AUSTRALIAN QUESTIONNAIRE TO ASSESS BSE RISK (OIE) Terrestrial Animal Health Code, 2009 and USA export risk factor for TSE to Australia
Greetings,
I understand ABA et al and their alliance with R-CALF as their Sister alliance. I know not to mess with someone's Sister. However, a friendly word of advice to you. Don't believe the ''USA BSE FREE'', and or 'everything over here is o.k. mentality' i.e. 'don't look, don't find'. The USDA, FDA et al have failed terribly in BSE surveillance, testing, and feed ban. In other words, do not be fooled by their innocent act.
I thought some of you might be interested in some of these figures. See the bovine products the USA exported to Australia in 2010, 2009, and before. ...
http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/cattle/Trade.htm
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/meattrade/
Trade Codes Conversion Factors
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/MeatTrade/Data/TradeCodesConversionFactors.xls
USA CATTLE EXPORT TO AUSTRALIA OCT 2009 = 33
USA CATTLE EXPORT TO AUSTRALIA JAN 2010 = 15
USA CATTLE EXPORT TO AUSTRALIA JAN 2003 = 23
USA CATTLE EXPORT TO AUSTRALIA FEB 2001 = 12
USA CATTLE EXPORT TO AUSTRALIA DEC 2000 = 171
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/meattrade/Data/Cattle_Monthly-Full.xls
Livestock and meat trade data
SEE after Japan, toward the bottom of the skroll bar, you will see USA export to Australia, i have posted only a few recent ones ;
63,"0102100050","Bovine animals, live, purebred breeding, except dairy, female",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",2009,10,33.0
63,"0102900000","Bovine animals, live, nesoi",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",2003,1,23.0
63,"0102900000","Bovine animals, live, nesoi",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",2010,1,15.0
63,"0201100010","Carcasses and half-carcasses of veal, fresh or chilled",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,12,1344.81942
63,"0202100010","Carcasses and half-carcasses of veal, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2003,1,730.0
63,"0202100010","Carcasses and half-carcasses of veal, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2003,1,1609.3740600000001
63,"0202203550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, other cuts with bone in, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2003,1,1315.0
63,"0202203550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, other cuts with bone in, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,1,1398.0
63,"0202203550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, other cuts with bone in, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,2,484.0
63,"0202203550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, other cuts with bone in, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2003,1,2899.0779299999999
63,"0202203550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, other cuts with bone in, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,1,3082.0615560000001
63,"0202203550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, other cuts with bone in, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,2,1067.0370480000001
63,"0202303550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2003,1,4400.0
63,"0202303550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2005,12,9435.0
63,"0202303550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2008,10,920.0
63,"0202303550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2008,11,804.0
63,"0202303550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,2,2344.0
63,"0202303550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,3,2099.0
63,"0202303550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,9,2121.0
63,"0202303550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,10,1752.0
63,"0202303550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,11,12737.0
63,"0202303550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,12,3848.0
63,"0202303550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2010,1,1715.0
63,"0202303550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2003,1,13230.968385095999
63,"0202303550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2005,12,28371.406071222897
63,"0202303550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2008,10,2766.4752077927997
63,"0202303550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2008,11,2417.6587685493596
63,"0202303550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,2,7048.4977033329596
63,"0202303550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,3,6311.7733273446593
63,"0202303550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,9,6377.9281692701397
63,"0202303550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,10,5268.3310478836793
63,"0202303550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,11,38300.646436583578
63,"0202303550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,12,11571.083260420319
63,"0202303550","Meat of bovine animals, frozen, boneless, processed",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2010,1,5157.0706319180999
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2004,3,8870.0
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2008,7,4660.0
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2008,10,12217.0
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2008,11,12554.0
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2008,12,1121.0
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,1,4639.0
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,2,6188.0
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,3,3058.0
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,9,20202.0
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,10,1180.0
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,11,1987.0
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,12,3366.0
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2010,1,17032.0
boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2008,7,14598.513313226642
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2008,10,38272.540160448472
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2008,11,39328.269556705418
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2008,12,3511.7882884392843
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,1,14532.726021471757
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,2,19385.321970439152
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,3,9579.8827707826331
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,9,63287.374668198412
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,10,3696.6192509887201
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,11,6224.7308912835488
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,12,10544.763049854264
63,"0202306000","Meat of bovine animals, boneless, except processed, frozen",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2010,1,53356.626341389732
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1991,8,178.75224528398721
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1995,4,7821.0065719920531
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1995,12,648.87065038087349
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1997,8,4224.5113968782307
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1997,9,10216.286658797482
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1998,12,942.02433264661249
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1999,3,1528.9275379957039
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1999,4,7807.3022331869479
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1999,5,2967.2872717141877
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2001,7,2074.717726929478
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2005,1,4019.5421556192587
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2005,5,1787.5224528398719
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2005,12,3269.378566244126
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1991,8,300.0
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1995,4,13126.0
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1995,12,1089.0
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1997,8,7090.0
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1997,9,17146.0
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1998,12,1581.0
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1999,3,2566.0
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1999,4,13103.0
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1999,5,4980.0
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2001,7,3482.0
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2005,1,6746.0
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2005,5,3000.0
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2005,12,5487.0
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1991,8,537.51484229940002
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1995,4,23518.06606673975
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1995,12,1951.1788775468219
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1997,8,12703.267439675819
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1997,9,30720.764953551708
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1998,12,2832.7032189178381
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1999,3,4597.5436178008677
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1999,4,23476.856595496793
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1999,5,8922.7463821700403
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2001,7,6238.755602955036
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2005,1,12086.917087172507
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2005,5,5375.1484229939997
63,"1602509500","Meat or meat offal of bovine animals, nesoi, prepared or preserved",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2005,12,9831.1464656560256
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1989,2,0.46385770948041372
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1992,9,12.621978489262959
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1993,7,0.48831279280336071
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1994,9,27.641344017830303
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1996,5,6.8332236046247345
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1997,11,3.9443682778946747
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1999,2,2.366620966736805
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2000,1,9.254276853596485
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2000,2,0.62242131425177971
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2000,10,0.80622887600167148
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2000,12,15.278904961252811
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2001,7,0.72970813141051483
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2002,8,1.5390925020345021
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2002,11,0.39443682778946748
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2007,1,7.1716504028680976
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1989,2,2.1821896551724138
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1992,9,59.379310344827587
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1993,7,2.2972370689655173
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1994,9,130.03697844827587
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1996,5,32.146474137931037
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1997,11,18.556034482758623
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1999,2,11.133620689655173
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2000,1,43.536168103448276
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2000,2,2.9281422413793106
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2000,10,3.7928534482758622
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2000,12,71.878655172413801
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2001,7,3.4328663793103451
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2002,8,7.2405646551724141
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2002,11,1.8556034482758621
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2007,1,33.738581896551722
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1989,2,588.0
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1992,9,16000.0
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1993,7,619.0
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1994,9,35039.0
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1996,5,8662.0
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1997,11,5000.0
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1999,2,3000.0
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2000,1,11731.0
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2000,2,789.0
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2000,10,1022.0
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2000,12,19368.0
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2001,7,925.0
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2002,8,1951.0
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2002,11,500.0
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2007,1,9091.0
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1989,2,1.3948378839359998
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1992,9,37.954772351999999
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1993,7,1.4683752553679998
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1994,9,83.118579277607992
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1996,5,20.547764882063998
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1997,11,11.860866359999999
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1999,2,7.1165198159999994
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2000,1,27.827964653831998
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2000,2,1.8716447116079997
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2000,10,2.424361083984
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2000,12,45.944251932095995
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2001,7,2.1942602765999997
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2002,8,4.6281100536719997
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2002,11,1.186086636
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2007,1,21.565427215751999
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1989,2,5.5806478534799995
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1992,9,151.85436336000001
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1993,7,5.8748656824899994
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1994,9,332.55156486069001
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1996,5,82.210155964020004
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1997,11,47.454488550000001
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1999,2,28.47269313
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2000,1,111.33772103601
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2000,2,7.4883182931899999
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2000,10,9.6996974596199994
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2000,12,183.81970684728
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2001,7,8.7790803817499992
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2002,8,18.516741432210001
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2002,11,4.7454488550000002
63,"1602900000","Animal meat, nesoi, including preparations of blood of any animal, prepared or p",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2007,1,86.281751081609997
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1989,4,84.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1990,1,373.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1990,2,373.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1990,5,8320.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1990,7,45.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1990,12,123.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1991,1,5.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1991,2,25.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1991,5,99.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1991,12,111.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1993,1,400.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1993,6,17.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1993,9,10.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1993,10,54.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1993,12,32.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1994,4,15.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1994,5,413.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1994,7,36.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1995,2,61.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1995,12,14.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1996,5,393.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1997,6,13.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1998,1,92.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1998,6,25.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1998,8,2.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1999,1,54.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1999,5,12.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",1999,12,15.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",2000,12,171.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",2001,2,12.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",2003,1,23.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",2009,10,33.0
63,,"Cattle",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","NO",2010,1,15.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1989,1,5913.691040465992
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1989,2,8617.9846536214136
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1989,3,12242.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1989,7,309.31032207453239
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1989,8,215.29311999999999
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1989,10,1125.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1989,12,8422.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1990,1,33520.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1990,7,12900.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1990,9,2863.4500758814338
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1991,1,4745.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1991,2,10344.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1991,8,178.75224528398721
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1991,10,15880.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1991,11,14.912599999999999
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1992,3,18452.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1992,8,7259.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1992,9,34944.62197848926
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1992,11,40320.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1993,7,0.48831279280336071
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1993,11,12221.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1994,6,1398.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1994,9,27.641344017830303
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1994,10,24071.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1994,11,87268.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1994,12,106447.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1995,1,59161.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1995,2,29350.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1995,3,89.579893985938114
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1995,4,16330.006571992053
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1995,5,1158.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1995,6,50678.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1995,8,200.19501895202973
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1995,10,19114.232874623343
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1995,11,61233.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1995,12,84905.18281038088
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1996,1,3237.0873259675795
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1996,3,3237.0873259675795
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1996,4,8997.954500465552
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1996,5,10062.833223604624
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1996,7,3237.0873259675795
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1996,8,11613.114657947021
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1996,9,4526.0306311722397
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1996,10,14416.625416981311
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1996,11,24814.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1996,12,41094.546192364935
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1997,1,90585.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1997,2,18717.157584111086
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1997,3,33338.703328968819
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1997,4,1767.45676
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1997,5,21657.08938906281
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1997,6,1587.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1997,8,24209.100251471809
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1997,9,10216.286658797482
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1997,11,3.9443682778946747
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1997,12,2301.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1998,2,7152.3599999999997
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1998,7,1781.9160245459943
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1998,9,809.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1998,10,5282.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1998,11,2926.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1998,12,2595.0243326466125
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1999,1,76814.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1999,2,147221.36662096673
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1999,3,37453.927537995703
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1999,4,94607.302233186943
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1999,5,183625.4768360008
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1999,6,40877.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1999,7,50080.709385103779
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1999,8,1777.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1999,9,6546.6029311495122
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1999,10,362877.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1999,11,362877.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1999,12,434922.5464049796
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2000,1,1054975.2535568536
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2000,2,149619.9994030071
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2000,3,145168.31403942229
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2000,4,114582.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2000,5,49202.931222827479
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2000,7,3171.8586185913177
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2000,8,2920.2621758543073
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2000,10,0.80622887600167148
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2000,11,13.688559999999999
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2000,12,13575.604864961253
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2001,1,23.273999999999997
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2001,2,533.47888
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2001,3,13208.31208
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2001,4,244.01495999999997
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2001,5,1059.7750799999999
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2001,6,989.60191999999995
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2001,7,10043.447435060887
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2001,8,1730.5124379568465
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2001,9,540.01472718608181
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2001,10,1946.57692
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2001,11,22433.775079999999
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2001,12,7633.36996
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2002,1,17747.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2002,2,1500.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2002,5,2362.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2002,7,18000.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2002,8,3117.5390925020347
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2002,9,38047.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2002,10,750.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2002,11,1208.3944368277894
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2002,12,267.82847130068842
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2003,1,6445.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2004,3,8870.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2004,12,5435.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2005,1,4019.5421556192587
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2005,2,14813.529623085549
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2005,5,1787.5224528398719
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2005,12,12704.378566244126
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2007,1,7.1716504028680976
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2007,9,690.16180707786816
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2008,7,4660.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2008,9,372.1342844783976
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2008,10,13672.957535722926
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2008,11,13508.897747017896
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2008,12,1121.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,1,6037.0
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,2,9146.1568216309752
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,3,5266.7164893656018
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,7,4416.0135486850877
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,8,1243.553743850671
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,9,25228.533112898378
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,10,3350.7262183185849
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,11,15361.858603928238
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2009,12,8891.1055815010586
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2010,1,19487.962044619751
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2010,2,429.84816381591963
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2010,3,1527.9148368365873
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",2010,4,1013.299412743682
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1989,1,17773.993257300001
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1989,2,24091.519894083936
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1989,3,36812.162493260279
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1989,7,930.10797558000002
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1989,8,550.6263907199999
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1989,10,3382.9180526250002
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1989,12,25325.276304381481
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1990,1,101165.45111170376
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1990,7,40412.193506571602
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1990,9,8610.50396052
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1991,1,14268.396586405001
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1991,2,31104.803854536003
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1991,8,537.51484229940002
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1991,10,49747.723479407527
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1991,11,38.139960599999995
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1992,3,57805.100355291412
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1992,8,22740.473849938237
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1992,9,109470.41551433333
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1992,11,124224.89628681127
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1993,7,1.4683752553679998
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1993,11,36884.508412006333
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1994,6,4203.8395005373204
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1994,9,83.118579277607992
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1994,10,72382.418181283138
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1994,11,267646.28747291822
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1994,12,325143.31408661621
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1995,1,182510.57676092951
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1995,2,91945.572047897411
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1995,3,269.37016937913603
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1995,4,50174.450140182991
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1995,5,3627.6992310550322
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1995,6,158760.39864542912
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1995,8,601.99408331999996
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1995,10,59872.125277996165
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1995,11,187082.17893998665
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1995,12,250499.78191942893
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1996,1,9734.0454703800006
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1996,3,9734.0454703800006
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1996,4,27057.19352868
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1996,5,31523.262330935089
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1996,7,9734.0454703800006
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1996,8,34921.080202680001
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1996,9,13609.94731614
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1996,10,44480.165420498728
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1996,11,77735.517028842456
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1996,12,127703.16917649825
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1997,1,252176.16668868414
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1997,2,57517.35836971648
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1997,3,102874.11723874707
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1997,4,3935.20617756
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1997,5,67023.480030798819
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1997,6,3498.7351140000001
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1997,8,75195.603015218541
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1997,9,30720.764953551708
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1997,11,11.860866359999999
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1997,12,6919.1950577513398
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1998,2,22267.578603714446
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1998,7,5358.2896785599996
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1998,9,2534.3770966524362
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1998,10,13361.8098347874
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1998,11,6450.7239720000007
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1998,12,8011.1028984808509
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1999,1,240637.38232665046
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1999,2,460779.39438117377
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1999,3,117140.80344133457
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1999,4,295397.66251568403
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1999,5,574806.34290558333
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1999,6,128056.52976497111
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1999,7,154397.29264395183
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1999,8,5566.8579737347081
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1999,9,19685.885548140002
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1999,10,1136795.0033398592
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1999,11,1136795.0033398592
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1999,12,1361404.9575389081
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2000,1,3303591.1867361693
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2000,2,462082.15022629866
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2000,3,454331.21782343934
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2000,4,358954.26018371998
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2000,5,153602.34478296374
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2000,7,9537.9002510400005
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2000,8,8781.3401192999991
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2000,10,2.424361083984
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2000,11,35.009397359999994
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2000,12,42515.068779698253
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2001,1,59.524793999999993
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2001,2,1193.2296112800002
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2001,3,41142.630670992396
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2001,4,624.08439576000001
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2001,5,3314.3650012242006
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2001,6,2965.2196985170203
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2001,7,24257.509455951575
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2001,8,5299.8699072450599
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2001,9,1470.4167353400001
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2001,10,4408.4944285199999
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2001,11,61885.443889175753
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2001,12,17790.579995471642
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2002,1,50372.314686900616
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2002,2,4699.092268206
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2002,5,5207.317164
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2002,7,56389.107218472003
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2002,8,6874.230262053672
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2002,9,119190.90901895579
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2002,10,2255.278702005
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2002,11,3785.521726631232
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2002,12,805.37046281999994
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2003,1,17739.420375096
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2004,3,27787.298945991482
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2004,12,11982.120570000001
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2005,1,12086.917087172507
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2005,2,44544.85048062
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2005,5,5375.1484229939997
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2005,12,38202.552536878924
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2007,1,21.565427215751999
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2007,9,2075.3429659200001
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2008,7,14598.513313226642
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2008,9,1119.02203476
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2008,10,42650.660188901275
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2008,11,42199.683625294776
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2008,12,3511.7882884392843
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,1,17614.787577471758
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,2,27892.243265432113
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,3,16221.577780427293
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,7,13279.12173882
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,8,3739.4136977399999
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,9,78402.352100788557
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,10,10224.076061732399
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,11,46443.442560307129
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2009,12,26669.493051274581
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2010,1,60741.79819760783
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2010,2,1292.5698786
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2010,3,4594.4983866599996
63,,"Beef and veal",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",2010,4,3047.03011242
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/MeatTrade/data/LivestockMeatTrade.zip
Livestock and meat trade data
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/MeatTrade/data/LivestockMeatTrade.zip
63,"0201203000","*Meat Bovine Animals NESOI Cuts w/ bone processed frh/chd",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1989,10,1125.0
63,"0201203000","*Meat Bovine Animals NESOI Cuts w/ bone processed frh/chd",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1991,2,10344.0
63,"0201203000","*Meat Bovine Animals NESOI Cuts w/ bone processed frh/chd",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1989,10,3382.9180526250002
63,"0201203000","*Meat Bovine Animals NESOI Cuts w/ bone processed frh/chd",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1991,2,31104.803854536003
63,"0201303000","*Beef Boneless Processed, NESOI, FR/CH ADDTL Note 3",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1989,3,12242.0
63,"0201303000","*Beef Boneless Processed, NESOI, FR/CH ADDTL Note 3",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1989,12,8422.0
63,"0201303000","*Beef Boneless Processed, NESOI, FR/CH ADDTL Note 3",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1993,11,11143.0
63,"0201303000","*Beef Boneless Processed, NESOI, FR/CH ADDTL Note 3",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1994,6,1398.0
63,"0201303000","*Beef Boneless Processed, NESOI, FR/CH ADDTL Note 3",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1994,10,24071.0
63,"0201303000","*Beef Boneless Processed, NESOI, FR/CH ADDTL Note 3",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1994,11,45673.0
63,"0201303000","*Beef Boneless Processed, NESOI, FR/CH ADDTL Note 3",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1994,12,66244.0
63,"0201303000","*Beef Boneless Processed, NESOI, FR/CH ADDTL Note 3",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1995,1,22474.0
63,"0201303000","*Beef Boneless Processed, NESOI, FR/CH ADDTL Note 3",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1995,11,37745.0
63,"0201303000","*Beef Boneless Processed, NESOI, FR/CH ADDTL Note 3",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","KG",1995,12,35685.0
63,"0201303000","*Beef Boneless Processed, NESOI, FR/CH ADDTL Note 3",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1989,3,36812.162493260279
63,"0201303000","*Beef Boneless Processed, NESOI, FR/CH ADDTL Note 3",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1989,12,25325.276304381481
63,"0201303000","*Beef Boneless Processed, NESOI, FR/CH ADDTL Note 3",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1993,11,33507.427435255624
63,"0201303000","*Beef Boneless Processed, NESOI, FR/CH ADDTL Note 3",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1994,6,4203.8395005373204
63,"0201303000","*Beef Boneless Processed, NESOI, FR/CH ADDTL Note 3",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1994,10,72382.418181283138
63,"0201303000","*Beef Boneless Processed, NESOI, FR/CH ADDTL Note 3",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1994,11,137340.45887556582
63,"0201303000","*Beef Boneless Processed, NESOI, FR/CH ADDTL Note 3",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1994,12,199198.24311415898
63,"0201303000","*Beef Boneless Processed, NESOI, FR/CH ADDTL Note 3",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1995,1,67580.178065147164
63,"0201303000","*Beef Boneless Processed, NESOI, FR/CH ADDTL Note 3",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1995,11,113500.6594762383
63,"0201303000","*Beef Boneless Processed, NESOI, FR/CH ADDTL Note 3",6021,"Australia","US Export, QTY","CWE",1995,12,107306.1606413979
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/MeatTrade/data/LivestockMeatTrade.zip
BEEF AND VEAL USA EXPORT TO AUSTRALIA
Beef and veal: Monthly U.S. trade (carcass weight, 1,000 pounds)
Import/export, country code and name 1/ Jan-00 Feb-00 Mar-00 Apr-00 May-00 Jun-00 Jul-00 Aug-00 Sep-00 Oct-00 Nov-00 Dec-00 Jan-01 Feb-01 Mar-01 Apr-01 May-01 Jun-01 Jul-01 Aug-01 Sep-01 Oct-01 Nov-01 Dec-01 Jan-02 Feb-02 Mar-02 Apr-02 May-02 Jun-02 Jul-02 Aug-02 Sep-02 Oct-02 Nov-02 Dec-02 Jan-03 Feb-03 Mar-03 Apr-03 May-03 Jun-03 Jul-03 Aug-03 Sep-03 Oct-03 Nov-03 Dec-03 Jan-04 Feb-04 Mar-04 Apr-04 May-04 Jun-04 Jul-04 Aug-04 Sep-04 Oct-04 Nov-04 Dec-04 Jan-05 Feb-05 Mar-05 Apr-05 May-05 Jun-05 Jul-05 Aug-05 Sep-05 Oct-05 Nov-05 Dec-05 Jan-06 Feb-06 Mar-06 Apr-06 May-06 Jun-06 Jul-06 Aug-06 Sep-06 Oct-06 Nov-06 Dec-06 Jan-07 Feb-07 Mar-07 Apr-07 May-07 Jun-07 Jul-07 Aug-07 Sep-07 Oct-07 Nov-07 Dec-07 Jan-08 Feb-08 Mar-08 Apr-08 May-08 Jun-08 Jul-08 Aug-08 Sep-08 Oct-08 Nov-08 Dec-08 Jan-09 Feb-09 Mar-09 Apr-09 May-09 Jun-09 Jul-09 Aug-09 Sep-09 Oct-09 Nov-09 Dec-09 Jan-10 Feb-10 Mar-10 Apr-10
6021 Australia 3,304 462 454 359 154 10 9 0 0 43 0 1 41 1 3 3 24 5 1 4 62 18 50 5 5 56 7 119 2 4 1 18 28 12 12 45 5 38 0 2 15 1 43 42 4 18 28 16 13 4 78 10 46 27 61 1 5 3
http://www.ers.usda.gov/data/meattrade/Data/BeefVeal_Monthly-Full.xls
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/MeatTrade/data/LivestockMeatTrade.zip
PLEASE UNDERSTAND, that was just a partial list. to see complete list, follow urls ;
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/MeatTrade/documentation.htm
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/MeatTrade/data/LivestockMeatTrade.zip
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/schedules/b/2006/c02.pdf
http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/schedules/b/2006/c01.pdf
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/MeatTrade/Data/TradeCodesConversionFactors.xls
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/MeatTrade/links.htm
STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION BETWEEN EATING VEAL AND RISK OF CJD
5. The UK surveillance unit is conducting a long-term case-control study on dietary history and risk of CJD. The current statistical analysis has produced a finding that people who eat veal on average at least once a year appear to be at thirteen times the risk of individuals who have never eaten veal. This finding is likely to cause concern if taken at face value. ...
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090505194948/http://bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1994/10/00004001.pdf
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090505194948/http://bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1994/10/00003001.pdf
POLICY RESTRICTED
snip...
PROBLEM
7. The main findings in the case-control study were STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN CONSUMPTION OF VEAL OR VENISON AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CJD (INCREASED RISKS OF 2-13x).
IP PS(L) wishes to probe this further we think it best to explain the matter VERBALLY. The problem is how to present the findings in this year's annual report in a way which avoids unnecessary public alarm and limits the scope for media scare stores. (or the facts...TSS)
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080103020408/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1994/07/00001001.pdf
BRITISH DEER FARMERS ASSOCIATION
OCTOBER 1994
Dear Mr Elmhirst,
CREUTZFELDT-JAKOB DISEASE (CJD) SURVEILLANCE UNIT REPORT
Thank you for your recent letter concerning the publication of the third annual report from the CJD Surveillance Unit. I am sorry that you are dissatisfied with the way in which this report was published.
The Surveillance Unit is completely independent outside body and the Department of Health is committed to publishing their reports as soon as they become available. In the circumstances it is not the practice to circulate the report for comment since the findings of the report would not be amended. In future we can ensure that the British Deer Farmers Association receives a copy of the report in advance of publication.
snip...
The statistical results regarding the consumption of venison was put into perspective in the body of the report and was NOT MENTIONED AT ALL IN THE PRESS RELEASE. Media attention regarding this report was low key but gave a realistic presentation of the statistical findings of the Unit. This approach to publication was successful in that consumption of VENISON was highlighted only by the media i.e. in the News at one television programme.
I believe that a further statement about the report, or indeed statistical links between CJD and consumption of Venison, would increase, and quite possibly GIVE DAMAGING CREDENCE, to the whole issue. From the low key media reports of which I am aware it seems unlikely that venison consumption will suffer adversely, if at all.
http://web.archive.org/web/20030511010117/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1994/10/00003001.pdf
BSE GBR RISK AUSTRALIA
• In addition to cattle imported from the UK, Australia also imported cattle from other BSE risk countries. According to the CD, Australia imported cattle from Canada (31), Denmark (128), France (185), Ireland (1), Japan (24), and the USA (675). Most of these imports occurred between 1988 and 2003.
The official USA export figures indicate that a total of 1,441 cattle were exported to Australia from the USA during the period 1993 and 2001. However, information subsequently provided by the only pre-USA export quarantine station that was approved during the time period in question indicated that only 493 cattle were exported to the Australia from the USA during that period. According to the Australian authorities, 190 of the animals imported into Australia between 1996 and 2003 were still alive in early 2004. A further 11 of these animals had died but did not enter the rendering system.
• Official export data were not available for Canada. According to the Australian authorities, 16 of the 21 animals imported from Canada between 1996 and 2003 were still alive in early 2004.
snip...
• The official export figures from the USA showed that 857 tons of MBM was exported to Australia between 1996 and 2001. The official export figures from Canada showed that 163 tons of MBM was exported to Australia in 1998.
see full annex of report here ;
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/scdocs/doc/37rax1.pdf
FULL REPORT ;
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/scdocs/doc/6r.pdf
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-17 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of USA
2.1 Import of cattle from BSE-Risk2 countries
An overview of the data on live cattle imports is presented in table 1 and is based on data as provided in the country dossier (CD) and corresponding data on relevant exports as available from BSE risk countries that exported to the USA. Only data from risk periods are indicated, i.e. those periods when exports from a BSE risk country already represented an external challenge, according to the SSC opinion on the GBR (SSC July 2000 and updated January 2002).
• According to the country dossier, 323 cattle were imported directly from the UK, all between 1980 and 1989, and 10 via Canada in 90, 91 and 92. According to Eurostat, 327 cattle were imported from UK. Of these cattle 96% were beef breeding cattle, 4% were dairy cattle. After 1989 an import stop for UK cattle was in effect.
• Cattle imported from the UK were traced-back in 1995. This trace back exercise provided the details on which the assessment of the HRS of the import risk assessment is based. The animals still alive in 1995 (117 cattle) have been purchased, diagnostic samples were taken, and the carcasses were incinerated. These animals were not taken into account for the external challenge. All these animals tested negative for BSE (histopathology and IHC). Of these 117 cattle 52 came from UK-herds in which one or more cases of BSE later on developed.
• For 173 cattle imported from the UK in the 80s, information on their final use is, according to the HRS, lacking and it is indicated that it is possible that some of these animals could have been rendered. In the HRS it is also noted that these animals were imported before the peak of the epidemic and none came from a birth cohort in which a BSE case is known to be developed. However, based on realistic worst case assumptions it has to be assumed that they created a risk if rendered for feed.
• EU export data show that from the EU (excluding UK), 1,663 cattle were exported to the USA since 1980; according to the CD only 460 cattle have been imported from the EU.
• According to the CD, 162 cattle were imported from Ireland between 1980 and 1988 (according to Eurostat 233). The trace back of these animals showed that 22 were found as being excluded from rendering in the US system and 4 were born in US quarantine and were therefore not taken into account for the external challenge.
• According to the CD, 6 cattle from Belgium (Eurostat also 6), 46 from Germany (Eurostat 430), 3 from Austria (Eurostat 0) and 8 from Italy (Eurostat 21) have been imported. The 40 breeding-cattle imported from these countries in 1996 and 1997 were all traced back and none of them entered the US system.
• According to Eurostat, 12 cattle from Denmark and 558 cattle from the Netherlands were imported to the USA. These imports were not indicated in the CD.
• Additionally according to the CD, 235 cattle have been imported from France (403 according to Eurostat) and 103 cattle from Switzerland (48 according to other sources).
• The discrepancy in the EU export data and the import data in the CD (See table 1) can in some cases, be explained by the use of the fiscal year data (from October to September) in the CD.
• Between 235.000 and 1.7 Million (CD and Other sources) cattle per year are imported to the USA from Canada. According to the CD, feeder/slaughter cattle represent typically more around 80% of the imported cattle from Canada; therefore, only 20% of the imported cattle have been taken into account.
• From Japan, 242 animals from a special beef breed were imported. These animals were traced, and were mostly excluded from the US rendering system. At most 39 of these animals have been rendered.
2.2 Import of MBM or MBM-containing feedstuffs from BSE-Risk countries
An overview of the data on MBM imports is presented in table 2 and is based on data provided in the country dossier (CD) and corresponding data on relevant exports as available from BSE risk countries that exported to the USA. Only data from risk periods are indicated, i.e. those periods when exports from a BSE risk country already represented an external challenge, according to the SSC opinion on the GBR (SSC, July 2000 and updated January 2002).
• The CD reports import of 5 tons of MBM from the UK. According to Eurostat, 63 tons have been exported from the UK to the USA between 1980 and 1996; however, according the updated MBM statistics from the UK (August 2001) 24 tons of MBM were exported from the UK to the USA between 1980 and 1996; 39 tons exported in 1989 were not confirmed by the updated UK export statistic and therefore not taken into account. A further 38 tons were exported in 1997-1998 and 39 tons in 1999. As it was illegal to export mammalian meat meal, bone meal and MBM from UK since 27/03/1996, exports indicated after that date should only have included non-mammalian MBM. Therefore, these imports were not taken into account.
• According to the CD, MBM was imported from Denmark, France, Italy and the Netherlands. It was claimed but not substantiated that these imports were not from ruminant origin, and therefore did not contribute to the BSE risk of the USA.
• The Eurostat export statistics indicated additional exports from Belgium, Greece, Ireland and Spain.
• Very large amounts of MBM (CD and other sources) between 18.000 and 44.000 tons annually were imported from Canada.
country imported 2038 (other sources) or 1128 (CD) live cattle from BSE risk countries other than Canada, of which 327 (other sources) or 323 (CD) came from the UK. From Canada the imports were >500,000 animals per year. The numbers shown in table 1 are the raw import figures and are not reflecting the adjusted imports for the assessment of the external challenge. Broken down to 5 year periods the resulting external challenge is as given in table 3. This assessment takes into account the different aspects discussed above that allow to assume that certain imported cattle did not enter the domestic BSE-cattle system, i.e. were not rendered into feed. In the case of the USA, all the animals for which tracing information showed that they were not rendered were excluded from the external challenge. MBM imports:
In total the country imported 689 tons MBM (CD) or 2,230 tons MBM (other sources) from BSE risk countries other than Canada, of which 5 tons (CD) or 101 tons (other sources) were exported from the UK (UK export data). From Canada, the imports were about 30 000 tons per year. The numbers shown in table 2 are the raw import figures and are not reflecting the adjusted imports for the assessment of the external challenge. Broken down to 5 year periods the resulting external challenge is as given in table 3. This assessment takes into account the different aspects discussed above that allow to assume that certain imported MBM did not enter the domestic BSE/cattle system or did not represent an external challenge for other reasons. As it was illegal to export mammalian MBM from UK since 27/03/1996, exports indicated after that date should only have included non-mammalian MBM. In the case of the USA imported MBM from UK in 1989 and between 1997 and 1999 was not taken into account.
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-17 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of USA
please see full text ;
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/scdocs/doc/3rax1.pdf
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of the USA Question number: EFSA-Q-2003-083
Adopted: 1 July 2004
Summary (0.1 Mb)
Report (0.2 Mb)
Annex (0.3 Mb)
Summary
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.
A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1211902594180.htm
----- Original Message -----
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
To: TERRY SINGELTARY
Sent: Saturday, June 19, 2010 3:12 PM
Subject: AUSTRALIAN QUESTIONNAIRE TO ASSESS BSE RISK (OIE) Terrestrial Animal Health Code, 2009
AUSTRALIAN QUESTIONNAIRE TO ASSESS BSE RISK
Introduction
Acceptance of a submission from an applicant country for an assessment of BSE risk is based on the provision of comprehensive data and supporting evidence from the Competent Authority over the five areas listed below. In general, the data requirements are consistent with those of Chapter 11.6 – Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) Terrestrial Animal Health Code, 2009.
A risk assessment to determine the BSE risk status of the cattle population and whether the beef and beef products from a country represent a risk to the health of Australian consumers will be undertaken by Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ). This document sets out the criteria under the five areas that will be examined to determine BSE risk. Applicant countries should also refer to the documents explaining the assessment process (link) and the requirements for the importation of beef and beef products for human consumption (link).
Countries should note that as part of the assessment, verification of in-country control measures may be undertaken by in-country inspection and the results of any such inspections will be considered prior to completing the country assessment. Countries will be required to provide an annual update report by 31 January to the Australian BSE Food Safety Assessment Committee (the Committee) as described in Section 5. Countries are also required to report to the Committee, within 24 hours, any exceptional developments in regard to the countries BSE status e.g. identification of the first indigenous case of BSE.
The document comprises the following:
Section 1 – Risk assessment requirements regarding risk release and exposure
Section 2 – Other system requirements
• Ongoing BSE awareness program
• Compulsory notification and investigation of BSE cases
• Diagnostic capability
• Animal traceability and identification systems
• Animal slaughter and processing systems
Section 3 – BSE surveillance and monitoring system
Section 4 – BSE history of the country
Section 5 – Ongoing review of country BSE status and additional data
3
SECTION 1 – RISK ASSESSMENT REQUIREMENTS – RISK RELEASE AND EXPOSURE
snip...
see full text 12 pages ;
http://www.foodstandards.gov.au/_srcfiles/Questionnaire%20to%20Assess%20BSE%20Risk%2023%20Feb%2020101.pdf
Australian Beef Association’s Beef Producers’ Summit Remarks by Bill Bullard, CEO, R-CALF USA Casino, NSW, Australia June 25, 2010 Greetings from the U.S. Live Cattle Industry R-CALF USA is the largest trade association in the United States that exclusively represents live cattle producers in the United States’ multi-segmented beef supply chain. Producers in the U.S. and Australia are fierce competitors: We’re both competing to maximize our respective share of world’s largest beef consumer market – the United States market; and, we’re both competing to maximize our respective sharea of the global beef market. Australia is the world’s 6th largest beef producer and the U.S. is No. 1. Australia is the world’s 2nd largest beef exporter and the U.S. is No. 3. Trade between the United States and Australia is a one-way street. The U.S. imports approximately $1 billion in beef from Australia annually and the cumulative trade deficit with Australia over the past 20 years is approximately $14.4 billion.
http://www.r-calfusa.com/100625-RemarksPresentationToABA.pdf
Saturday, June 19, 2010
U.S. DENIED UPGRADED BSE STATUS FROM OIE
see full text and reasons why here ;
http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/06/us-denied-upgraded-bse-status-from-oie.html
Saturday, June 12, 2010
PUBLICATION REQUEST AND FOIA REQUEST Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Study of Atypical Bse
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/06/publication-request-and-foia-request.html
Thursday, June 24, 2010
Accumulation of L-type Bovine Prions in Peripheral Nerve Tissues
Volume 16, Number 7–July 2010
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/06/accumulation-of-l-type-bovine-prions-in.html
Monday, July 05, 2010
Immunohistochemical Detection of Disease-Associated Prion Protein in the Intestine of Cattle Naturally Affected with Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/07/immunohistochemical-detection-of.html
Wednesday, March 3, 2010
NOR-98 ATYPICAL SCRAPIE USA 4 CASES DETECTED JANUARY 2010
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2010/03/nor-98-atypical-scrapie-usa-4-cases.html
Monday, June 14, 2010
A molecular switch controls interspecies prion disease transmission in mice
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2010/06/molecular-switch-controls-interspecies.html
Thursday, June 03, 2010
Prion Strain Mutation and Selection John Collinge
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2010/06/prion-strain-mutation-and-selection.html
Wednesday, May 19, 2010
Molecular, Biochemical and Genetic Characteristics of BSE in Canada
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/05/molecular-biochemical-and-genetic.html
Saturday, June 5, 2010
Research Project: Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies: Identification of atypical scrapie in Canadian sheep
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2010/06/research-project-transmissible.html
R-CALF
BSE MRR TSS, R-CALF ON CANADA VS USA
Bill Rancher Joined: 10 Feb 2005 Posts: 1418 Location: GWN Posted: Fri Jan 05, 2007 9:49 am Post
subject: Texan wrote:
Hey Terry, I'd like to get a little further clarification on something if/when you have time. I'm not sure if I'm reading you correctly....
flounder wrote:
This is what sank my battleship in regards to testifying for r-calf. they actually appoached me about it, but i told them i would be glad to testify, but i was not stopping at the Canadian border, my testimony was to come south as well if given the opportunity. and that ended that, but i did supply them with a load of data, for whatever that was worth.
I highlighted the parts that confuse me. This almost makes it seem as if R-CALF was asking you to testify for them, but changed their mind when they found out that you were going to tell the WHOLE truth, instead of just the truth as regards Canadian imports. I thought that R-CALF was only interested in the WHOLE truth - not just the selected parts of the truth that fit their protectionist agenda? After reading your post, it makes a person wonder. Maybe I read it wrong... Am I reading this correctly, Terry? That can't be right, can it? Thanks.
snip...
I was wondering exactly the same thing Texan.
_________________
Canadian Beef....A cut above the rest! my answer to big muddy from canada ;
http://ranchers.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=15704&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=12
http://ranchers.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=15704&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=24
http://ranchers.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=15704&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=36
http://ranchers.net/forum/viewtopic.php?t=15704&postdays=0&postorder=asc&start=48
full text submission ;
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=09000064801f3412&disposition=attachment&contentType=crtext
Subject: USDA VS CREEKSTONE BSE/BASE/TSE TESTING Civil Action No. 06-0544 Date: September 4, 2007 at 9:47 am PST USDA
AUGUST 21, 2007
Mr. Terry S. Singeltary Sr. Post Office Box 42 Bacliff, Texas 77518-0042
Dear Mr. Singeltary:
This is in response to your e-mails to Secretary Johanns concerning private testing for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and a ruling by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia involving Creekstone Farms Premium Beef, LLC. We regret the delay in responding.
As you may know, the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) filed an appeal of the U.S. District Court's order on June 15,2007. While we recognize your views, we cannot comment on any matters at issue in the pending litigation. However, we can assure you that USDA remains committed to ensuring effective, scientifically sound testing for significant animal diseases and to protecting U.S. animal and public health from BSE.
We understand that the effects of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) are devastating, and we are sorry to learn of the loss of your mother. Some of us at USDA have also lost family members to CJD and other degenerative neurological diseases. Although it is rare, the classical form of CJD does occur sporadically in the United States and worldwide. However, no cases of vCJD-the form of BSE that can be transmitted from animals to humans-are known to have originated in the United States. Because the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is responsible for addressing concerns about CJD and other human health issues, you may wish to contact that agency directly. The address is CDC, HHS, 200 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, D.C. 20201.
We also wish to clarify that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration's 1997 ban on ruminant-to-ruminant feeding is the primary measure in place to protect animal health with regard to BSE. Protection of public health from BSE is achieved by the removal from the human food supply of the animal tissues-often referred to as specified risk
Mr. Terry S. Singeltary, Sr. Page 2
materials-in which the BSE infective agent would be found if present, and by other controls imposed at the slaughter level. These additional controls include the Food Safety and Inspection Services' ban on nonambulatory cattle from the human food chain; a prohibition on air-injection stunning of slaughter cattle; the requirement of additional process controls in advanced meat recovery systems; and, a prohibition on the use of mechanically separated beef in human food. Additionally, protection from BSE and other diseases is achieved by conducting antemortem inspections of slaughter cattle and excluding any animals that display clinical signs of neurological disease or other abnormalities.
We appreciate the opportunity to address your concerns. To learn more about USDA's BSE surveillance and safeguarding activities, please visit our Web site at www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/index.shtml.
Sincerely,
Jere L. Dick Associate Deputy Administrator National Animal Health Policy and Programs Veterinary Services
============================END=========================
Friday, August 29, 2008
CREEKSTONE VS USDA COURT OF APPEALS, BUSH SAYS, NO WAY, NO HOW
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/08/creekstone-vs-usda-court-of-appeals.html
Thursday, October 18, 2007
BSE BASE MAD COW TESTING TEXAS, USA, AND CANADA, A REVIEW OF SORTS
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2007/10/bse-base-mad-cow-testing-texas-usa-and.html
Wednesday, February 10, 2010
NAIS MAD COW TRACEABILITY DUMPED BY USDA APHIS 2010
http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2010/02/nais-mad-cow-traceability-dumped-by.html
Thursday, July 08, 2010
GLOBAL CLUSTERS OF CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE - A REVIEW 2010
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/07/global-clusters-of-creutzfeldt-jakob.html
Wednesday, June 16, 2010
Defining sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease strains and their transmission properties
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/06/defining-sporadic-creutzfeldt-jakob.html
CJD TEXAS 38 YEAR OLD FEMALE WORKED SLAUGHTERING CATTLE EXPOSED TO BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD MATTER
>>> Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she would euthanize the cattle. <<<
http://www.recordandoalinda.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19:cjd-english-info&catid=9:cjd-ingles&Itemid=8
>>> Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she would euthanize the cattle. <<<
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/03/irma-linda-andablo-cjd-victim-she-died.html
CJD TEXAS 38 YEAR OLD FEMALE WORKED SLAUGHTERING CATTLE EXPOSED TO BRAIN AND SPINAL CORD MATTER
http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/2010/03/cjd-texas-38-year-old-female-worked.html
Archive Number 20100405.1091 Published Date 05-APR-2010 Subject PRO/AH/EDR> Prion disease update 1010 (04)
snip...
[Terry S. Singeltary Sr. has added the following comment:
"According to the World Health Organisation, the future public health threat of vCJD in the UK and Europe and potentially the rest of the world is of concern and currently unquantifiable. However, the possibility of a significant and geographically diverse vCJD epidemic occurring over the next few decades cannot be dismissed.
The key word here is diverse. What does diverse mean? If USA scrapie transmitted to USA bovine does not produce pathology as the UK c-BSE, then why would CJD from there look like UK vCJD?"
http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:568933508083034::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,82101
Thursday, July 08, 2010
Nosocomial transmission of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease: results from a risk-based assessment of surgical interventions Public release date: 8-Jul-2010
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/07/nosocomial-transmission-of-sporadic.html
Friday, November 30, 2007
CJD QUESTIONNAIRE USA CWRU AND CJD FOUNDATION
http://cjdquestionnaire.blogspot.com/
*****URGENT NOTE HERE ABOUT OIE AND THEIR JUNK SCIENCE ABOUT ATYPICAL BSE*****
To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.
http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2
14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)
18.173 page 189
Experimental Challenge of Cattle with H-type and L-type Atypical BSE
A. Buschmann1, U. Ziegler1, M. Keller1, R. Rogers2, B. Hills3, M.H. Groschup1. 1Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany, 2Health Canada, Bureau of Microbial Hazards, Health Products & Food Branch, Ottawa, Canada, 3Health Canada, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Secretariat, Ottawa, Canada
Background: After the detection of two novel BSE forms designated H-type and L-type atypical BSE the question of the pathogenesis and the agent distribution of these two types in cattle was fully open. From initial studies of the brain pathology, it was already known that the anatomical distribution of L-type BSE differs from that of the classical type where the obex region in the brainstem always displays the highest PrPSc concentrations. In contrast in L-type BSE cases, the thalamus and frontal cortex regions showed the highest levels of the pathological prion protein, while the obex region was only weakly involved.
Methods:We performed intracranial inoculations of cattle (five and six per group) using 10%brainstemhomogenates of the two German H- and L-type atypical BSE isolates. The animals were inoculated under narcosis and then kept in a free-ranging stable under appropriate biosafety conditions.At least one animal per group was killed and sectioned in the preclinical stage and the remaining animals were kept until they developed clinical symptoms. The animals were examined for behavioural changes every four weeks throughout the experiment following a protocol that had been established during earlier BSE pathogenesis studies with classical BSE.
Results and Discussion: All animals of both groups developed clinical symptoms and had to be euthanized within 16 months. The clinical picture differed from that of classical BSE, as the earliest signs of illness were loss of body weight and depression. However, the animals later developed hind limb ataxia and hyperesthesia predominantly and the head. Analysis of brain samples from these animals confirmed the BSE infection and the atypical Western blot profile was maintained in all animals. Samples from these animals are now being examined in order to be able to describe the pathogenesis and agent distribution for these novel BSE types. Conclusions: A pilot study using a commercially avaialble BSE rapid test ELISA revealed an essential restriction of PrPSc to the central nervous system for both atypical BSE forms. A much more detailed analysis for PrPSc and infectivity is still ongoing.
http://www.isid.org/14th_icid/
http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/IMED2009_AbstrAuth.pdf
http://www.isid.org/publications/ICID_Archive.shtml
14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -
Final Abstract Number: ISE.114
Session: International Scientific Exchange
Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America
update October 2009
T. Singeltary
Bacliff, TX, USA
Background:
An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.
Methods:
12 years independent research of available data
Results:
I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.
Conclusion:
I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.
http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/14th_ICID_ISE_Abstracts.pdf
International Society for Infectious Diseases Web: http://www.isid.org/
I ask Professor Kong ;
Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment
''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''
Professor Kong reply ;
.....snip
''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete.
Thanks for your interest.''
Best regards,
Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
END...TSS
P02.35
Molecular Features of the Protease-resistant Prion Protein (PrPres) in H-type BSE
Biacabe, A-G1; Jacobs, JG2; Gavier-Widén, D3; Vulin, J1; Langeveld, JPM2; Baron, TGM1 1AFSSA, France; 2CIDC-Lelystad, Netherlands; 3SVA, Sweden
Western blot analyses of PrPres accumulating in the brain of BSE-infected cattle have demonstrated 3 different molecular phenotypes regarding to the apparent molecular masses and glycoform ratios of PrPres bands. We initially described isolates (H-type BSE) essentially characterized by higher PrPres molecular mass and decreased levels of the diglycosylated PrPres band, in contrast to the classical type of BSE. This type is also distinct from another BSE phenotype named L-type BSE, or also BASE (for Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy), mainly characterized by a low representation of the diglycosylated PrPres band as well as a lower PrPres molecular mass. Retrospective molecular studies in France of all available BSE cases older than 8 years old and of part of the other cases identified since the beginning of the exhaustive surveillance of the disease in 20001 allowed to identify 7 H-type BSE cases, among 594 BSE cases that could be classified as classical, L- or H-type BSE. By Western blot analysis of H-type PrPres, we described a remarkable specific feature with antibodies raised against the C-terminal region of PrP that demonstrated the existence of a more C-terminal cleaved form of PrPres (named PrPres#2 ), in addition to the usual PrPres form (PrPres #1). In the unglycosylated form, PrPres #2 migrates at about 14 kDa, compared to 20 kDa for PrPres #1. The proportion of the PrPres#2 in cattle seems to by higher compared to the PrPres#1. Furthermore another PK–resistant fragment at about 7 kDa was detected by some more N-terminal antibodies and presumed to be the result of cleavages of both N- and C-terminal parts of PrP. These singular features were maintained after transmission of the disease to C57Bl/6 mice. The identification of these two additional PrPres fragments (PrPres #2 and 7kDa band) reminds features reported respectively in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and in Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker (GSS) syndrome in humans.
http://www.neuroprion.com/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2007/abstract_book.pdf
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
Atypical BSE in Cattle
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/03/atypical-bse-in-cattle-position-post.html
WHAT MAD COW FEED BAN ???
The ruminant to ruminant feed ban (partial and voluntary) of August 4, 1997, was nothing more than ink on paper. ...TSS
Tuesday, March 2, 2010
Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed/Adulterated/Misbranded Rangen Inc 2/11/10 USA
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-proteins-prohibited-in-ruminant.html
Monday, March 1, 2010
ANIMAL PROTEIN I.E. MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE A REVIEW 2010
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-protien-ie-mad-cow-feed-in.html
Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE
April 5, 2010
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/04/update-on-feed-enforcement-activities.html
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0006 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary Sr Views Add Comments How To Comment
snip...
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
go figure....
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&d=APHIS-2006-0041-0006
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
To: FREAS@CBER.FDA.GOV
Cc: william.freas@fda.hhs.gov ; rosanna.harvey@fda.hhs.gov
Sent: Friday, December 01, 2006 2:59 PM
Subject: Re: TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006 [TSS SUBMISSION
snip...
ONE FINAL COMMENT PLEASE, (i know this is long Dr. Freas but please bear with me)
THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted blood from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone.
These are the facts as i have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species. ...
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
snip... 48 pages...
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f3413&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
Docket No, 04-047-l Regulatory Identification No. (RIN) 091O-AF46 NEW BSE SAFEGUARDS (comment submission)
these old urls dead here;
https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/regpublic.nsf/0/eff9eff1f7c5cf2b87256ecf000df08d?OpenDocument
http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/dailys/04/sep04/093004/04n-0264-c00160-vol23.pdf
please see full text submission here ;
Docket No, 04-047-l Regulatory Identification No. (RIN) 091O-AF46 NEW BSE SAFEGUARDS (comment submission)
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/07/docket-no-04-047-l-regulatory.html
Docket APHIS-2007-0033 Docket Title Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Biennial Review and Republication of the Select Agent and Toxin List Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2007-0033-0001 Document Title Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Biennial Review and Republication of the Select Agent and Toxin List Public Submission APHIS-2007-0033-0002.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singeltary comment
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=090000648027c28e
Manuscript Draft Manuscript Number: Title: HUMAN and ANIMAL TSE Classifications i.e. mad cow disease and the UKBSEnvCJD only theory Article Type: Personal View Corresponding Author: Mr. Terry S. Singeltary, Corresponding Author's Institution: na First Author: Terry S Singeltary, none Order of Authors: Terry S Singeltary, none; Terry S. Singeltary Abstract: TSEs have been rampant in the USA for decades in many species, and they all have been rendered and fed back to animals for human/animal consumption. I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2007.
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=090000648027c28e&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf
Subject: Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION
Date: August 24, 2005 at 2:47 pm PST
August 24, 2005
Importation of Whole Cuts of Boneless Beef from Japan [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 TSS SUBMISSION
Greetings APHIS ET AL,
My name is Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
I would kindly like to comment on [Docket No. 05-004-1] RIN 0579-AB93 ;
PROPOSED RULES
Exportation and importation of animals and animal products:
Whole cuts of boneless beef from-
Japan,
48494-48500 [05-16422]
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=0900006480086ebc&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw6
Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL IMPORTS FROM CANADA
https://web01.aphis.usda.gov/BSEcom.nsf/0/b78ba677e2b0c12185256dd300649f9d?OpenDocument&AutoFramed
PLEASE SEE FULL TEXT HERE ;
Docket No. 03-080-1 -- USDA ISSUES PROPOSED RULE TO ALLOW LIVE ANIMAL IMPORTS FROM CANADA
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/07/docket-no-03-080-1-usda-issues-proposed.html
Docket APHIS-2006-0026 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Animal Identification and Importation of Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0026-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions, Identification of Ruminants and Processing and Importation of Commodities Public Submission APHIS-2006-0026-0012 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801e47e1
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary
Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY
THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
go figure. ...
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8151
The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.
http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
Tuesday, July 13, 2010
Saturday, June 19, 2010
U.S. DENIED UPGRADED BSE STATUS FROM OIE
U.S. denied upgraded BSE status from OIE
By SUE ROESLER, The Prairie Star Wednesday, June 16, 2010 3:24 PM MDT
Although USDA-APHIS presented paperwork asking for a higher bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) status from the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), the U.S. did not get a change in status.
The U.S. remains a controlled BSE risk status, in the same category as Canada and Mexico.
Under OIE regulations, there are three BSE risk categories - negligible, controlled and undetermined risk.
Cindy Ragin, press relations at USDA-APHIS, said she did not know why the U.S. was not upgraded in status, but said they did send in paperwork requesting the upgrade.
At the 78th OIE annual general session held in Paris from May 23-28, world delegates decided on the member countries' BSE status, Ragin said. There are 176 countries who are members of the OIE.
Korea received an upgrade to a controlled risk status from a previous status as an undetermined risk.
Controlled risk status is granted to countries where surveillance is adequate and there are measures in place to prevent an outbreak of the disease, even though some cases of BSE are still found, according to the OIE.
However, Korea's livestock producers are still suffering from an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD). Korea's last outbreak of FMD was reported in March 2010 and involved a pig. Some 317 cattle and 1,223 pigs on the farm were slaughtered, according to the OIE.
FMD outbreaks are occurring in other countries in the Far East including Japan and Hong Kong. There have also been recent outbreaks of FMD in South Africa, Mongolia and Egypt.
OIE members who have a negligible BSE risk status include: Argentina, India, Peru, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Chile, Norway, Sweden, Fin-land, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Iceland.
In addition to the U.S., Canada, Mexico and Korea, those countries with a controlled BSE risk include: Austria, Greece, Belgium, Hungary, Nether-lands, Brazil, Ireland, Panama, Canada, Italy, Poland, Chinese Taipei, Japan, Portugal, Colombia, Slovak Republic, Cyprus, Latvia, Slovenia, Czech Repub-lic, Lichtenstein, Spain, Denmark, Lith-uania, Switzerland, Estonia, Luxem-bourg, United Kingdom, France, Malta, and Germany.
http://www.theprairiestar.com/articles/2010/06/16/ag_news/livestock/live22.txt
Key work of the Assembly The Delegates approved the new list of countries and zones that had applied for official OIE recognition of their status with respect to one or more of four priority diseases: bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), foot and mouth disease, contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP) and rinderpest. With regard to BSE, the OIE newly recognised India and Peru as having a “negligible risk” status, while the Republic of Korea and Panama were recognised as having a “controlled BSE risk status”.
http://www.oie.int/eng/session2010/PDF%20Press%20releases/PRESS78_EN.pdf
78th General Session of the OIE 23/05/10
http://www.oie.int/eng/session2010/presse.htm
EU COMMENTS AND POSITIONS
On the proposed changes to OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals
20
CHAPTER 2.4.6: BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
General comments
The changes proposed are generally welcomed by the EU. However, some specific comments detailed below should be taken into account for the final revised version to be adopted in the next General Session.
Specific comments
LINE 13: The words "and possibly spontaneous" should be added as follows: "... suggesting that earlier, undetected indigenous and possibly spontaneous cases may have occurred."
LINE 31: The EU would argue for the re-instatement of the deleted phrase [before, or without, the recognition] since fallen stock in particular could be showing some clinical signs which went unrecognised. As written, it applies more to the active screening of the healthy slaughter population.
Line 228: Replace: "All currently recognized forms of BSE (C, H and L-Type) are detectable by these methods." with: "Classical BSE is recognized by all these methods, while a complete evaluation of the approved BSE rapid tests on atypical forms (C, H and L-Type) was never carried out".
http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/organisations/docs/l410677%20EU%20positions%20OIE%2078GS%20Terrestrial%20Manual_annex.pdf
http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/organisations/EU_comments_position_papers_en.htm
C H A P T E R 4 . 5 .
CONTROL OF HAZARDS OF AQUATIC ANIMAL HEALTH HAZARDS AND PUBLIC HEALTH IMPORTANCE IN AQUATIC ANIMAL FEEDS EU
comment
The EU would agree with the proposed amendments. Nevertheless, the proposed chapter would benefit of the following amendments:
1) With regard to Article 4.5.4., point 4 on "Good practices", the following rewording is proposed for the first sentence (highlighted): Where national guidelines exist, good aquaculture practices and good manufacturing practices (including good hygienic practices) should be followed. Countries without such guidelines are encouraged to develop them or to take already available or existing guidelines on board.
2) With regard to Article 4.5.4. point 5 on "relationship between prions and aquatic animal species", it must be highlighted that in a recent publication by Salta et al. (2009) it was reported that Gilthead Sea Bream developed TSE-like pathologies after having been force fed with BSE agent and Scrapie agent respectively. The PrPTSE found in Sea Bream was Sea Bream PrP and not residual PrPBSE or PrPSc. Therefore, there is now evidence showing that TSEs can be potentially transmitted from cattle or sheep to fish. The TSE like pathology was induced after force feeding high quantities of BSE and Scrapie agent. It is yet unknown, whether transmission would occur if more realistic doses of exposure were used. In other words, the “height” of the so called “species barrier” for transmission of PrPTSE from mammals to fish is unknown. However, given the new findings, we suggest that the relevant paragraph is amended to say that there may be a potential risk if terrestrial animal by-products were used as ingredients in aquatic animal feed with respect to prion diseases.
3) With regard to Article 4.5.4., point 11 on "Design and management of inspection programmes" we propose the following wording for the second sentence (highlighted):
Operators in the feed and feed ingredients business and other relevant industries should implement procedures to ensure compliance with regulatory standards for harvest, handling, storage, processing, distribution and use of feed and feed ingredients. Operators have the primary responsibility for implementing systems for process quality control. Where such systems are applied, the Competent Authority should verify that they meet all regulatory requirements. Article 4.5.1. Introduction
http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/organisations/comments_com_OIE_Aquatic_Health_Code_en.pdf
Questionnaire on bovine spongiform encephalopathy GENERAL INTRODUCTION
http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/organisations/comments_com_OIE_Terrestrial_Health_Code_092009_en.pdf
Greetings,
IF the truth were known (and it's not like I have not been trying), the USA, Canada, and Mexico (there are other Countries too), should all be listed in this new TSE prion trader friendly atmosphere as ''undetermined risk''. Because USDA et al have absolutely no idea. The ideology of only the UK BSE theory and there from only imported MBM and feed, to ignore the fact that the continuous rendering technology was developed and the USDA got the UK to use it first, some five years before the USA started using the same technology, and then the fact of all the different TSE in different species here in North America, and different strains there from, to continue to believe in only the imported factor of feed and animals, and not take seriously the _home grown_ factor, from tainted _home grown TSE tainted feed_, from the same type rendering technology, is like sticking your head in a hole in the ground and hoping for the best. kind of like what BP did in the Gulf of Mexico. But for the OIE to continue to go by this decades old science on BSE, and continue to ignore the risk factors from other strains of BSE, and other TSE in other species, when scientist from around the globe continue to wave flags of concern, to continue this ignorance is dangerous for human and animal health. But typical for the OIE and the USDA in reference to the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy disease. Both the USDA and the OIE have ignored these documented risk factors for years, even decades, simply for trading purposes. The USDA et al until 2003 when the first documented case of c-BSE was documented in Washington State, the USDA had nothing to do with countries that had BSE. Until that cow old Luther capped in Washington, then the shoe was on the other foot. The USDA and the OIE after that literally changed the rules and regulations on BSE that had been in place for almost a decade trying to eradicate it all around the globe before it mutated, by doing away with the BSE GBR risk assessments and ignoring them, and implementing the infamous force fed USDA BSE MRR policy (all this is explained below in the source reference). But two mad cows sat on ice while all this political science was taking place for 7 months. One finally confirmed thanks to the OIG and the Honorable Phyllis Fong, and the other could not be confirmed due to the fact in had been improperly stored for 4 MONTHS, before testing. Kind of like the other stumbling and staggering mad cow in Texas that got away, went straight to be rendered for pet food, without NO TSE prion test at all. I could go on, about the healthy brains, from healthy cows, cows they knew did not have BSE, submitted for the infamous 2004 Enhanced BSE surveillance and testing program, or the other 9,200 brains they only used IHC testing, the least likely to find BSE. Sadly, once they did start documenting BSE back to back, they shut it down, said that was enough, let's cancel this right here in it's tracks, and we have heard nothing since, like the USA has now become immune to any TSE in any bovine. ;
When the OIE and the USDA et al collaborated to make legal the trading of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy, when they did away with the BSE GBR risk assessments, where the USA, Canada, and Mexico were categorized as BSE GBR III. please see ;
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1211902594180.htm
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-17 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of USA
please see full text ;
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/scdocs/doc/3rax1.pdf
YET, in 2010, tons and tons of banned mad cow protein are still in commerce here in the USA, scientific studies are being misconstrued and manipulated by ARS USDA, which are still going by TSE science that is decades old, while refusing to acknowledge new scientific studies, and FOIA requests are still being held up by the USDA et al on these urgent matters (see source related materials below). CJD of unknown phenotype, in victims that are getting younger, with longer clinical course from first onset of symptoms to death are occurring, in fact, sporadic CJD is still rising, where the TSEs in the different species are mutating here in the USA, and we still have this same dog and pony show by the OIE and USDA et al. IF you go back and look at the Countries that went by these OIE BSE guidelines, most all came down with BSE. I have said it before, I was say it again now, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. ...TSS
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.
snip...
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf
USDA: In 9,200 cases only one type of test could be used
WASHINGTON (AP)--The U.S. Department of Agriculture acknowledged Aug. 17 that its testing options for bovine spongiform encephalopathy were limited in 9,200 cases despite its effort to expand surveillance throughout the U.S. herd.
In those cases, only one type of test was used--one that failed to detect the disease in an infected Texas cow.
The department posted the information on its website because of an inquiry from The Associated Press.
Conducted over the past 14 months, the tests have not been included in the department's running tally of BSE tests since last summer. That total reached 439,126 on Aug. 17.
"There's no secret program," the department's chief veterinarian, John Clifford, said in an interview. "There has been no hiding, I can assure you of that."
Officials intended to report the tests later in an annual report, Clifford said.
These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC.
In the Texas case, officials had declared the cow free of disease in November after an IHC test came back negative. The department's inspector general ordered an additional kind of test, which confirmed the animal was infected.
Veterinarians in remote locations have used the preservative on tissue to keep it from degrading on its way to the department's laboratory in Ames, Iowa. Officials this year asked veterinarians to stop using preservative and send fresh or chilled samples within 48 hours.
The department recently investigated a possible case of BSE that turned up in a preserved sample. Further testing ruled out the disease two weeks ago.
Scientists used two additional tests--rapid screening and Western blot--to help detect BSE in the country's second confirmed case, in a Texas cow in June. They used IHC and Western blot to confirm the first case, in a Washington state cow in December 2003.
"The IHC test is still an excellent test," Clifford said. "These are not simple tests, either."
Clifford pointed out that scientists reran the IHC several times and got conflicting results. That happened, too, with the Western blot test. Both tests are accepted by international animal health officials.
Date: 8/25/05
http://www.hpj.com/archives/2005/aug05/aug29/BSEtestoptionswerelimited.cfm
""These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."
THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!
THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS
USDA 2003
We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently gone back. Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS.
Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area.
snip.............
Dr. Detwiler: It seems a good idea, but I'm not aware of it. Another important thing to get across to the public is that the negatives do not guarantee absence of infectivity. The animal could be early in the disease and the incubation period. Even sample collection is so important. If you're not collecting the right area of the brain in sheep, or if collecting lymphoreticular tissue, and you don't get a good biopsy, you could miss the area with the PRP in it and come up with a negative test. There's a new, unusual form of Scrapie that's been detected in Norway. We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently gone back.
Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS .
Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area.
snip...
FULL TEXT;
Completely Edited Version PRION ROUNDTABLE
Accomplished this day, Wednesday, December 11, 2003, Denver, Colorado
2005
=============================
CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006
The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.
The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.
These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm
LET US LOOK AT AUSTRALIA, AND THE BSE RISK ASSESSMENT THE O.I.E. ASK THEM ABOUT IN 2009. IF YOU LOOK AT THESE QUESTIONS, THE USA HAS FAILED AT EVERY ASPECT OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE SET FORTH BY THE O.I.E. FOR AUSTRALIA IN 2009.
AUSTRALIAN QUESTIONNAIRE TO ASSESS BSE RISK
Introduction
Acceptance of a submission from an applicant country for an assessment of BSE risk is based on the provision of comprehensive data and supporting evidence from the Competent Authority over the five areas listed below. In general, the data requirements are consistent with those of Chapter 11.6 – Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) Terrestrial Animal Health Code, 2009.
A risk assessment to determine the BSE risk status of the cattle population and whether the beef and beef products from a country represent a risk to the health of Australian consumers will be undertaken by Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ). This document sets out the criteria under the five areas that will be examined to determine BSE risk. Applicant countries should also refer to the documents explaining the assessment process (link) and the requirements for the importation of beef and beef products for human consumption (link).
Countries should note that as part of the assessment, verification of in-country control measures may be undertaken by in-country inspection and the results of any such inspections will be considered prior to completing the country assessment. Countries will be required to provide an annual update report by 31 January to the Australian BSE Food Safety Assessment Committee (the Committee) as described in Section 5. Countries are also required to report to the Committee, within 24 hours, any exceptional developments in regard to the countries BSE status e.g. identification of the first indigenous case of BSE.
The document comprises the following:
Section 1 – Risk assessment requirements regarding risk release and exposure
Section 2 – Other system requirements
• Ongoing BSE awareness program
• Compulsory notification and investigation of BSE cases
• Diagnostic capability
• Animal traceability and identification systems
• Animal slaughter and processing systems
Section 3 – BSE surveillance and monitoring system
Section 4 – BSE history of the country
Section 5 – Ongoing review of country BSE status and additional data
3
SECTION 1 – RISK ASSESSMENT REQUIREMENTS – RISK RELEASE AND EXPOSURE
snip...
see full text 12 pages ;
http://www.foodstandards.gov.au/_srcfiles/Questionnaire%20to%20Assess%20BSE%20Risk%2023%20Feb%2020101.pdf
see USA here ;
TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION FEBRUARY 2010 REPORT CHAPTER 1.6. STATUS FOR OIE LISTED DISEASES: PROCEDURES FOR SELF DECLARATION AND FOR OFFICIAL RECOGNITION BY THE OIE
Article 1.6.1.
General principles Members may wish to make a self declaration as to the freedom of a country, zone or compartment from an OIE listed disease. The Member may inform the OIE of its claimed status and the OIE may publish the claim. Publication does not imply endorsement of the claim. The OIE does not recognise publish self declaration for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), foot and mouth disease (FMD), rinderpest and contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP). Members may request official recognition by the OIE as to: 1. the risk status of a country or zone with regard to BSE;
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/import_export/animals/oie/downloads/tahc_feb10/tahc_status_oie_list_dis_78_feb10_cmt.pdf
IT was set up to fail.
Please under stand what this says ;
The Member may inform the OIE of its claimed status and the OIE may publish the claim.
and then remember this ;
IN A NUT SHELL ; $$$
(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)
11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries.The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to then Central Bureau............
http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf
full text ;
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2007/10/bse-base-mad-cow-testing-texas-usa-and.html
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/
REPEAL THE B.S.E. MINIMAL RISK REGION (MRR) policy !
THEN, put back in place the B.S.E. G.B.R. Risk Assessments, and enhance them to include all T.S.E. i.e. the atypical strains.
REPEAL THE B.S.E. MINIMAL RISK REGION (MRR) policy !
The BSE MRR policy was shoved down the throat of every country by the O.I.E. and the U.S.D.A..
MOST every one of those Country's came down with BSE.
THE O.I.E. formula to detect B.S.E. is, and has been flawed. It was and is a policy set up for trade, NOT for human and animal health.
The BSE MRR policy made legal what the U.K. did, when the poisoned the globe with BSE. Except BSE has mutated and different strains have evolved, some that are more virulent than the c-BSE, all can transmit to humans (Kong et al 2009), all are in North America.
The BSE MRR policy was ratified while two cases of BSE were sitting on the shelf waiting to be confirmed (one was 7+ months later after an Act of Congress, and the other suspect sample that sat on a shelf for 4 months, which was not preserved correctly, which only IHC could be used, the least likely to detect BSE, was found inconclusive or negative), then the Alabama mad cow was confirmed. AFTER this, the USDA shut the testing program down to levels that would not detect BSE.
Docket APHIS-2006-0026 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Animal Identification and Importation of Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0026-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions, Identification of Ruminants and Processing and Importation of Commodities Public Submission APHIS-2006-0026-0012 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801e47e1
SEE FULL TEXT ;
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=09000064801e47e1&disposition=attachment&contentType=xml
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines
Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary
Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY
THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
go figure. ...
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8151
SEE FULL TEXT ;
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
WHAT THE USA AND THE OIE DID, was make legal what the U.K. did when they poisoned the globe with mad cow disease. they knew what they were doing, but did it anyway. The BSE GBR risk assessments were put into place so that would never ever happen again. UNTIL they USA finally documented a case. UP until then, the USA would not accept products that may contain BSE from any country. ONCE the USA lost the 'gold card', the shoe was the on the other foot, and they literally left 2 suspect mad cow brain samples sit on a shelf for 7+ months and 4 months respectfully, all the while the BSE MRR policy was being legalized. ONCE made legal, and after an act of Congress, the one suspect Texas mad cow case that had sat up on a shelf for 7+ months was finally confirmed by Weybridge et al in the U.K., and the other, which the sample was not preserved correctly, was found after being a suspect, to be inconclusive and finally they termed it negative. Then the Alabama mad cow was confirmed and they had to shut the program down before they found anymore. ...TSS
2000
England worried briefly about infecting other countries 27 Aug 00
confidential
correspondence obtained by Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
BSE11/2 020;
SC1337p
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY Richmond House, 79 Whitehall, London SWIA 2NS Telephone 01-210 3000 From the Chief Medical Officer Sir Donald Achson KBE DM DSc FRCP FFCM FFOM
Mr K C Meldrum Chief Veterinary Officer Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Government Buildings Hook Rise South Tolworth Surbiton Surrey KT6 7NG 3 January 1990
Dear Mr Meldrum
BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
You will recall that we have previously discussed the potential risks of BSE occurring in other countries as a result of the continuing export from the UK of meat and bone that may be contaminated by scrapie or possibly BSE.
I remain concerned that we are not being consistent in our attempts to contain the risks of BSE. Having banned the feeding of meat and bone meal to ruminamts in 1988, we should take steps to prevent these UK products being fed to ruminants in other countries. This could be achieved either through a ban on the export of meat and bone meal, or at least by the proper labelling of these products to make it absolutely clear they should not be fed to ruminants [or zoo animals, including rare and endangered primates -- webmaster]. Unless some such action is taken the difficult problems we have faced with BSE may well occur in other countries who import UK meat and bone meal. Surely it is short sighted for us to risk being seen in future as having been responsible for the introduction of BSE to the food chain in other countries.
I would be very interested to hear how you feel this gap in the present precautionary measures to eliminate BSE should be closed. We should be aiming at the global elimination of this new bovine disense. The export of our meat and bone meal is a continuing risk to other countries.
Yours Sincerely Donald Acheson
Copy: Dr Metters Dr Pickles
90/1.03/1.1 ============ BSE13/3 0083
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090505194948/http://bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/01/03001001.pdf
Dr Pickles From: Dr J S Metters DCM0 International, Prevention and Community Services 7 June 1990 Copies to: Dr McInnes Miss Pease Mr Otley
BSE
1. I spoke to Mr Capstick yesterday. Among other things, he told me that MAFF are now considering the labelling of animal foodstuffs, and in particular what detail would be required if such labelling was made compulsory. Apparently our freedom of action is constrained by EC Directives [total garbage, MAFF wants to keep exporting -- webmaster], and there is also concern about the level of detail that should be included in any foodstuff labels.
2. Mr Capstick suggested that this was not an area that DH had a particular interest. I countered by saying that we supported the principle of labelling of animal foodstuffs, particularly when these were going for export.
3. I also thanked him for keeping us informed, in a way that I hope encourage further communication of MAFF's internal deliberations.
J S METTERS Room 509 Richmond House Ext. 5591 92/YdeS 90/6.7/5.1
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090505194948/http://bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/06/07005001.pdf
see singeltary comments 2000 ;
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/aug00_last_news.html#fff
MY comments/questions are as follows ;
1. SINCE the first Harvard BSE Risk Assessment was so flawed and fraught with error after the PEER REVIEW assessment assessed this fact, how do you plan on stopping this from happening again, will there be another peer review with top TSE Scientist, an impartial jury so-to-speak, to assess this new and updated Harvard BSE/TSE risk assessment and will this assessment include the Atypical TSE and SRM issues ?
*** Suppressed peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002 ***
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/topics/BSE_Peer_Review.pdf
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=090000648027c28e&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf
Wednesday, April 16, 2008
MBM, greaves, meat offal, live cattle, imports from UK to USA vs Canada
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/04/mbm-greaves-meat-offal-live-cattle.html
Monday, November 23, 2009
BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS UPDATE NOVEMBER 23, 2009 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND O.I.E.
http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-gbr-risk-assessments-update.html
Wednesday, February 10, 2010
NAIS MAD COW TRACEABILITY DUMPED BY USDA APHIS 2010
http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2010/02/nais-mad-cow-traceability-dumped-by.html
Sunday, March 28, 2010
Nor-98 atypical Scrapie, atypical BSE, spontaneous TSE, trade policy, sound science ?
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2010/03/nor-98-atypical-scrapie-atypical-bse.html
Saturday, April 10, 2010
TOYOTA VS MAD COW DISEASE USA OIE BSE MRR IMPORT AND EXPORT TRADE WARS
Can you say TOYOTA. IT is a sad day when trade trumps human and animal health. as the case with the BSE MRR policy. Behind closed doors, the BSe spin machine is working i.e. Vilsack saying that 'The U.S. has had no cases in the last three years, and only three in two decades.' i can tell you with absolute certainty, that is only part of the story. i can tell you that in fact, the USDA BSE surveillance and testing have failed the consumer here in the USA, and abroad, and that we have been exposed to the TSE agent, i.e. USA atypical BSE, which laboratory studies show is more virulent. i can tell you with absolute certainty they infamous June 2004 enhanced BSE surveillance program, where some 800,000+ cattle were tested over many years of testing, was fraught with fraud, and in short, a failed program, and proven to be so by the GAO and the OIG, where it was proven that some of the testing program was using perfectly healthy cattle in their BSE testing program. Where some 9,200+ BSE test on suspect questionable cattle, only the IHC test were used. THE IHC is the least likely test to find BSE. IT only tells you if that part of the tissue sample is in fact infected or not, but it does not tell you about the rest of the brain. By only using the IHC, you miss many cases (Detwiler et al 2003 BSE ROUNDTABLE). i can tell you with absolute certainty, that when pressed, the USDA et al will say that even if we are missing cases of BSE, that the BSE mad cow feed ban of August 4, 1997, will stop BSE, but the ban was nothing more than ink on paper. This mad cow feed ban was only partial and voluntary. i can tell you with absolute certainty that in 2010, since 8/4/97, banned mad cow feed is in commerce here in the USA, BY THE TONS. i can tell you with absolute certainty, that when the BSE MRR policy was put in place, that this exposed everyone around the globe with the TSE agent, either by consumption and or friendly fire there from, and that decision was based NOT on science, but on trade. i can tell you with absolute certainty, that SINCE the USDA and the NSLP did in fact expose our children across the Nation with BSE via the NSLP USDA DEAD STOCK DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM, that if they are capable of this, they are capable of exposing any person, in any country with the BSE TSE agent. North America has documented the so called typical c-BSE, l-BSE, and h-BSE. typical scrapie strains are rampant in the USA in sheep and goats, and the atypical Nor-98 scrapie is spreading, and CWD in deer and elk is spreading, with now documented a 2nd strain, and two strains of TME in mink. all this over the years have been fed back to food producing animals for animals and humans. Confucius ask, IF USA sheep Scrapie transmitted to USA cattle does not produce the same pathology as the U.K. c-BSE, why then would human CJD there from look like the U.K. nvCJD ??? what the USA has done defies all science and logic i.e. NO MAD COW DISEASE and or any human TSE there from. Either the BSE Mad Cow outbreak and human infection nvCJD there from, that happened in the U.K. was totally false, or the same thing is happening in the USA as we speak. sCJD of unknown phenotypes are rising in the USA. sporadic CJD is not a single strain, but multiple strains of unknown routes and sources of the TSE agent. IF the federal government can lie for almost a century about asbestos, and or tobacco, just to protect those two industry giants, i can guarantee you that they are doing it with mad cow type disease i.e. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy. or just ask the Indians. ...TSS
full text ;
Saturday, April 10, 2010
TOYOTA VS MAD COW DISEASE USA OIE BSE MRR IMPORT AND EXPORT TRADE WARS
http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/04/toyota-vs-mad-cow-disease-usa-oie-bse.html
Wednesday, April 28, 2010
BSE, Scrapie, CWD, REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION Paris, 8-12 February 2010
REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL
http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/04/bse-scrapie-cwd-report-of-meeting-of.html
DAMNING TESTIMONY FROM STANLEY PRUSINER THE NOBEL PRIZE WINNER ON PRIONS SPEAKING ABOUT TRADE AND PRIONS, ''level of absolute ignorance'', ''yes, i think prions are bad to eat, and you can die from them''. ...(watch and turn it up)
http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/prusinerclip.html
A most interesting case, she was 38 years old, and worked a Tyson meat slaughter house, handling brain and spinal cords ;
Irma Linda Andablo CJD Victim, she died at 38 years old on February 6, 2010 in Mesquite Texas
Irma Linda Andablo CJD Victim, she died at 38 years old on February 6, 2010 in Mesquite Texas.She left 6 Kids and a Husband.The Purpose of this web is to give information in Spanish to the Hispanic community, and to all the community who want's information about this terrible disease.-
Physician Discharge Summary, Parkland Hospital, Dallas Texas
Admit Date: 12/29/2009 Discharge Date: 1/20/2010 Attending Provider: Greenberg, Benjamin Morris; General Neurology Team: General Neurology Team
Linda was a Hispanic female with no past medical history presents with 14 months of incresing/progressive altered mental status, generalized weakness, inability to walk, loss of appetite, inability to speak, tremor and bowel/blader incontinence.She was, in her usual state of health up until February, 2009, when her husbans notes that she began forgetting things like names and short term memories. He also noticed mild/vague personality changes such as increased aggression. In March, she was involved in a hit and run MVA,although she was not injured. The police tracked her down and ticketed her. At that time, her son deployed to Iraq with the Army and her husband assumed her mentation changes were due to stress over these two events. Also in March, she began to have weakness in her legs, making it difficult to walk. Over the next few months, her mentation and personality changes worsened, getting to a point where she could no longer recognized her children. She was eating less and less. She was losing more weight. In the last 2-3 months, she reached the point where she could not walk without an assist, then 1 month ago, she stopped talking, only making grunting/aggressive sounds when anyone came near her. She also became both bowel and bladder incontinent, having to wear diapers. Her '"tremor'" and body jerks worsened and her hands assumed a sort of permanent grip position, leading her family to put tennis balls in her hands to protect her fingers.
The husband says that they have lived in Nebraska for the past 21 years. They had seen a doctor there during the summer time who prescribed her Seroquel and Lexapro, Thinking these were sx of a mood disorder. However, the medications did not help and she continued to deteriorate clinically. Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she would euthanize the cattle. The husband says that he does not know any fellow workers with a similar illness. He also says that she did not have any preceeding illness or travel.
http://www.recordandoalinda.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19:cjd-english-info&catid=9:cjd-ingles&Itemid=8
> Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she
> worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for
> packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she
> would euthanize the cattle.
please see full text ;
Monday, March 29, 2010
Irma Linda Andablo CJD Victim, she died at 38 years old on February 6, 2010 in Mesquite Texas
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/03/irma-linda-andablo-cjd-victim-she-died.html
TSE
Senate 'Down Under' link at bottom of the following url, my submission read out in the Hansard Senate recently by the ABA Chairman Brad Bellinger ;
http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/
*****URGENT NOTE HERE ABOUT OIE AND THEIR JUNK SCIENCE ABOUT ATYPICAL BSE*****
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
Atypical BSE in Cattle
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/03/atypical-bse-in-cattle-position-post.html
To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.
http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2
Archive Number 20100405.1091 Published Date 05-APR-2010
Subject PRO/AH/EDR> Prion disease update 1010 (04)
snip...
[Terry S. Singeltary Sr. has added the following comment:
"According to the World Health Organisation, the future public health threat of vCJD in the UK and Europe and potentially the rest of the world is of concern and currently unquantifiable. However, the possibility of a significant and geographically diverse vCJD epidemic occurring over the next few decades cannot be dismissed
.
The key word here is diverse. What does diverse mean? If USA scrapie transmitted to USA bovine does not produce pathology as the UK c-BSE, then why would CJD from there look like UK vCJD?"
http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:568933508083034::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,82101
14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)
18.173 page 189
Experimental Challenge of Cattle with H-type and L-type Atypical BSE
A. Buschmann1, U. Ziegler1, M. Keller1, R. Rogers2, B. Hills3, M.H. Groschup1. 1Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany, 2Health Canada, Bureau of Microbial Hazards, Health Products & Food Branch, Ottawa, Canada, 3Health Canada, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Secretariat, Ottawa, Canada
Background: After the detection of two novel BSE forms designated H-type and L-type atypical BSE the question of the pathogenesis and the agent distribution of these two types in cattle was fully open. From initial studies of the brain pathology, it was already known that the anatomical distribution of L-type BSE differs from that of the classical type where the obex region in the brainstem always displays the highest PrPSc concentrations. In contrast in L-type BSE cases, the thalamus and frontal cortex regions showed the highest levels of the pathological prion protein, while the obex region was only weakly involved.
Methods:We performed intracranial inoculations of cattle (five and six per group) using 10%brainstemhomogenates of the two German H- and L-type atypical BSE isolates. The animals were inoculated under narcosis and then kept in a free-ranging stable under appropriate biosafety conditions.At least one animal per group was killed and sectioned in the preclinical stage and the remaining animals were kept until they developed clinical symptoms. The animals were examined for behavioural changes every four weeks throughout the experiment following a protocol that had been established during earlier BSE pathogenesis studies with classical BSE.
Results and Discussion: All animals of both groups developed clinical symptoms and had to be euthanized within 16 months. The clinical picture differed from that of classical BSE, as the earliest signs of illness were loss of body weight and depression. However, the animals later developed hind limb ataxia and hyperesthesia predominantly and the head. Analysis of brain samples from these animals confirmed the BSE infection and the atypical Western blot profile was maintained in all animals. Samples from these animals are now being examined in order to be able to describe the pathogenesis and agent distribution for these novel BSE types. Conclusions: A pilot study using a commercially avaialble BSE rapid test ELISA revealed an essential restriction of PrPSc to the central nervous system for both atypical BSE forms. A much more detailed analysis for PrPSc and infectivity is still ongoing.
http://www.isid.org/14th_icid/
http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/IMED2009_AbstrAuth.pdf
http://www.isid.org/publications/ICID_Archive.shtml
14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -
Final Abstract Number: ISE.114
Session: International Scientific Exchange
Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America
update October 2009
T. Singeltary
Bacliff, TX, USA
Background:
An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.
Methods:
12 years independent research of available data
Results:
I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.
Conclusion:
I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.
http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/14th_ICID_ISE_Abstracts.pdf
International Society for Infectious Diseases Web: http://www.isid.org
I ask Professor Kong ;
Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment
''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''
Professor Kong reply ;
.....snip
''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete.
Thanks for your interest.''
Best regards,
Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
END...TSS
P02.35
Molecular Features of the Protease-resistant Prion Protein (PrPres) in H-type BSE
Biacabe, A-G1; Jacobs, JG2; Gavier-Widén, D3; Vulin, J1; Langeveld, JPM2; Baron, TGM1 1AFSSA, France; 2CIDC-Lelystad, Netherlands; 3SVA, Sweden
Western blot analyses of PrPres accumulating in the brain of BSE-infected cattle have demonstrated 3 different molecular phenotypes regarding to the apparent molecular masses and glycoform ratios of PrPres bands. We initially described isolates (H-type BSE) essentially characterized by higher PrPres molecular mass and decreased levels of the diglycosylated PrPres band, in contrast to the classical type of BSE. This type is also distinct from another BSE phenotype named L-type BSE, or also BASE (for Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy), mainly characterized by a low representation of the diglycosylated PrPres band as well as a lower PrPres molecular mass. Retrospective molecular studies in France of all available BSE cases older than 8 years old and of part of the other cases identified since the beginning of the exhaustive surveillance of the disease in 20001 allowed to identify 7 H-type BSE cases, among 594 BSE cases that could be classified as classical, L- or H-type BSE. By Western blot analysis of H-type PrPres, we described a remarkable specific feature with antibodies raised against the C-terminal region of PrP that demonstrated the existence of a more C-terminal cleaved form of PrPres (named PrPres#2 ), in addition to the usual PrPres form (PrPres #1). In the unglycosylated form, PrPres #2 migrates at about 14 kDa, compared to 20 kDa for PrPres #1. The proportion of the PrPres#2 in cattle seems to by higher compared to the PrPres#1. Furthermore another PK–resistant fragment at about 7 kDa was detected by some more N-terminal antibodies and presumed to be the result of cleavages of both N- and C-terminal parts of PrP. These singular features were maintained after transmission of the disease to C57Bl/6 mice. The identification of these two additional PrPres fragments (PrPres #2 and 7kDa band) reminds features reported respectively in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and in Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker (GSS) syndrome in humans.
http://www.neuroprion.com/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2007/abstract_book.pdf
Sunday, February 14, 2010
[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/02/docket-no-fsis-2006-0011-fsis-harvard.html
http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.
snip...
Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:
soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),
implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),
snip...
The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf
snip... please see full text ;
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/06/mad-cows-and-computer-models-us.html
PLEASE NOTE *
Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.
snip...
The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...
http://web.archive.org/web/20030516051623/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf
Tuesday, March 2, 2010
Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed/Adulterated/Misbranded Rangen Inc 2/11/10 USA
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-proteins-prohibited-in-ruminant.html
Monday, March 1, 2010
ANIMAL PROTEIN I.E. MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE A REVIEW 2010
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-protien-ie-mad-cow-feed-in.html
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. (Submitted question): Monday, April 5, 2010
Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE April 5, 2010
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/04/update-on-feed-enforcement-activities.html
Friday, April 23, 2010
Upcoming BSE Webinar on Thursday, April 22, 2010 a review
http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/04/upcoming-bse-webinar-on-thursday-april.html
PLEASE understand, there is literally 100s and 100s of tonnage of banned mad cow protein in commerce in the USA in 2010.
THE August 4, 1997 was a voluntary and partial feed ban.
IT was nothing more than ink on paper. ...TSS
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm
Thursday, March 19, 2009
MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA WITH ONGOING 12 YEARS OF DENIAL
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html
PLEASE be aware, for 4 years, the USDA fed our children all across the Nation dead stock downer cows, the most high risk cattle for BSE aka mad cow disease and other dangerous pathogens. who will watch our children for CJD for the next 5+ decades ???
SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM FROM DOWNER CATTLE UPDATE
http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2009/05/who-will-watch-children.html
http://downercattle.blogspot.com/
atypical BSE MAD COW STRAIN MORE VIRULENT TO HUMANS THAN UK STRAIN
18 January 2007 - Draft minutes of the SEAC 95 meeting (426 KB) held on 7 December 2006 are now available.
snip...
64. A member noted that at the recent Neuroprion meeting, a study was presented showing that in transgenic mice BSE passaged in sheep may be more virulent and infectious to a wider range of species than bovine derived BSE.
Other work presented suggested that BSE and bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy (BASE) MAY BE RELATED. A mutation had been identified in the prion protein gene in an AMERICAN BASE CASE THAT WAS SIMILAR IN NATURE TO A MUTATION FOUND IN CASES OF SPORADIC CJD.
snip...
http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/95.pdf
3:30 Transmission of the Italian Atypical BSE (BASE) in Humanized Mouse
Models Qingzhong Kong, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Pathology, Case Western Reserve University
Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy (BASE) is an atypical BSE strain discovered recently in Italy, and similar or different atypical BSE cases were also reported in other countries. The infectivity and phenotypes of these atypical BSE strains in humans are unknown. In collaboration with Pierluigi Gambetti, as well as Maria Caramelli and her co-workers, we have inoculated transgenic mice expressing human prion protein with brain homogenates from BASE or BSE infected cattle. Our data shows that about half of the BASE-inoculated mice became infected with an average incubation time of about 19 months; in contrast, none of the BSE-inoculated mice appear to be infected after more than 2 years.
***These results indicate that BASE is transmissible to humans and suggest that BASE is more virulent than classical BSE in humans.***
6:30 Close of Day One
http://www.healthtech.com/2007/tse/day1.asp
SEE STEADY INCREASE IN SPORADIC CJD IN THE USA FROM 1997 TO 2006. SPORADIC CJD CASES TRIPLED, with phenotype of 'UNKNOWN' strain growing. ...
http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/resources-casereport.html
There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection.
He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf
2008 - 2010
The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.
http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html
CJD SURVEILLANCE TEXAS
http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/2007/12/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-surveillance.html
Friday, November 30, 2007
CJD QUESTIONNAIRE USA CWRU AND CJD FOUNDATION
http://cjdquestionnaire.blogspot.com/
Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Committee On June 12, 2009 (TRANSCRIPT)
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/BloodVaccinesandOtherBiologics/TransmissibleSpongiformEncephalopathiesAdvisoryCommittee/UCM171810.pdf
Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Committee On June 12, 2009 (Singeltary submission)
http://tseac.blogspot.com/2009/05/meeting-of-transmissible-spongiform.html
Saturday, June 13, 2009
Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States 2003 revisited 2009
http://cjdusa.blogspot.com/2009/06/monitoring-occurrence-of-emerging-forms.html
Friday, February 05, 2010
New Variant Creutzfelt Jakob Disease case reports United States 2010 A Review
http://vcjd.blogspot.com/2010/02/new-variant-creutzfelt-jakob-disease.html
Saturday, January 2, 2010
Human Prion Diseases in the United States January 1, 2010 ***FINAL***
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/01/human-prion-diseases-in-united-states.html
my comments to PLosone here ;
http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action?inReplyTo=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd&root=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd
BSE: TIME TO TAKE H.B. PARRY SERIOUSLY
If the scrapie agent is generated from ovine DNA and thence causes disease in other species, then perhaps, bearing in mind the possible role of scrapie in CJD of humans (Davinpour et al, 1985), scrapie and not BSE should be the notifiable disease. ...
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090505194948/http://bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1988/06/08004001.pdf
http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2007/12/scrapie-hb-parry-seriously-yb886841.html
Sunday, April 18, 2010
SCRAPIE AND ATYPICAL SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION STUDIES A REVIEW 2010
http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2010/04/scrapie-and-atypical-scrapie.html
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY UPDATE June 16, 2010
J Clin Invest. doi:10.1172/JCI42051. Copyright © 2010, The American Society for Clinical Investigation.
Research Article
A molecular switch controls interspecies prion disease transmission in mice
Christina J. Sigurdson1,2,3, K. Peter R. Nilsson3, Simone Hornemann4, Giuseppe Manco3, Natalia Fernández-Borges5, Petra Schwarz3, Joaquín Castilla5,6, Kurt Wüthrich4,7 and Adriano Aguzzi3
1Department of Pathology and Department of Medicine, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California, USA. 2Department of Pathology, Immunology, and Microbiology, University of California, Davis, Davis, California, USA. 3UniversitätsSpital Zürich, Institute of Neuropathology, Zürich, Switzerland. 4Institut für Molekularbiologie und Biophysik, ETH Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland. 5CIC BioGUNE, Parque tecnológico de Bizkaia, Bizkaia, Spain. 6Ikerbasque, Basque Foundation for Science, Bizkaia, Spain. 7Department of Molecular Biology and Skaggs Institute for Chemical Biology, The Scripps Research Institute, La Jolla, California, USA.
Address correspondence to: Adriano Aguzzi, UniversitätsSpital Zürich, Institute of Neuropathology, Department of Pathology, Schmelzbergstrasse 12, CH-8091 Zürich, Switzerland. Phone: 41.44.255.2107; Fax: 41.44.255.4402; E-mail: adriano.aguzzi@usz.ch. Or to: Christina Sigurdson, Department of Pathology, University of California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Dr., La Jolla, California 92093, USA. Phone: 858.534.0978; Fax: 858.246.0523; E-mail: csigurdson@ucsd.edu.
Published June 14, 2010 Received for publication December 15, 2009, and accepted in revised form April 28, 2010.
Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies are lethal neurodegenerative disorders that present with aggregated forms of the cellular prion protein (PrPC), which are known as PrPSc. Prions from different species vary considerably in their transmissibility to xenogeneic hosts. The variable transmission barriers depend on sequence differences between incoming PrPSc and host PrPC and additionally, on strain-dependent conformational properties of PrPSc. The ß2-a2 loop region within PrPC varies substantially between species, with its structure being influenced by the residue types in the 2 amino acid sequence positions 170 (most commonly S or N) and 174 (N or T). In this study, we inoculated prions from 5 different species into transgenic mice expressing either disordered-loop or rigid-loop PrPC variants. Similar ß2-a2 loop structures correlated with efficient transmission, whereas dissimilar loops correlated with strong transmission barriers. We then classified literature data on cross-species transmission according to the 170S/N polymorphism. Transmission barriers were generally low between species with the same amino acid residue in position 170 and high between those with different residues. These findings point to a triggering role of the local ß2-a2 loop structure for prion transmissibility between different species.
snip...
These observations suggest striking differences in the ß-sheet alignment of PrPSc aggregates between prion-infected 170S and 170N animals and may provide a plausible starting point for clarifying the structural basis of prion species barriers that are highly relevant to public health, including the potential transmissibility of bovine and cervid prions to humans.
snip...
As a possible exception to these observations, cattle may be susceptible to CWD from white-tailed deer (86). The latter finding suggests that specific prion strains can overrule the codon 170 homology requirement.
http://www.jci.org/articles/view/42051?key=456180f4a34aad821c6f#B87
Monday, June 14, 2010
A molecular switch controls interspecies prion disease transmission in mice
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2010/06/molecular-switch-controls-interspecies.html
Friday, May 14, 2010
Prion Strain Mutation Determined by Prion Protein Conformational Compatibility and Primary Structure
Published Online May 13, 2010 Science DOI: 10.1126/science.1187107 Science Express Index
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2010/05/prion-strain-mutation-determined-by.html
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/
Saturday, June 5, 2010
Research Project: Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies: Identification of atypical scrapie in Canadian sheep
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2010/06/research-project-transmissible.html
Saturday, June 12, 2010
PUBLICATION REQUEST AND FOIA REQUEST Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Study of Atypical Bse
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/06/publication-request-and-foia-request.html
Tuesday, June 1, 2010
USA cases of dpCJD rising with 24 cases so far in 2010
http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/2010/06/usa-cases-of-dpcjd-rising-with-24-cases.html
Wednesday, June 16, 2010
Defining sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease strains and their transmission properties
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/06/defining-sporadic-creutzfeldt-jakob.html
Friendly Fire, the pass it forward mode of TSE. ...
Wednesday, June 02, 2010
CJD Annex H UPDATE AFTER DEATH PRECAUTIONS Published: 2 June 2003 Updated: May 2010
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/06/cjd-annex-h-update-after-death.html
Saturday, April 24, 2010
New connection between Alzheimer’s and prionic illnesses discovered
http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/2010/04/new-connection-between-alzheimers-and.html
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
flounder9@verizon.net
By SUE ROESLER, The Prairie Star Wednesday, June 16, 2010 3:24 PM MDT
Although USDA-APHIS presented paperwork asking for a higher bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) status from the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE), the U.S. did not get a change in status.
The U.S. remains a controlled BSE risk status, in the same category as Canada and Mexico.
Under OIE regulations, there are three BSE risk categories - negligible, controlled and undetermined risk.
Cindy Ragin, press relations at USDA-APHIS, said she did not know why the U.S. was not upgraded in status, but said they did send in paperwork requesting the upgrade.
At the 78th OIE annual general session held in Paris from May 23-28, world delegates decided on the member countries' BSE status, Ragin said. There are 176 countries who are members of the OIE.
Korea received an upgrade to a controlled risk status from a previous status as an undetermined risk.
Controlled risk status is granted to countries where surveillance is adequate and there are measures in place to prevent an outbreak of the disease, even though some cases of BSE are still found, according to the OIE.
However, Korea's livestock producers are still suffering from an outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD). Korea's last outbreak of FMD was reported in March 2010 and involved a pig. Some 317 cattle and 1,223 pigs on the farm were slaughtered, according to the OIE.
FMD outbreaks are occurring in other countries in the Far East including Japan and Hong Kong. There have also been recent outbreaks of FMD in South Africa, Mongolia and Egypt.
OIE members who have a negligible BSE risk status include: Argentina, India, Peru, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Chile, Norway, Sweden, Fin-land, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Iceland.
In addition to the U.S., Canada, Mexico and Korea, those countries with a controlled BSE risk include: Austria, Greece, Belgium, Hungary, Nether-lands, Brazil, Ireland, Panama, Canada, Italy, Poland, Chinese Taipei, Japan, Portugal, Colombia, Slovak Republic, Cyprus, Latvia, Slovenia, Czech Repub-lic, Lichtenstein, Spain, Denmark, Lith-uania, Switzerland, Estonia, Luxem-bourg, United Kingdom, France, Malta, and Germany.
http://www.theprairiestar.com/articles/2010/06/16/ag_news/livestock/live22.txt
Key work of the Assembly The Delegates approved the new list of countries and zones that had applied for official OIE recognition of their status with respect to one or more of four priority diseases: bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), foot and mouth disease, contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP) and rinderpest. With regard to BSE, the OIE newly recognised India and Peru as having a “negligible risk” status, while the Republic of Korea and Panama were recognised as having a “controlled BSE risk status”.
http://www.oie.int/eng/session2010/PDF%20Press%20releases/PRESS78_EN.pdf
78th General Session of the OIE 23/05/10
http://www.oie.int/eng/session2010/presse.htm
EU COMMENTS AND POSITIONS
On the proposed changes to OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals
20
CHAPTER 2.4.6: BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
General comments
The changes proposed are generally welcomed by the EU. However, some specific comments detailed below should be taken into account for the final revised version to be adopted in the next General Session.
Specific comments
LINE 13: The words "and possibly spontaneous" should be added as follows: "... suggesting that earlier, undetected indigenous and possibly spontaneous cases may have occurred."
LINE 31: The EU would argue for the re-instatement of the deleted phrase [before, or without, the recognition] since fallen stock in particular could be showing some clinical signs which went unrecognised. As written, it applies more to the active screening of the healthy slaughter population.
Line 228: Replace: "All currently recognized forms of BSE (C, H and L-Type) are detectable by these methods." with: "Classical BSE is recognized by all these methods, while a complete evaluation of the approved BSE rapid tests on atypical forms (C, H and L-Type) was never carried out".
http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/organisations/docs/l410677%20EU%20positions%20OIE%2078GS%20Terrestrial%20Manual_annex.pdf
http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/organisations/EU_comments_position_papers_en.htm
C H A P T E R 4 . 5 .
CONTROL OF HAZARDS OF AQUATIC ANIMAL HEALTH HAZARDS AND PUBLIC HEALTH IMPORTANCE IN AQUATIC ANIMAL FEEDS EU
comment
The EU would agree with the proposed amendments. Nevertheless, the proposed chapter would benefit of the following amendments:
1) With regard to Article 4.5.4., point 4 on "Good practices", the following rewording is proposed for the first sentence (highlighted): Where national guidelines exist, good aquaculture practices and good manufacturing practices (including good hygienic practices) should be followed. Countries without such guidelines are encouraged to develop them or to take already available or existing guidelines on board.
2) With regard to Article 4.5.4. point 5 on "relationship between prions and aquatic animal species", it must be highlighted that in a recent publication by Salta et al. (2009) it was reported that Gilthead Sea Bream developed TSE-like pathologies after having been force fed with BSE agent and Scrapie agent respectively. The PrPTSE found in Sea Bream was Sea Bream PrP and not residual PrPBSE or PrPSc. Therefore, there is now evidence showing that TSEs can be potentially transmitted from cattle or sheep to fish. The TSE like pathology was induced after force feeding high quantities of BSE and Scrapie agent. It is yet unknown, whether transmission would occur if more realistic doses of exposure were used. In other words, the “height” of the so called “species barrier” for transmission of PrPTSE from mammals to fish is unknown. However, given the new findings, we suggest that the relevant paragraph is amended to say that there may be a potential risk if terrestrial animal by-products were used as ingredients in aquatic animal feed with respect to prion diseases.
3) With regard to Article 4.5.4., point 11 on "Design and management of inspection programmes" we propose the following wording for the second sentence (highlighted):
Operators in the feed and feed ingredients business and other relevant industries should implement procedures to ensure compliance with regulatory standards for harvest, handling, storage, processing, distribution and use of feed and feed ingredients. Operators have the primary responsibility for implementing systems for process quality control. Where such systems are applied, the Competent Authority should verify that they meet all regulatory requirements. Article 4.5.1. Introduction
http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/organisations/comments_com_OIE_Aquatic_Health_Code_en.pdf
Questionnaire on bovine spongiform encephalopathy GENERAL INTRODUCTION
http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/organisations/comments_com_OIE_Terrestrial_Health_Code_092009_en.pdf
Greetings,
IF the truth were known (and it's not like I have not been trying), the USA, Canada, and Mexico (there are other Countries too), should all be listed in this new TSE prion trader friendly atmosphere as ''undetermined risk''. Because USDA et al have absolutely no idea. The ideology of only the UK BSE theory and there from only imported MBM and feed, to ignore the fact that the continuous rendering technology was developed and the USDA got the UK to use it first, some five years before the USA started using the same technology, and then the fact of all the different TSE in different species here in North America, and different strains there from, to continue to believe in only the imported factor of feed and animals, and not take seriously the _home grown_ factor, from tainted _home grown TSE tainted feed_, from the same type rendering technology, is like sticking your head in a hole in the ground and hoping for the best. kind of like what BP did in the Gulf of Mexico. But for the OIE to continue to go by this decades old science on BSE, and continue to ignore the risk factors from other strains of BSE, and other TSE in other species, when scientist from around the globe continue to wave flags of concern, to continue this ignorance is dangerous for human and animal health. But typical for the OIE and the USDA in reference to the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy disease. Both the USDA and the OIE have ignored these documented risk factors for years, even decades, simply for trading purposes. The USDA et al until 2003 when the first documented case of c-BSE was documented in Washington State, the USDA had nothing to do with countries that had BSE. Until that cow old Luther capped in Washington, then the shoe was on the other foot. The USDA and the OIE after that literally changed the rules and regulations on BSE that had been in place for almost a decade trying to eradicate it all around the globe before it mutated, by doing away with the BSE GBR risk assessments and ignoring them, and implementing the infamous force fed USDA BSE MRR policy (all this is explained below in the source reference). But two mad cows sat on ice while all this political science was taking place for 7 months. One finally confirmed thanks to the OIG and the Honorable Phyllis Fong, and the other could not be confirmed due to the fact in had been improperly stored for 4 MONTHS, before testing. Kind of like the other stumbling and staggering mad cow in Texas that got away, went straight to be rendered for pet food, without NO TSE prion test at all. I could go on, about the healthy brains, from healthy cows, cows they knew did not have BSE, submitted for the infamous 2004 Enhanced BSE surveillance and testing program, or the other 9,200 brains they only used IHC testing, the least likely to find BSE. Sadly, once they did start documenting BSE back to back, they shut it down, said that was enough, let's cancel this right here in it's tracks, and we have heard nothing since, like the USA has now become immune to any TSE in any bovine. ;
When the OIE and the USDA et al collaborated to make legal the trading of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy, when they did away with the BSE GBR risk assessments, where the USA, Canada, and Mexico were categorized as BSE GBR III. please see ;
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1211902594180.htm
Annex to the EFSA Scientific Report (2004) 3, 1-17 on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk of USA
please see full text ;
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/scdocs/doc/3rax1.pdf
YET, in 2010, tons and tons of banned mad cow protein are still in commerce here in the USA, scientific studies are being misconstrued and manipulated by ARS USDA, which are still going by TSE science that is decades old, while refusing to acknowledge new scientific studies, and FOIA requests are still being held up by the USDA et al on these urgent matters (see source related materials below). CJD of unknown phenotype, in victims that are getting younger, with longer clinical course from first onset of symptoms to death are occurring, in fact, sporadic CJD is still rising, where the TSEs in the different species are mutating here in the USA, and we still have this same dog and pony show by the OIE and USDA et al. IF you go back and look at the Countries that went by these OIE BSE guidelines, most all came down with BSE. I have said it before, I was say it again now, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. ...TSS
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.
snip...
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf
USDA: In 9,200 cases only one type of test could be used
WASHINGTON (AP)--The U.S. Department of Agriculture acknowledged Aug. 17 that its testing options for bovine spongiform encephalopathy were limited in 9,200 cases despite its effort to expand surveillance throughout the U.S. herd.
In those cases, only one type of test was used--one that failed to detect the disease in an infected Texas cow.
The department posted the information on its website because of an inquiry from The Associated Press.
Conducted over the past 14 months, the tests have not been included in the department's running tally of BSE tests since last summer. That total reached 439,126 on Aug. 17.
"There's no secret program," the department's chief veterinarian, John Clifford, said in an interview. "There has been no hiding, I can assure you of that."
Officials intended to report the tests later in an annual report, Clifford said.
These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC.
In the Texas case, officials had declared the cow free of disease in November after an IHC test came back negative. The department's inspector general ordered an additional kind of test, which confirmed the animal was infected.
Veterinarians in remote locations have used the preservative on tissue to keep it from degrading on its way to the department's laboratory in Ames, Iowa. Officials this year asked veterinarians to stop using preservative and send fresh or chilled samples within 48 hours.
The department recently investigated a possible case of BSE that turned up in a preserved sample. Further testing ruled out the disease two weeks ago.
Scientists used two additional tests--rapid screening and Western blot--to help detect BSE in the country's second confirmed case, in a Texas cow in June. They used IHC and Western blot to confirm the first case, in a Washington state cow in December 2003.
"The IHC test is still an excellent test," Clifford said. "These are not simple tests, either."
Clifford pointed out that scientists reran the IHC several times and got conflicting results. That happened, too, with the Western blot test. Both tests are accepted by international animal health officials.
Date: 8/25/05
http://www.hpj.com/archives/2005/aug05/aug29/BSEtestoptionswerelimited.cfm
""These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."
THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!
THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS
USDA 2003
We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently gone back. Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS.
Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area.
snip.............
Dr. Detwiler: It seems a good idea, but I'm not aware of it. Another important thing to get across to the public is that the negatives do not guarantee absence of infectivity. The animal could be early in the disease and the incubation period. Even sample collection is so important. If you're not collecting the right area of the brain in sheep, or if collecting lymphoreticular tissue, and you don't get a good biopsy, you could miss the area with the PRP in it and come up with a negative test. There's a new, unusual form of Scrapie that's been detected in Norway. We have to be careful that we don't get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We've gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We're using the brain stem and we're looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It's a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They've recently gone back.
Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an 'official' test result as recognized by APHIS .
Dr. Detwiler: That's on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren't they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they're looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area.
snip...
FULL TEXT;
Completely Edited Version PRION ROUNDTABLE
Accomplished this day, Wednesday, December 11, 2003, Denver, Colorado
2005
=============================
CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006
The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.
The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.
These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm
LET US LOOK AT AUSTRALIA, AND THE BSE RISK ASSESSMENT THE O.I.E. ASK THEM ABOUT IN 2009. IF YOU LOOK AT THESE QUESTIONS, THE USA HAS FAILED AT EVERY ASPECT OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE SET FORTH BY THE O.I.E. FOR AUSTRALIA IN 2009.
AUSTRALIAN QUESTIONNAIRE TO ASSESS BSE RISK
Introduction
Acceptance of a submission from an applicant country for an assessment of BSE risk is based on the provision of comprehensive data and supporting evidence from the Competent Authority over the five areas listed below. In general, the data requirements are consistent with those of Chapter 11.6 – Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy of the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) Terrestrial Animal Health Code, 2009.
A risk assessment to determine the BSE risk status of the cattle population and whether the beef and beef products from a country represent a risk to the health of Australian consumers will be undertaken by Food Standards Australia New Zealand (FSANZ). This document sets out the criteria under the five areas that will be examined to determine BSE risk. Applicant countries should also refer to the documents explaining the assessment process (link) and the requirements for the importation of beef and beef products for human consumption (link).
Countries should note that as part of the assessment, verification of in-country control measures may be undertaken by in-country inspection and the results of any such inspections will be considered prior to completing the country assessment. Countries will be required to provide an annual update report by 31 January to the Australian BSE Food Safety Assessment Committee (the Committee) as described in Section 5. Countries are also required to report to the Committee, within 24 hours, any exceptional developments in regard to the countries BSE status e.g. identification of the first indigenous case of BSE.
The document comprises the following:
Section 1 – Risk assessment requirements regarding risk release and exposure
Section 2 – Other system requirements
• Ongoing BSE awareness program
• Compulsory notification and investigation of BSE cases
• Diagnostic capability
• Animal traceability and identification systems
• Animal slaughter and processing systems
Section 3 – BSE surveillance and monitoring system
Section 4 – BSE history of the country
Section 5 – Ongoing review of country BSE status and additional data
3
SECTION 1 – RISK ASSESSMENT REQUIREMENTS – RISK RELEASE AND EXPOSURE
snip...
see full text 12 pages ;
http://www.foodstandards.gov.au/_srcfiles/Questionnaire%20to%20Assess%20BSE%20Risk%2023%20Feb%2020101.pdf
see USA here ;
TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION FEBRUARY 2010 REPORT CHAPTER 1.6. STATUS FOR OIE LISTED DISEASES: PROCEDURES FOR SELF DECLARATION AND FOR OFFICIAL RECOGNITION BY THE OIE
Article 1.6.1.
General principles Members may wish to make a self declaration as to the freedom of a country, zone or compartment from an OIE listed disease. The Member may inform the OIE of its claimed status and the OIE may publish the claim. Publication does not imply endorsement of the claim. The OIE does not recognise publish self declaration for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), foot and mouth disease (FMD), rinderpest and contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP). Members may request official recognition by the OIE as to: 1. the risk status of a country or zone with regard to BSE;
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/import_export/animals/oie/downloads/tahc_feb10/tahc_status_oie_list_dis_78_feb10_cmt.pdf
IT was set up to fail.
Please under stand what this says ;
The Member may inform the OIE of its claimed status and the OIE may publish the claim.
and then remember this ;
IN A NUT SHELL ; $$$
(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)
11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries.The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to then Central Bureau............
http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf
full text ;
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2007/10/bse-base-mad-cow-testing-texas-usa-and.html
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/
REPEAL THE B.S.E. MINIMAL RISK REGION (MRR) policy !
THEN, put back in place the B.S.E. G.B.R. Risk Assessments, and enhance them to include all T.S.E. i.e. the atypical strains.
REPEAL THE B.S.E. MINIMAL RISK REGION (MRR) policy !
The BSE MRR policy was shoved down the throat of every country by the O.I.E. and the U.S.D.A..
MOST every one of those Country's came down with BSE.
THE O.I.E. formula to detect B.S.E. is, and has been flawed. It was and is a policy set up for trade, NOT for human and animal health.
The BSE MRR policy made legal what the U.K. did, when the poisoned the globe with BSE. Except BSE has mutated and different strains have evolved, some that are more virulent than the c-BSE, all can transmit to humans (Kong et al 2009), all are in North America.
The BSE MRR policy was ratified while two cases of BSE were sitting on the shelf waiting to be confirmed (one was 7+ months later after an Act of Congress, and the other suspect sample that sat on a shelf for 4 months, which was not preserved correctly, which only IHC could be used, the least likely to detect BSE, was found inconclusive or negative), then the Alabama mad cow was confirmed. AFTER this, the USDA shut the testing program down to levels that would not detect BSE.
Docket APHIS-2006-0026 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Animal Identification and Importation of Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0026-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions, Identification of Ruminants and Processing and Importation of Commodities Public Submission APHIS-2006-0026-0012 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801e47e1
SEE FULL TEXT ;
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=09000064801e47e1&disposition=attachment&contentType=xml
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines
Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary
Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY
THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
go figure. ...
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8151
SEE FULL TEXT ;
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
WHAT THE USA AND THE OIE DID, was make legal what the U.K. did when they poisoned the globe with mad cow disease. they knew what they were doing, but did it anyway. The BSE GBR risk assessments were put into place so that would never ever happen again. UNTIL they USA finally documented a case. UP until then, the USA would not accept products that may contain BSE from any country. ONCE the USA lost the 'gold card', the shoe was the on the other foot, and they literally left 2 suspect mad cow brain samples sit on a shelf for 7+ months and 4 months respectfully, all the while the BSE MRR policy was being legalized. ONCE made legal, and after an act of Congress, the one suspect Texas mad cow case that had sat up on a shelf for 7+ months was finally confirmed by Weybridge et al in the U.K., and the other, which the sample was not preserved correctly, was found after being a suspect, to be inconclusive and finally they termed it negative. Then the Alabama mad cow was confirmed and they had to shut the program down before they found anymore. ...TSS
2000
England worried briefly about infecting other countries 27 Aug 00
confidential
correspondence obtained by Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
BSE11/2 020;
SC1337p
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY Richmond House, 79 Whitehall, London SWIA 2NS Telephone 01-210 3000 From the Chief Medical Officer Sir Donald Achson KBE DM DSc FRCP FFCM FFOM
Mr K C Meldrum Chief Veterinary Officer Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food Government Buildings Hook Rise South Tolworth Surbiton Surrey KT6 7NG 3 January 1990
Dear Mr Meldrum
BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
You will recall that we have previously discussed the potential risks of BSE occurring in other countries as a result of the continuing export from the UK of meat and bone that may be contaminated by scrapie or possibly BSE.
I remain concerned that we are not being consistent in our attempts to contain the risks of BSE. Having banned the feeding of meat and bone meal to ruminamts in 1988, we should take steps to prevent these UK products being fed to ruminants in other countries. This could be achieved either through a ban on the export of meat and bone meal, or at least by the proper labelling of these products to make it absolutely clear they should not be fed to ruminants [or zoo animals, including rare and endangered primates -- webmaster]. Unless some such action is taken the difficult problems we have faced with BSE may well occur in other countries who import UK meat and bone meal. Surely it is short sighted for us to risk being seen in future as having been responsible for the introduction of BSE to the food chain in other countries.
I would be very interested to hear how you feel this gap in the present precautionary measures to eliminate BSE should be closed. We should be aiming at the global elimination of this new bovine disense. The export of our meat and bone meal is a continuing risk to other countries.
Yours Sincerely Donald Acheson
Copy: Dr Metters Dr Pickles
90/1.03/1.1 ============ BSE13/3 0083
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090505194948/http://bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/01/03001001.pdf
Dr Pickles From: Dr J S Metters DCM0 International, Prevention and Community Services 7 June 1990 Copies to: Dr McInnes Miss Pease Mr Otley
BSE
1. I spoke to Mr Capstick yesterday. Among other things, he told me that MAFF are now considering the labelling of animal foodstuffs, and in particular what detail would be required if such labelling was made compulsory. Apparently our freedom of action is constrained by EC Directives [total garbage, MAFF wants to keep exporting -- webmaster], and there is also concern about the level of detail that should be included in any foodstuff labels.
2. Mr Capstick suggested that this was not an area that DH had a particular interest. I countered by saying that we supported the principle of labelling of animal foodstuffs, particularly when these were going for export.
3. I also thanked him for keeping us informed, in a way that I hope encourage further communication of MAFF's internal deliberations.
J S METTERS Room 509 Richmond House Ext. 5591 92/YdeS 90/6.7/5.1
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090505194948/http://bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1990/06/07005001.pdf
see singeltary comments 2000 ;
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/aug00_last_news.html#fff
MY comments/questions are as follows ;
1. SINCE the first Harvard BSE Risk Assessment was so flawed and fraught with error after the PEER REVIEW assessment assessed this fact, how do you plan on stopping this from happening again, will there be another peer review with top TSE Scientist, an impartial jury so-to-speak, to assess this new and updated Harvard BSE/TSE risk assessment and will this assessment include the Atypical TSE and SRM issues ?
*** Suppressed peer review of Harvard study October 31, 2002 ***
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/topics/BSE_Peer_Review.pdf
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=090000648027c28e&disposition=attachment&contentType=pdf
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/PDF/BSE_Risk_Assess_Response_Public_Comments.pdf
Wednesday, April 16, 2008
MBM, greaves, meat offal, live cattle, imports from UK to USA vs Canada
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/04/mbm-greaves-meat-offal-live-cattle.html
Monday, November 23, 2009
BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS UPDATE NOVEMBER 23, 2009 COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND O.I.E.
http://docket-aphis-2006-0041.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-gbr-risk-assessments-update.html
Wednesday, February 10, 2010
NAIS MAD COW TRACEABILITY DUMPED BY USDA APHIS 2010
http://naiscoolyes.blogspot.com/2010/02/nais-mad-cow-traceability-dumped-by.html
Sunday, March 28, 2010
Nor-98 atypical Scrapie, atypical BSE, spontaneous TSE, trade policy, sound science ?
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2010/03/nor-98-atypical-scrapie-atypical-bse.html
Saturday, April 10, 2010
TOYOTA VS MAD COW DISEASE USA OIE BSE MRR IMPORT AND EXPORT TRADE WARS
Can you say TOYOTA. IT is a sad day when trade trumps human and animal health. as the case with the BSE MRR policy. Behind closed doors, the BSe spin machine is working i.e. Vilsack saying that 'The U.S. has had no cases in the last three years, and only three in two decades.' i can tell you with absolute certainty, that is only part of the story. i can tell you that in fact, the USDA BSE surveillance and testing have failed the consumer here in the USA, and abroad, and that we have been exposed to the TSE agent, i.e. USA atypical BSE, which laboratory studies show is more virulent. i can tell you with absolute certainty they infamous June 2004 enhanced BSE surveillance program, where some 800,000+ cattle were tested over many years of testing, was fraught with fraud, and in short, a failed program, and proven to be so by the GAO and the OIG, where it was proven that some of the testing program was using perfectly healthy cattle in their BSE testing program. Where some 9,200+ BSE test on suspect questionable cattle, only the IHC test were used. THE IHC is the least likely test to find BSE. IT only tells you if that part of the tissue sample is in fact infected or not, but it does not tell you about the rest of the brain. By only using the IHC, you miss many cases (Detwiler et al 2003 BSE ROUNDTABLE). i can tell you with absolute certainty, that when pressed, the USDA et al will say that even if we are missing cases of BSE, that the BSE mad cow feed ban of August 4, 1997, will stop BSE, but the ban was nothing more than ink on paper. This mad cow feed ban was only partial and voluntary. i can tell you with absolute certainty that in 2010, since 8/4/97, banned mad cow feed is in commerce here in the USA, BY THE TONS. i can tell you with absolute certainty, that when the BSE MRR policy was put in place, that this exposed everyone around the globe with the TSE agent, either by consumption and or friendly fire there from, and that decision was based NOT on science, but on trade. i can tell you with absolute certainty, that SINCE the USDA and the NSLP did in fact expose our children across the Nation with BSE via the NSLP USDA DEAD STOCK DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM, that if they are capable of this, they are capable of exposing any person, in any country with the BSE TSE agent. North America has documented the so called typical c-BSE, l-BSE, and h-BSE. typical scrapie strains are rampant in the USA in sheep and goats, and the atypical Nor-98 scrapie is spreading, and CWD in deer and elk is spreading, with now documented a 2nd strain, and two strains of TME in mink. all this over the years have been fed back to food producing animals for animals and humans. Confucius ask, IF USA sheep Scrapie transmitted to USA cattle does not produce the same pathology as the U.K. c-BSE, why then would human CJD there from look like the U.K. nvCJD ??? what the USA has done defies all science and logic i.e. NO MAD COW DISEASE and or any human TSE there from. Either the BSE Mad Cow outbreak and human infection nvCJD there from, that happened in the U.K. was totally false, or the same thing is happening in the USA as we speak. sCJD of unknown phenotypes are rising in the USA. sporadic CJD is not a single strain, but multiple strains of unknown routes and sources of the TSE agent. IF the federal government can lie for almost a century about asbestos, and or tobacco, just to protect those two industry giants, i can guarantee you that they are doing it with mad cow type disease i.e. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy. or just ask the Indians. ...TSS
full text ;
Saturday, April 10, 2010
TOYOTA VS MAD COW DISEASE USA OIE BSE MRR IMPORT AND EXPORT TRADE WARS
http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/04/toyota-vs-mad-cow-disease-usa-oie-bse.html
Wednesday, April 28, 2010
BSE, Scrapie, CWD, REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL HEALTH STANDARDS COMMISSION Paris, 8-12 February 2010
REPORT OF THE MEETING OF THE OIE TERRESTRIAL ANIMAL
http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2010/04/bse-scrapie-cwd-report-of-meeting-of.html
DAMNING TESTIMONY FROM STANLEY PRUSINER THE NOBEL PRIZE WINNER ON PRIONS SPEAKING ABOUT TRADE AND PRIONS, ''level of absolute ignorance'', ''yes, i think prions are bad to eat, and you can die from them''. ...(watch and turn it up)
http://maddeer.org/video/embedded/prusinerclip.html
A most interesting case, she was 38 years old, and worked a Tyson meat slaughter house, handling brain and spinal cords ;
Irma Linda Andablo CJD Victim, she died at 38 years old on February 6, 2010 in Mesquite Texas
Irma Linda Andablo CJD Victim, she died at 38 years old on February 6, 2010 in Mesquite Texas.She left 6 Kids and a Husband.The Purpose of this web is to give information in Spanish to the Hispanic community, and to all the community who want's information about this terrible disease.-
Physician Discharge Summary, Parkland Hospital, Dallas Texas
Admit Date: 12/29/2009 Discharge Date: 1/20/2010 Attending Provider: Greenberg, Benjamin Morris; General Neurology Team: General Neurology Team
Linda was a Hispanic female with no past medical history presents with 14 months of incresing/progressive altered mental status, generalized weakness, inability to walk, loss of appetite, inability to speak, tremor and bowel/blader incontinence.She was, in her usual state of health up until February, 2009, when her husbans notes that she began forgetting things like names and short term memories. He also noticed mild/vague personality changes such as increased aggression. In March, she was involved in a hit and run MVA,although she was not injured. The police tracked her down and ticketed her. At that time, her son deployed to Iraq with the Army and her husband assumed her mentation changes were due to stress over these two events. Also in March, she began to have weakness in her legs, making it difficult to walk. Over the next few months, her mentation and personality changes worsened, getting to a point where she could no longer recognized her children. She was eating less and less. She was losing more weight. In the last 2-3 months, she reached the point where she could not walk without an assist, then 1 month ago, she stopped talking, only making grunting/aggressive sounds when anyone came near her. She also became both bowel and bladder incontinent, having to wear diapers. Her '"tremor'" and body jerks worsened and her hands assumed a sort of permanent grip position, leading her family to put tennis balls in her hands to protect her fingers.
The husband says that they have lived in Nebraska for the past 21 years. They had seen a doctor there during the summer time who prescribed her Seroquel and Lexapro, Thinking these were sx of a mood disorder. However, the medications did not help and she continued to deteriorate clinically. Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she would euthanize the cattle. The husband says that he does not know any fellow workers with a similar illness. He also says that she did not have any preceeding illness or travel.
http://www.recordandoalinda.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19:cjd-english-info&catid=9:cjd-ingles&Itemid=8
> Up until about 6 years ago, the pt worked at Tyson foods where she
> worked on the assembly line, slaughtering cattle and preparing them for
> packaging. She was exposed to brain and spinal cord matter when she
> would euthanize the cattle.
please see full text ;
Monday, March 29, 2010
Irma Linda Andablo CJD Victim, she died at 38 years old on February 6, 2010 in Mesquite Texas
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/03/irma-linda-andablo-cjd-victim-she-died.html
TSE
Senate 'Down Under' link at bottom of the following url, my submission read out in the Hansard Senate recently by the ABA Chairman Brad Bellinger ;
http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/
*****URGENT NOTE HERE ABOUT OIE AND THEIR JUNK SCIENCE ABOUT ATYPICAL BSE*****
Wednesday, March 31, 2010
Atypical BSE in Cattle
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/03/atypical-bse-in-cattle-position-post.html
To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.
http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2
Archive Number 20100405.1091 Published Date 05-APR-2010
Subject PRO/AH/EDR> Prion disease update 1010 (04)
snip...
[Terry S. Singeltary Sr. has added the following comment:
"According to the World Health Organisation, the future public health threat of vCJD in the UK and Europe and potentially the rest of the world is of concern and currently unquantifiable. However, the possibility of a significant and geographically diverse vCJD epidemic occurring over the next few decades cannot be dismissed
The key word here is diverse. What does diverse mean? If USA scrapie transmitted to USA bovine does not produce pathology as the UK c-BSE, then why would CJD from there look like UK vCJD?"
http://www.promedmail.org/pls/apex/f?p=2400:1001:568933508083034::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1000,82101
14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)
18.173 page 189
Experimental Challenge of Cattle with H-type and L-type Atypical BSE
A. Buschmann1, U. Ziegler1, M. Keller1, R. Rogers2, B. Hills3, M.H. Groschup1. 1Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany, 2Health Canada, Bureau of Microbial Hazards, Health Products & Food Branch, Ottawa, Canada, 3Health Canada, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Secretariat, Ottawa, Canada
Background: After the detection of two novel BSE forms designated H-type and L-type atypical BSE the question of the pathogenesis and the agent distribution of these two types in cattle was fully open. From initial studies of the brain pathology, it was already known that the anatomical distribution of L-type BSE differs from that of the classical type where the obex region in the brainstem always displays the highest PrPSc concentrations. In contrast in L-type BSE cases, the thalamus and frontal cortex regions showed the highest levels of the pathological prion protein, while the obex region was only weakly involved.
Methods:We performed intracranial inoculations of cattle (five and six per group) using 10%brainstemhomogenates of the two German H- and L-type atypical BSE isolates. The animals were inoculated under narcosis and then kept in a free-ranging stable under appropriate biosafety conditions.At least one animal per group was killed and sectioned in the preclinical stage and the remaining animals were kept until they developed clinical symptoms. The animals were examined for behavioural changes every four weeks throughout the experiment following a protocol that had been established during earlier BSE pathogenesis studies with classical BSE.
Results and Discussion: All animals of both groups developed clinical symptoms and had to be euthanized within 16 months. The clinical picture differed from that of classical BSE, as the earliest signs of illness were loss of body weight and depression. However, the animals later developed hind limb ataxia and hyperesthesia predominantly and the head. Analysis of brain samples from these animals confirmed the BSE infection and the atypical Western blot profile was maintained in all animals. Samples from these animals are now being examined in order to be able to describe the pathogenesis and agent distribution for these novel BSE types. Conclusions: A pilot study using a commercially avaialble BSE rapid test ELISA revealed an essential restriction of PrPSc to the central nervous system for both atypical BSE forms. A much more detailed analysis for PrPSc and infectivity is still ongoing.
http://www.isid.org/14th_icid/
http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/IMED2009_AbstrAuth.pdf
http://www.isid.org/publications/ICID_Archive.shtml
14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -
Final Abstract Number: ISE.114
Session: International Scientific Exchange
Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America
update October 2009
T. Singeltary
Bacliff, TX, USA
Background:
An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.
Methods:
12 years independent research of available data
Results:
I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.
Conclusion:
I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.
http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/14th_ICID_ISE_Abstracts.pdf
International Society for Infectious Diseases Web: http://www.isid.org
I ask Professor Kong ;
Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment
''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''
Professor Kong reply ;
.....snip
''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete.
Thanks for your interest.''
Best regards,
Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
END...TSS
P02.35
Molecular Features of the Protease-resistant Prion Protein (PrPres) in H-type BSE
Biacabe, A-G1; Jacobs, JG2; Gavier-Widén, D3; Vulin, J1; Langeveld, JPM2; Baron, TGM1 1AFSSA, France; 2CIDC-Lelystad, Netherlands; 3SVA, Sweden
Western blot analyses of PrPres accumulating in the brain of BSE-infected cattle have demonstrated 3 different molecular phenotypes regarding to the apparent molecular masses and glycoform ratios of PrPres bands. We initially described isolates (H-type BSE) essentially characterized by higher PrPres molecular mass and decreased levels of the diglycosylated PrPres band, in contrast to the classical type of BSE. This type is also distinct from another BSE phenotype named L-type BSE, or also BASE (for Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy), mainly characterized by a low representation of the diglycosylated PrPres band as well as a lower PrPres molecular mass. Retrospective molecular studies in France of all available BSE cases older than 8 years old and of part of the other cases identified since the beginning of the exhaustive surveillance of the disease in 20001 allowed to identify 7 H-type BSE cases, among 594 BSE cases that could be classified as classical, L- or H-type BSE. By Western blot analysis of H-type PrPres, we described a remarkable specific feature with antibodies raised against the C-terminal region of PrP that demonstrated the existence of a more C-terminal cleaved form of PrPres (named PrPres#2 ), in addition to the usual PrPres form (PrPres #1). In the unglycosylated form, PrPres #2 migrates at about 14 kDa, compared to 20 kDa for PrPres #1. The proportion of the PrPres#2 in cattle seems to by higher compared to the PrPres#1. Furthermore another PK–resistant fragment at about 7 kDa was detected by some more N-terminal antibodies and presumed to be the result of cleavages of both N- and C-terminal parts of PrP. These singular features were maintained after transmission of the disease to C57Bl/6 mice. The identification of these two additional PrPres fragments (PrPres #2 and 7kDa band) reminds features reported respectively in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and in Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker (GSS) syndrome in humans.
http://www.neuroprion.com/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2007/abstract_book.pdf
Sunday, February 14, 2010
[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/02/docket-no-fsis-2006-0011-fsis-harvard.html
http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2010/02/transmissible-spongiform-encephalopathy.html
2009 UPDATE ON ALABAMA AND TEXAS MAD COWS 2005 and 2006
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2006/08/bse-atypical-texas-and-alabama-update.html
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.
snip...
Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:
soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),
implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),
snip...
The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf
snip... please see full text ;
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/06/mad-cows-and-computer-models-us.html
PLEASE NOTE *
Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.
snip...
The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...
http://web.archive.org/web/20030516051623/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf
Tuesday, March 2, 2010
Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed/Adulterated/Misbranded Rangen Inc 2/11/10 USA
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-proteins-prohibited-in-ruminant.html
Monday, March 1, 2010
ANIMAL PROTEIN I.E. MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE A REVIEW 2010
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-protien-ie-mad-cow-feed-in.html
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. (Submitted question): Monday, April 5, 2010
Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE April 5, 2010
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/04/update-on-feed-enforcement-activities.html
Friday, April 23, 2010
Upcoming BSE Webinar on Thursday, April 22, 2010 a review
http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/04/upcoming-bse-webinar-on-thursday-april.html
PLEASE understand, there is literally 100s and 100s of tonnage of banned mad cow protein in commerce in the USA in 2010.
THE August 4, 1997 was a voluntary and partial feed ban.
IT was nothing more than ink on paper. ...TSS
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm
Thursday, March 19, 2009
MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA WITH ONGOING 12 YEARS OF DENIAL
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html
PLEASE be aware, for 4 years, the USDA fed our children all across the Nation dead stock downer cows, the most high risk cattle for BSE aka mad cow disease and other dangerous pathogens. who will watch our children for CJD for the next 5+ decades ???
SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM FROM DOWNER CATTLE UPDATE
http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2009/05/who-will-watch-children.html
http://downercattle.blogspot.com/
atypical BSE MAD COW STRAIN MORE VIRULENT TO HUMANS THAN UK STRAIN
18 January 2007 - Draft minutes of the SEAC 95 meeting (426 KB) held on 7 December 2006 are now available.
snip...
64. A member noted that at the recent Neuroprion meeting, a study was presented showing that in transgenic mice BSE passaged in sheep may be more virulent and infectious to a wider range of species than bovine derived BSE.
Other work presented suggested that BSE and bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy (BASE) MAY BE RELATED. A mutation had been identified in the prion protein gene in an AMERICAN BASE CASE THAT WAS SIMILAR IN NATURE TO A MUTATION FOUND IN CASES OF SPORADIC CJD.
snip...
http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/95.pdf
3:30 Transmission of the Italian Atypical BSE (BASE) in Humanized Mouse
Models Qingzhong Kong, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Pathology, Case Western Reserve University
Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy (BASE) is an atypical BSE strain discovered recently in Italy, and similar or different atypical BSE cases were also reported in other countries. The infectivity and phenotypes of these atypical BSE strains in humans are unknown. In collaboration with Pierluigi Gambetti, as well as Maria Caramelli and her co-workers, we have inoculated transgenic mice expressing human prion protein with brain homogenates from BASE or BSE infected cattle. Our data shows that about half of the BASE-inoculated mice became infected with an average incubation time of about 19 months; in contrast, none of the BSE-inoculated mice appear to be infected after more than 2 years.
***These results indicate that BASE is transmissible to humans and suggest that BASE is more virulent than classical BSE in humans.***
6:30 Close of Day One
http://www.healthtech.com/2007/tse/day1.asp
SEE STEADY INCREASE IN SPORADIC CJD IN THE USA FROM 1997 TO 2006. SPORADIC CJD CASES TRIPLED, with phenotype of 'UNKNOWN' strain growing. ...
http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/resources-casereport.html
There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection.
He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf
2008 - 2010
The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.
http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html
CJD SURVEILLANCE TEXAS
http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/2007/12/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-surveillance.html
Friday, November 30, 2007
CJD QUESTIONNAIRE USA CWRU AND CJD FOUNDATION
http://cjdquestionnaire.blogspot.com/
Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Committee On June 12, 2009 (TRANSCRIPT)
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/BloodVaccinesandOtherBiologics/TransmissibleSpongiformEncephalopathiesAdvisoryCommittee/UCM171810.pdf
Meeting of the Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Committee On June 12, 2009 (Singeltary submission)
http://tseac.blogspot.com/2009/05/meeting-of-transmissible-spongiform.html
Saturday, June 13, 2009
Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States 2003 revisited 2009
http://cjdusa.blogspot.com/2009/06/monitoring-occurrence-of-emerging-forms.html
Friday, February 05, 2010
New Variant Creutzfelt Jakob Disease case reports United States 2010 A Review
http://vcjd.blogspot.com/2010/02/new-variant-creutzfelt-jakob-disease.html
Saturday, January 2, 2010
Human Prion Diseases in the United States January 1, 2010 ***FINAL***
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/01/human-prion-diseases-in-united-states.html
my comments to PLosone here ;
http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action?inReplyTo=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd&root=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd
BSE: TIME TO TAKE H.B. PARRY SERIOUSLY
If the scrapie agent is generated from ovine DNA and thence causes disease in other species, then perhaps, bearing in mind the possible role of scrapie in CJD of humans (Davinpour et al, 1985), scrapie and not BSE should be the notifiable disease. ...
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090505194948/http://bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1988/06/08004001.pdf
http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2007/12/scrapie-hb-parry-seriously-yb886841.html
Sunday, April 18, 2010
SCRAPIE AND ATYPICAL SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION STUDIES A REVIEW 2010
http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2010/04/scrapie-and-atypical-scrapie.html
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY UPDATE June 16, 2010
J Clin Invest. doi:10.1172/JCI42051. Copyright © 2010, The American Society for Clinical Investigation.
Research Article
A molecular switch controls interspecies prion disease transmission in mice
Christina J. Sigurdson1,2,3, K. Peter R. Nilsson3, Simone Hornemann4, Giuseppe Manco3, Natalia Fernández-Borges5, Petra Schwarz3, Joaquín Castilla5,6, Kurt Wüthrich4,7 and Adriano Aguzzi3
1Department of Pathology and Department of Medicine, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California, USA. 2Department of Pathology, Immunology, and Microbiology, University of California, Davis, Davis, California, USA. 3UniversitätsSpital Zürich, Institute of Neuropathology, Zürich, Switzerland. 4Institut für Molekularbiologie und Biophysik, ETH Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland. 5CIC BioGUNE, Parque tecnológico de Bizkaia, Bizkaia, Spain. 6Ikerbasque, Basque Foundation for Science, Bizkaia, Spain. 7Department of Molecular Biology and Skaggs Institute for Chemical Biology, The Scripps Research Institute, La Jolla, California, USA.
Address correspondence to: Adriano Aguzzi, UniversitätsSpital Zürich, Institute of Neuropathology, Department of Pathology, Schmelzbergstrasse 12, CH-8091 Zürich, Switzerland. Phone: 41.44.255.2107; Fax: 41.44.255.4402; E-mail: adriano.aguzzi@usz.ch. Or to: Christina Sigurdson, Department of Pathology, University of California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Dr., La Jolla, California 92093, USA. Phone: 858.534.0978; Fax: 858.246.0523; E-mail: csigurdson@ucsd.edu.
Published June 14, 2010 Received for publication December 15, 2009, and accepted in revised form April 28, 2010.
Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies are lethal neurodegenerative disorders that present with aggregated forms of the cellular prion protein (PrPC), which are known as PrPSc. Prions from different species vary considerably in their transmissibility to xenogeneic hosts. The variable transmission barriers depend on sequence differences between incoming PrPSc and host PrPC and additionally, on strain-dependent conformational properties of PrPSc. The ß2-a2 loop region within PrPC varies substantially between species, with its structure being influenced by the residue types in the 2 amino acid sequence positions 170 (most commonly S or N) and 174 (N or T). In this study, we inoculated prions from 5 different species into transgenic mice expressing either disordered-loop or rigid-loop PrPC variants. Similar ß2-a2 loop structures correlated with efficient transmission, whereas dissimilar loops correlated with strong transmission barriers. We then classified literature data on cross-species transmission according to the 170S/N polymorphism. Transmission barriers were generally low between species with the same amino acid residue in position 170 and high between those with different residues. These findings point to a triggering role of the local ß2-a2 loop structure for prion transmissibility between different species.
snip...
These observations suggest striking differences in the ß-sheet alignment of PrPSc aggregates between prion-infected 170S and 170N animals and may provide a plausible starting point for clarifying the structural basis of prion species barriers that are highly relevant to public health, including the potential transmissibility of bovine and cervid prions to humans.
snip...
As a possible exception to these observations, cattle may be susceptible to CWD from white-tailed deer (86). The latter finding suggests that specific prion strains can overrule the codon 170 homology requirement.
http://www.jci.org/articles/view/42051?key=456180f4a34aad821c6f#B87
Monday, June 14, 2010
A molecular switch controls interspecies prion disease transmission in mice
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2010/06/molecular-switch-controls-interspecies.html
Friday, May 14, 2010
Prion Strain Mutation Determined by Prion Protein Conformational Compatibility and Primary Structure
Published Online May 13, 2010 Science DOI: 10.1126/science.1187107 Science Express Index
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2010/05/prion-strain-mutation-determined-by.html
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/
Saturday, June 5, 2010
Research Project: Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies: Identification of atypical scrapie in Canadian sheep
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2010/06/research-project-transmissible.html
Saturday, June 12, 2010
PUBLICATION REQUEST AND FOIA REQUEST Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Study of Atypical Bse
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/06/publication-request-and-foia-request.html
Tuesday, June 1, 2010
USA cases of dpCJD rising with 24 cases so far in 2010
http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/2010/06/usa-cases-of-dpcjd-rising-with-24-cases.html
Wednesday, June 16, 2010
Defining sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease strains and their transmission properties
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/06/defining-sporadic-creutzfeldt-jakob.html
Friendly Fire, the pass it forward mode of TSE. ...
Wednesday, June 02, 2010
CJD Annex H UPDATE AFTER DEATH PRECAUTIONS Published: 2 June 2003 Updated: May 2010
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/06/cjd-annex-h-update-after-death.html
Saturday, April 24, 2010
New connection between Alzheimer’s and prionic illnesses discovered
http://betaamyloidcjd.blogspot.com/2010/04/new-connection-between-alzheimers-and.html
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
flounder9@verizon.net
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