administrator. APHIS and FSIS deputy administrators will alert the BSE Response Team and activate the Response Plan. The VS deputy administrator serves as the liaison between the BSE Response Team and the APHIS administrator. The APHIS, VS deputy administrator notifies the APHIS administrator and the VS regional director of the State from which the suspect animal originated.
APHIS Administrator
The APHIS Administrator immediately notifies the USDA Assistant Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs. This immediate notification will be followed by an official informational memorandum from the APHIS Administrator, through the Assistant Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs, to the Secretary of Agriculture. This memorandum will be prepared by the BSE Response Team; a draft is maintained by the Team leaders in the reserved section of their plans. The APHIS Administrator is responsible for securing indemnity funds for depopulation of the herd if CVL confirms NVSL's diagnosis.
Assistant Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs
The Assistant Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs, in conjuction with the Undersecretary for Food Safety, is responsible for notifying the Secretary. The Assistant Secretary serves as the liaison between APHIS and Department-level officials.
Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary has the authority to declare a Federal EMERGENCY if appropriate and approve funding as necessary. Information will be provided to the Secretary up the chain of command from the BSE Response Team.
FSIS, OPHS Deputy Administrator
The OPHS Deputy Administrator, together with the APHIS, VS Deputy Administrator, alert the BSE Response Team leaders and instruct them to assemble the BSE Response Team and activate the Plan. The OPHS Deputy Administrator serves as the liaison between the BSE Response Team and the FSIS Administrator. The OPHS Deputy Administrator is responsible for notifying the FSIS regional director in charge of the State from which the suspect animal originated.
FSIS Deputy Administrator
The FSIS Deputy Administrator is responsible for notifying the Undersecretary for Food Safety.
Undersecretary for Food Safety
The Undersecretary for Food Safety, in conjuction with the Assistant Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs, notifies the Secretary of Agriculture.
APHIS, VS, Regional Director
The APHIS, VS regional director in charge of the State from which the suspect animal originated notifies the VS Area Veterinarian-in-Charge (AVIC) for that State. The regional director is the liaison between VS field staff and the VS Deputy Administrator at headquarters. In addition, the regional director shares all information with the BSE Response Team.
APHIS, VS, AVIC
The VS AVIC, in cooperation with State animal health authorities, is responsible for coordination the field activities surrounding the emergency response to BSE. The AVIC assembles the local VS staff to initiate activities outlined in the BSE Red Book including tracing the progeny and herdmates of the suspect animal and beginning an epidemiologic investigation. The VS AVIC coordinates with the State Veterinarian to quarantine the suspect animal's herd of origin. The State has the authority to order a routine quarantine for a neurological disease. The BSE Response Team surveyed every State to determine if they would utilize this authority in the event that NVSL identifies a presumptive diagnosis of BSE. All States responded that they would issue a quarantine.
BSE Response Team
The BSE Response Team leaders will notify each team member and instruct them to assemble in the Situation Room at APHIS headquarters in Riverdale, MD. The Team leaders are responsible for ensuring that all of the Team's duties are fulfilled. It is their responsibility to ensure that the technical information and expert recommendations reach the decisionmakers in a timely fashion. Together with VS Emergency Programs staff, the Team leaders will obtain APHIS, VS administrative support staff in Riverdale, MD, to ready the room for use as BSE headquarters. The Team will begin gathering and assembling information from APHIS and FSIS region and field staff. The Team will pull the draft documents from the third section in the Team leaders manuals and begin filling in current information as it becomes available.
Public Notification
Should NVSL receive notice from CVL confirming a case of BSE, the next level of notification is activated. Each player will follow the same notification protocol as described above for preliminary notification to confirm the diagnosis of a case of BSE.
BSE Response Team
The BSE Response Team will complete the informational memorandum for the Secretary. The Team will prepare the letter to the Office of International Epizootics (OIE), the international animal health organization, for signature by the APHIS, VS Deputy Administrator. OIE requires that all countries submit official notification within 24 hours of confirming a diagnosis of BSE. The BSE Response Team and the office of the APHIS, VS Deputy Administrator would coordinate a teleconference to inform all APHIS regional directors and AVIC'S. The BSE Response Team and the office of the FSIS, OPHS Deputy Administrator would coordinate a teleconference to inform all regional and field FSIS offices. The BSE Response Team would coordinate a teleconference to notify other Federal agencies. The BSE Response Team would coordinate a teleconference to notify key industry/consumer representatives. The BSE Response Team and APHIS International Services would notify foreign embassies. The BSE Response Team would establish a toll-free 800 telephone line for industry representatives, reporters, and the public. The BSE Response Team would coordinate with APHIS Legislative and Public Affairs and USDA office of Communications to issue a press release the day the diagnosis is confirmed. The press release would announce a press conference to be held the morning after the diagnosis is confirmed......
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. (216-119-138-129.ipset18.wt.net) Subject: Emergency Operations...BSE Red Book Date: March 13, 2000 at 1:30 pm PST
BSE Red Book 2.1-35
7.0 Emergency Operations
The section below would be implemented only after a first case of BSE is confirmed in the United States.
7.1 READEO Activation
READEO activation will rarely be necessary for BSE outbreaks. Different from most other foreign animal diseases and infectious diseases, BSE is not a rapidly spreading, acute epizootic; is not thought to be transmitted horizontally between animals within a herd, has an extremely long incubation period, and usually affects only isolated single animals or, at most, a few animals within herds. Because BSE does not spread rapidly, the workload to investigate and manage most outbreaks should not normally exceed the capability of existing local field personnel. READEO activation should be considered only if the particular circumstances of a BSE outbreak warrant. If field personnel feel they are unable to manage a BSE outbreak, they should communicate this to their Regional Director and VS, Emergency Program staff, who will evaluate the need for READEO activation.
7.2 READEO Organization
If READEO is activated, a reference should be made to the revised READEO Manual for further guidance on READEO organization and operations.
7.2.1 Office of the Director When an animal disease emergency exists, the Task Force Directors are responsible for the READEO activities. The directors immediately move to the location of the outbreak and setup the READEO headquarters. Work is coordinated with State officials of the States involved in the outbreak. 7.2.1.1 State Director--(Note: This is the new designation for the Assistant Director.) Each READEO may have one or more State Directors since each State where the disease outbreak is found will be represented in the READEO by State officials designated by the State Veterinarian. 7.2.1.2 Emergency Program Officer--This individual, designated by the Chief Staff Veterinarian of VS, Emergency Programs, provides liaison between the READEO and the Emergency Programs at APHIS headquarters. 7.2.1.3 Public Affairs Officer--The Public Affairs Officer plans, develops, supervises, and maintains information activities for the READEO. 7.2.1.4 Legal--The Legal Advisor provides counsel and assistance to the READEO. 7.2.1.5 Military--The U.S. Armed Forces Command will designate a senior line officer to be the Military Support Officer on the staff of the READEO Task Force Directon The individual is assigned to be the liaison between the Depart-
October 1998
BSE Red Book 2.1-36
ment of Defense and VS, Emergency Programs,and to coordinate needed military assistance during eradication of an FAD outbreak. 7.2.1.6 Meat and Poultry Inspection Operations--The Meat and Poultry Inspection Operations, Food Safety and Inspection Service, will designate personnel to report to the READEO Task Director and to provide liaison between the Task Force and the Meat and Poultry Inspection Operations. 7.2.1.7 Laboratory Coordination--The Laboratory Coordination Officer will advise the READE(3 Director concerning laboratory capabilities and appropriate laboratory examinations to be conducted to provide needed results as rapidly as possible. This individual will assist with interpretation of results.
7.2.2 Administration The Administrative Officer assigned to the READEO will direct and coordinate all facets of general administrative functions. Refer to the revised READEO Manual for a detailed description of the organization and responsibilities.
7.2.3 Field Operations The Field Operations Officer will direct line operations and supervise field personnel in a READEO. Disease investigation, field epidemiology, disease security and personnel security, animal movement control and quarantine enforcement, appraisals of animals and materials, depopulation and disposal, and cleaning and disinfection are among this person's responsibilities.
7.2.4 Technical Support Staff support consists of a technically competent staff designed to act as a resource for the READEO Task Force. Personnel may include but are not limited to individuals who have expertise in the following areas: animal welfare, data systems, disease reporting, economics, environmental impact, epidemiology, evaluation, orientation and training, risk analysis, and wildlife. The staff communicates the needs of the Field Epidemiology Delivery System (FEDS) to the READEO Director as required to maintain an efficient, accurate, up-to-date FEDS. 7.2.4.1 Animal Welfare---Animal Welfare Officers must be knowledgeable about current Federal and State animal welfare regulations, humane methods of animal depopulation, and socioeconomic concerns related to animal welfare issues. They advise the technical support staff and field operations concerning current procedures and accepted methods for use in the humane depopulation of livestock and poultry. 7.2.4.2 Wildlife-- Wildlife Officers participate with the Director and other officials of the READEO to establish and carry out wildlife policies and objectives for the emergency animal disease operation. Through familiarity with the topography, wildlife density, susceptible wildlife species, and movements of susceptible wildlife, the Wildlife Officers can review maps and make recommendations concerning areas to be included in the quarantined high-risk and buffer zones. These officers maintain contact with local, State, and Federal wildlife enforcement officers and wildlife biologists. They develop strategies for conducting surveys of susceptible wi!dlife in the outbreak
October 1998
BSE Red Book 2.1-37
area to determine the incidence of the disease. They direct and coordinate the vaccination and depopulation of wild animals as necessary to eliminate the disease.
7.3 Supplies and Equipment
During an outbreak of BSE, supplies and equipment should be obtained through normal procurement procedures. If a READEO is activated, supplies and equipment should be ordered through the READEO Procurement and Supply Officer.
7.3.1 General Field Supplies Guidelines Refer to APHIS Directive 326.1, 10/10/77 and 221.1, 1/29/74.
7.4 Personnel Responsibilities
During a BSE outbreak, field personnel should follow instructions issued through the normal chain of command. If a READEO is activated, personnel should refer to the revised READEO Manual for detailed descriptions of individual responsibilities.
7.4.1 Personnel Personnel assigned to the READEO Task Force are individually accountable for equipment and supplies checked out to them. They should order replacement equipment and supplies or return equipment for repairs through the READEO Procurement and Supply Officer. All damages or losses to equipment or vehicles should be reported immediately to the READEO Administrative Officer, and the required forms should be completed and submitted promptly.
7.4.2 Travel Employees of the READEO Task Force are responsible for recording and preparing all travel-related documents. Claims for travel, lodging, per diem, and incidental expenses should be submitted to the READEO Administrative Officer for processing.
7.4.3 Vehicles Employees of the READEO Task Force are responsible for operating, cleaning, and performing routine maintenance of assigned vehicles. They also are responsible for recording mileage, expenses, and services. Required reports are to be submitted to the READEO Vehicle Officer.
7.4. 4 Clothing Employees of the READEO Task Force are issued protective clothing to wear when entering a premises where BSE has been diagnosed or is suspected. Clean clothing should be worn on each premises. Employees are responsible for laundering the clothing before reusing it.
October 1998
BSE Red Book 2.1-38
In a large task-foree operation, arrangements may be made for a commercial laundry service to handle the clothing. If it is possible and practical, all clothing should be labeled to identify the employees to whom it is assigned.
7.4.5 Miscellaneous Responsibilities Employees are responsible for conducting their assigned tasks in a professional manner. Complaints concerning task force employees should be directed to the READEO Director for resolution or appropriate action.
All animals, products, and materials to be destroyed because of BSE should be appraised according to 9 CFR 53.3 and appropriate State regulations.
7.5.1 Appraisal Teams Appraisals must represent the interests of the owner, the State, and the Federal Government and be consistent with fair market values. If State authorities approve, State and Federal interests may be represented by a VS employee alone. Owners may, at their discretion and expense, employ a professional appraiser to advise them or to act as their agent. Either the owner or the owner's agent must be present at appraisals. No animals may be destroyed until after the appraisal forms are signed by the owner or the owner's agent. Appraisers should be certain that the owner or the owner's agent is aware of the indemnity form's clause concerning liens and mortgages. When the number of animals to be destroyed is small, and the total value of animals, products, and materiais is low, APHIS field personnel may negotiate the appraised value with the animal's owner without assistance from a professional appraiser. The appraised value of a BSE suspect should be the slaughter value of the animal, taking into account any existing defects or diseases that would affect the slaughter value but ignoring those signs that caused the animal to be classified as a BSE suspect. If field personnel are in doubt concerning the need to use a professional appraiser, they should consult their supervisor or VS, Emergency Programs staff. If a determination is made that healthy progeny, ova, semen, or embryos must be destroyed, they should be appraised at 100 percent of replacement value. Feeds or feed ingredients located on suspect farms will rarely need to be destroyed. If a determination is made that feeds or feed ingredients must be destroyed (for example, to comply with a policy decision to remove all rendered products from animal feeds), then these materials should be appraised and indemn'ff~ed according to 9 CFR 53.3.
October 1998
BSE Red Book 2.1-39
7.6 Depopulation Procedures
7.6.1 Factors and Considerations If the owner is agreeable, a humane method of euthanasia of BSE suspects will be necessary to facilitate the accurate diagnosis of the disease problem, to ensure that the suspect animal is not slaughtered or rendered, and to terminate the animal's suffering. Under no circumstances may BSE suspects be sent fo slaughhter or rendering. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that the carcass of a BSE-confirmed animal has moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing. The VS, Emergency Programs staff, Riverdale, MD, must authorize the use of euthanasia, depopulation, and indemnity payments for READEO operations.
7.6.2 Humane Euthanasia Methods Only experienced veterinarians should perform euthanasia because there are inherent dangers. Precautions should be taken to prevent accidents. Owners should be given a complete explanation of what to expect, and only humane euthanasia methods should be used. Euthanasia should be performed away from public view, and, if possible, the owner should not be present. Euthanized animals must be checked to confirm death. (See VS Memo 583.1, 1992.) 7.6.2.1 Mechanical (Firearms)--Because the only acceptable method for euthanizing an animal by using firearms is to shoot it in the head, and because the animal's brain must be preserved to diagnose BSE, firearms are not an acceptable euthanasia method. 7.6.2.2 Chemicals(Toxic Gas or Lethal Injection)--Follow guidelines established by the American Veterinary Medical Association. When using a regulated controlled substance (e.g., barbiturates), control and administration of the euthanasia agent must be given by a veterinarian having a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) number issued by the U.S. Treasury. Control and administration of chemical substances for euthanasia must be authorized by the AVIC unless directed by the VS Deputy Administrator. (See VS Memorandum 583.1, 1992.)
7.6.3 Supervision of Depopulation Field personnel should never perform depopulation or euthanasia without explicit permission from their supervisor or, if appropriate, the READEO Humane and Disposal Officer. (Refer to the revised READEC) Manual.)
7. 6.4 Permits for Movement All BSE suspects may be moved under permit to facilitate medical treatment, euthanasia, necropsy examination, or carcass disposal. Permitted movement will be according to the quarantine restrictions and will be administered by the State or Federal officials.
7. 6. 5 Security Because BSE is neither contagious nor vector borne, strict disease security measures are not necessary. Personnel should observe normal disease security measures that are standard procedure for all farm visits. The READEO's Security and Disease Prevention Officer has the responsibility for establishing biosecurity measures.
October 1998
BSE Red Book 2.1-40
7.7 Disposal Under no circumstances may BSE suspects be sent to slaughter or rendering. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that the carcass of a BSE-confirmed animal has moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing. Field personel should arrange for the carcass to be transported to and examined by a qualified veterinary pathologist or field veterinary medical officer. After the pathologic examination has been completed and the necessary diagnostic specimens have been obtained, field personnel should arrange for disposal of the carcass. Before a method of disposal is selected, there are many factors that must be considered, and often other State and Federal agencies must be consulted. The environmental and legal impacts of the operation must be considered. Upon recommendation of the State or Federal agencies, VS may consider other disposal methods.
7.7.1 Incineration Incineration, although more expensive than burial, is the preferred disposal method for BSE-suspect carcasses. Federal, State, and local environmental regulations may restrict the use of this method and permits may be necessary. As soon as BSE suspects are reported to APHIS, field personnel should investigate the location and availability of incinerators of sufficient size to process a bovine carcass. Institutions likely to have incinerators include State and university diagnostic laboratories, waste contractors, large municipalities, and private industries. Ideally, the diagnostic laboratory where the pathologic examination was done will have incineration facilities. The BSE-suspect carcass disposal is APHIS' responsibility (not the diagnostic laboratory's). Field personnel should arrange for transportation and final disposal of the suspect carcass and should inform their supervisors and/or the READEO Humane and Disposal Officer of these arrangements. Personnel should be aware that some laboratories dispose of carcasses by rendering and should specifically inquire if this is the case. CNS suspects should be incinerated or held from rendering until a diagnosis of BSE can be ruled out. Under no circumstances may BSE susuects be sent to slaughter or rendering. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that the carcass of a BSE-confirmed animal has moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing. Field personnel should be prepared to accompany the carcass from the farm of origin to the diagnostic laboratory and then to the disposal site if any doubt exists concerning the final disposal method.
7.7.2 Burial If there are no other avenues for carcass disposal, burial of BSE-suspect carcasses may be an acceptable disposal method. APHIS field personnel should inquire with environmental authorities concerning Federal, State, and local regulations that may impose restrictions on this method. The burial site may be on the affected farm, at the diagnostic laboratory where the carcass is examined, or in a local landfill. The site should be inaccessible to animals, removed from populated areas, not used for agricultural purposes, clearly marked, and properly protected.
October 1998
BSE Red Book 2.1-41
Burial sites should also be located a sufficient distance from underground utility lines, septic systems, water wells, and surface water. Local environmental or public works officers may be helpful in locating a satisfactory site. Field personnel should consult with their supervisors and/or the READEO Environmental Impact Officer before digging. Burial trenches are normally at least 9 feet deep with floor dimensions of 7 by 2 feet per adult bovine carcass. Carcasses should be covered with at least 6 feet of soil. This soil should not be tightly packed because gas formation may cause a tightly packed trench to crack and leak.
7.7.3 Rendering Because BSE is spread by rendered animal protein, BSE-suspect and confirmed carcasses must not be rendered, unless the rendered material is incinerated. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that dead BSE animals or carcasses have moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing.
7.7.4 Other Disposal Methods The AVIC, the State animal health officials, and the READEO Director may recommend other methods of disposal to the Deputy Administer, VS, for approval (9 CFR 53.4). Options for disposal must be discussed and approved by VS, Emergency Programs staff and must comply with all State and local Environmental Protection Agency regulations.
7.8 Cleaning and Disinfecting (C&D)
Although BSE is neither contagious nor vector borne, appropriate C&D is required to prevent farm-to-farm transmission of most other infectious diseases. Field personnel must remember, however, that at the time they are requested to euthanize a BSE-suspect animal, a confirmed diagnosis of BSE will not be available. Signs compatible with BSE may be caused by numerous infectious diseases and many BSE-suspect animals will, in fact, have some other disease. Although the C&D of items such as manure, bedding, feed, stalls, halters, milking machines, and other supplies and equipment that have been in contact with BSE suspects is not specifically necessary to control BSE, C&D is still advisable to control other diseases that may be present.
7.8.1 Procedures for Cleaning and Disinfecting 7.8.1.1 Premises and Items--Field personnel are not responsible for C&D of premises such as barns, stalls, and animal pens unless invasive diagnostic procedures (such as a necropsy examination or the removal of the suspect animal's brain) were performed on the premises. If possible, field personnel should avoid doing such procedures on the farm. If circumstances require that such procedures must be done on the farm, personnel should clean and disinfect the immediate area after completing the work. 7.8.1.2 Vehicles--Vehicles used to transport personnel to affected premises should be kept clean, and normal precautions against the farm-to-farm spread of any disease should be observed.
October 1998
BSE Red Book 2.1-42
7,8.1.3 Carriers--Thoroughly clean trucks and trailers transporting BSE suspects. Manure and bedding may be disposed of by any environmentally accepted method such as spreading on fields or composting. After conveyances have been thoroughly cleaned, disinfectant should be sprayed on the sides and floor of the truck bed. 7.8.1.4 Livestock Markets--The risk of BSE transmission at livestock markets is negligible. If a BSE suspect is found at a livestock market, it should be managed the same as if it were found at a farm. Because of the high risk of transmission of diseases other than BSE, invasive diagnostic procedures, such as a necropsy examination or removal of the suspect animal's head, should not be performed at livestock markets. Due to the recent research findings concerning maternal transmission, any pens or areas in which calving occurs should be thoroughly cleaned and disinfected. Cleaning and disinfection is not necessary to prevent the spread of BSE. However, the C&D procedures are recommended to prevent the spread of other diseases from pens or buildings where BSE suspects were held. 7.8.1.5 Slaughter Plants--Becanse BSE is spread by rendered animal protein in cattle feeds, BSE suspects must not be slaughtered nor rendered. If a BSE suspect is found at a slaughter plant, it should be managed similarly to finding a suspect at a farm.
7.8.2 Approved Disinfectants Field personnel should use professional judgment in the choice of a disinfectant. Preferred disinfectants to inactivate the BSE agent include 1N sodium hydroxide solution or sodium hypochlorite solution containing 2 percent chlorine (1 hour exposure at 20 %C [68 %F]). This should be used whenever there is reason to strongly suspect that BSE is in fact the cause of the suspect animal's disease. Such reasons include previously confirmed BSE in the geographic area or signs more compatible with BSE than with any other neurologic disease. If the suspect animal's signs are more compatible with diseases such as rabies or listeriosis, then a phenolic disinfectant such as "One Stroke" may be preferable. (Refer to appendix A Survival of BSE Agent and sec. 1.4.4.)
7. 8. 3 Precautions All disinfectants are hazardous to human beings, animals, and the environment. Label directions should be carefully read and followed. Many disinfectants, including sodium hypochlorite solution, are also corrosive and should be used with caution on metal and other corrodible materials. Thorough rinsing is necessary if corrosive disinfectants are used on metallic items. Disinfectants, especially in concentrated form, may irritate skin, eyes, and respiratory systems. Protective equipment such as appropriate clothing, rubber boots, rubber gloves, mask and goggles should be worn during mixing and application of disinfectants. If areas of the body are exposed to a disinfectant, they should be washed thoroughly with water. Employees should notify their supervisor and their Health and Safety Officer if excessive human or animal exposure to disinfectants occurs or if there is accidental release into the environment.
October l998
BSE Red Book 2.1-43
Field personnel should use normal hygienic procedures (such as washing and disinfecting boots and removing the outer layer of clothing) when leaving the farm. Unless the disease problem is noncontagious, personnel should not travel to other livestock premises for the duration of that day.
7.9 Vector Control
Current scientific data indicate that BSE is not spread by vectors.
7.10 Disease Prevention and Philosophy
The goal of disease prevention and control is to confine the occurrence of BSE to as few herds as possible and to prevent recycling of the BSE agent in the ruminant food supply. If undiagnosed cases are rendered and included in ruminant rations, the long incubation period may allow many animals to be exposed. Action should be taken immediately after the detection and confirmation of BSE to initiate an extensive epidemiologic investigation to determine the source and extent of the disease, to stop the spread, and to eradicate the disease. 7.10.1 Philosophy--Immediate action should be taken to prevent contamination of the animal food supply by prohibiting rendering of any infected or suspect bovine carcasses. In addition, care should be taken to monitor those animals born and raised in affected herds and to prevent their becoming a source of infection to other herds. 7.10.2 Agent Spread--Epidemiologic evidence indicates that the primary route of BSE transmission is through the feeding of contaminated meat and bone meal that has been manufactured using scrapie infected sheep carcasses or BSE infected bovine carcasses. Recent research findings suggest that maternal transmission may occur at a rate of approximately 1 percent in some species. It is believed that this route of transmission is not significant enough to maintain an epidemic. Cases of apparent maternal transmission have also been identified in captive exotic ruminants. 7.10.3 Control of Products and Conveyances--Carcasses of BSE suspects should be incinerated. Carcasses must not be rendered and incorporated in animal feed. If carcasses are transported for disposal, conveyances should be cleaned and disinfected after use with either a sodium hypochlorite solution (2 percent available chlorine) or 1 N lye (sodium hydroxide solution). 7.10.4 Control of Biologics and Drugs--Although no documented cases of BSE have resulted from the use of biologics derived from bovines, tissues from suspect or exposed animals must not be used for the production of biologics and drugs. The agents responsible for causing the transmissible spongiform encephalopathies are highly resistant to normal inactivation processes. Careful selection of source materials is the best way to secure maximum safety of ingredients or reagents of bovine origin used in the manufacture of biologics or other medicinals. Factors that should be considered are the age of the animals, exposure to the agent, and the tissue or organ from which the product is derived.
October 1998
BSE Red Book 2.1-44
7.10.5 Wild Birds, Wind and Insects---Wild birds, wind and insects are not known factors in the spread of BSE. 7.10.6 Rodents--Rodents are not known factors in the spread of BSE. 7.10.7 Hunting--Restrictions on the hunting of wild animals are not necessary to prevent BSE. 7.10.8 Exhibitions--Cancelling scheduled exhibitions is not necessary. 7.10.9 Rendering Trucks and Drivers--The carcasses from BSE suspects must not be rendered. If any rendering truck is used to transport a suspect, it should be cleaned, washed, and disinfected as above. (Refer to appendix A--Agent Survival and sec. 7.8.2--Disinfectants.) 7.10.10 Treatment--Currently there is no known treatment for BSE. 7.10.11 Prevention--Suspects and animals confirmed to have BSE must not be rendered. Producers, feed mills, and rendering establishments should adhere to U.S. State and local rendering policies and FDA regulations concerning the feeding of rendered animal protein to ruminants. Because of the possibility that some transmissible spongiform encephalopathies may be transmitted at the time of parturition, precautions should be taken to prevent exposure of healthy animal to placenta and reproductive fluids. Importation of live animals and animal products from countries with BSE or having high risk factors for BSE should be restricted based upon scientific risk assessment. 7.10.11.1 Immunization--The agent that causes BSE elicits no detectable immune response in the host. Therefore, vaccination is not a viable option. There is no vaccine currently developed for BSE or other TSE's. 7.10.11.2 Sanitation--Although it is unknown whether a contaminated environment plays any role in the spread of BSE, it is suggested that pens having contained BSE-infected animals be cleaned and disinfected. The disinfectants o choice are sodium hydroxide (lye) and sodium hypochlorite, in infected herds it is also advisable that all placentas be removed promptly and buried or incinerated. The calving pens also should be cleaned and disinfected. 7.10.113 Producer Defense---The most effective way to prevent an intruduction of BSE into a herd is not to feed ruminant byproducts to ruminants. As of August 4, 1997, the FDA has a ban in place which prohibits the feeding of most mammlian proteins to ruminants.
7.11 Records Maintenance in a Foreign Animal Disease Outbreak
The APHIS FEDS will be used by the READEO to record information. FEDS a computerized network designed to transmit accurate information rapidly during any emergency disease outbreak. The use of FEDS will allow the READEO to direct its attention to the minute-to-minute business of containing and eradicating the disease. For an accurate record of the activities, all field supervisors in a READEO task force should maintain a diary. Activities and observations should be recorded in the diary when they occur. Date all documents and enter events by time and date to show a correct chronology. Enter events as they occur in the diary as well. An accurate history is of considerable value in developing policies and plans for future disease-eradication
October 1998
BSE Red book 2.1-45
programs, and it may be important if there is litigation. A diary will be helpful for day-to-day administration of funds, personnel, and equipment. It is also useful as a later reference in preparing reports and summaries of activities.
7.11.1 Daily Reporls Submit daily reports of significant activities to the READEO Director and the VS, Emergency Programs staff Riverdale, MD. (Refer to appendix F for current telephone listings.) Include the following as part of the historical file of an outbreak:
*Maps showing premises where BSE-infected animals were found; *Inventory of feeds and feed sources; *Origin of BSE-suspeet and confirmed animals; *Public information material distributed, newspaper clippings; and, Administrative reports to support the expenditure of funds, utilization of personnel and equipment, and disposition of excess materials and equipment at the end of the program.
7.11.2 Distribution The VS, Emergency Programs staff will distribute reports of significant activities to all AVIC's, State cooperators, and industry cooperators at least weekly. As soon as significant events occur, Emergency Programs will inform all APHIS headquarters units through normal reporting channels. Emergency Programs also will immediately report any significant events to the Deputy Administrator, VS, who will immediately advise the APHIS Administrator, especially of legal or politically important events. A weekly summary report of control and eradication activities will be provided to the APHIS Administrator and the Deputy Administrator, VS. See BSE Response Plan, communications section.
7.11.3 Disposition Records should be maintained until a historical account of the program has been prepared and all pertinent information has been gleaned from the records. Furthermore, all records should be maintained if there may be legal action pending as a result of the program activities. Usually, administrative records are maintained a minimum of 3 years for audit purposes.
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. (216-119-138-126.ipset18.wt.net) Subject: Hunkering down in the APHIS BSE Situation Room... Date: February 14, 2000 at 9:04 am PST
Subject: hunkering down in the APHIS BSE Situation Room Date: Wed, 12 May 1999 01:55:54 -0800 From: tom Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy To: mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000390/!x-usc:mailto:BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de
i am looking now a bizarre Oct 98 internal USDA publication describing a james bond-type US effort to control media should the long-anticipated first case of BSE in the US be admitted.
'Players' on the 27 member BSE Response Team are to be flown in from all over the country to a BSE Headquarters 'situation room' apparently an underground bunker in Riverdale, Maryland under the command of the Assistant Secretary of Marketing.
Authentic press releases are already prepared and ready to go out after a few specifics have been filled in. They are spelled out in a separate document, the BSE Red Book, aka BSE Emergency Disease Guidelines.
Aphis' National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) activates team assembly. From the time a bovine brain sample is submitted, it takes 14-18 days to confirm a diagnosis of BSE. In the first 10-13 days, NVSL have enough information to determine the need for additional tests. If a provisional BSE diagnosis is made, the sample is 'hand-carried' (are they going to tell the airline and customs?) to the Central Veterinary Laboratory in England for confirmation, where they are expecting a 24 to 96 hour turn-around.
I guess that means we can get the white tiger brain analyzed by Friday despite the 22 year delay to date. Maybe we could throw in a few cougar brains from NE Colorado too.
A Team Member is designated to silently monitor this listserve and www.mad-cow.org (among others) -- for what, it doesn't say. The Freedom of Information Act request from the East Coast consumer group turned up numerous top-secret USDA downloads from that site and Dealler's.
After 24 hours of secret briefings for 'select industry and trading partners' (to allow them to take positions on the commodities markets opposite the 'non-select' industry and trading partners?), a press conference will be held the next day.
There are plans to trace the cow, its lineage, its herdmates, the renderer, traceout of product, buyout of herd, farm of origin, to get the state involved to quarantine the herd (pre-arranged for all 50 states), expectations for trade bans, notification of OIE within 24 hours, media 800 numbers, spokespersons and backups, notify CDC, FDA, NIH, and many other commendable activities. The Flow Chart is a sight to behold, I will try to scan it in tomorrow.
In short, that cow is going to be toast by the time the public first hears about it.
The Plan does not speak to the scenario in which the CVL says, yes, this is bovine spongiform encephalopathy all right but it is one of your strains, not ours. Invoking their Absence of Evidence is Evidence of Absence principle, there may be no perceived need for public disclosure in this case.
USDA is caught completely unprepared if BSE first turns up in a US zoo animal. These animals could easily be diagnosed outside the "system" and be the subject of a publicity-seeking lab press release. I think this is a more likely scenario because the US has likely imported many thousands of zoo animals with advanced infections from Britain and France and there has been zero monitoring. Unlike with downer cows, anyone with the right colleagues can get ahold of a fallen zoo animal. Zoo animals enter the food chain in some cases after being rendered.
Another scenario would be some stock market speculator obtaining the Red Book and issuing a flurry of bogus but authentic-looking press releases that included bogus 800 and hacked USDA web links. The press here is so lazy and so accustomed to putting out public relation handouts as news that the objectives would be accomplished for a few hour (or days, depending on the Response Team's paralysis vis-a-vis off-flow chart events). Some people think a practise run for this happened in the Indiana case a year or two back.
The first case of nvCJD in an American will also be a public relations fiasco. In the dim bulb of the public mind, any American with mad cow disease would have gotten it from eating meat here. USDA has no way to prove that the victim acquired it on a three week trip to England in 1987. This will sound lame even to the press. All CJD is synonymous with mad cow disease in the public perception; the more often the different kinds are explained, the more their suspicions are aroused. The first case of nvCJD in an American will simply validate what they already know and just be viewed as an overdue admission from the government.
tom
___________________________________________________________END
TEXAS MAD COW ATYPICAL h-BSE
Epidemiology Investigation of Index Herd: Farm A
Background
The index cow was an approximately 12-year-old yellow or cream-colored Brahma cross that originated from Farm A located in Texas. The cow was sold through a livestock sale on 11/11/04, purchased by an order buyer, and was transported to a packing plant on Monday, 11/15/04. When the truck arrived at the packing plant during the late afternoon of 11/15/04, the index cow and one other were found dead on the truck and were transported to a pet food plant later that day where they were sampled for BSE testing as part of the enhanced BSE surveillance.
DNA analysis of blood samples taken from five of the six units of cattle that comprise Farm A yielded four animals from two different units that were genetically related to the index cow and confirmed Farm A as her herd of origin.
The herd on Farm A consisted of mixed breed beef cattle that are traditionally not used as seedstock replacement animals. Market records and preliminary tracing indicated that most animals that left the index herd either went to slaughter within a few days of sale or, in the case of younger animals, entered into known rendering and slaughter channels immediately following sale. There were only 11 cows identified during the investigation that were traced from Farm A into other herds where they had been used as replacement cows. The owner of Farm A raised this cow from birth and stated that the cow had never been off the premises prior to its sale. She was marketed because of poor body condition (the animal’s condition had not improved despite the early weaning of her 2003/2004 calf). The owner stated that the cow had always been excitable and had fallen while she was being loaded to go to the market, but that this was not unusual behavior for her in his opinion. In addition there was a report of this cow being down in the alley at the livestock market on 11/11/04, but she apparently got up again and was able to be loaded onto the truck to go to the packing plant. When questioned about any previous history of neurological signs in cattle on the farm, the owner reported that no cattle on the farm had ever shown any neurological signs, nor had there been any cases of rabies on the index farm.
Index Herd Census
Farm A consisted of 6 units (Units A through F) containing a total of about 217 adult cattle and approximately 100 to 120 calves. Early in the investigation, response personnel discovered that an additional unit belonging to the owner’s son and located adjacent to Unit F could also contain COI. This group, Unit G, contained 16 adult cattle and made a seventh unit that became included in the investigation.
On 6/22/05, the first three of the original six units were sampled for DNA testing to confirm the herd of origin of the index cow. Those first three units consisted of: Unit A contained 62 head with some older cattle (more likely than the other units to provide a DNA match); Unit B with 28 head (3-year-old unit); and Unit C with 25 head (2-year-old unit). Two additional units were sampled for DNA on 6/23/05; Unit D with 31 head and Unit E with 30 head, both of which contained older animals.
6
The sixth unit, Unit F, containing 41 head, was purchased in 1993 from another source. Because it did not have animals that were genetically related to the other 5 units, this unit was not sampled for DNA testing. Unit F, and adjacent Unit G, contained COI because the weaned heifers from those units were commingled and fed with weaned heifers from the other units for a short period of time before they were returned to their respective units of origin. This practice of weaning and feeding together fit the definition of a feed cohort.
Progeny
The owner did keep some replacement heifers and, although he was relatively sure that he had not kept any offspring from the yellow cow because of her excitable demeanor, DNA analysis of the herd revealed several animals in the herd that may have been older offspring of the index cow. While the owner sold 12 calves at the sale with the index cow on 11/11/04, her last calf was not in that group. According to the owner, the index cow’s last calf was born either in Fall 2003 or Spring 2004, weaned early, and sold through the livestock market some time between February and October 2004. The calf prior to that would have been born either in Fall 2002 or Spring 2003 and was sold at the livestock market sometime between January and December 2003.
Birth Cohort
The owner of Farm A kept very few herd records; this made finding documentation on this cow’s birth cohort difficult. The birth cohort, by definition, included all cattle born on the positive animal’s birth premises within 1 year, before or after, the positive animal’s date of birth. The index cow was approximately 12 years of age in November 2004, but there was no exact birth date in the herd records. A potential age range of 11 to 13 years was used to sufficiently cover the animal’s most likely age. Using this range, all cattle born on the index premises between 1990 and 1995 were considered part of the birth cohort. In lieu of the owner’s records, herd records from Veterinary Services’ Generic Database (GDB) were used to compile a list of brucellosis calfhood vaccination (CV) tag numbers from the index herd that corresponded to animals to be included in the birth cohort. There were 121 animals identified through GDB as having been calfhood vaccinated on the index farm between 1991 and 1994. The owner of Farm A did not calfhood vaccinate after 1994. Moreover, calfhood vaccinates include only heifers. Therefore, the list of 121 animals was not a complete list of all birth cohorts. However the tracing that response personnel conducted on other COI was designed to account for the remainder of the birth cohorts.
Feed Cohort
Animals in Units A, D, and E, that were weaned and fed with the positive cow between 1991-1995, were already considered at-risk as part of the defined birth cohort. Animals in Units B and C were 3-year-olds and 2-year-olds, respectively, and were too young to be either birth or feed cohorts. Although Unit F was purchased separately and did not contain animals genetically related to the other units, calves from Unit F were weaned and fed for a short period of time with weaned calves from other units and all calves were later returned to their respective units of origin. Since Unit F was not purchased until 1993, the feed cohort consisted of those animals in Unit F that could have been weaned and fed with the index cow in 1993 or 1994. Additionally, Unit G contained possible feed cohorts that could have been weaned and fed with the index cow between the years of 1991 and 1995.
7
Feed
The feeding regimen for the cattle in this herd consisted of natural pasture, hay, mineral supplement, syrup tubs occasionally, and a breeder’s supplement (predominantly a name brand manufactured breeder’s cube). The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) investigated all sources of feed and supplements used on Farm A. In-depth investigations and site visits were conducted by FDA involving retail feed stores, feed manufacturers, slaughter plants, renderers, and brokers. A more detailed account of the investigation is contained in FDA’s final report.
Removal of Cattle from the Index Farm
Any animal still present within the index herd that could have been a possible birth cohort or feed cohort of the index cow was targeted for removal as an at-risk animal. Units A, D, E, F, and G, all of which were known to contain older animals, were inventoried. Identification tags, tattoos, and brands were recorded, and all animals were aged based on their dentition and any man-made identification. Cattle whose estimated age indicated that they could have been part of the index cow’s birth or feed cohort were removed from the herd, euthanized, and tested for BSE; all were negative.
Units B and C were exempt from the cohort removal process because they contained only 3-year-old and 2-year-old animals respectively. Although the DNA analysis of animals in Units A through E determined that there were 2 animals present that could have been offspring of the index cow, their estimated age by dentition revealed that they were not of the appropriate age to be at-risk progeny. This verified the owner’s claim that he had sold the index cow’s last two calves at the livestock market and they were not currently present in the index herd.
After sorting by age, response personnel identified and removed the following numbers of cows from the herd on 7/6/05: Unit A, 11 cows; Unit D, 11 cows; Unit E, 7 cows. The same process was applied to Units F and G and the following numbers of cows were identified and removed from the herd on 7/7/05: Unit F, 28 cows; Unit G, 10 cows. Of the 67 animals removed from the herd as possible birth cohorts and/or feed cohorts of the index cow, 42 were definitively identified as belonging to the birth cohort due to the presence of a calfhood vaccination tag or tattoo that corresponded to the appropriate birth cohort years. All 67 animals were euthanized on 7/6/05 and 7/7/05 and samples were subsequently sent to USDA’s National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) for BSE testing. All samples were run on the ELISA test and confirmed negative on 7/8/05 and 7/9/05. Upon confirmation of negative results, disposal of carcasses was completed by burial in an approved landfill facility. The index farm was released from hold order on 7/11/05.
Tracing of Progeny
The 2003/2004 progeny of the index cow was known to have left the farm through a specific livestock market sometime between February and October 2004. The 2002/2003 progeny of the index cow left the farm through the same market sometime between January
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and December 2003. Response personnel learned early in the investigation that animals from the index farm were sold not only under the index farm owner’s name and that of his wife, but also by other members of the owner’s immediate family. Additionally, there were no herd records to indicate the gender of the two at-risk progeny. Therefore, market records for February through October 2004 and January through December 2003 were obtained for all calves sold both by Farm A’s owner and by members of his immediate family; response personnel traced all such calves to determine their disposition. With the index herd being composed of mixed breed beef cattle, the calves that left the farm were genetically unsuitable for use as replacement animals or for sale as breeding stock, a fact that was confirmed by the trace work and the documentation of the final disposition of the calves of interest.
Response personnel ultimately identified 213 calves of interest to be traced. Of these, 208 were confirmed to have entered known rendering/slaughter channels, 4 were presumed to have entered rendering/slaughter channels, and 1 was purchased in cash through a livestock market with no buyer name or contact information (this animal was classified as untraceable. See Appendix 1). A calf was categorized as presumed to have entered rendering/slaughter channels if it passed through at least one livestock market subsequent to its original sale and could not be individually traced due to unknown resale date and new backtag, but all calves resold matching that description during an appropriate date range were purchased by known rendering/slaughter order buyers.
It was not possible to DNA test the calves that entered known rendering and slaughter channels – most were of an age in which they were likely to have been slaughtered prior to the time of the investigation. There were no calves traced to farms outside of rendering and slaughter channels.
Tracing of Birth Cohorts
Since there were essentially no records maintained on the index farm, it was necessary to compile the list of known birth cohorts using brucellosis CV tag numbers for this herd from the period 1991 to 1994. The calves vaccinated during that time period were part of the index cow’s birth cohort and tracing activities centered on finding those animals. There were 121 animals whose CV tag number and/or tattoo included them as part of the birth cohort. Of those 121 animals, 67 animals were definitively accounted for (42 were found in the index herd, removed, and tested BSE negative; 25 were identified as having left Farm A through the market system and were traced, 11 of those were reported slaughtered, 13 were classified as presumed dead, and 1 was found alive, euthanized, and tested BSE negative). Of the remaining 54 animals from the birth cohort, there may have been several that died within the index herd, but the majority likely left the herd without identification and would have been either re-tagged at the livestock market or consigned directly to slaughter without identification. To account for these remaining birth cohorts, all adult cattle that left the index farm since 1990 were traced as COI.
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Tracing of Cattle of Interest
The investigation revealed that many animals left Farm A, arrived at markets without any identification tags, and were subsequently re-tagged at the market. Due to lack of farm records, it is unknown which of these re-tagged animals may have belonged to the birth cohort. As a result, all animals that may have left Farm A since 1990 were traced as COI. Additionally, animals from the index farm were sold not only under the index farm owner’s name and that of his wife, but also by other members of the owner’s immediate family; therefore, cattle sold from the index farm by all pertinent family members were traced. There were some older animals that left the index farm but were able to be excluded from further trace work because they were known not to have been part of the birth cohort or feed cohort of the index cow despite their being of the appropriate age. The index farm owner’s late father had maintained a herd of cattle separate from the index farm but which was added to the index farm in 1997. Complete herd test data and CV data from the GDB was obtained for the father’s herd and those animals were excluded from the tracing activities.
There were a total of 200 COI traced: 143 were reported to have been slaughtered (131 of those were confirmed as having been slaughtered), 1 is known to have died previously and was buried, 2 were found alive (1 was a known birth cohort that tested negative, 1 was determined not to be one of the cattle of interest due to her young age), 34 were classified as presumed dead, 20 were classified as untraceable. (See Appendix 1). Animals were confirmed at slaughter using GDB slaughter testing data or the hard copies of slaughter testing Form 4-54.
An animal was classified as presumed dead if records that could be used to advance the tracing of the animal were exhausted or did not exist, and the age of the animal at the time of the investigation was estimated to be at least 11 years old or older. Since the index herd was not a purebred or seedstock operation, and animals leaving the herd were unlikely to be purchased as replacement cattle, standard industry practices indicated that most adult animals that had left the herd would have been culled and slaughtered by the time they were in this age group. Additionally, this age cutoff was arrived at through review of market records and the specific years in which Farm A sold cattle through the market. An animal was classified as untraceable if all records to advance the tracing of the animal were exhausted or did not exist, and the age of the animal at the time of the investigation was estimated to be less than 11 years of age (the animal, therefore, could not be presumed dead).
Calculation of Minimum Estimated Ages
Throughout the tracing process, personnel used minimum estimated ages of the 200 COI to evaluate whether those individuals could be old enough to be part of the birth or feed cohort of the index cow. Since Farm A’s owner maintained no records on the ages of animals, GDB data assisted in assigning minimum estimated ages. Animals that were wearing brucellosis CV eartags could be aged quite accurately because the exact CV date was recorded in the GDB and those animals would have been vaccinated between 4 to 12 months of age. The GDB also contained lists of individual eartags for all animals on the
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index farm that were included in complete herd brucellosis testing in 1991, 1993, and 1994. Cattle included in those herd tests would have been at least 18 months of age at the time of the test and their minimum age today could be extrapolated from that data. Finally, the GDB also contained livestock market testing data that could also be used to assign a minimum age because the animal would have been at least 18 months of age on date the earliest brucellosis market test was conducted. The minimum ages calculated for the cattle of interest were used later in an analysis by USDA’s Centers for Epidemiology and Animal Health (CEAH) to determine the probable disposition of untraceable and presumed dead animals based on their age.
Trace Herds
Response personnel made every attempt to trace COI to their final dispositions (which, in most cases, was slaughter). If an animal was traced to a herd owner and the owner could not provide information that indicated that the animal of interest was not currently present within his/her herd, the owner’s herds were placed under hold order pending a herd inventory to determine whether or not the animal of interest had been retained. There were eight herds identified as the last traceable location of the animal of interest and were, therefore, subjected to herd inventories in an attempt to locate the animal.
When an animal of interest was located within a herd, the age of the animal was estimated using dentition and any man-made identification. If the animal fell into the appropriate age range to be a possible birth cohort or feed cohort of the index cow, the animal was removed from the herd and tested. If an animal of interest was located within the herd and fell into the appropriate age range to be a possible at-risk progeny of the index cow, the animal was sampled for DNA testing.
Trace Herd 1
The owner of Trace Herd 1 was identified as having received one of the adult COI from the index herd. Trace Herd 1 contained 909 head of cattle in multiple pastures and was placed under hold order on 7/21/05. Upon completion of herd inventory, the animal of interest was not found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 1 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified as untraceable. The hold order on Trace Herd 1 was released on 8/8/05.
Trace Herd 2
Trace Herd 2 was identified as having received one of the adult COI from the index herd. Trace Herd 2 contained 19 head of cattle on one pasture and was placed under hold order on 7/25/05. The owner of Trace Herd 2 identified the animal of interest by her eartag while he was feeding his cattle out of a bucket and individually penned her for inspection by field personnel. While the cow was identified as one of the animals that had left the index farm, her age by dentition was estimated to be only 5 years old, which was too young to have placed her as part of the birth or feed cohort of the index animal. She was classified as found alive but determined not to be one of the COI; the hold order on Trace Herd 2 was released on 7/26/05.
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Trace Herd 3
The owner of Trace Herd 3 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest. The herd was placed under hold order on 7/27/05. The herd inventory was conducted on 7/28/05. The animal of interest was not present within the herd, and the hold order was released on 7/28/05. The person who thought he sold the animal to the owner of Trace Herd 3 had no records and could not remember who else he might have sold the cow to. Additionally, a search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable because all leads were exhausted.
Trace Herd 4
The owner of Trace Herd 4 was identified as having received one of the COI through an order buyer. Trace Herd 4 was placed under hold order on 7/29/05. A complete herd inventory was conducted on 8/22/05 and 8/23/05. There were 233 head of cattle that were examined individually by both State and Federal personnel for all man-made identification and brands. The animal of interest was not present within the herd. Several animals were reported to have died in the herd sometime after they arrived on the premises in April 2005. A final search of GDB records yielded no further results on the eartag of interest at either subsequent market sale or slaughter. With all leads having been exhausted, this animal of interest has been classified as untraceable. The hold order on Trace Herd 4 was released on 8/23/05.
Trace Herd 5
The owner of Trace Herd 5 was identified as having received two COI and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 5 is made up of 67 head of cattle in multiple pastures. During the course of the herd inventory, the owner located records that indicated that one of the COI, a known birth cohort, had been sold to Trace Herd 8 where she was subsequently found alive. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the other animal of interest was not found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 5 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 5 was released on 8/8/05.
Trace Herd 6
The owner of Trace Herd 6 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. This herd is made up of 58 head of cattle on two pastures. A herd inventory was conducted and the animal of interest was not present within the herd. The owner of Trace Herd 6 had very limited records and was unable to provide further information on where the cow might have gone after he purchased her from the livestock market. A search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. Additionally, many of the animals presented for sale by the owner of the herd had been re-tagged at the market effectually losing the traceability of the history of that animal prior to re-tagging. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 6 was released on 8/3/05.
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Trace Herd 7
The owner of Trace Herd 7 was identified as having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 7 contains 487 head of cattle on multiple pastures in multiple parts of the State, including a unit kept on an island. The island location is a particularly rough place to keep cattle and the owner claimed to have lost 22 head on the island in 2004 due to liver flukes. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the animal of interest was not found present within Trace Herd 7. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 7 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest. The cow was subsequently classified as untraceable. It is quite possible though that she may have died within the herd, especially if she belonged to the island unit. The hold order on Trace Herd 7 was released on 8/8/05.
Trace Herd 8
Trace Herd 8 received an animal of interest, which happened to be a known birth cohort of the index cow, from Trace Herd 5. Trace Herd 8 consists of 146 head of cattle that were placed under hold order on 8/4/05. A herd inventory was conducted, the birth cohort was found alive in the herd, and she was purchased and euthanized. The hold order on Trace Herd 8 was released on 8/4/05. The cow was sampled on 8/5/05 and BSE tested by ELISA at NVSL. Results were negative (as reported on 8/6/05); carcass disposal was completed by alkaline digestion.
Analysis of Data on Presumed Dead and Untraceable Animals
CEAH performed an analysis of the minimum estimated ages of those COI that were classified as either presumed dead or untraceable to determine the likely disposition of those animals based on their ages. Moreover, CEAH performed an analysis of the likely disposition of the one calf that was classified as untraceable during the investigation.
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/bse_final_epi_report8-05.pdf
ALABAMA MAD COW ATYPICAL h-BSE
Epidemiology Investigation of Index Herd: Farm A
The index case was a deep red, crossbred beef cow estimated to be approximately 10- years-old based on dentition. On March 16, 2006, USDA personnel exhumed the carcass of the index case, sent the head to NVSL and transported under seal the remainder of the carcass to the Alabama State Diagnostic Laboratory (ASDL). The investigators confirmed the carcass to be that of a red beef cow. The body and facial area did not contain any white markings. No identification devices were found on the cow, including any evidence of brands, tattoos, or ear tags. Additionally, on March 29, NVSL examined the head of the carcass to confirm the lack of a tag and the lack of evidence (holes or scarring) of previous tags in the ear.
The age of the index cow was estimated by examination of the dentition as 10-years-old by the accredited veterinarian. Regulatory personnel examined the dentition of the exhumed carcass and concurred with the estimate. The teeth in the head of the carcass were short with elongated necks with some incisors missing. This is consistent with the dentition of other cattle from Alabama with a known age of 10 or more years. Genetic tests were conducted at NVSL to match the NVSL-generated homogenate of the obex, the homogenate of obex from the Georgia lab, brain material from the cow head (collected by NVSL), and ear material from the cow head (also collected by NVSL). On March 23, the results for these tests indicated they all originated from the same source and confirmed that that carcass exhumed on March 16 was the index case.
Disposal of the Index Case
Following exhumation on March 16, the carcass was broken down and Federal personnel transported the head (stored on ice) to NVSL. The remainder of the carcass was placed in hazardous materials barrels and transported under seal to ASDL by Federal and State personnel.
The carcass is currently being held under seal in a secure cooler at the ASDL, pending final disposal. The head remains frozen at NVSL. Cleaning and disinfection of the site was completed following removal of the carcass.
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At-Risk Progeny of the Index Case
2005 calf:
The index cow gave birth to a black bull calf around February or March 2005. The calf was born on the index premises. The owner took the calf to a stockyard sale in July 2005. The owner reported that the animal died at the stockyard prior to sale and the carcass disposed of in a sanitary landfill. An interview of the stockyard manager confirmed memory of that owner having a calf die at the stockyard. Stockyard records confirmed delivery of material to the landfill on that day. This trace thread is closed.
2006 calf:
At the time of death, the index cow had at her side a 2- to 3-week old red Charolais cross female calf born in February 2006. This calf was present on the premises when the investigation began. On March 16, this calf was indemnified using Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) funds and transported to NVSL where it is currently held in APHIS custody. ARS is developing a research protocol to study this calf. Results obtained on April 6 of a DNA analysis comparing a blood sample from the calf to tissues from the index case confirmed that this animal was the calf of the index cow. This trace thread is closed.
These two calves constitute the last two calves born to the index cow prior diagnosis of BSE.
Trace Back Investigation
Investigation of Index herd (Farm A):
The most recent owner (Farm A) purchased the index case at a stockyard in December 2004. The stockyard sheet for that day describes Farm A buying a single animal that matches the appearance of the index case. This cow was red, back tag #57, with shortsolid mouth (indicating worn incisors) and 7 months pregnant, weighing 990 lb. The owner confirmed this purchased cow is the index cow.
Based on the color/breed, age, and pregnancy status of the index case, the following criteria were used to trace the index case to its herd of origin: 1. Coat color - Only cattle described as red in color were traced as potential leads to the herd of origin. All other colors, including red with white described on the face (such as red, white-faced or red, mottled-faced, and breeds that are not red in color, such as Charolais), were excluded from further investigation. This is because the index case was solid red with no white on the head and any red cow
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with recorded facial coloring would not be compatible in appearance with the index cow.
2. Age - Only cattle known or suspected to have been born before March 1998 (i.e., greater than 8 years of age at the time of death of the index case) were traced as potential leads to the herd of origin. To estimate the lower limits of age, cattle sold at a stockyard and identified as being 18 months of age by mouthing (the date they shed their deciduous medial incisors) will be considered to be at least two years of age on the date of sale. This takes into account that the exact age of shedding of medial incisors varies slightly among cattle and erring on the older side of the estimate of the cattle’s age will more likely increase the number of animals traced.
3. Other factors - Other factors considered in determining whether or not to pursue an animal as possibly being the index case include the recorded weight at sale, stage of pregnancy, and ages of calves. The value of these factors depends on the information obtained from interviews, sales records and other evidence used to trace the index case.
Investigation of Previous Farms/Owners Investigation of Farm B Background: Stockyard records identified the prior owner of the index cow as Farm B. The cow was one of 26 animals sold as part of a dispersal of the herd of Farm B in December 2004. Investigation: All 26 animals had been purchased between July 2004 and November 2004. The owner of Farm B was deceased by the time the index case was detected. Interview of the widow of Farm B confirmed that, due to health issues, the owner of Farm B had sold all his cattle in early 2004 then began to re-establish a herd during late 2004 before again selling out in December 2004.
Results: Stockyard records of all 26 cattle purchased by Farm B were evaluated to determine where the index cow came from. Four animals could not be ruled out as having been the index cow based on color, age, and stage of pregnancy at the time of sale. Each animal belongs to a different owner. Two additional red cows were purchased by Farm B but were too young and at the wrong stage of pregnancy at the time of sale to qualify as the index case and were excluded from further tracing.
Investigation of Farm C Background: The owner of Farm C sold a red cow with calf at its side at a stockyard on August 8, 2004, weight 1,220 lbs (total for pair). These animals were later purchased by Farm B. This animal is consistent with the weight, age, and stage of pregnancy of the index case at that time.
6 Investigation: Farm C purchased the animal in question as a yearling or bred heifer in 1997 along with two half siblings from Farm G. Of the three animals purchased, one remains on Farm C, another died several months prior to the investigation and is buried on the premises, and the third is the possible index cow being traced. The three cows were all sired by the same bull. Additionally, the possible index cow, if on Farm C, would have given birth in this herd and there would likely be calves present. On March 25, blood samples were collected from all animals on Farm C between the ages of 18 months and 8 years of age, including the known half-sibling, in order to determine if any of the animals were compatible with being first generation progeny of the index case. In addition, the known half-sibling was evaluated for genetic linkage to the index case. Samples were submitted to NVSL for DNA analysis in order to determine genetic linkages.
Results: Results received on March 6 indicated that none of the animals tested qualified as offspring or siblings of the index cow. The animal identified by the owner of Farm C as possibly related to the index cow did not genetically match the index case. No animals remained on Farm C that would qualify for additional testing. Farm C was excluded as a source of the index case, and the suspected half-sibling did not qualify as related. This trace thread is closed. Farm G stated that the cow traced to his herd had a bangle tag, although there was no evidence of a tag or prior presence of a tag in the index cow’s ear at the time of death. This trace thread is closed. Investigation of Farm D Background: The owner of Farm D sold a red cow on September 11, 2004, full mouth, 5 months pregnant, 1,015 lbs. This animal is consistent with the weight, age, and stage of pregnancy of the index case at that time.
Investigation: Farm D is a cattle dealer. He buys and sells many cattle each year. According to records, at two stockyards with which Farm D does business, he purchased 35 red cows from 23 different premises (Farms M – II) that were consistent with the index case according to age and weight between 2000 (the earliest date of availability of records) and September 11, 2004, (the date he was reported as having sold the cow being traced). This owner’s typical business practice is to purchase young cows (less than 3 years of age) that are not pregnant or recently bred, breed them, hold them until near calving, and then resell them as bred cows and cow calf pairs. He does not typically keep cows for more than a year. He does not retain calves from any of the cattle (with the exception of a single Braham cow). He is certain that the cow was not born on his premises. Because of the transient nature of cattle within this herd, and lack of suspected first generation offspring, no DNA analysis was performed on animals in Farm D. Farm D purchased a red cow from Farm M on March 17, 2004, as part of a cow and calf pair through a local stockyard. Farm M is a registered Red Angus breeder. All cattle are 7 tattooed and tagged as part of the registry process. Farm M had a few recipient cattle that were sold at approximately the same time that the animal being traced through Farm D would have been sold. All of the recipient cattle were Holsteins and were excluded based on phenotype. Because all qualifying animals on this farm are identified by both tattoo and ear tag as a requirement of registration, the farm could not have been the source of the index cow.
This trace thread is closed. Farm N consigned a cow and calf pair to Farm D on January 8, 2003, at a local stockyard. The weight of the pair at purchase was 1,140 lbs. Farm N consists of approximately 25 cows, primarily Charolais cross and black Angus cross. Farm N’s current herd was established in 1996. According to records kept at Farm N, the cow sold to Farm D produced bull calves in 1997, 1999, and 2001 and heifers in 1998, and 2000. Because this cow was small for the herd, none of her heifers were retained in this herd. The cow was listed as a red Angus-type cow that was purchased through a stockyard in 1997. The sale records for the stockyard were destroyed in a fire and therefore unavailable. Since the cow was not born in this herd, and no offspring or other related animals remained in the herd, there are no eligible animals remaining on this farm for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed. Farm O consigned a red cow to the stockyard on December 14, 2002, as a 5-month pregnant cow, weighing 1,060 lb, which was purchased later by Farm D. Farm O had purchased 118 head in early 2002, calved them out, and rebred them before selling the calves and the bred cows later that year. None of these animals remains on the farm and no calves were retained. The owner of Farm O purchased the cattle through four to five stockyards or other sources. The traced cow was not born in this herd and no animals remain on the farm that qualify for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.
Farm P consigned two red cows to the stockyard on August 10, 2002. Farm P purchased these two cattle from Farm JJ in 2000 as part of a group of 38 heifers. There are no cattle remaining on Farm P at this time; therefore, no animals are available for genetic testing for comparison with the index cow. This trace thread is closed.
The cattle present on Farm JJ were dispersed in 2001 and a new owner began operating from the same property. The new owner did not recall the exact cattle in question but was very certain that any cattle sold from Farm JJ (under either owner) would have had ear tags in place, and if sold before the 2001 dispersal, would have been branded on the right hip. Because the index cow had no evidence of having ever been tagged or branded, this farm can be excluded as a source of the index cow. This trace thread is closed.
Farm Q sold five red cows at a stockyard on April 17, 2002, that were later purchased by Farm D. All five of these animals, according to the owner, were red Angus-type cows, between 6-and 10-years of age and sold with a calf at their side. The owner had purchased these five cows as part of a group of cattle from Farm KK. Farm Q does not keep replacement heifers. There are no eligible animals remaining on Farm Q for genetic testing and this trace thread is closed. 8 All five of the animals traced back from Farm Q were purchased from Farm KK as part of an unknown number of red Angus-type cows sold to Farm Q. Farm KK currently consists of a beef cow/calf operation with approximately 300 brood cows. The herd is a mixed breed beef herd that was acquired over a period of several years by purchasing cattle at local stockyards. The owner of Farm KK had a herd with another animal consisting of approximately 60 head of mixed breed cattle in 1998 to 1999 that had been purchased and sold out entirely to the local stockyard in either 1999 or 2000. However, he could not find any records for that sale and all stockyard records were destroyed in a fire during 2000. The owner of Farm KK stated he had not sold any cattle privately to Farm Q and did not know who purchased the cattle at the stockyard. Subsequent to the 1999/2000 dispersal, Farm KK began buying cattle again and sold all its animals in 2004. The current herd consists of brood cows that have been purchased at local stockyards since the 2004 dispersal. These cattle are not known to be related to any previously owned cattle. There are no animals remaining on Farm KK that would be appropriate for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed. Farm R consigned a red cow to the stockyard March 6, 2002. The owner of Farm R does not remember the specific cow, but has a registered Beefmaster herd and a commercial herd and does not retain commercial heifers as replacements. He purchases replacement animals to enter the commercial herd from three different stockyards. No animals are present on the farm that would be eligible for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.
Farm S sold a red cow and calf pair to Farm D through the stockyard on March 27, 2002. Farm S sold all his cattle a year ago and has purchased new cattle. None of the original herd remains on the farm. He said he purchased the traced cow from a neighbor. He bought the neighbor’s entire herd at the time and took the traced cow directly to the stockyard. The neighbor’s farm does not have any cattle remaining. No animals remain on either farm that would qualify for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.
Farm T consigned a red cow to the stockyard on January 9, 2002. This cow was later purchased by Farm D. All cattle on Farm T were sold in 2003. The owner of Farm T stated that he purchased three older red cows at the same stockyard in 1999 or 2000 and sold them back in 2002 or 2003. He thinks the cows had tags in their ears but is not sure. Additionally, no animals remain on the farm that would be appropriate for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.
Three red pairs were consigned to the stockyard from Farm U on three different dates in 2001. These cows were later purchased by Farm D. The owner of Farm U has been out of the cow business since 2001. He has no memory of these cows or any other particular cattle. He stated that he would have tagged his brood cows, which is inconsistent with the lack of evidence of tagging in the index cow. There are no animals on this farm for genetic testing and this trace thread is closed. Farm V consigned two red cows to the stockyard on January 12, 2000, that were later purchased by Farm D. The owner of Farm V purchased a group of cows in 1998 from 9 the stockyard to keep on some land that he had purchased. Farm V sold all of the cows in 2000. He currently has only roping steers. No eligible animals remain on this farm for genetic testing. All stockyard records prior to 2000 were destroyed in a fire, so tracing this cow further back is not possible. This trace thread has been closed.
Two red cows were consigned to the stockyard on October 13, 2001, from Farm W, one of which was purchased by Farm D. There are approximately 50 cows of various breeds currently located on Farm W. The owner of Farm W has maintained a cow herd since 1973 and does not maintain identification on his cattle. The owner of Farm W does not recall details about the animal being traced through his farm; however, farm records indicated that the animal would likely have been one of two red cows purchased from a stockyard on May 1, 2001. Although the owner of Farm W typically retains heifers, the calves from both of these cows were sold on October 10, 2001, according to the stockyard’s records. No animals remain on this farm for genetic testing. Records collected from the stockyard indicate that the purchase weight for these traced animals was 580 and 650 lbs, both of which fall below the minimum weight defined in the SOP for investigation. These cows are excluded as the index cow based on their weights at the time of sale. This trace thread is closed. Farm X consigned two red cows to a stockyard on January 17, 2001, that were later purchased by farm D. The daughter-in-law of the owner of Farm X stated that all the cattle in the herd as of 2001 were sold in 2004 after the owner’s death. Subsequently, the owner’s son did purchase some additional cattle (unrelated to the traced animals) but these animals have also been sold. There are currently no animals remaining on the farm. No eligible animals remain on this farm for genetic testing and there are no records for purchases or sale of animals; therefore, this trace thread is closed.
A red cow and calf pair was consigned by Farm Y to the stockyard on March 11, 2001. This pair was later purchased by Farm D. Farm Y buys and sells cattle regularly and had no specific recollection of the traced cow, but when presented with stockyard records he felt reasonably sure that the animal in question was a horned Limousin cow sold with a calf at her side. He stated that all his cattle were tagged, either at the time of purchase, or by him after bringing them to his farm. Farm Y sold out all cattle during 2004 but has since begun accumulating cattle again. The index cow did not have horns and there was no evidence of dehorning or tagging. In addition, no eligible animals remain in the herd for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.
Farm Z consigned three red cow and calf pairs to the stockyard on June 6, 2001. These animals were later purchased by Farm D. The owner of Farm Z has land (owned and rented) in many locations and occasionally runs cattle on some of this land. He reported that his practice was to buy entire herds and sell the complete herd a few months later. He sold all of his cattle accumulated from the mid-1990s during May or June of 2001 and was without cattle until later in the year when he began restocking. He has since bought and sold groups of cattle several times but keeps no records himself. There are no eligible animals remaining for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed. 10 Farm AA consigned a red cow to the stockyard on September 19, 2001. This cow was later purchased by Farm D. The traced cow was lotted-in the day before the sale and had been purchased through another stockyard earlier in the week. Sales records show the weight of the cow as 1,140 lb at the time of purchase at the previous stockyard sale, which exceeds the upper weight established for tracing in the SOP. This cow is excluded from further tracing. This trace thread is closed.
A red cow and calf pair was consigned to the stockyard by a dairy, identified as Farm BB, on November 10, 2001. This cow was later purchased by Farm D. Farm BB is comprised of a milking Holstein dairy with about 300 milking animals. The owners of Farm BB also have approximately 400 mixed breed beef cattle maintained as a cow/calf operation. Farm BB does not retain any heifers as replacements for either the dairy operation or the beef operation. They buy all their replacement cows for the dairy and buy beef cattle to raise a calf then resell the cow with a calf within a 12-to 18-month time period. When asked about records of purchased cattle, one of the owners stated that he could not locate any records prior to 2002. Farm BB utilized the services of a cattle dealer to purchase cattle at various stockyards in the region. Some of the cattle might have had ear tags prior to purchase but the owners did not put in their own ear tags when the cattle were bought. The current herd at Farm BB is comprised of various breeds of beef cattle, but they would not be the same cattle that were present in 2001, since all cows at the premises are sold within a 12- to 18-month period (with calves) after purchase. Therefore, this trace thread is closed.
Farm CC consigned a red cow to the stockyard on December 8, 2001. This cow was later purchased by Farm D. Farm CC has no cattle at this time. The owner of Farm CC has no records of cattle that he has owned and no memory of the particular animal being traced. There are no animals on the farm eligible for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.
Farm DD consigned a red cow to the stockyard on December 12, 2001 that was later purchased by Farm D. The owner of Farm DD has no records of his cattle operation. He currently owns three cows, one bull, and two calves. All are black and none has identification. Additionally, the owner has stated that he has never owned any cows more than two years. No animals currently on the farm were present at the time the traced cow was sold and no offspring were retained from that time. There are no eligible animals remaining on this farm for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.
Farm EE consigned a red cow to the stockyard on March 3, 2000. This cow was later purchased by Farm D. All cattle on Farm EE were sold two or three years ago. No records of sales or purchases were kept. No animals remain on this farm for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.
Farm FF consigned a red cow to the stockyard on June 21, 2000. This cow was later purchased by Farm D. Farm FF has not kept cattle since the herd was dispersed 11 approximately three years ago. The owner of Farm FF has no knowledge or records of the cow in question other than that the cow would have been purchased through the same stockyard where it was sold. Purchase records prior to 2000 for this stockyard were destroyed in a fire. There are no eligible animals on the farm for genetic testing and this trace thread is closed. Farm GG consigned a red cow to the stockyard on June 21, 2000. This cow was later purchased by Farm D. The owner of Farm GG runs a feeding operation and normally purchases 350 to 450 lb steers and heifers for feeding out. He generally has fewer than 700 head at any one time. Farm GG reported selling the entire cow herd between late 2000 and early 2001. He has no recollection or records of the traced animal. Most of his cows at that time were purchased either through the stockyard or by private. He did not keep offspring of his cattle. No eligible animals remain on the farm for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.
Farm HH consigned two red cows to the stockyard on September 20, 2000. These cows were later purchased by Farm D. All cattle on Farm HH were sold at that time as part of a herd dispersal and none remaining on the farm are eligible for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed. Farm II consigned a red cow and calf pair to the stockyard on October 11, 2000. This cow was later purchased by Farm D. Farm II’s owner currently has 100 to 150 cows. He formerly had Beefmaster cattle but now has a herd of mixed crossbred cattle. He normally buys cows through the stockyard or from private individuals. After he brings them to his farm, he evaluates them by close examination. If he decides to keep the animal he tags it. Those that he decides not to retain are sold at the stockyard the next week. If any animal was sold from his farm without an ear tag, it would have been one of these that he resold immediately. On review of his records, the owner believes that the cow sold at the stockyard on October 11, 2000, was one that was purchased through the same stockyard on April 3, 2000. That cow was tagged on his farm with a green bangle tag #6. There was no tag in the index cow’s ear, nor was there evidence of a either a hole or scar. This cow is excluded as the index cow based on the known presence of an ear tag. This trace thread is closed. Results: In all, 25 farms were investigated as suppliers of cows that could have supplied the index cow to Farm D. All of these farms were excluded as the herd of origin of the Index Case. Therefore the trace back from Farm D is closed. 12 Investigation into Farm E Background: Farm E sold a red cow on August 11, 2004, 2 months pregnant, weighing 790 lbs. This cow was later purchased by Farm B. This animal is consistent with the weight, age, and stage of pregnancy of the index case at that time. Investigation: Farm E purchased two cows on January 17, 2000, that matched the color, approximate age, and stage of pregnancy of the index case. These cows had been purchased from Farm K and Farm L. Farm K sold an 18-month old red heifer through a stockyard that was later purchased by Farm E. The cow in question had been tested for brucellosis at the stockyard and an official brucellosis ear tag was placed in its ear. The cow was at the minimum age for tracing at the time of sale. Because all cattle on Farm K were dispersed in 2003 and no animals remain on the farm and because the index case had not been ear tagged. This traced is closed. Farm L consigned an 18-month old red cow to a stockyard on January 17, 2000, that was later purchased by Farm E. The cow in question had been tested for brucellosis at the stockyard and an official brucellosis ear tag was placed in its ear. The cow was also at the minimum age for tracing at the time of sale. There was only one animal present on Farm L from January 2000 at the time of the investigation in 2006. Because the cow being traced did not calve in this herd there were no animals eligible for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed. Farm E indicated that he may have kept some calves from red cows. DNA testing was conducted in Herd E to determine whether offspring of the index case were present. On March 31 blood samples were collected from all cattle that qualified by age as possible progeny of the cow being traced in order to determine if they could be genetically linked to the index case. Results received on April 8 indicated that no animals qualify as first generation offspring or full siblings of the index case. This trace thread is closed.
Results: Because both animals sold to Farm E had been identified with ear tags, and because either no animals were present or no animals were eligible for genetic matching on the farms supplying Farm L neither of these animals could have been the index case. The trace thread from Farm E is closed. Investigation into Farm F Background: Farm F sold a red cow with a calf on September 1, 2004, no age or pregnancy status available, weight 890 lbs. This cow was purchased by Farm B. This animal is consistent with the color and weight of the index case at that time. Investigation: The stockyard records indicated that this cow had a Charolais Cross bred steer at its side, which was sold for slaughter. 13 The owner of farm F had purchased the cow from Farm H through the stockyard. The cow was sold as lot #87 on April 9, 2003. Farm H identified the cow as having come from two possible sources, one of which was a purchased animal that was confirmed to be a Beefmaster breed, light red in color, and branded. This cow was excluded as the index case. The other possible animal might have been raised in the herd. If it had been raised in his herd it was possible that one animal that qualified as first generation progeny would still be presenting the herd. On March 29, blood samples were collected from all animals 18 months of age or older on Farm H. Results received on April 6 indicated that none of the animals qualified as offspring of the index case, including the one animal identified by the owner as the offspring of the cow being traced. This trace thread is closed.
The owner of Farm F also purchased another red cow from Farm I on the same day as determined by stockyard records. No animals remain on the premises of Farm I to be genetically compared to the index case. This trace thread is closed.
Results: Farm F did not retain any calves from his cows so no animals were eligible for genetic comparison. This trace thread is closed.
Summary: Despite a thorough investigation of two farms that were known to contain the index cow, and 35 other farms that might have supplied the index cow to the farms where the index case was known to have resided, the investigators were unable to locate the herd of origin. The index case did not have unique or permanent identification, plus, the size and color of the cow being traced is very common in the Southern United States. Due to the unremarkable appearance of solid red cows, it is not easy for owners to remember individual animals. In the Southern United States, it is common business practice to buy breeding age cows and keep them for several years while they produce calves. Most calves produced are sold the year they are born, whereas breeding cows are sold when there is a lapse in breeding, which can occur multiple times in cows’ lives. For all of these reasons, USDA was unable to locate the herd of origin.
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/EPI_Final5-2-06.pdf
AND WE KNOW WHERE THIS OTHER MAD COW WENT FROM TEXAS, WE JUST DON'T KNOW WHAT STRAIN $$$
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Statement May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.
FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.
FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).
FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.
To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.
Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.
FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.
####
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/new01061.html
ITEM 6 – BARB CASE CLUSTERS
39. Professor John Wilesmith (Defra) updated the committee on the
BSE cases born after the 1996 reinforced mammalian meat and
bone meal ban in the UK (BARB cases). Around 116 BARB cases
had been identified in Great Britain up to 22 November 2005,
mostly through active surveillance. BARB cases had decreased in
successive birth cohorts, from 44 in the 1996/1997 cohort to none
to date in the 2000/2001 cohort. However, 3 BARB cases had
been identified in the 2001/2002 cohort. Backcalculation of the
prevalence of BARB cases indicated a drop from 130 infected
animals per million (95% confidence interval 90-190) in the
1996/1997 cohort to 30 infected animals per million (95%
confidence interval 10-60) in the 1999/2000 cohort. A shift in the
geographical distribution of BSE cases, from the concentration of
pre-1996 BSE cases in Eastern England to a more uniform
14
© SEAC 2005
distribution of BARB cases, had occurred. However, it appeared
that certain post-1996 cohorts had a higher exposure to BSE in
certain areas for limited periods. Several clusters of BARB cases
within herds had been identified (5 pairs, 2 triplets and 1
quadruplet).
40. A triplet of BARB cases in South West Wales had been
investigated in detail. The triplet comprised 2 cases born in
September and October 2001 and a third in May 2002. The
animals born in 2001 were reared outdoors from the spring of 2002
but the animal born in 2002 had been reared indoors. Further
investigation of feeding practices revealed that a new feed bin for
the adult dairy herd had been installed in September 1998. In July
2002 the feed bin was emptied, but not cleaned, and relocated. All
3 BARB cases received feed from the relocated bin. This finding
suggested the hypothesis that the feed bin installed in September
1998 was filled initially with contaminated feed, that remnants of
this feed fell to the bottom of the bin during its relocation, and thus
young animals in the 2001/2002 birth cohort were exposed to
feedstuffs produced in 1998. No adult cattle had been infected
because of the reduced susceptibility to BSE with increasing age.
41. Further investigation of multiple case herds had found no
association of BARB clusters with the closure of feed mills.
42. Professor Wilesmith concluded that there is evidence of a decline
in risk of infection for successive birth cohorts of cattle. The BARB
epidemic is unlikely to be sustained by animals born after 31 July
2000. Feed bins could represent a continued source of occasional
infection and advice to farmers is being formulated to reduce this
risk. There is no evidence for an indigenous source of infection for
the BARB cases.
43. Members considered it encouraging that no other factor, apart from
feed contamination, had been identified as a possible cause of
BARB cases to date. Members commented that this study
suggests that only a small amount of contaminated feed may be
required for infection and that BSE infectivity can survive in the
environment for several years. Professor Wilesmith agreed and
noted that infection caused by small doses of infectious material
was consistent with other studies, and it would appear there is little
dilution of infectivity, if present, in the rendering system.
Additionally it appeared that the infectious agent had survived for 4
years in the feed bin.
44. The Chair thanked Professor Wilesmith for his presentation.
snip...
http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/final90.pdf
11/03/2009 00:54:58
Risk of Introduction of BSE into Japan by the Historical Importation of Live Cattle from the United Kingdom
http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2009/03/risk-of-introduction-of-bse-into-japan.html
Tuesday, March 10, 2009
JAPAN-Local governments to carry on BSE testing despite subsidy cuts
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/03/japan-local-governments-to-carry-on-bse.html
J. Virol. doi:10.1128/JVI.02561-07 Copyright (c) 2008, American Society for Microbiology and/or the Listed Authors/Institutions. All Rights Reserved.
Evaluation of the Human Transmission Risk of an Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Prion Strain Qingzhong Kong*, Mengjie Zheng, Cristina Casalone, Liuting Qing, Shenghai Huang, Bikram Chakraborty, Ping Wang, Fusong Chen, Ignazio Cali, Cristiano Corona, Francesca Martucci, Barbara Iulini, Pierluigi Acutis, Lan Wang, Jingjing Liang, Meiling Wang, Xinyi Li, Salvatore Monaco, Gianluigi Zanusso, Wen-Quan Zou, Maria Caramelli, and Pierluigi Gambetti* Department of Pathology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH 44106, USA; CEA, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, 10154 Torino, Italy; Department of Neurological and Visual Sciences, University of Verona, 37134 Verona, Italy
* To whom correspondence should be addressed. Email: mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000390/!x-usc:mailto:qxk2@case.edu. mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000390/!x-usc:mailto:pxg13@case.edu.
Abstract
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), the prion disease in cattle, was widely believed to have only one strain (BSE-C). BSE-C causes the fatal prion disease named new variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease in humans. Two atypical BSE strains, BASE (or BSE-L) and BSE-H, have been discovered in several countries since 2004; their transmissibility and phenotypes in humans are unknown. We investigated the infectivity and human phenotype of BASE by inoculating transgenic (Tg) mice expressing the human prion protein with brain homogenates from two BASE-affected cattle. Sixty percent of the inoculated Tg mice became infected after 20-22 months incubation, a transmission rate higher than those reported for BSE-C. A quarter of BASE-infected Tg mice, but none of the Tg mice infected with a sporadic human prion disease, showed presence of pathogenic prion protein isoforms in the spleen, indicating that the BASE prion is intrinsically lymphotropic. The pathological prion protein isoforms in BASE-infected humanized Tg mouse brains are different from those of the original cattle BASE or sporadic human prion disease. Minimal brain spongiosis and long incubation time are observed in the BASE-infected Tg mice. These results suggest that, in humans, BASE is a more virulent BSE strain and likely lymphotropic.
http://jvi.asm.org/cgi/content/abstract/JVI.02561-07v1?papetoc
personal communication that h type bse will transmit to humans ;
Wednesday, February 11, 2009 Atypical BSE North America Update February 2009
Greetings,
Considering that Mad Cow disease of all documented phenotypes, either the c-BSE, or the atypical h-BSE and or the l-BSE, ALL of which have been documented in North America, how many more, who knows, but they seem to be throwing all there marbles in the pot now by calling the h-type BSE 'familial'. what happens if we come up with another strain ? kinda like the sporadic FFI, that's not familial, what's that all about ? considering the many different strains of the typical scrapie 20+, and then the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, which the USA has documented 6 cases the last i heard, and the thought of more than one strain of CWD in deer and elk, where will the next year, 4 years, 8 years, and beyond take us in the world of human and animal Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy and 'sound science' in the USA ? WILL the New Administration see the enfamous enhanced bse surveillance program of 2004 for what it was, a fraud, and have a 'redo' ? WE can hope i suppose. ...TSS
Both of the BSE cases ascertained in the US native-born cattle were atypical cases (H-type), which contributed to the initial ambiguity of the diagnosis. 174, 185 In Canada, there have been 2 atypical BSE cases in addition to the 14 cases of the classic UK strain of BSE2: one was the H-type, and the other was of the L-type.198
snip...end
source :
Enhanced Abstract Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association January 1, 2009, Vol. 234, No. 1, Pages 59-72
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy
Jane L. Harman, DVM, PhD; Christopher J. Silva, PhD
http://avmajournals.avma.org/doi/ref/10.2460/javma.234.1.59
Thursday, December 04, 2008 2:37 PM
"we have found that H-BSE can infect humans."
personal communication with Professor Kong. ...TSS
see full text ;
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/atypical-bse-north-america-update.html
JOURNAL OF VIROLOGY, Apr. 2008, p. 3697–3701 Vol. 82, No. 7 0022-538X/08/$08.000 doi:10.1128/JVI.02561-07 Copyright © 2008, American Society for Microbiology. All Rights Reserved.
Evaluation of the Human Transmission Risk of an Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Prion Strain
Qingzhong Kong,1* Mengjie Zheng,1 Cristina Casalone,2 Liuting Qing,1 Shenghai Huang,1† Bikram Chakraborty,1 Ping Wang,1 Fusong Chen,1 Ignazio Cali,1 Cristiano Corona,2 Francesca Martucci,2 Barbara Iulini,2 Pierluigi Acutis,2 Lan Wang,1 Jingjing Liang,1 Meiling Wang,1 Xinyi Li,1 Salvatore Monaco,3 Gianluigi Zanusso,3 Wen-Quan Zou,1 Maria Caramelli,2 and Pierluigi Gambetti1* Department of Pathology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio 441061; CEA, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, 10154 Torino, Italy2; and Department of Neurological and Visual Sciences, University of Verona, 37134 Verona, Italy3 Received 30 November 2007/Accepted 16 January 2008
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), the prion disease in cattle, was widely believed to be caused by only one strain, BSE-C. BSE-C causes the fatal prion disease named new variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease in humans. Two atypical BSE strains, bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy (BASE, also named BSE-L) and BSE-H, have been discovered in several countries since 2004; their transmissibility and phenotypes in humans are unknown. We investigated the infectivity and human phenotype of BASE strains by inoculating transgenic (Tg) mice expressing the human prion protein with brain homogenates from two BASE straininfected cattle. Sixty percent of the inoculated Tg mice became infected after 20 to 22 months of incubation, a transmission rate higher than those reported for BSE-C. A quarter of BASE strain-infected Tg mice, but none of the Tg mice infected with prions causing a sporadic human prion disease, showed the presence of pathogenic prion protein isoforms in the spleen, indicating that the BASE prion is intrinsically lymphotropic. The pathological prion protein isoforms in BASE strain-infected humanized Tg mouse brains are different from those from the original cattle BASE or sporadic human prion disease. Minimal brain spongiosis and long incubation times are observed for the BASE strain-infected Tg mice. These results suggest that in humans, the BASE strain is a more virulent BSE strain and likely lymphotropic.
0022-538X/08/$08.000 doi:10.1128/JVI.02561-07 Copyright © 2008, American Society for Microbiology. All Rights Reserved. Evaluation of the Human Transmission Risk of an Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Prion Strain Qingzhong Kong,1* Mengjie Zheng,1 Cristina Casalone,2 Liuting Qing,1 Shenghai Huang,1† Bikram Chakraborty,1 Ping Wang,1 Fusong Chen,1 Ignazio Cali,1 Cristiano Corona,2 Francesca Martucci,2 Barbara Iulini,2 Pierluigi Acutis,2 Lan Wang,1 Jingjing Liang,1 Meiling Wang,1 Xinyi Li,1 Salvatore Monaco,3 Gianluigi Zanusso,3 Wen-Quan Zou,1 Maria Caramelli,2 and Pierluigi Gambetti1* Department of Pathology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio 441061; CEA, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, 10154 Torino, Italy2; and Department of Neurological and Visual Sciences, University of Verona, 37134 Verona, Italy3 Received 30 November 2007/Accepted 16 January 2008
TSS
snip...
Testimony
on behalf of the
National Cattlemen's Beef Association and Georgia Cattlemen's Association with regard to
Reviewing Animal Identification Systems
submitted to the
United States House of Representatives - Committee on Agriculture Subcommittee on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry
The Honorable David Scott, Chairman
submitted by
Bill Nutt President-elect Georgia Cattlemen's Association Member - NCBA Cattle Health and Well-Being Committee
March 11, 2009 Washington, DC
snip...
Our systems currently work effectively in response to competitive market driven forces. These systems were developed, and work well, under the concepts of the voluntary NAIS cooperatively developed by industry and involved agencies. I am very concerned, however, about the effects of the latest USDA proposals and initiatives. Moving to mandatory animal ID will change our system from a flexible, market-driven approach to a rigid bureaucratic system that gets in the way of good business management of our operations and adds additional risks and potential liabilities.
snip...
http://agriculture.house.gov/testimony/111/h031109/Nutt.doc
2. In an attempt to ensure compliance with the health and safety provisions contained in USDA's rule that reopened the Canadian border to imports of live Canadian cattle, despite Canada's ongoing BSE outbreak, USDA required, beginning in July 2005, that all Canadian imports be permanently and individually identified with eartags and brands (cattle imported in sealed trucks for immediate slaughter were exempted). However, the OIG reported that USDA did not adequately meet required health and safety provisions designed to prevent the introduction of BSE. In a March 2008 report, the OIG found that over 142,000 identified cattle and swine from Canada were slaughtered in U.S. slaughtering establishments without USDA ensuring that proper import protocols were in place, that USDA could not ensure that identified Canadian cattle even arrived at approved slaughtering establishments, and that there were 145 indications of non-compliance with the health and safety standards contained in the agency's rule. In addition, another OIG report revealed that USDA was not properly performing and/or enforcing ante-mortem inspections of cattle at slaughter and that a measure crucial to the protection of human health - the removal of specified risk materials (SRMs) - is not being performed properly, even at plants that slaughter cull cattle that have an inherently higher risk for BSE. Thus, while individual animal identification was touted as a mitigation measure to help prevent the introduction and spread of BSE, as well as to prevent human exposure to the disease, the mandatory individual identification of Canadian cattle functioned as a false panacea that has effectively subjected the U.S. cattle herd and consumers to increased health risks.
R-CALF USA fully supports the mandatory identification of all imported cattle with a permanent hot-iron brand that would conspicuously denote the animals' country-of-origin. However, the importation of foreign cattle subject to such mandatory animal identification should only be allowed following a scientific determination that the country-of-origin of the imported cattle presents no known risk for any serious communicable disease. Because mandatory animal identification can neither prevent the introduction of disease, nor even mitigate potential introduction of disease, the purpose of such mandatory animal identification for imported cattle would be to facilitate the location and monitoring of cattle imported from a country that experiences a communicable disease outbreak subsequent to the scientific determination that the disease was not known to exist in that country.
snip...
In other words, USDA decided to impose a national animal identification system on U.S. livestock producers and then it invented the need to achieve 48-hour disease traceback capabilities in order to justify and legitimize its pursuit.
snip...end
http://agriculture.house.gov/testimony/111/h031109/Thornsberry.doc
http://agriculture.house.gov/hearings/statements.html
they put in a 48-hour disease outbreak traceback many many years ago, except to this day, USDA et al have failed, up to one point about 8 months on that Texas mad cow, then 4 months on another suspect BSE that turned out to be negative in part in my opinion negative, due the way the sample was preserved. all this to hold back any other confirmations of BSE in the USA so the infamous OIE/USDA BSE MMR policy could go into effect. that made legal, the exporting of TSE tainted materials.
48 hour traceback for BSE mad cow disease in the USA ???
NOT in your lifetime !
8 YEARS IN REVIEW OF THE MAD COW DEBACLE IN THE USA ;
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Statement May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms
snip...full text ;
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/12/mad-cow-disease-usa-december-28-2008-8.html
PLEASE SEE ;
NOTIFICATION
Because of their responsibility for examining condemned or BSE-suspect animals, NVSL is the organization responsible for activating the notification and BSE response process. It is NVSL that will begin the activation of the BSE Response Plan. From the time a sample is submitted, it takes 14 to 18 days to confirm a diagnosis of BSE In the first 10 to 13 days, pathologists at NVSL have enough information to either rule out BSE or determine the need for additional tests. If it is determined that there is no evidence of BSE, the results are added to the more than 7,500 others that have also been negative. NVSL maintains these data. If additional tests do suggest a presumptive diagnosis of BSE, an NVSL pathologist will hand carry the sample to the United Kingdom for confirmation. It is at this critical point, when NVSL suggests a diagnosis of BSE and is preparing to send the sample to the United Kingdom, that this BSE Response Plan is initiated. The Plan begins the preliminary notification from NVSL to APHIS.
Prelimanary Notification
The director of NVSL is responsible for immediately notifying the APHIS, Veterinary Services (VS) deputy administrator when tests suggest a presumptive diagnosis of BSE. Once NVSL has made a presumptive diagnosis of BSE, APHIS and FSIS field activities will also be initiated. APHIS will receive notification (either confirming or not confirming NVSL's diagnosis) from the United Kingdom anywhere between 24 and 96 hours. (The international animal health community has recognized the United Kingdom's Central Veterinary Laboratory {CVL} as the world's reference laboratory for diagnosing BSE. Other countries, including Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Switzerland, have all sent samples to this lab to confirm their first case of BSE).
NVSL
NVSL will provide all laboratory support in carrying out this BSE Response Plan and serve as the liaison with CVL. NVSL will prepare its facility to receive and process additional samples from the suspect animal's progeny or herdmates or other suspects. NVSL will also coordinate any other assistance from State or university diagnostic laboratories if necessary.
FULL TEXT ;
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. (216-119-138-126.ipset18.wt.net) Subject: U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary Date: February 14, 2000 at 8:56 am PST
Subject: U.S. Emergency Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Response Plan Summary Date: Tue, 4 May 1999 18:25:12 -0500 From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy To: mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000390/!x-usc:mailto:BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas......
I thought it might be interesting for those of you who have not seen this plan, to do so. So here it is...........
The mission of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) is to enhance the quality of life for the American people by supporting production agriculture; ensuring a safe, affordable, nutritious, and accessible food supply; caring for agricultural, forest, and range lands; supporting sound development of rural communities; providing economic opportunities for farm and rural residents; expanding global markets for agricultural and forest products and services; and working to reduce hunger in America and throughout the world.
USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) is responsible for ensuring the health and care of animals and plants. APHIS improves agricultural productivity and competitiveness and contributes to the national economy and the public health. USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is responsible for protecting the Nation's meat and poultry supply--making sure it is safe, wholesome, unadulterated, and properly labeled and packaged. These two agencies have come together to lead USDA's actions in the prevention, monitoring, and control of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in the U.S. livestock and food supply. The public knows BSE as "MAD COW DISEASE", a disease linked to human cases of new-variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (nvCJD). USDA knows BSE as the disease that devastated the livestock industry in the United Kingdom and shattered consumer confidence in Europe. BSE has affected international trade and all aspects of the animal and public health communities. It has called even greater attention to the U.S. Government's accountability for a safe food supply. No case of BSE has ever been found in the United States. Since 1989, USDA has had a number of stringent safeguards in place to prevent BSE from entering the country. USDA conducts an ongoing, comprehensive interagency surveillance program for BSE. This surveillance program allows USDA to monitor actively for BSE to ensure immediate detection in the event that BSE were to be introduced into the United States. Immediate detection allows for swift response. As an emergency preparedness measure, USDA has developed this BSE Response Plan to be initiated in the event that a case of BSE is diagnosed in the United States. The Plan details comprehensive instructions for USDA staff as to who is to do what, when, where, and how in the event that BSE were to be diagnosed in the United States.
BACKGROUND
APHIS is responsible for being prepared for potential FOREIGN animal disease outbreaks. The purpose of such preparation is to provide a step-by-step plan of action in the event that a FOREIGN animal disease, such as BSE, is detected in the United States. These plans, often referred to as "RED BOOKS", provide guidance by outlining certain actions that should take place, such as identification of a suspect animal, laboratory confirmation, epidemiologic investigation, and animal and herd disposition activities. Copies of Red Books for specific FOREIGN animal diseases are distributed to agency headquarters and each regional and field office to have in preparation for a disease outbreak.
In 1990, APHIS developed a plan to respond to a confirmation of BSE in the United States. In August 1996, a joint APHIS-FSIS working group updated the BSE Red Book in accordance with current science and research surrounding BSE and the related family of disease called transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE's). The BSE Red Book is officially entitled BSE EMERGENCY DISEASE GUIDELINES. The APHIS-FSIS working group determined that the BSE Red Book, which detailed laboratory and field activities to be carried out in an emergency, needed another component. After the March 1996 announcement by the United Kingdom that BSE was linked to nvCJD, it became apparent to the working group that the Plan needed to address communication issues, both internally within USDA and the Federal Government and externally to the public at large. A confirmed case of BSE would affect such a vast array of stakeholders-consumers, cattle producers, the food animal industry, international trading partners, animal and public health communities, media, and others. Having clear, accurate information readily available would build trust and credibility and facilitate any response measures needed. There needed to be a notification plan. Who was responsible for notifying who, what, when, and how? The plan needed to identify clear channels of communication as to ensure immediate collection and dissemination of accurate information. The joint APHIS--FSIS working group became formally known as the BSE Response Team and is responsible for the development of this BSE Response Response Plan. BSE Response Team members represent a mix of backgrounds and expertise, including veterinary medicine, food safety, public health, epidemiology, pathology, international trade, and public affairs. The Team is coordinatied by two Team Leaders, one each from APHIS and FSIS, who serve as liaisons and technical advisors to their respective agencies on regulations and policies regarding BSE. Over the past 2 years, the BSE Response Plan has been reviewed, edited, revised, and approved by officials at all levels of APHIS, FSIS, and USDA. The Plan has also been shared with other Government agencies, such as the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), and other stakeholders, such as the Animal Ag Coalition. The BSE Response Team monitors and assesses all ongoing events and research findings regarding TSE's. The Team leaders are responsible for ensuring that prevention and diagnostic measures are continually revised and adjusted as new information and knowledge become available.
NOTIFICATION: Roles and Responsibilities
Surveillance
As part of USDA's surveillance program for BSE in the United States, veterinary pathologists and field investigators from APHIS and FSIS have received training from British counterparts in diagnosing BSE. FSIS inspects cattle before they go to slaughter; these inspection procedures include identifying animals with central nervous system conditions. Animals with such conditions are considered suspect for BSE, prohibited from slaughter, and referred to APHIS for examination as explained below. Pathologists at APHIS National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) histopathologically examine the brains from these condemned animals. In addition, samples are tested using a technique called immunohistochemistry, which tests for the presence of the protease-resistant prion protein (a marker for BSE). NVSL also examines samples from neurologically ill cattle and nonambulatory ("DOWNER") cattle identified on the farm or at slaughter and from rabies-negative cattle submitted to veterinary diagnostic laboratories and teaching hospitals.
NOTIFICATION
Because of their responsibility for examining condemned or BSE-suspect animals, NVSL is the organization responsible for activating the notification and BSE response process. It is NVSL that will begin the activation of the BSE Response Plan. From the time a sample is submitted, it takes 14 to 18 days to confirm a diagnosis of BSE In the first 10 to 13 days, pathologists at NVSL have enough information to either rule out BSE or determine the need for additional tests. If it is determined that there is no evidence of BSE, the results are added to the more than 7,500 others that have also been negative. NVSL maintains these data. If additional tests do suggest a presumptive diagnosis of BSE, an NVSL pathologist will hand carry the sample to the United Kingdom for confirmation. It is at this critical point, when NVSL suggests a diagnosis of BSE and is preparing to send the sample to the United Kingdom, that this BSE Response Plan is initiated. The Plan begins the preliminary notification from NVSL to APHIS.
Prelimanary Notification
The director of NVSL is responsible for immediately notifying the APHIS, Veterinary Services (VS) deputy administrator when tests suggest a presumptive diagnosis of BSE. Once NVSL has made a presumptive diagnosis of BSE, APHIS and FSIS field activities will also be initiated. APHIS will receive notification (either confirming or not confirming NVSL's diagnosis) from the United Kingdom anywhere between 24 and 96 hours. (The international animal health community has recognized the United Kingdom's Central Veterinary Laboratory {CVL} as the world's reference laboratory for diagnosing BSE. Other countries, including Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Switzerland, have all sent samples to this lab to confirm their first case of BSE).
NVSL
NVSL will provide all laboratory support in carrying out this BSE Response Plan and serve as the liaison with CVL. NVSL will prepare its facility to receive and process additional samples from the suspect animal's progeny or herdmates or other suspects. NVSL will also coordinate any other assistance from State or university diagnostic laboratories if necessary.
APHIS, VS DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
Veterinary Services is the animal health arm of APHIS and the program responsible for carrying out field actions in response to BSE. Upon notifiction of a presumptive diagnosis from NVSL, the APHIS, VS deputy administrator immediately notifies the FSIS, Office of Public Health and Science (OPHS) deputy administrator. APHIS and FSIS deputy administrators will alert the BSE Response Team and activate the Response Plan. The VS deputy administrator serves as the liaison between the BSE Response Team and the APHIS administrator. The APHIS, VS deputy administrator notifies the APHIS administrator and the VS regional director of the State from which the suspect animal originated.
APHIS Administrator
The APHIS Administrator immediately notifies the USDA Assistant Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs. This immediate notification will be followed by an official informational memorandum from the APHIS Administrator, through the Assistant Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs, to the Secretary of Agriculture. This memorandum will be prepared by the BSE Response Team; a draft is maintained by the Team leaders in the reserved section of their plans. The APHIS Administrator is responsible for securing indemnity funds for depopulation of the herd if CVL confirms NVSL's diagnosis.
Assistant Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs
The Assistant Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs, in conjuction with the Undersecretary for Food Safety, is responsible for notifying the Secretary. The Assistant Secretary serves as the liaison between APHIS and Department-level officials.
Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary has the authority to declare a Federal EMERGENCY if appropriate and approve funding as necessary. Information will be provided to the Secretary up the chain of command from the BSE Response Team.
FSIS, OPHS Deputy Administrator
The OPHS Deputy Administrator, together with the APHIS, VS Deputy Administrator, alert the BSE Response Team leaders and instruct them to assemble the BSE Response Team and activate the Plan. The OPHS Deputy Administrator serves as the liaison between the BSE Response Team and the FSIS Administrator. The OPHS Deputy Administrator is responsible for notifying the FSIS regional director in charge of the State from which the suspect animal originated.
FSIS Deputy Administrator
The FSIS Deputy Administrator is responsible for notifying the Undersecretary for Food Safety.
Undersecretary for Food Safety
The Undersecretary for Food Safety, in conjuction with the Assistant Secretary for Marketing and Regulatory Programs, notifies the Secretary of Agriculture.
APHIS, VS, Regional Director
The APHIS, VS regional director in charge of the State from which the suspect animal originated notifies the VS Area Veterinarian-in-Charge (AVIC) for that State. The regional director is the liaison between VS field staff and the VS Deputy Administrator at headquarters. In addition, the regional director shares all information with the BSE Response Team.
APHIS, VS, AVIC
The VS AVIC, in cooperation with State animal health authorities, is responsible for coordination the field activities surrounding the emergency response to BSE. The AVIC assembles the local VS staff to initiate activities outlined in the BSE Red Book including tracing the progeny and herdmates of the suspect animal and beginning an epidemiologic investigation. The VS AVIC coordinates with the State Veterinarian to quarantine the suspect animal's herd of origin. The State has the authority to order a routine quarantine for a neurological disease. The BSE Response Team surveyed every State to determine if they would utilize this authority in the event that NVSL identifies a presumptive diagnosis of BSE. All States responded that they would issue a quarantine.
BSE Response Team
The BSE Response Team leaders will notify each team member and instruct them to assemble in the Situation Room at APHIS headquarters in Riverdale, MD. The Team leaders are responsible for ensuring that all of the Team's duties are fulfilled. It is their responsibility to ensure that the technical information and expert recommendations reach the decisionmakers in a timely fashion. Together with VS Emergency Programs staff, the Team leaders will obtain APHIS, VS administrative support staff in Riverdale, MD, to ready the room for use as BSE headquarters. The Team will begin gathering and assembling information from APHIS and FSIS region and field staff. The Team will pull the draft documents from the third section in the Team leaders manuals and begin filling in current information as it becomes available.
Public Notification
Should NVSL receive notice from CVL confirming a case of BSE, the next level of notification is activated. Each player will follow the same notification protocol as described above for preliminary notification to confirm the diagnosis of a case of BSE.
BSE Response Team
The BSE Response Team will complete the informational memorandum for the Secretary. The Team will prepare the letter to the Office of International Epizootics (OIE), the international animal health organization, for signature by the APHIS, VS Deputy Administrator. OIE requires that all countries submit official notification within 24 hours of confirming a diagnosis of BSE. The BSE Response Team and the office of the APHIS, VS Deputy Administrator would coordinate a teleconference to inform all APHIS regional directors and AVIC'S. The BSE Response Team and the office of the FSIS, OPHS Deputy Administrator would coordinate a teleconference to inform all regional and field FSIS offices. The BSE Response Team would coordinate a teleconference to notify other Federal agencies. The BSE Response Team would coordinate a teleconference to notify key industry/consumer representatives. The BSE Response Team and APHIS International Services would notify foreign embassies. The BSE Response Team would establish a toll-free 800 telephone line for industry representatives, reporters, and the public. The BSE Response Team would coordinate with APHIS Legislative and Public Affairs and USDA office of Communications to issue a press release the day the diagnosis is confirmed. The press release would announce a press conference to be held the morning after the diagnosis is confirmed......
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. (216-119-138-129.ipset18.wt.net) Subject: Emergency Operations...BSE Red Book Date: March 13, 2000 at 1:30 pm PST
BSE Red Book 2.1-35
7.0 Emergency Operations
The section below would be implemented only after a first case of BSE is confirmed in the United States.
7.1 READEO Activation
READEO activation will rarely be necessary for BSE outbreaks. Different from most other foreign animal diseases and infectious diseases, BSE is not a rapidly spreading, acute epizootic; is not thought to be transmitted horizontally between animals within a herd, has an extremely long incubation period, and usually affects only isolated single animals or, at most, a few animals within herds. Because BSE does not spread rapidly, the workload to investigate and manage most outbreaks should not normally exceed the capability of existing local field personnel. READEO activation should be considered only if the particular circumstances of a BSE outbreak warrant. If field personnel feel they are unable to manage a BSE outbreak, they should communicate this to their Regional Director and VS, Emergency Program staff, who will evaluate the need for READEO activation.
7.2 READEO Organization
If READEO is activated, a reference should be made to the revised READEO Manual for further guidance on READEO organization and operations.
7.2.1 Office of the Director When an animal disease emergency exists, the Task Force Directors are responsible for the READEO activities. The directors immediately move to the location of the outbreak and setup the READEO headquarters. Work is coordinated with State officials of the States involved in the outbreak. 7.2.1.1 State Director--(Note: This is the new designation for the Assistant Director.) Each READEO may have one or more State Directors since each State where the disease outbreak is found will be represented in the READEO by State officials designated by the State Veterinarian. 7.2.1.2 Emergency Program Officer--This individual, designated by the Chief Staff Veterinarian of VS, Emergency Programs, provides liaison between the READEO and the Emergency Programs at APHIS headquarters. 7.2.1.3 Public Affairs Officer--The Public Affairs Officer plans, develops, supervises, and maintains information activities for the READEO. 7.2.1.4 Legal--The Legal Advisor provides counsel and assistance to the READEO. 7.2.1.5 Military--The U.S. Armed Forces Command will designate a senior line officer to be the Military Support Officer on the staff of the READEO Task Force Directon The individual is assigned to be the liaison between the Depart-
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ment of Defense and VS, Emergency Programs,and to coordinate needed military assistance during eradication of an FAD outbreak. 7.2.1.6 Meat and Poultry Inspection Operations--The Meat and Poultry Inspection Operations, Food Safety and Inspection Service, will designate personnel to report to the READEO Task Director and to provide liaison between the Task Force and the Meat and Poultry Inspection Operations. 7.2.1.7 Laboratory Coordination--The Laboratory Coordination Officer will advise the READE(3 Director concerning laboratory capabilities and appropriate laboratory examinations to be conducted to provide needed results as rapidly as possible. This individual will assist with interpretation of results.
7.2.2 Administration The Administrative Officer assigned to the READEO will direct and coordinate all facets of general administrative functions. Refer to the revised READEO Manual for a detailed description of the organization and responsibilities.
7.2.3 Field Operations The Field Operations Officer will direct line operations and supervise field personnel in a READEO. Disease investigation, field epidemiology, disease security and personnel security, animal movement control and quarantine enforcement, appraisals of animals and materials, depopulation and disposal, and cleaning and disinfection are among this person's responsibilities.
7.2.4 Technical Support Staff support consists of a technically competent staff designed to act as a resource for the READEO Task Force. Personnel may include but are not limited to individuals who have expertise in the following areas: animal welfare, data systems, disease reporting, economics, environmental impact, epidemiology, evaluation, orientation and training, risk analysis, and wildlife. The staff communicates the needs of the Field Epidemiology Delivery System (FEDS) to the READEO Director as required to maintain an efficient, accurate, up-to-date FEDS. 7.2.4.1 Animal Welfare---Animal Welfare Officers must be knowledgeable about current Federal and State animal welfare regulations, humane methods of animal depopulation, and socioeconomic concerns related to animal welfare issues. They advise the technical support staff and field operations concerning current procedures and accepted methods for use in the humane depopulation of livestock and poultry. 7.2.4.2 Wildlife-- Wildlife Officers participate with the Director and other officials of the READEO to establish and carry out wildlife policies and objectives for the emergency animal disease operation. Through familiarity with the topography, wildlife density, susceptible wildlife species, and movements of susceptible wildlife, the Wildlife Officers can review maps and make recommendations concerning areas to be included in the quarantined high-risk and buffer zones. These officers maintain contact with local, State, and Federal wildlife enforcement officers and wildlife biologists. They develop strategies for conducting surveys of susceptible wi!dlife in the outbreak
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area to determine the incidence of the disease. They direct and coordinate the vaccination and depopulation of wild animals as necessary to eliminate the disease.
7.3 Supplies and Equipment
During an outbreak of BSE, supplies and equipment should be obtained through normal procurement procedures. If a READEO is activated, supplies and equipment should be ordered through the READEO Procurement and Supply Officer.
7.3.1 General Field Supplies Guidelines Refer to APHIS Directive 326.1, 10/10/77 and 221.1, 1/29/74.
7.4 Personnel Responsibilities
During a BSE outbreak, field personnel should follow instructions issued through the normal chain of command. If a READEO is activated, personnel should refer to the revised READEO Manual for detailed descriptions of individual responsibilities.
7.4.1 Personnel Personnel assigned to the READEO Task Force are individually accountable for equipment and supplies checked out to them. They should order replacement equipment and supplies or return equipment for repairs through the READEO Procurement and Supply Officer. All damages or losses to equipment or vehicles should be reported immediately to the READEO Administrative Officer, and the required forms should be completed and submitted promptly.
7.4.2 Travel Employees of the READEO Task Force are responsible for recording and preparing all travel-related documents. Claims for travel, lodging, per diem, and incidental expenses should be submitted to the READEO Administrative Officer for processing.
7.4.3 Vehicles Employees of the READEO Task Force are responsible for operating, cleaning, and performing routine maintenance of assigned vehicles. They also are responsible for recording mileage, expenses, and services. Required reports are to be submitted to the READEO Vehicle Officer.
7.4. 4 Clothing Employees of the READEO Task Force are issued protective clothing to wear when entering a premises where BSE has been diagnosed or is suspected. Clean clothing should be worn on each premises. Employees are responsible for laundering the clothing before reusing it.
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In a large task-foree operation, arrangements may be made for a commercial laundry service to handle the clothing. If it is possible and practical, all clothing should be labeled to identify the employees to whom it is assigned.
7.4.5 Miscellaneous Responsibilities Employees are responsible for conducting their assigned tasks in a professional manner. Complaints concerning task force employees should be directed to the READEO Director for resolution or appropriate action.
All animals, products, and materials to be destroyed because of BSE should be appraised according to 9 CFR 53.3 and appropriate State regulations.
7.5.1 Appraisal Teams Appraisals must represent the interests of the owner, the State, and the Federal Government and be consistent with fair market values. If State authorities approve, State and Federal interests may be represented by a VS employee alone. Owners may, at their discretion and expense, employ a professional appraiser to advise them or to act as their agent. Either the owner or the owner's agent must be present at appraisals. No animals may be destroyed until after the appraisal forms are signed by the owner or the owner's agent. Appraisers should be certain that the owner or the owner's agent is aware of the indemnity form's clause concerning liens and mortgages. When the number of animals to be destroyed is small, and the total value of animals, products, and materiais is low, APHIS field personnel may negotiate the appraised value with the animal's owner without assistance from a professional appraiser. The appraised value of a BSE suspect should be the slaughter value of the animal, taking into account any existing defects or diseases that would affect the slaughter value but ignoring those signs that caused the animal to be classified as a BSE suspect. If field personnel are in doubt concerning the need to use a professional appraiser, they should consult their supervisor or VS, Emergency Programs staff. If a determination is made that healthy progeny, ova, semen, or embryos must be destroyed, they should be appraised at 100 percent of replacement value. Feeds or feed ingredients located on suspect farms will rarely need to be destroyed. If a determination is made that feeds or feed ingredients must be destroyed (for example, to comply with a policy decision to remove all rendered products from animal feeds), then these materials should be appraised and indemn'ff~ed according to 9 CFR 53.3.
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7.6 Depopulation Procedures
7.6.1 Factors and Considerations If the owner is agreeable, a humane method of euthanasia of BSE suspects will be necessary to facilitate the accurate diagnosis of the disease problem, to ensure that the suspect animal is not slaughtered or rendered, and to terminate the animal's suffering. Under no circumstances may BSE suspects be sent fo slaughhter or rendering. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that the carcass of a BSE-confirmed animal has moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing. The VS, Emergency Programs staff, Riverdale, MD, must authorize the use of euthanasia, depopulation, and indemnity payments for READEO operations.
7.6.2 Humane Euthanasia Methods Only experienced veterinarians should perform euthanasia because there are inherent dangers. Precautions should be taken to prevent accidents. Owners should be given a complete explanation of what to expect, and only humane euthanasia methods should be used. Euthanasia should be performed away from public view, and, if possible, the owner should not be present. Euthanized animals must be checked to confirm death. (See VS Memo 583.1, 1992.) 7.6.2.1 Mechanical (Firearms)--Because the only acceptable method for euthanizing an animal by using firearms is to shoot it in the head, and because the animal's brain must be preserved to diagnose BSE, firearms are not an acceptable euthanasia method. 7.6.2.2 Chemicals(Toxic Gas or Lethal Injection)--Follow guidelines established by the American Veterinary Medical Association. When using a regulated controlled substance (e.g., barbiturates), control and administration of the euthanasia agent must be given by a veterinarian having a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) number issued by the U.S. Treasury. Control and administration of chemical substances for euthanasia must be authorized by the AVIC unless directed by the VS Deputy Administrator. (See VS Memorandum 583.1, 1992.)
7.6.3 Supervision of Depopulation Field personnel should never perform depopulation or euthanasia without explicit permission from their supervisor or, if appropriate, the READEO Humane and Disposal Officer. (Refer to the revised READEC) Manual.)
7. 6.4 Permits for Movement All BSE suspects may be moved under permit to facilitate medical treatment, euthanasia, necropsy examination, or carcass disposal. Permitted movement will be according to the quarantine restrictions and will be administered by the State or Federal officials.
7. 6. 5 Security Because BSE is neither contagious nor vector borne, strict disease security measures are not necessary. Personnel should observe normal disease security measures that are standard procedure for all farm visits. The READEO's Security and Disease Prevention Officer has the responsibility for establishing biosecurity measures.
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7.7 Disposal Under no circumstances may BSE suspects be sent to slaughter or rendering. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that the carcass of a BSE-confirmed animal has moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing. Field personel should arrange for the carcass to be transported to and examined by a qualified veterinary pathologist or field veterinary medical officer. After the pathologic examination has been completed and the necessary diagnostic specimens have been obtained, field personnel should arrange for disposal of the carcass. Before a method of disposal is selected, there are many factors that must be considered, and often other State and Federal agencies must be consulted. The environmental and legal impacts of the operation must be considered. Upon recommendation of the State or Federal agencies, VS may consider other disposal methods.
7.7.1 Incineration Incineration, although more expensive than burial, is the preferred disposal method for BSE-suspect carcasses. Federal, State, and local environmental regulations may restrict the use of this method and permits may be necessary. As soon as BSE suspects are reported to APHIS, field personnel should investigate the location and availability of incinerators of sufficient size to process a bovine carcass. Institutions likely to have incinerators include State and university diagnostic laboratories, waste contractors, large municipalities, and private industries. Ideally, the diagnostic laboratory where the pathologic examination was done will have incineration facilities. The BSE-suspect carcass disposal is APHIS' responsibility (not the diagnostic laboratory's). Field personnel should arrange for transportation and final disposal of the suspect carcass and should inform their supervisors and/or the READEO Humane and Disposal Officer of these arrangements. Personnel should be aware that some laboratories dispose of carcasses by rendering and should specifically inquire if this is the case. CNS suspects should be incinerated or held from rendering until a diagnosis of BSE can be ruled out. Under no circumstances may BSE susuects be sent to slaughter or rendering. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that the carcass of a BSE-confirmed animal has moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing. Field personnel should be prepared to accompany the carcass from the farm of origin to the diagnostic laboratory and then to the disposal site if any doubt exists concerning the final disposal method.
7.7.2 Burial If there are no other avenues for carcass disposal, burial of BSE-suspect carcasses may be an acceptable disposal method. APHIS field personnel should inquire with environmental authorities concerning Federal, State, and local regulations that may impose restrictions on this method. The burial site may be on the affected farm, at the diagnostic laboratory where the carcass is examined, or in a local landfill. The site should be inaccessible to animals, removed from populated areas, not used for agricultural purposes, clearly marked, and properly protected.
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Burial sites should also be located a sufficient distance from underground utility lines, septic systems, water wells, and surface water. Local environmental or public works officers may be helpful in locating a satisfactory site. Field personnel should consult with their supervisors and/or the READEO Environmental Impact Officer before digging. Burial trenches are normally at least 9 feet deep with floor dimensions of 7 by 2 feet per adult bovine carcass. Carcasses should be covered with at least 6 feet of soil. This soil should not be tightly packed because gas formation may cause a tightly packed trench to crack and leak.
7.7.3 Rendering Because BSE is spread by rendered animal protein, BSE-suspect and confirmed carcasses must not be rendered, unless the rendered material is incinerated. Notify FDA, CVM if you suspect that dead BSE animals or carcasses have moved to rendering or animal feed manufacturing.
7.7.4 Other Disposal Methods The AVIC, the State animal health officials, and the READEO Director may recommend other methods of disposal to the Deputy Administer, VS, for approval (9 CFR 53.4). Options for disposal must be discussed and approved by VS, Emergency Programs staff and must comply with all State and local Environmental Protection Agency regulations.
7.8 Cleaning and Disinfecting (C&D)
Although BSE is neither contagious nor vector borne, appropriate C&D is required to prevent farm-to-farm transmission of most other infectious diseases. Field personnel must remember, however, that at the time they are requested to euthanize a BSE-suspect animal, a confirmed diagnosis of BSE will not be available. Signs compatible with BSE may be caused by numerous infectious diseases and many BSE-suspect animals will, in fact, have some other disease. Although the C&D of items such as manure, bedding, feed, stalls, halters, milking machines, and other supplies and equipment that have been in contact with BSE suspects is not specifically necessary to control BSE, C&D is still advisable to control other diseases that may be present.
7.8.1 Procedures for Cleaning and Disinfecting 7.8.1.1 Premises and Items--Field personnel are not responsible for C&D of premises such as barns, stalls, and animal pens unless invasive diagnostic procedures (such as a necropsy examination or the removal of the suspect animal's brain) were performed on the premises. If possible, field personnel should avoid doing such procedures on the farm. If circumstances require that such procedures must be done on the farm, personnel should clean and disinfect the immediate area after completing the work. 7.8.1.2 Vehicles--Vehicles used to transport personnel to affected premises should be kept clean, and normal precautions against the farm-to-farm spread of any disease should be observed.
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BSE Red Book 2.1-42
7,8.1.3 Carriers--Thoroughly clean trucks and trailers transporting BSE suspects. Manure and bedding may be disposed of by any environmentally accepted method such as spreading on fields or composting. After conveyances have been thoroughly cleaned, disinfectant should be sprayed on the sides and floor of the truck bed. 7.8.1.4 Livestock Markets--The risk of BSE transmission at livestock markets is negligible. If a BSE suspect is found at a livestock market, it should be managed the same as if it were found at a farm. Because of the high risk of transmission of diseases other than BSE, invasive diagnostic procedures, such as a necropsy examination or removal of the suspect animal's head, should not be performed at livestock markets. Due to the recent research findings concerning maternal transmission, any pens or areas in which calving occurs should be thoroughly cleaned and disinfected. Cleaning and disinfection is not necessary to prevent the spread of BSE. However, the C&D procedures are recommended to prevent the spread of other diseases from pens or buildings where BSE suspects were held. 7.8.1.5 Slaughter Plants--Becanse BSE is spread by rendered animal protein in cattle feeds, BSE suspects must not be slaughtered nor rendered. If a BSE suspect is found at a slaughter plant, it should be managed similarly to finding a suspect at a farm.
7.8.2 Approved Disinfectants Field personnel should use professional judgment in the choice of a disinfectant. Preferred disinfectants to inactivate the BSE agent include 1N sodium hydroxide solution or sodium hypochlorite solution containing 2 percent chlorine (1 hour exposure at 20 %C [68 %F]). This should be used whenever there is reason to strongly suspect that BSE is in fact the cause of the suspect animal's disease. Such reasons include previously confirmed BSE in the geographic area or signs more compatible with BSE than with any other neurologic disease. If the suspect animal's signs are more compatible with diseases such as rabies or listeriosis, then a phenolic disinfectant such as "One Stroke" may be preferable. (Refer to appendix A Survival of BSE Agent and sec. 1.4.4.)
7. 8. 3 Precautions All disinfectants are hazardous to human beings, animals, and the environment. Label directions should be carefully read and followed. Many disinfectants, including sodium hypochlorite solution, are also corrosive and should be used with caution on metal and other corrodible materials. Thorough rinsing is necessary if corrosive disinfectants are used on metallic items. Disinfectants, especially in concentrated form, may irritate skin, eyes, and respiratory systems. Protective equipment such as appropriate clothing, rubber boots, rubber gloves, mask and goggles should be worn during mixing and application of disinfectants. If areas of the body are exposed to a disinfectant, they should be washed thoroughly with water. Employees should notify their supervisor and their Health and Safety Officer if excessive human or animal exposure to disinfectants occurs or if there is accidental release into the environment.
October l998
BSE Red Book 2.1-43
Field personnel should use normal hygienic procedures (such as washing and disinfecting boots and removing the outer layer of clothing) when leaving the farm. Unless the disease problem is noncontagious, personnel should not travel to other livestock premises for the duration of that day.
7.9 Vector Control
Current scientific data indicate that BSE is not spread by vectors.
7.10 Disease Prevention and Philosophy
The goal of disease prevention and control is to confine the occurrence of BSE to as few herds as possible and to prevent recycling of the BSE agent in the ruminant food supply. If undiagnosed cases are rendered and included in ruminant rations, the long incubation period may allow many animals to be exposed. Action should be taken immediately after the detection and confirmation of BSE to initiate an extensive epidemiologic investigation to determine the source and extent of the disease, to stop the spread, and to eradicate the disease. 7.10.1 Philosophy--Immediate action should be taken to prevent contamination of the animal food supply by prohibiting rendering of any infected or suspect bovine carcasses. In addition, care should be taken to monitor those animals born and raised in affected herds and to prevent their becoming a source of infection to other herds. 7.10.2 Agent Spread--Epidemiologic evidence indicates that the primary route of BSE transmission is through the feeding of contaminated meat and bone meal that has been manufactured using scrapie infected sheep carcasses or BSE infected bovine carcasses. Recent research findings suggest that maternal transmission may occur at a rate of approximately 1 percent in some species. It is believed that this route of transmission is not significant enough to maintain an epidemic. Cases of apparent maternal transmission have also been identified in captive exotic ruminants. 7.10.3 Control of Products and Conveyances--Carcasses of BSE suspects should be incinerated. Carcasses must not be rendered and incorporated in animal feed. If carcasses are transported for disposal, conveyances should be cleaned and disinfected after use with either a sodium hypochlorite solution (2 percent available chlorine) or 1 N lye (sodium hydroxide solution). 7.10.4 Control of Biologics and Drugs--Although no documented cases of BSE have resulted from the use of biologics derived from bovines, tissues from suspect or exposed animals must not be used for the production of biologics and drugs. The agents responsible for causing the transmissible spongiform encephalopathies are highly resistant to normal inactivation processes. Careful selection of source materials is the best way to secure maximum safety of ingredients or reagents of bovine origin used in the manufacture of biologics or other medicinals. Factors that should be considered are the age of the animals, exposure to the agent, and the tissue or organ from which the product is derived.
October 1998
BSE Red Book 2.1-44
7.10.5 Wild Birds, Wind and Insects---Wild birds, wind and insects are not known factors in the spread of BSE. 7.10.6 Rodents--Rodents are not known factors in the spread of BSE. 7.10.7 Hunting--Restrictions on the hunting of wild animals are not necessary to prevent BSE. 7.10.8 Exhibitions--Cancelling scheduled exhibitions is not necessary. 7.10.9 Rendering Trucks and Drivers--The carcasses from BSE suspects must not be rendered. If any rendering truck is used to transport a suspect, it should be cleaned, washed, and disinfected as above. (Refer to appendix A--Agent Survival and sec. 7.8.2--Disinfectants.) 7.10.10 Treatment--Currently there is no known treatment for BSE. 7.10.11 Prevention--Suspects and animals confirmed to have BSE must not be rendered. Producers, feed mills, and rendering establishments should adhere to U.S. State and local rendering policies and FDA regulations concerning the feeding of rendered animal protein to ruminants. Because of the possibility that some transmissible spongiform encephalopathies may be transmitted at the time of parturition, precautions should be taken to prevent exposure of healthy animal to placenta and reproductive fluids. Importation of live animals and animal products from countries with BSE or having high risk factors for BSE should be restricted based upon scientific risk assessment. 7.10.11.1 Immunization--The agent that causes BSE elicits no detectable immune response in the host. Therefore, vaccination is not a viable option. There is no vaccine currently developed for BSE or other TSE's. 7.10.11.2 Sanitation--Although it is unknown whether a contaminated environment plays any role in the spread of BSE, it is suggested that pens having contained BSE-infected animals be cleaned and disinfected. The disinfectants o choice are sodium hydroxide (lye) and sodium hypochlorite, in infected herds it is also advisable that all placentas be removed promptly and buried or incinerated. The calving pens also should be cleaned and disinfected. 7.10.113 Producer Defense---The most effective way to prevent an intruduction of BSE into a herd is not to feed ruminant byproducts to ruminants. As of August 4, 1997, the FDA has a ban in place which prohibits the feeding of most mammlian proteins to ruminants.
7.11 Records Maintenance in a Foreign Animal Disease Outbreak
The APHIS FEDS will be used by the READEO to record information. FEDS a computerized network designed to transmit accurate information rapidly during any emergency disease outbreak. The use of FEDS will allow the READEO to direct its attention to the minute-to-minute business of containing and eradicating the disease. For an accurate record of the activities, all field supervisors in a READEO task force should maintain a diary. Activities and observations should be recorded in the diary when they occur. Date all documents and enter events by time and date to show a correct chronology. Enter events as they occur in the diary as well. An accurate history is of considerable value in developing policies and plans for future disease-eradication
October 1998
BSE Red book 2.1-45
programs, and it may be important if there is litigation. A diary will be helpful for day-to-day administration of funds, personnel, and equipment. It is also useful as a later reference in preparing reports and summaries of activities.
7.11.1 Daily Reporls Submit daily reports of significant activities to the READEO Director and the VS, Emergency Programs staff Riverdale, MD. (Refer to appendix F for current telephone listings.) Include the following as part of the historical file of an outbreak:
*Maps showing premises where BSE-infected animals were found; *Inventory of feeds and feed sources; *Origin of BSE-suspeet and confirmed animals; *Public information material distributed, newspaper clippings; and, Administrative reports to support the expenditure of funds, utilization of personnel and equipment, and disposition of excess materials and equipment at the end of the program.
7.11.2 Distribution The VS, Emergency Programs staff will distribute reports of significant activities to all AVIC's, State cooperators, and industry cooperators at least weekly. As soon as significant events occur, Emergency Programs will inform all APHIS headquarters units through normal reporting channels. Emergency Programs also will immediately report any significant events to the Deputy Administrator, VS, who will immediately advise the APHIS Administrator, especially of legal or politically important events. A weekly summary report of control and eradication activities will be provided to the APHIS Administrator and the Deputy Administrator, VS. See BSE Response Plan, communications section.
7.11.3 Disposition Records should be maintained until a historical account of the program has been prepared and all pertinent information has been gleaned from the records. Furthermore, all records should be maintained if there may be legal action pending as a result of the program activities. Usually, administrative records are maintained a minimum of 3 years for audit purposes.
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. (216-119-138-126.ipset18.wt.net) Subject: Hunkering down in the APHIS BSE Situation Room... Date: February 14, 2000 at 9:04 am PST
Subject: hunkering down in the APHIS BSE Situation Room Date: Wed, 12 May 1999 01:55:54 -0800 From: tom Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy To: mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000390/!x-usc:mailto:BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de
i am looking now a bizarre Oct 98 internal USDA publication describing a james bond-type US effort to control media should the long-anticipated first case of BSE in the US be admitted.
'Players' on the 27 member BSE Response Team are to be flown in from all over the country to a BSE Headquarters 'situation room' apparently an underground bunker in Riverdale, Maryland under the command of the Assistant Secretary of Marketing.
Authentic press releases are already prepared and ready to go out after a few specifics have been filled in. They are spelled out in a separate document, the BSE Red Book, aka BSE Emergency Disease Guidelines.
Aphis' National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) activates team assembly. From the time a bovine brain sample is submitted, it takes 14-18 days to confirm a diagnosis of BSE. In the first 10-13 days, NVSL have enough information to determine the need for additional tests. If a provisional BSE diagnosis is made, the sample is 'hand-carried' (are they going to tell the airline and customs?) to the Central Veterinary Laboratory in England for confirmation, where they are expecting a 24 to 96 hour turn-around.
I guess that means we can get the white tiger brain analyzed by Friday despite the 22 year delay to date. Maybe we could throw in a few cougar brains from NE Colorado too.
A Team Member is designated to silently monitor this listserve and www.mad-cow.org (among others) -- for what, it doesn't say. The Freedom of Information Act request from the East Coast consumer group turned up numerous top-secret USDA downloads from that site and Dealler's.
After 24 hours of secret briefings for 'select industry and trading partners' (to allow them to take positions on the commodities markets opposite the 'non-select' industry and trading partners?), a press conference will be held the next day.
There are plans to trace the cow, its lineage, its herdmates, the renderer, traceout of product, buyout of herd, farm of origin, to get the state involved to quarantine the herd (pre-arranged for all 50 states), expectations for trade bans, notification of OIE within 24 hours, media 800 numbers, spokespersons and backups, notify CDC, FDA, NIH, and many other commendable activities. The Flow Chart is a sight to behold, I will try to scan it in tomorrow.
In short, that cow is going to be toast by the time the public first hears about it.
The Plan does not speak to the scenario in which the CVL says, yes, this is bovine spongiform encephalopathy all right but it is one of your strains, not ours. Invoking their Absence of Evidence is Evidence of Absence principle, there may be no perceived need for public disclosure in this case.
USDA is caught completely unprepared if BSE first turns up in a US zoo animal. These animals could easily be diagnosed outside the "system" and be the subject of a publicity-seeking lab press release. I think this is a more likely scenario because the US has likely imported many thousands of zoo animals with advanced infections from Britain and France and there has been zero monitoring. Unlike with downer cows, anyone with the right colleagues can get ahold of a fallen zoo animal. Zoo animals enter the food chain in some cases after being rendered.
Another scenario would be some stock market speculator obtaining the Red Book and issuing a flurry of bogus but authentic-looking press releases that included bogus 800 and hacked USDA web links. The press here is so lazy and so accustomed to putting out public relation handouts as news that the objectives would be accomplished for a few hour (or days, depending on the Response Team's paralysis vis-a-vis off-flow chart events). Some people think a practise run for this happened in the Indiana case a year or two back.
The first case of nvCJD in an American will also be a public relations fiasco. In the dim bulb of the public mind, any American with mad cow disease would have gotten it from eating meat here. USDA has no way to prove that the victim acquired it on a three week trip to England in 1987. This will sound lame even to the press. All CJD is synonymous with mad cow disease in the public perception; the more often the different kinds are explained, the more their suspicions are aroused. The first case of nvCJD in an American will simply validate what they already know and just be viewed as an overdue admission from the government.
tom
___________________________________________________________END
TEXAS MAD COW ATYPICAL h-BSE
Epidemiology Investigation of Index Herd: Farm A
Background
The index cow was an approximately 12-year-old yellow or cream-colored Brahma cross that originated from Farm A located in Texas. The cow was sold through a livestock sale on 11/11/04, purchased by an order buyer, and was transported to a packing plant on Monday, 11/15/04. When the truck arrived at the packing plant during the late afternoon of 11/15/04, the index cow and one other were found dead on the truck and were transported to a pet food plant later that day where they were sampled for BSE testing as part of the enhanced BSE surveillance.
DNA analysis of blood samples taken from five of the six units of cattle that comprise Farm A yielded four animals from two different units that were genetically related to the index cow and confirmed Farm A as her herd of origin.
The herd on Farm A consisted of mixed breed beef cattle that are traditionally not used as seedstock replacement animals. Market records and preliminary tracing indicated that most animals that left the index herd either went to slaughter within a few days of sale or, in the case of younger animals, entered into known rendering and slaughter channels immediately following sale. There were only 11 cows identified during the investigation that were traced from Farm A into other herds where they had been used as replacement cows. The owner of Farm A raised this cow from birth and stated that the cow had never been off the premises prior to its sale. She was marketed because of poor body condition (the animal’s condition had not improved despite the early weaning of her 2003/2004 calf). The owner stated that the cow had always been excitable and had fallen while she was being loaded to go to the market, but that this was not unusual behavior for her in his opinion. In addition there was a report of this cow being down in the alley at the livestock market on 11/11/04, but she apparently got up again and was able to be loaded onto the truck to go to the packing plant. When questioned about any previous history of neurological signs in cattle on the farm, the owner reported that no cattle on the farm had ever shown any neurological signs, nor had there been any cases of rabies on the index farm.
Index Herd Census
Farm A consisted of 6 units (Units A through F) containing a total of about 217 adult cattle and approximately 100 to 120 calves. Early in the investigation, response personnel discovered that an additional unit belonging to the owner’s son and located adjacent to Unit F could also contain COI. This group, Unit G, contained 16 adult cattle and made a seventh unit that became included in the investigation.
On 6/22/05, the first three of the original six units were sampled for DNA testing to confirm the herd of origin of the index cow. Those first three units consisted of: Unit A contained 62 head with some older cattle (more likely than the other units to provide a DNA match); Unit B with 28 head (3-year-old unit); and Unit C with 25 head (2-year-old unit). Two additional units were sampled for DNA on 6/23/05; Unit D with 31 head and Unit E with 30 head, both of which contained older animals.
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The sixth unit, Unit F, containing 41 head, was purchased in 1993 from another source. Because it did not have animals that were genetically related to the other 5 units, this unit was not sampled for DNA testing. Unit F, and adjacent Unit G, contained COI because the weaned heifers from those units were commingled and fed with weaned heifers from the other units for a short period of time before they were returned to their respective units of origin. This practice of weaning and feeding together fit the definition of a feed cohort.
Progeny
The owner did keep some replacement heifers and, although he was relatively sure that he had not kept any offspring from the yellow cow because of her excitable demeanor, DNA analysis of the herd revealed several animals in the herd that may have been older offspring of the index cow. While the owner sold 12 calves at the sale with the index cow on 11/11/04, her last calf was not in that group. According to the owner, the index cow’s last calf was born either in Fall 2003 or Spring 2004, weaned early, and sold through the livestock market some time between February and October 2004. The calf prior to that would have been born either in Fall 2002 or Spring 2003 and was sold at the livestock market sometime between January and December 2003.
Birth Cohort
The owner of Farm A kept very few herd records; this made finding documentation on this cow’s birth cohort difficult. The birth cohort, by definition, included all cattle born on the positive animal’s birth premises within 1 year, before or after, the positive animal’s date of birth. The index cow was approximately 12 years of age in November 2004, but there was no exact birth date in the herd records. A potential age range of 11 to 13 years was used to sufficiently cover the animal’s most likely age. Using this range, all cattle born on the index premises between 1990 and 1995 were considered part of the birth cohort. In lieu of the owner’s records, herd records from Veterinary Services’ Generic Database (GDB) were used to compile a list of brucellosis calfhood vaccination (CV) tag numbers from the index herd that corresponded to animals to be included in the birth cohort. There were 121 animals identified through GDB as having been calfhood vaccinated on the index farm between 1991 and 1994. The owner of Farm A did not calfhood vaccinate after 1994. Moreover, calfhood vaccinates include only heifers. Therefore, the list of 121 animals was not a complete list of all birth cohorts. However the tracing that response personnel conducted on other COI was designed to account for the remainder of the birth cohorts.
Feed Cohort
Animals in Units A, D, and E, that were weaned and fed with the positive cow between 1991-1995, were already considered at-risk as part of the defined birth cohort. Animals in Units B and C were 3-year-olds and 2-year-olds, respectively, and were too young to be either birth or feed cohorts. Although Unit F was purchased separately and did not contain animals genetically related to the other units, calves from Unit F were weaned and fed for a short period of time with weaned calves from other units and all calves were later returned to their respective units of origin. Since Unit F was not purchased until 1993, the feed cohort consisted of those animals in Unit F that could have been weaned and fed with the index cow in 1993 or 1994. Additionally, Unit G contained possible feed cohorts that could have been weaned and fed with the index cow between the years of 1991 and 1995.
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Feed
The feeding regimen for the cattle in this herd consisted of natural pasture, hay, mineral supplement, syrup tubs occasionally, and a breeder’s supplement (predominantly a name brand manufactured breeder’s cube). The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) investigated all sources of feed and supplements used on Farm A. In-depth investigations and site visits were conducted by FDA involving retail feed stores, feed manufacturers, slaughter plants, renderers, and brokers. A more detailed account of the investigation is contained in FDA’s final report.
Removal of Cattle from the Index Farm
Any animal still present within the index herd that could have been a possible birth cohort or feed cohort of the index cow was targeted for removal as an at-risk animal. Units A, D, E, F, and G, all of which were known to contain older animals, were inventoried. Identification tags, tattoos, and brands were recorded, and all animals were aged based on their dentition and any man-made identification. Cattle whose estimated age indicated that they could have been part of the index cow’s birth or feed cohort were removed from the herd, euthanized, and tested for BSE; all were negative.
Units B and C were exempt from the cohort removal process because they contained only 3-year-old and 2-year-old animals respectively. Although the DNA analysis of animals in Units A through E determined that there were 2 animals present that could have been offspring of the index cow, their estimated age by dentition revealed that they were not of the appropriate age to be at-risk progeny. This verified the owner’s claim that he had sold the index cow’s last two calves at the livestock market and they were not currently present in the index herd.
After sorting by age, response personnel identified and removed the following numbers of cows from the herd on 7/6/05: Unit A, 11 cows; Unit D, 11 cows; Unit E, 7 cows. The same process was applied to Units F and G and the following numbers of cows were identified and removed from the herd on 7/7/05: Unit F, 28 cows; Unit G, 10 cows. Of the 67 animals removed from the herd as possible birth cohorts and/or feed cohorts of the index cow, 42 were definitively identified as belonging to the birth cohort due to the presence of a calfhood vaccination tag or tattoo that corresponded to the appropriate birth cohort years. All 67 animals were euthanized on 7/6/05 and 7/7/05 and samples were subsequently sent to USDA’s National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) for BSE testing. All samples were run on the ELISA test and confirmed negative on 7/8/05 and 7/9/05. Upon confirmation of negative results, disposal of carcasses was completed by burial in an approved landfill facility. The index farm was released from hold order on 7/11/05.
Tracing of Progeny
The 2003/2004 progeny of the index cow was known to have left the farm through a specific livestock market sometime between February and October 2004. The 2002/2003 progeny of the index cow left the farm through the same market sometime between January
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and December 2003. Response personnel learned early in the investigation that animals from the index farm were sold not only under the index farm owner’s name and that of his wife, but also by other members of the owner’s immediate family. Additionally, there were no herd records to indicate the gender of the two at-risk progeny. Therefore, market records for February through October 2004 and January through December 2003 were obtained for all calves sold both by Farm A’s owner and by members of his immediate family; response personnel traced all such calves to determine their disposition. With the index herd being composed of mixed breed beef cattle, the calves that left the farm were genetically unsuitable for use as replacement animals or for sale as breeding stock, a fact that was confirmed by the trace work and the documentation of the final disposition of the calves of interest.
Response personnel ultimately identified 213 calves of interest to be traced. Of these, 208 were confirmed to have entered known rendering/slaughter channels, 4 were presumed to have entered rendering/slaughter channels, and 1 was purchased in cash through a livestock market with no buyer name or contact information (this animal was classified as untraceable. See Appendix 1). A calf was categorized as presumed to have entered rendering/slaughter channels if it passed through at least one livestock market subsequent to its original sale and could not be individually traced due to unknown resale date and new backtag, but all calves resold matching that description during an appropriate date range were purchased by known rendering/slaughter order buyers.
It was not possible to DNA test the calves that entered known rendering and slaughter channels – most were of an age in which they were likely to have been slaughtered prior to the time of the investigation. There were no calves traced to farms outside of rendering and slaughter channels.
Tracing of Birth Cohorts
Since there were essentially no records maintained on the index farm, it was necessary to compile the list of known birth cohorts using brucellosis CV tag numbers for this herd from the period 1991 to 1994. The calves vaccinated during that time period were part of the index cow’s birth cohort and tracing activities centered on finding those animals. There were 121 animals whose CV tag number and/or tattoo included them as part of the birth cohort. Of those 121 animals, 67 animals were definitively accounted for (42 were found in the index herd, removed, and tested BSE negative; 25 were identified as having left Farm A through the market system and were traced, 11 of those were reported slaughtered, 13 were classified as presumed dead, and 1 was found alive, euthanized, and tested BSE negative). Of the remaining 54 animals from the birth cohort, there may have been several that died within the index herd, but the majority likely left the herd without identification and would have been either re-tagged at the livestock market or consigned directly to slaughter without identification. To account for these remaining birth cohorts, all adult cattle that left the index farm since 1990 were traced as COI.
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Tracing of Cattle of Interest
The investigation revealed that many animals left Farm A, arrived at markets without any identification tags, and were subsequently re-tagged at the market. Due to lack of farm records, it is unknown which of these re-tagged animals may have belonged to the birth cohort. As a result, all animals that may have left Farm A since 1990 were traced as COI. Additionally, animals from the index farm were sold not only under the index farm owner’s name and that of his wife, but also by other members of the owner’s immediate family; therefore, cattle sold from the index farm by all pertinent family members were traced. There were some older animals that left the index farm but were able to be excluded from further trace work because they were known not to have been part of the birth cohort or feed cohort of the index cow despite their being of the appropriate age. The index farm owner’s late father had maintained a herd of cattle separate from the index farm but which was added to the index farm in 1997. Complete herd test data and CV data from the GDB was obtained for the father’s herd and those animals were excluded from the tracing activities.
There were a total of 200 COI traced: 143 were reported to have been slaughtered (131 of those were confirmed as having been slaughtered), 1 is known to have died previously and was buried, 2 were found alive (1 was a known birth cohort that tested negative, 1 was determined not to be one of the cattle of interest due to her young age), 34 were classified as presumed dead, 20 were classified as untraceable. (See Appendix 1). Animals were confirmed at slaughter using GDB slaughter testing data or the hard copies of slaughter testing Form 4-54.
An animal was classified as presumed dead if records that could be used to advance the tracing of the animal were exhausted or did not exist, and the age of the animal at the time of the investigation was estimated to be at least 11 years old or older. Since the index herd was not a purebred or seedstock operation, and animals leaving the herd were unlikely to be purchased as replacement cattle, standard industry practices indicated that most adult animals that had left the herd would have been culled and slaughtered by the time they were in this age group. Additionally, this age cutoff was arrived at through review of market records and the specific years in which Farm A sold cattle through the market. An animal was classified as untraceable if all records to advance the tracing of the animal were exhausted or did not exist, and the age of the animal at the time of the investigation was estimated to be less than 11 years of age (the animal, therefore, could not be presumed dead).
Calculation of Minimum Estimated Ages
Throughout the tracing process, personnel used minimum estimated ages of the 200 COI to evaluate whether those individuals could be old enough to be part of the birth or feed cohort of the index cow. Since Farm A’s owner maintained no records on the ages of animals, GDB data assisted in assigning minimum estimated ages. Animals that were wearing brucellosis CV eartags could be aged quite accurately because the exact CV date was recorded in the GDB and those animals would have been vaccinated between 4 to 12 months of age. The GDB also contained lists of individual eartags for all animals on the
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index farm that were included in complete herd brucellosis testing in 1991, 1993, and 1994. Cattle included in those herd tests would have been at least 18 months of age at the time of the test and their minimum age today could be extrapolated from that data. Finally, the GDB also contained livestock market testing data that could also be used to assign a minimum age because the animal would have been at least 18 months of age on date the earliest brucellosis market test was conducted. The minimum ages calculated for the cattle of interest were used later in an analysis by USDA’s Centers for Epidemiology and Animal Health (CEAH) to determine the probable disposition of untraceable and presumed dead animals based on their age.
Trace Herds
Response personnel made every attempt to trace COI to their final dispositions (which, in most cases, was slaughter). If an animal was traced to a herd owner and the owner could not provide information that indicated that the animal of interest was not currently present within his/her herd, the owner’s herds were placed under hold order pending a herd inventory to determine whether or not the animal of interest had been retained. There were eight herds identified as the last traceable location of the animal of interest and were, therefore, subjected to herd inventories in an attempt to locate the animal.
When an animal of interest was located within a herd, the age of the animal was estimated using dentition and any man-made identification. If the animal fell into the appropriate age range to be a possible birth cohort or feed cohort of the index cow, the animal was removed from the herd and tested. If an animal of interest was located within the herd and fell into the appropriate age range to be a possible at-risk progeny of the index cow, the animal was sampled for DNA testing.
Trace Herd 1
The owner of Trace Herd 1 was identified as having received one of the adult COI from the index herd. Trace Herd 1 contained 909 head of cattle in multiple pastures and was placed under hold order on 7/21/05. Upon completion of herd inventory, the animal of interest was not found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 1 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified as untraceable. The hold order on Trace Herd 1 was released on 8/8/05.
Trace Herd 2
Trace Herd 2 was identified as having received one of the adult COI from the index herd. Trace Herd 2 contained 19 head of cattle on one pasture and was placed under hold order on 7/25/05. The owner of Trace Herd 2 identified the animal of interest by her eartag while he was feeding his cattle out of a bucket and individually penned her for inspection by field personnel. While the cow was identified as one of the animals that had left the index farm, her age by dentition was estimated to be only 5 years old, which was too young to have placed her as part of the birth or feed cohort of the index animal. She was classified as found alive but determined not to be one of the COI; the hold order on Trace Herd 2 was released on 7/26/05.
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Trace Herd 3
The owner of Trace Herd 3 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest. The herd was placed under hold order on 7/27/05. The herd inventory was conducted on 7/28/05. The animal of interest was not present within the herd, and the hold order was released on 7/28/05. The person who thought he sold the animal to the owner of Trace Herd 3 had no records and could not remember who else he might have sold the cow to. Additionally, a search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable because all leads were exhausted.
Trace Herd 4
The owner of Trace Herd 4 was identified as having received one of the COI through an order buyer. Trace Herd 4 was placed under hold order on 7/29/05. A complete herd inventory was conducted on 8/22/05 and 8/23/05. There were 233 head of cattle that were examined individually by both State and Federal personnel for all man-made identification and brands. The animal of interest was not present within the herd. Several animals were reported to have died in the herd sometime after they arrived on the premises in April 2005. A final search of GDB records yielded no further results on the eartag of interest at either subsequent market sale or slaughter. With all leads having been exhausted, this animal of interest has been classified as untraceable. The hold order on Trace Herd 4 was released on 8/23/05.
Trace Herd 5
The owner of Trace Herd 5 was identified as having received two COI and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 5 is made up of 67 head of cattle in multiple pastures. During the course of the herd inventory, the owner located records that indicated that one of the COI, a known birth cohort, had been sold to Trace Herd 8 where she was subsequently found alive. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the other animal of interest was not found within the herd. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 5 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest and she was subsequently classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 5 was released on 8/8/05.
Trace Herd 6
The owner of Trace Herd 6 was identified as possibly having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. This herd is made up of 58 head of cattle on two pastures. A herd inventory was conducted and the animal of interest was not present within the herd. The owner of Trace Herd 6 had very limited records and was unable to provide further information on where the cow might have gone after he purchased her from the livestock market. A search of GDB for all cattle sold through the markets by that individual did not result in a match to the animal of interest. Additionally, many of the animals presented for sale by the owner of the herd had been re-tagged at the market effectually losing the traceability of the history of that animal prior to re-tagging. The animal of interest traced to this herd was classified as untraceable due to all leads having been exhausted. The hold order on Trace Herd 6 was released on 8/3/05.
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Trace Herd 7
The owner of Trace Herd 7 was identified as having received an animal of interest and was placed under hold order on 8/1/05. Trace Herd 7 contains 487 head of cattle on multiple pastures in multiple parts of the State, including a unit kept on an island. The island location is a particularly rough place to keep cattle and the owner claimed to have lost 22 head on the island in 2004 due to liver flukes. Upon completion of the herd inventory, the animal of interest was not found present within Trace Herd 7. A GDB search of all recorded herd tests conducted on Trace Herd 7 and all market sales by the owner failed to locate the identification tag of the animal of interest. The cow was subsequently classified as untraceable. It is quite possible though that she may have died within the herd, especially if she belonged to the island unit. The hold order on Trace Herd 7 was released on 8/8/05.
Trace Herd 8
Trace Herd 8 received an animal of interest, which happened to be a known birth cohort of the index cow, from Trace Herd 5. Trace Herd 8 consists of 146 head of cattle that were placed under hold order on 8/4/05. A herd inventory was conducted, the birth cohort was found alive in the herd, and she was purchased and euthanized. The hold order on Trace Herd 8 was released on 8/4/05. The cow was sampled on 8/5/05 and BSE tested by ELISA at NVSL. Results were negative (as reported on 8/6/05); carcass disposal was completed by alkaline digestion.
Analysis of Data on Presumed Dead and Untraceable Animals
CEAH performed an analysis of the minimum estimated ages of those COI that were classified as either presumed dead or untraceable to determine the likely disposition of those animals based on their ages. Moreover, CEAH performed an analysis of the likely disposition of the one calf that was classified as untraceable during the investigation.
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/bse_final_epi_report8-05.pdf
ALABAMA MAD COW ATYPICAL h-BSE
Epidemiology Investigation of Index Herd: Farm A
The index case was a deep red, crossbred beef cow estimated to be approximately 10- years-old based on dentition. On March 16, 2006, USDA personnel exhumed the carcass of the index case, sent the head to NVSL and transported under seal the remainder of the carcass to the Alabama State Diagnostic Laboratory (ASDL). The investigators confirmed the carcass to be that of a red beef cow. The body and facial area did not contain any white markings. No identification devices were found on the cow, including any evidence of brands, tattoos, or ear tags. Additionally, on March 29, NVSL examined the head of the carcass to confirm the lack of a tag and the lack of evidence (holes or scarring) of previous tags in the ear.
The age of the index cow was estimated by examination of the dentition as 10-years-old by the accredited veterinarian. Regulatory personnel examined the dentition of the exhumed carcass and concurred with the estimate. The teeth in the head of the carcass were short with elongated necks with some incisors missing. This is consistent with the dentition of other cattle from Alabama with a known age of 10 or more years. Genetic tests were conducted at NVSL to match the NVSL-generated homogenate of the obex, the homogenate of obex from the Georgia lab, brain material from the cow head (collected by NVSL), and ear material from the cow head (also collected by NVSL). On March 23, the results for these tests indicated they all originated from the same source and confirmed that that carcass exhumed on March 16 was the index case.
Disposal of the Index Case
Following exhumation on March 16, the carcass was broken down and Federal personnel transported the head (stored on ice) to NVSL. The remainder of the carcass was placed in hazardous materials barrels and transported under seal to ASDL by Federal and State personnel.
The carcass is currently being held under seal in a secure cooler at the ASDL, pending final disposal. The head remains frozen at NVSL. Cleaning and disinfection of the site was completed following removal of the carcass.
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At-Risk Progeny of the Index Case
2005 calf:
The index cow gave birth to a black bull calf around February or March 2005. The calf was born on the index premises. The owner took the calf to a stockyard sale in July 2005. The owner reported that the animal died at the stockyard prior to sale and the carcass disposed of in a sanitary landfill. An interview of the stockyard manager confirmed memory of that owner having a calf die at the stockyard. Stockyard records confirmed delivery of material to the landfill on that day. This trace thread is closed.
2006 calf:
At the time of death, the index cow had at her side a 2- to 3-week old red Charolais cross female calf born in February 2006. This calf was present on the premises when the investigation began. On March 16, this calf was indemnified using Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) funds and transported to NVSL where it is currently held in APHIS custody. ARS is developing a research protocol to study this calf. Results obtained on April 6 of a DNA analysis comparing a blood sample from the calf to tissues from the index case confirmed that this animal was the calf of the index cow. This trace thread is closed.
These two calves constitute the last two calves born to the index cow prior diagnosis of BSE.
Trace Back Investigation
Investigation of Index herd (Farm A):
The most recent owner (Farm A) purchased the index case at a stockyard in December 2004. The stockyard sheet for that day describes Farm A buying a single animal that matches the appearance of the index case. This cow was red, back tag #57, with shortsolid mouth (indicating worn incisors) and 7 months pregnant, weighing 990 lb. The owner confirmed this purchased cow is the index cow.
Based on the color/breed, age, and pregnancy status of the index case, the following criteria were used to trace the index case to its herd of origin: 1. Coat color - Only cattle described as red in color were traced as potential leads to the herd of origin. All other colors, including red with white described on the face (such as red, white-faced or red, mottled-faced, and breeds that are not red in color, such as Charolais), were excluded from further investigation. This is because the index case was solid red with no white on the head and any red cow
5
with recorded facial coloring would not be compatible in appearance with the index cow.
2. Age - Only cattle known or suspected to have been born before March 1998 (i.e., greater than 8 years of age at the time of death of the index case) were traced as potential leads to the herd of origin. To estimate the lower limits of age, cattle sold at a stockyard and identified as being 18 months of age by mouthing (the date they shed their deciduous medial incisors) will be considered to be at least two years of age on the date of sale. This takes into account that the exact age of shedding of medial incisors varies slightly among cattle and erring on the older side of the estimate of the cattle’s age will more likely increase the number of animals traced.
3. Other factors - Other factors considered in determining whether or not to pursue an animal as possibly being the index case include the recorded weight at sale, stage of pregnancy, and ages of calves. The value of these factors depends on the information obtained from interviews, sales records and other evidence used to trace the index case.
Investigation of Previous Farms/Owners Investigation of Farm B Background: Stockyard records identified the prior owner of the index cow as Farm B. The cow was one of 26 animals sold as part of a dispersal of the herd of Farm B in December 2004. Investigation: All 26 animals had been purchased between July 2004 and November 2004. The owner of Farm B was deceased by the time the index case was detected. Interview of the widow of Farm B confirmed that, due to health issues, the owner of Farm B had sold all his cattle in early 2004 then began to re-establish a herd during late 2004 before again selling out in December 2004.
Results: Stockyard records of all 26 cattle purchased by Farm B were evaluated to determine where the index cow came from. Four animals could not be ruled out as having been the index cow based on color, age, and stage of pregnancy at the time of sale. Each animal belongs to a different owner. Two additional red cows were purchased by Farm B but were too young and at the wrong stage of pregnancy at the time of sale to qualify as the index case and were excluded from further tracing.
Investigation of Farm C Background: The owner of Farm C sold a red cow with calf at its side at a stockyard on August 8, 2004, weight 1,220 lbs (total for pair). These animals were later purchased by Farm B. This animal is consistent with the weight, age, and stage of pregnancy of the index case at that time.
6 Investigation: Farm C purchased the animal in question as a yearling or bred heifer in 1997 along with two half siblings from Farm G. Of the three animals purchased, one remains on Farm C, another died several months prior to the investigation and is buried on the premises, and the third is the possible index cow being traced. The three cows were all sired by the same bull. Additionally, the possible index cow, if on Farm C, would have given birth in this herd and there would likely be calves present. On March 25, blood samples were collected from all animals on Farm C between the ages of 18 months and 8 years of age, including the known half-sibling, in order to determine if any of the animals were compatible with being first generation progeny of the index case. In addition, the known half-sibling was evaluated for genetic linkage to the index case. Samples were submitted to NVSL for DNA analysis in order to determine genetic linkages.
Results: Results received on March 6 indicated that none of the animals tested qualified as offspring or siblings of the index cow. The animal identified by the owner of Farm C as possibly related to the index cow did not genetically match the index case. No animals remained on Farm C that would qualify for additional testing. Farm C was excluded as a source of the index case, and the suspected half-sibling did not qualify as related. This trace thread is closed. Farm G stated that the cow traced to his herd had a bangle tag, although there was no evidence of a tag or prior presence of a tag in the index cow’s ear at the time of death. This trace thread is closed. Investigation of Farm D Background: The owner of Farm D sold a red cow on September 11, 2004, full mouth, 5 months pregnant, 1,015 lbs. This animal is consistent with the weight, age, and stage of pregnancy of the index case at that time.
Investigation: Farm D is a cattle dealer. He buys and sells many cattle each year. According to records, at two stockyards with which Farm D does business, he purchased 35 red cows from 23 different premises (Farms M – II) that were consistent with the index case according to age and weight between 2000 (the earliest date of availability of records) and September 11, 2004, (the date he was reported as having sold the cow being traced). This owner’s typical business practice is to purchase young cows (less than 3 years of age) that are not pregnant or recently bred, breed them, hold them until near calving, and then resell them as bred cows and cow calf pairs. He does not typically keep cows for more than a year. He does not retain calves from any of the cattle (with the exception of a single Braham cow). He is certain that the cow was not born on his premises. Because of the transient nature of cattle within this herd, and lack of suspected first generation offspring, no DNA analysis was performed on animals in Farm D. Farm D purchased a red cow from Farm M on March 17, 2004, as part of a cow and calf pair through a local stockyard. Farm M is a registered Red Angus breeder. All cattle are 7 tattooed and tagged as part of the registry process. Farm M had a few recipient cattle that were sold at approximately the same time that the animal being traced through Farm D would have been sold. All of the recipient cattle were Holsteins and were excluded based on phenotype. Because all qualifying animals on this farm are identified by both tattoo and ear tag as a requirement of registration, the farm could not have been the source of the index cow.
This trace thread is closed. Farm N consigned a cow and calf pair to Farm D on January 8, 2003, at a local stockyard. The weight of the pair at purchase was 1,140 lbs. Farm N consists of approximately 25 cows, primarily Charolais cross and black Angus cross. Farm N’s current herd was established in 1996. According to records kept at Farm N, the cow sold to Farm D produced bull calves in 1997, 1999, and 2001 and heifers in 1998, and 2000. Because this cow was small for the herd, none of her heifers were retained in this herd. The cow was listed as a red Angus-type cow that was purchased through a stockyard in 1997. The sale records for the stockyard were destroyed in a fire and therefore unavailable. Since the cow was not born in this herd, and no offspring or other related animals remained in the herd, there are no eligible animals remaining on this farm for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed. Farm O consigned a red cow to the stockyard on December 14, 2002, as a 5-month pregnant cow, weighing 1,060 lb, which was purchased later by Farm D. Farm O had purchased 118 head in early 2002, calved them out, and rebred them before selling the calves and the bred cows later that year. None of these animals remains on the farm and no calves were retained. The owner of Farm O purchased the cattle through four to five stockyards or other sources. The traced cow was not born in this herd and no animals remain on the farm that qualify for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.
Farm P consigned two red cows to the stockyard on August 10, 2002. Farm P purchased these two cattle from Farm JJ in 2000 as part of a group of 38 heifers. There are no cattle remaining on Farm P at this time; therefore, no animals are available for genetic testing for comparison with the index cow. This trace thread is closed.
The cattle present on Farm JJ were dispersed in 2001 and a new owner began operating from the same property. The new owner did not recall the exact cattle in question but was very certain that any cattle sold from Farm JJ (under either owner) would have had ear tags in place, and if sold before the 2001 dispersal, would have been branded on the right hip. Because the index cow had no evidence of having ever been tagged or branded, this farm can be excluded as a source of the index cow. This trace thread is closed.
Farm Q sold five red cows at a stockyard on April 17, 2002, that were later purchased by Farm D. All five of these animals, according to the owner, were red Angus-type cows, between 6-and 10-years of age and sold with a calf at their side. The owner had purchased these five cows as part of a group of cattle from Farm KK. Farm Q does not keep replacement heifers. There are no eligible animals remaining on Farm Q for genetic testing and this trace thread is closed. 8 All five of the animals traced back from Farm Q were purchased from Farm KK as part of an unknown number of red Angus-type cows sold to Farm Q. Farm KK currently consists of a beef cow/calf operation with approximately 300 brood cows. The herd is a mixed breed beef herd that was acquired over a period of several years by purchasing cattle at local stockyards. The owner of Farm KK had a herd with another animal consisting of approximately 60 head of mixed breed cattle in 1998 to 1999 that had been purchased and sold out entirely to the local stockyard in either 1999 or 2000. However, he could not find any records for that sale and all stockyard records were destroyed in a fire during 2000. The owner of Farm KK stated he had not sold any cattle privately to Farm Q and did not know who purchased the cattle at the stockyard. Subsequent to the 1999/2000 dispersal, Farm KK began buying cattle again and sold all its animals in 2004. The current herd consists of brood cows that have been purchased at local stockyards since the 2004 dispersal. These cattle are not known to be related to any previously owned cattle. There are no animals remaining on Farm KK that would be appropriate for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed. Farm R consigned a red cow to the stockyard March 6, 2002. The owner of Farm R does not remember the specific cow, but has a registered Beefmaster herd and a commercial herd and does not retain commercial heifers as replacements. He purchases replacement animals to enter the commercial herd from three different stockyards. No animals are present on the farm that would be eligible for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.
Farm S sold a red cow and calf pair to Farm D through the stockyard on March 27, 2002. Farm S sold all his cattle a year ago and has purchased new cattle. None of the original herd remains on the farm. He said he purchased the traced cow from a neighbor. He bought the neighbor’s entire herd at the time and took the traced cow directly to the stockyard. The neighbor’s farm does not have any cattle remaining. No animals remain on either farm that would qualify for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.
Farm T consigned a red cow to the stockyard on January 9, 2002. This cow was later purchased by Farm D. All cattle on Farm T were sold in 2003. The owner of Farm T stated that he purchased three older red cows at the same stockyard in 1999 or 2000 and sold them back in 2002 or 2003. He thinks the cows had tags in their ears but is not sure. Additionally, no animals remain on the farm that would be appropriate for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.
Three red pairs were consigned to the stockyard from Farm U on three different dates in 2001. These cows were later purchased by Farm D. The owner of Farm U has been out of the cow business since 2001. He has no memory of these cows or any other particular cattle. He stated that he would have tagged his brood cows, which is inconsistent with the lack of evidence of tagging in the index cow. There are no animals on this farm for genetic testing and this trace thread is closed. Farm V consigned two red cows to the stockyard on January 12, 2000, that were later purchased by Farm D. The owner of Farm V purchased a group of cows in 1998 from 9 the stockyard to keep on some land that he had purchased. Farm V sold all of the cows in 2000. He currently has only roping steers. No eligible animals remain on this farm for genetic testing. All stockyard records prior to 2000 were destroyed in a fire, so tracing this cow further back is not possible. This trace thread has been closed.
Two red cows were consigned to the stockyard on October 13, 2001, from Farm W, one of which was purchased by Farm D. There are approximately 50 cows of various breeds currently located on Farm W. The owner of Farm W has maintained a cow herd since 1973 and does not maintain identification on his cattle. The owner of Farm W does not recall details about the animal being traced through his farm; however, farm records indicated that the animal would likely have been one of two red cows purchased from a stockyard on May 1, 2001. Although the owner of Farm W typically retains heifers, the calves from both of these cows were sold on October 10, 2001, according to the stockyard’s records. No animals remain on this farm for genetic testing. Records collected from the stockyard indicate that the purchase weight for these traced animals was 580 and 650 lbs, both of which fall below the minimum weight defined in the SOP for investigation. These cows are excluded as the index cow based on their weights at the time of sale. This trace thread is closed. Farm X consigned two red cows to a stockyard on January 17, 2001, that were later purchased by farm D. The daughter-in-law of the owner of Farm X stated that all the cattle in the herd as of 2001 were sold in 2004 after the owner’s death. Subsequently, the owner’s son did purchase some additional cattle (unrelated to the traced animals) but these animals have also been sold. There are currently no animals remaining on the farm. No eligible animals remain on this farm for genetic testing and there are no records for purchases or sale of animals; therefore, this trace thread is closed.
A red cow and calf pair was consigned by Farm Y to the stockyard on March 11, 2001. This pair was later purchased by Farm D. Farm Y buys and sells cattle regularly and had no specific recollection of the traced cow, but when presented with stockyard records he felt reasonably sure that the animal in question was a horned Limousin cow sold with a calf at her side. He stated that all his cattle were tagged, either at the time of purchase, or by him after bringing them to his farm. Farm Y sold out all cattle during 2004 but has since begun accumulating cattle again. The index cow did not have horns and there was no evidence of dehorning or tagging. In addition, no eligible animals remain in the herd for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.
Farm Z consigned three red cow and calf pairs to the stockyard on June 6, 2001. These animals were later purchased by Farm D. The owner of Farm Z has land (owned and rented) in many locations and occasionally runs cattle on some of this land. He reported that his practice was to buy entire herds and sell the complete herd a few months later. He sold all of his cattle accumulated from the mid-1990s during May or June of 2001 and was without cattle until later in the year when he began restocking. He has since bought and sold groups of cattle several times but keeps no records himself. There are no eligible animals remaining for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed. 10 Farm AA consigned a red cow to the stockyard on September 19, 2001. This cow was later purchased by Farm D. The traced cow was lotted-in the day before the sale and had been purchased through another stockyard earlier in the week. Sales records show the weight of the cow as 1,140 lb at the time of purchase at the previous stockyard sale, which exceeds the upper weight established for tracing in the SOP. This cow is excluded from further tracing. This trace thread is closed.
A red cow and calf pair was consigned to the stockyard by a dairy, identified as Farm BB, on November 10, 2001. This cow was later purchased by Farm D. Farm BB is comprised of a milking Holstein dairy with about 300 milking animals. The owners of Farm BB also have approximately 400 mixed breed beef cattle maintained as a cow/calf operation. Farm BB does not retain any heifers as replacements for either the dairy operation or the beef operation. They buy all their replacement cows for the dairy and buy beef cattle to raise a calf then resell the cow with a calf within a 12-to 18-month time period. When asked about records of purchased cattle, one of the owners stated that he could not locate any records prior to 2002. Farm BB utilized the services of a cattle dealer to purchase cattle at various stockyards in the region. Some of the cattle might have had ear tags prior to purchase but the owners did not put in their own ear tags when the cattle were bought. The current herd at Farm BB is comprised of various breeds of beef cattle, but they would not be the same cattle that were present in 2001, since all cows at the premises are sold within a 12- to 18-month period (with calves) after purchase. Therefore, this trace thread is closed.
Farm CC consigned a red cow to the stockyard on December 8, 2001. This cow was later purchased by Farm D. Farm CC has no cattle at this time. The owner of Farm CC has no records of cattle that he has owned and no memory of the particular animal being traced. There are no animals on the farm eligible for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.
Farm DD consigned a red cow to the stockyard on December 12, 2001 that was later purchased by Farm D. The owner of Farm DD has no records of his cattle operation. He currently owns three cows, one bull, and two calves. All are black and none has identification. Additionally, the owner has stated that he has never owned any cows more than two years. No animals currently on the farm were present at the time the traced cow was sold and no offspring were retained from that time. There are no eligible animals remaining on this farm for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.
Farm EE consigned a red cow to the stockyard on March 3, 2000. This cow was later purchased by Farm D. All cattle on Farm EE were sold two or three years ago. No records of sales or purchases were kept. No animals remain on this farm for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.
Farm FF consigned a red cow to the stockyard on June 21, 2000. This cow was later purchased by Farm D. Farm FF has not kept cattle since the herd was dispersed 11 approximately three years ago. The owner of Farm FF has no knowledge or records of the cow in question other than that the cow would have been purchased through the same stockyard where it was sold. Purchase records prior to 2000 for this stockyard were destroyed in a fire. There are no eligible animals on the farm for genetic testing and this trace thread is closed. Farm GG consigned a red cow to the stockyard on June 21, 2000. This cow was later purchased by Farm D. The owner of Farm GG runs a feeding operation and normally purchases 350 to 450 lb steers and heifers for feeding out. He generally has fewer than 700 head at any one time. Farm GG reported selling the entire cow herd between late 2000 and early 2001. He has no recollection or records of the traced animal. Most of his cows at that time were purchased either through the stockyard or by private. He did not keep offspring of his cattle. No eligible animals remain on the farm for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed.
Farm HH consigned two red cows to the stockyard on September 20, 2000. These cows were later purchased by Farm D. All cattle on Farm HH were sold at that time as part of a herd dispersal and none remaining on the farm are eligible for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed. Farm II consigned a red cow and calf pair to the stockyard on October 11, 2000. This cow was later purchased by Farm D. Farm II’s owner currently has 100 to 150 cows. He formerly had Beefmaster cattle but now has a herd of mixed crossbred cattle. He normally buys cows through the stockyard or from private individuals. After he brings them to his farm, he evaluates them by close examination. If he decides to keep the animal he tags it. Those that he decides not to retain are sold at the stockyard the next week. If any animal was sold from his farm without an ear tag, it would have been one of these that he resold immediately. On review of his records, the owner believes that the cow sold at the stockyard on October 11, 2000, was one that was purchased through the same stockyard on April 3, 2000. That cow was tagged on his farm with a green bangle tag #6. There was no tag in the index cow’s ear, nor was there evidence of a either a hole or scar. This cow is excluded as the index cow based on the known presence of an ear tag. This trace thread is closed. Results: In all, 25 farms were investigated as suppliers of cows that could have supplied the index cow to Farm D. All of these farms were excluded as the herd of origin of the Index Case. Therefore the trace back from Farm D is closed. 12 Investigation into Farm E Background: Farm E sold a red cow on August 11, 2004, 2 months pregnant, weighing 790 lbs. This cow was later purchased by Farm B. This animal is consistent with the weight, age, and stage of pregnancy of the index case at that time. Investigation: Farm E purchased two cows on January 17, 2000, that matched the color, approximate age, and stage of pregnancy of the index case. These cows had been purchased from Farm K and Farm L. Farm K sold an 18-month old red heifer through a stockyard that was later purchased by Farm E. The cow in question had been tested for brucellosis at the stockyard and an official brucellosis ear tag was placed in its ear. The cow was at the minimum age for tracing at the time of sale. Because all cattle on Farm K were dispersed in 2003 and no animals remain on the farm and because the index case had not been ear tagged. This traced is closed. Farm L consigned an 18-month old red cow to a stockyard on January 17, 2000, that was later purchased by Farm E. The cow in question had been tested for brucellosis at the stockyard and an official brucellosis ear tag was placed in its ear. The cow was also at the minimum age for tracing at the time of sale. There was only one animal present on Farm L from January 2000 at the time of the investigation in 2006. Because the cow being traced did not calve in this herd there were no animals eligible for genetic testing. This trace thread is closed. Farm E indicated that he may have kept some calves from red cows. DNA testing was conducted in Herd E to determine whether offspring of the index case were present. On March 31 blood samples were collected from all cattle that qualified by age as possible progeny of the cow being traced in order to determine if they could be genetically linked to the index case. Results received on April 8 indicated that no animals qualify as first generation offspring or full siblings of the index case. This trace thread is closed.
Results: Because both animals sold to Farm E had been identified with ear tags, and because either no animals were present or no animals were eligible for genetic matching on the farms supplying Farm L neither of these animals could have been the index case. The trace thread from Farm E is closed. Investigation into Farm F Background: Farm F sold a red cow with a calf on September 1, 2004, no age or pregnancy status available, weight 890 lbs. This cow was purchased by Farm B. This animal is consistent with the color and weight of the index case at that time. Investigation: The stockyard records indicated that this cow had a Charolais Cross bred steer at its side, which was sold for slaughter. 13 The owner of farm F had purchased the cow from Farm H through the stockyard. The cow was sold as lot #87 on April 9, 2003. Farm H identified the cow as having come from two possible sources, one of which was a purchased animal that was confirmed to be a Beefmaster breed, light red in color, and branded. This cow was excluded as the index case. The other possible animal might have been raised in the herd. If it had been raised in his herd it was possible that one animal that qualified as first generation progeny would still be presenting the herd. On March 29, blood samples were collected from all animals 18 months of age or older on Farm H. Results received on April 6 indicated that none of the animals qualified as offspring of the index case, including the one animal identified by the owner as the offspring of the cow being traced. This trace thread is closed.
The owner of Farm F also purchased another red cow from Farm I on the same day as determined by stockyard records. No animals remain on the premises of Farm I to be genetically compared to the index case. This trace thread is closed.
Results: Farm F did not retain any calves from his cows so no animals were eligible for genetic comparison. This trace thread is closed.
Summary: Despite a thorough investigation of two farms that were known to contain the index cow, and 35 other farms that might have supplied the index cow to the farms where the index case was known to have resided, the investigators were unable to locate the herd of origin. The index case did not have unique or permanent identification, plus, the size and color of the cow being traced is very common in the Southern United States. Due to the unremarkable appearance of solid red cows, it is not easy for owners to remember individual animals. In the Southern United States, it is common business practice to buy breeding age cows and keep them for several years while they produce calves. Most calves produced are sold the year they are born, whereas breeding cows are sold when there is a lapse in breeding, which can occur multiple times in cows’ lives. For all of these reasons, USDA was unable to locate the herd of origin.
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/EPI_Final5-2-06.pdf
AND WE KNOW WHERE THIS OTHER MAD COW WENT FROM TEXAS, WE JUST DON'T KNOW WHAT STRAIN $$$
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Statement May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.
FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.
FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
Cattle with central nervous system symptoms are of particular interest because cattle with bovine spongiform encephalopathy or BSE, also known as "mad cow disease," can exhibit such symptoms. In this case, there is no way now to test for BSE. But even if the cow had BSE, FDA's animal feed rule would prohibit the feeding of its rendered protein to other ruminant animals (e.g., cows, goats, sheep, bison).
FDA is sending a letter to the firm summarizing its findings and informing the firm that FDA will not object to use of this material in swine feed only. If it is not used in swine feed, this material will be destroyed. Pigs have been shown not to be susceptible to BSE. If the firm agrees to use the material for swine feed only, FDA will track the material all the way through the supply chain from the processor to the farm to ensure that the feed is properly monitored and used only as feed for pigs.
To protect the U.S. against BSE, FDA works to keep certain mammalian protein out of animal feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA established its animal feed rule in 1997 after the BSE epidemic in the U.K. showed that the disease spreads by feeding infected ruminant protein to cattle.
Under the current regulation, the material from this Texas cow is not allowed in feed for cattle or other ruminant animals. FDA's action specifying that the material go only into swine feed means also that it will not be fed to poultry.
FDA is committed to protecting the U.S. from BSE and collaborates closely with the U.S. Department of Agriculture on all BSE issues. The animal feed rule provides crucial protection against the spread of BSE, but it is only one of several such firewalls. FDA will soon be improving the animal feed rule, to make this strong system even stronger.
####
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/new01061.html
ITEM 6 – BARB CASE CLUSTERS
39. Professor John Wilesmith (Defra) updated the committee on the
BSE cases born after the 1996 reinforced mammalian meat and
bone meal ban in the UK (BARB cases). Around 116 BARB cases
had been identified in Great Britain up to 22 November 2005,
mostly through active surveillance. BARB cases had decreased in
successive birth cohorts, from 44 in the 1996/1997 cohort to none
to date in the 2000/2001 cohort. However, 3 BARB cases had
been identified in the 2001/2002 cohort. Backcalculation of the
prevalence of BARB cases indicated a drop from 130 infected
animals per million (95% confidence interval 90-190) in the
1996/1997 cohort to 30 infected animals per million (95%
confidence interval 10-60) in the 1999/2000 cohort. A shift in the
geographical distribution of BSE cases, from the concentration of
pre-1996 BSE cases in Eastern England to a more uniform
14
© SEAC 2005
distribution of BARB cases, had occurred. However, it appeared
that certain post-1996 cohorts had a higher exposure to BSE in
certain areas for limited periods. Several clusters of BARB cases
within herds had been identified (5 pairs, 2 triplets and 1
quadruplet).
40. A triplet of BARB cases in South West Wales had been
investigated in detail. The triplet comprised 2 cases born in
September and October 2001 and a third in May 2002. The
animals born in 2001 were reared outdoors from the spring of 2002
but the animal born in 2002 had been reared indoors. Further
investigation of feeding practices revealed that a new feed bin for
the adult dairy herd had been installed in September 1998. In July
2002 the feed bin was emptied, but not cleaned, and relocated. All
3 BARB cases received feed from the relocated bin. This finding
suggested the hypothesis that the feed bin installed in September
1998 was filled initially with contaminated feed, that remnants of
this feed fell to the bottom of the bin during its relocation, and thus
young animals in the 2001/2002 birth cohort were exposed to
feedstuffs produced in 1998. No adult cattle had been infected
because of the reduced susceptibility to BSE with increasing age.
41. Further investigation of multiple case herds had found no
association of BARB clusters with the closure of feed mills.
42. Professor Wilesmith concluded that there is evidence of a decline
in risk of infection for successive birth cohorts of cattle. The BARB
epidemic is unlikely to be sustained by animals born after 31 July
2000. Feed bins could represent a continued source of occasional
infection and advice to farmers is being formulated to reduce this
risk. There is no evidence for an indigenous source of infection for
the BARB cases.
43. Members considered it encouraging that no other factor, apart from
feed contamination, had been identified as a possible cause of
BARB cases to date. Members commented that this study
suggests that only a small amount of contaminated feed may be
required for infection and that BSE infectivity can survive in the
environment for several years. Professor Wilesmith agreed and
noted that infection caused by small doses of infectious material
was consistent with other studies, and it would appear there is little
dilution of infectivity, if present, in the rendering system.
Additionally it appeared that the infectious agent had survived for 4
years in the feed bin.
44. The Chair thanked Professor Wilesmith for his presentation.
snip...
http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/final90.pdf
11/03/2009 00:54:58
Risk of Introduction of BSE into Japan by the Historical Importation of Live Cattle from the United Kingdom
http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2009/03/risk-of-introduction-of-bse-into-japan.html
Tuesday, March 10, 2009
JAPAN-Local governments to carry on BSE testing despite subsidy cuts
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/03/japan-local-governments-to-carry-on-bse.html
J. Virol. doi:10.1128/JVI.02561-07 Copyright (c) 2008, American Society for Microbiology and/or the Listed Authors/Institutions. All Rights Reserved.
Evaluation of the Human Transmission Risk of an Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Prion Strain Qingzhong Kong*, Mengjie Zheng, Cristina Casalone, Liuting Qing, Shenghai Huang, Bikram Chakraborty, Ping Wang, Fusong Chen, Ignazio Cali, Cristiano Corona, Francesca Martucci, Barbara Iulini, Pierluigi Acutis, Lan Wang, Jingjing Liang, Meiling Wang, Xinyi Li, Salvatore Monaco, Gianluigi Zanusso, Wen-Quan Zou, Maria Caramelli, and Pierluigi Gambetti* Department of Pathology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH 44106, USA; CEA, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, 10154 Torino, Italy; Department of Neurological and Visual Sciences, University of Verona, 37134 Verona, Italy
* To whom correspondence should be addressed. Email: mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000390/!x-usc:mailto:qxk2@case.edu. mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000390/!x-usc:mailto:pxg13@case.edu.
Abstract
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), the prion disease in cattle, was widely believed to have only one strain (BSE-C). BSE-C causes the fatal prion disease named new variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease in humans. Two atypical BSE strains, BASE (or BSE-L) and BSE-H, have been discovered in several countries since 2004; their transmissibility and phenotypes in humans are unknown. We investigated the infectivity and human phenotype of BASE by inoculating transgenic (Tg) mice expressing the human prion protein with brain homogenates from two BASE-affected cattle. Sixty percent of the inoculated Tg mice became infected after 20-22 months incubation, a transmission rate higher than those reported for BSE-C. A quarter of BASE-infected Tg mice, but none of the Tg mice infected with a sporadic human prion disease, showed presence of pathogenic prion protein isoforms in the spleen, indicating that the BASE prion is intrinsically lymphotropic. The pathological prion protein isoforms in BASE-infected humanized Tg mouse brains are different from those of the original cattle BASE or sporadic human prion disease. Minimal brain spongiosis and long incubation time are observed in the BASE-infected Tg mice. These results suggest that, in humans, BASE is a more virulent BSE strain and likely lymphotropic.
http://jvi.asm.org/cgi/content/abstract/JVI.02561-07v1?papetoc
personal communication that h type bse will transmit to humans ;
Wednesday, February 11, 2009 Atypical BSE North America Update February 2009
Greetings,
Considering that Mad Cow disease of all documented phenotypes, either the c-BSE, or the atypical h-BSE and or the l-BSE, ALL of which have been documented in North America, how many more, who knows, but they seem to be throwing all there marbles in the pot now by calling the h-type BSE 'familial'. what happens if we come up with another strain ? kinda like the sporadic FFI, that's not familial, what's that all about ? considering the many different strains of the typical scrapie 20+, and then the atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, which the USA has documented 6 cases the last i heard, and the thought of more than one strain of CWD in deer and elk, where will the next year, 4 years, 8 years, and beyond take us in the world of human and animal Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy and 'sound science' in the USA ? WILL the New Administration see the enfamous enhanced bse surveillance program of 2004 for what it was, a fraud, and have a 'redo' ? WE can hope i suppose. ...TSS
Both of the BSE cases ascertained in the US native-born cattle were atypical cases (H-type), which contributed to the initial ambiguity of the diagnosis. 174, 185 In Canada, there have been 2 atypical BSE cases in addition to the 14 cases of the classic UK strain of BSE2: one was the H-type, and the other was of the L-type.198
snip...end
source :
Enhanced Abstract Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association January 1, 2009, Vol. 234, No. 1, Pages 59-72
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy
Jane L. Harman, DVM, PhD; Christopher J. Silva, PhD
http://avmajournals.avma.org/doi/ref/10.2460/javma.234.1.59
Thursday, December 04, 2008 2:37 PM
"we have found that H-BSE can infect humans."
personal communication with Professor Kong. ...TSS
see full text ;
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/atypical-bse-north-america-update.html
JOURNAL OF VIROLOGY, Apr. 2008, p. 3697–3701 Vol. 82, No. 7 0022-538X/08/$08.000 doi:10.1128/JVI.02561-07 Copyright © 2008, American Society for Microbiology. All Rights Reserved.
Evaluation of the Human Transmission Risk of an Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Prion Strain
Qingzhong Kong,1* Mengjie Zheng,1 Cristina Casalone,2 Liuting Qing,1 Shenghai Huang,1† Bikram Chakraborty,1 Ping Wang,1 Fusong Chen,1 Ignazio Cali,1 Cristiano Corona,2 Francesca Martucci,2 Barbara Iulini,2 Pierluigi Acutis,2 Lan Wang,1 Jingjing Liang,1 Meiling Wang,1 Xinyi Li,1 Salvatore Monaco,3 Gianluigi Zanusso,3 Wen-Quan Zou,1 Maria Caramelli,2 and Pierluigi Gambetti1* Department of Pathology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio 441061; CEA, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, 10154 Torino, Italy2; and Department of Neurological and Visual Sciences, University of Verona, 37134 Verona, Italy3 Received 30 November 2007/Accepted 16 January 2008
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), the prion disease in cattle, was widely believed to be caused by only one strain, BSE-C. BSE-C causes the fatal prion disease named new variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease in humans. Two atypical BSE strains, bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy (BASE, also named BSE-L) and BSE-H, have been discovered in several countries since 2004; their transmissibility and phenotypes in humans are unknown. We investigated the infectivity and human phenotype of BASE strains by inoculating transgenic (Tg) mice expressing the human prion protein with brain homogenates from two BASE straininfected cattle. Sixty percent of the inoculated Tg mice became infected after 20 to 22 months of incubation, a transmission rate higher than those reported for BSE-C. A quarter of BASE strain-infected Tg mice, but none of the Tg mice infected with prions causing a sporadic human prion disease, showed the presence of pathogenic prion protein isoforms in the spleen, indicating that the BASE prion is intrinsically lymphotropic. The pathological prion protein isoforms in BASE strain-infected humanized Tg mouse brains are different from those from the original cattle BASE or sporadic human prion disease. Minimal brain spongiosis and long incubation times are observed for the BASE strain-infected Tg mice. These results suggest that in humans, the BASE strain is a more virulent BSE strain and likely lymphotropic.
0022-538X/08/$08.000 doi:10.1128/JVI.02561-07 Copyright © 2008, American Society for Microbiology. All Rights Reserved. Evaluation of the Human Transmission Risk of an Atypical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Prion Strain Qingzhong Kong,1* Mengjie Zheng,1 Cristina Casalone,2 Liuting Qing,1 Shenghai Huang,1† Bikram Chakraborty,1 Ping Wang,1 Fusong Chen,1 Ignazio Cali,1 Cristiano Corona,2 Francesca Martucci,2 Barbara Iulini,2 Pierluigi Acutis,2 Lan Wang,1 Jingjing Liang,1 Meiling Wang,1 Xinyi Li,1 Salvatore Monaco,3 Gianluigi Zanusso,3 Wen-Quan Zou,1 Maria Caramelli,2 and Pierluigi Gambetti1* Department of Pathology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio 441061; CEA, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, 10154 Torino, Italy2; and Department of Neurological and Visual Sciences, University of Verona, 37134 Verona, Italy3 Received 30 November 2007/Accepted 16 January 2008
TSS
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