Saturday, April 18, 2020

Coronavirus at Smithfield pork plant: The untold story of America's biggest outbreak

Coronavirus at Smithfield pork plant: The untold story of America's biggest outbreak

How did the biggest cluster in the US emerge in a corner of South Dakota? Infections spread like wildfire through a pork factory and questions remain about what the company did to protect staff.

On the afternoon of 25 March, Julia sat down at her laptop and logged into a phony Facebook account. She'd opened it in middle school, to surreptitiously monitor boys she had crushes on. But now, many years later, it was about to serve a much more serious purpose.

"Can you please look into Smithfield," she typed in a message to an account called Argus911, the Facebook-based tip line for the local newspaper, the Argus Leader. "They do have a positive [Covid-19] case and are planning to stay open." By "Smithfield", she was referring to the Smithfield Foods pork-processing plant located in her town of Sioux Falls, South Dakota. The factory - a massive, eight-story white box perched on the banks of the Big Sioux River - is the ninth-largest hog-processing facility in the US. When running at full capacity, it processes 19,500 freshly-slaughtered hogs per day, slicing, grinding and smoking them into millions of pounds of bacon, hot dogs and spiral-cut hams. With 3,700 workers, it is also the fourth-largest employer in the city.

"Thank you for the tip," the Argus911 account responded. "What job did the worker who tested positive have?"

"We are not exactly sure," Julia wrote back.

"OK, thanks," Argus911 replied. "We'll be in touch."

The next day, at 7:35am, the Argus Leader published the story on its website: "Smithfield Foods employee tests positive for coronavirus". The reporter confirmed through a company spokeswoman that, indeed, an employee had tested positive, was in a 14-day quarantine, and that his or her work area and other common spaces had been "thoroughly sanitised". But the plant, deemed part of a "critical infrastructure industry" by the Trump administration, would remain fully operational.

Snip..

By 15 April, when Smithfield finally closed under pressure from the South Dakota governor's office, the plant had become the number one hotspot in the US, with a cluster of 644 confirmed cases among Smithfield employees and people who contracted it from them. In total, Smithfield-related infections account for 55% of the caseload in the state, which is far outpacing its far more populous Midwestern neighbour states in cases per capita. According to the New York Times, the Smithfield Foods case numbers have surpassed the USS Theodore Roosevelt naval ship and the Cook County Jail in Chicago, Illinois.

snip...

The Smithfield pork plant, located in a Republican-led state that is one of five in the US that has not issued any kind of shelter-in-place order, has become a microcosm illustrating the socioeconomic disparities laid bare by the global pandemic. While many white-collar workers around the country are sheltering in place and working from home, food industry workers like the employees at Smithfield are deemed "essential" and must remain on the front lines.

Graphic of pigs wearing masks

"These jobs for essential workers are lower paying than the average job across America, in some cases by significant margins. So home health aides, cashiers - absolutely essential, on the front lines, have to physically report to work," said Adie Tomer, a fellow at the Brookings Institute. "They are more predominantly African American or Hispanic than the overall working populations."

The workforce at Smithfield is made up largely of immigrants and refugees from places like Myanmar, Ethiopia, Nepal, Congo and El Salvador. There are 80 different languages spoken in the plant. Estimates of the mean hourly wage range from $14-16 an hour. Those hours are long, the work is gruelling, and standing on a production line often means being less than a foot away from your co-workers on either side.


Tyson Foods processing plant in rural Iowa hit hard by coronavirus with 186 positive cases

Tommy Birch

Tyler Jett

Des Moines Register

Soaring numbers of workers at the Columbus Junction, Iowa, pork-processing plant who have been sickened by COVID-19 have sparked fears not only for the employees’ health but also for the vitality of this small town and the continuity of the nation’s meat supply.

Officials from Tyson Foods have closed the plant amid one of the state's largest outbreaks of COVID-19: 186 employees have tested positive for the illness. The facility is one of the nation's major pork processing plants and the rural community's largest employer.

“We are taking on water fast,” National Pork Producers Council President Howard “A.V.” Roth said, adding that thousands of hog farms could close this year without government intervention. “Immediate action is imperative, or a lot of hog farms will go under.”

The Columbus Junction plant is one of several meatpacking facilities across the state and the nation where business has been suspended after they were hard-hit by the highly contagious coronavirus.

Essential employees:COVID-19 claims lives of 30 grocery store workers, thousands more may have it, union says

Pandemic repercussions:3 in 10 Americans have lost income due to coronavirus

In Tama County, where 108 positive COVID tests and three deaths have been reported, National Beef suspended production at Iowa Premium beef plant after an outbreak. Smithfield Foods, the world’s biggest pork processor, shut its Sioux Falls, South Dakota, plant over the weekend as the coronavirus spread among workers.

Meat processing plants from Colorado to Canada have similarly suspended production after the virus spread.

“The whole system is gummed up,” Iowa State University agricultural economist Dermot Hayes said. “It’s not just the farm and the packer. It’s all along the chain.” 

Tyson Foods officials said Tuesday that the company would keep its Columbus Junction plant, which has about 1,400 employees in normal times, shuttered. The plant – said to be responsible for 2% of the country’s total slaughtering capacity – has been closed since April 6. The company is diverting livestock originally scheduled for delivery at Columbus Junction to its other plants, when possible.

Tyson was taking precautions to protect its employees from the spread before the closure. Staff was checking the temperature of workers at all locations before they entered facilities. But checking temperatures only ensures that symptomatic people do not engage with others; those who are not feverish can still spread the virus.

“Protecting our team members continues to be top priority for us,” the company said in a statement to the Des Moines Register. The plant will continue to pay employees and keep its doors closed while assessing the situation, officials said.

Gov. Kim Reynolds said Tuesday that nearly half of the day's newly confirmed cases – 86 of the 189 – were tied to the Tyson Food plant outbreak.

A Tyson Foods processing plant is seen, Tuesday, April 14, 2020, in Columbus Junction, Iowa.

https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2020/04/15/testing-rural-iowa-covid-19-coronavirus-tyson-food-pork-processing/5136043002/?utm_source=feedblitz&utm_medium=FeedBlitzRss&utm_campaign=usatodaycomnation-topstories&fbclid=IwAR3XIrm3ooThaU_Dsv6_LoIB_PtOw_muMvNLri-51LYCAJ05SQtPkKLav6I

4 Georgia poultry workers dead from coronavirus, company says

American workers who process the nation’s meat have proven especially susceptible to the new virus, as they work shoulder-to-shoulder on production lines.

April 17, 2020, 11:22 AM CDT

By The Associated Press

SAVANNAH, Ga. — Four employees of a major poultry producer's operations in rural southwest Georgia have died after becoming infected with the coronavirus, a company spokesman said Friday.

Tyson Foods spokesman Gary Mickelson said three of the employees worked at the company's chicken processing plant in Camilla, while the fourth person worked in a supporting job outside the plant. He declined to say how many workers there have tested positive for COVID-19, the disease caused by the new virus.


Coronavirus cases found in at least 17 meat processing plants across U.S. 

Coronavirus infections in at least 17 meat processing plants across nine states are contributing to a spike in confirmed cases in the Midwest. Although 13 plants are already closed temporarily or operating at reduced capacity, Iowa Governor Kim Reynolds says shutting down plants would hurt farmers and the national food supply. Adriana Diaz looks at the effect the pandemic has had on some of these facilities. 4H AGO

17 plants in 10 states...



The new rule will end limits on how fast slaughterhouses can kill pigs. It will also shift responsibility for removing defective meat during the slaughtering process from government inspectors to plant workers. The USDA will still inspect live pigs and the final pork products.


As line speeds increase, meatpacking workers are in ever more danger Don't expect the Trump administration to improve conditions in this already brutal industry. Matt McConnell Opinion contributor 

https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2019/09/18/line-speeds-increase-meatpacking-workers-evermore-danger-column/2256988001/

***> The estimated low level of immunity against SARS-CoV-2 indicates that efficient control measures that limit transmission risk will have to be maintained beyond the 11th May to avoid a rebound of the epidemic.

Estimating the burden of SARS-CoV-2 in France

Henrik Salje, Cécile Tran Kiem, Noémie Lefrancq, Noémie Courtejoie, Paolo Bosetti, Juliette Paireau, Alessio Andronico, Nathanaël Hoze, Jehanne Richet, Claire-Lise Dubost, et al.

Abstract

France has been heavily affected by the SARS-CoV-2 epidemic and went into lockdown on the 17th March 2020. Using models applied to hospital and death data, we estimate the impact of the lockdown and current population immunity. We find 2.6% of infected individuals are hospitalized and 0.53% die, ranging from 0.001% in those <20y 8.3="" in="" those="" to="">80y. Across all ages, men are more likely to be hospitalized, enter intensive care, and die than women. The lockdown reduced the reproductive number from 3.3 to 0.5 (84% reduction). By 11 May, when interventions are scheduled to be eased, we project 3.7 million (range: 2.3-6.7) people, 5.7% of the population, will have been infected. Population immunity appears insufficient to avoid a second wave if all control measures are released at the end of the lockdown.

This study shows the massive impact the French lockdown had on SARS-CoV-2 transmission. It estimates underlying probabilities of infection, hospitalization and death, which is essential for the interpretation of COVID-19 surveillance data. The forecasts we provide can inform planning of ICU bed occupancy and lockdown exit strategies. 

***> The estimated low level of immunity against SARS-CoV-2 indicates that efficient control measures that limit transmission risk will have to be maintained beyond the 11th May to avoid a rebound of the epidemic.


Coronavirus can infect cats — dogs, not so much But scientists say it’s unclear whether felines can spread the virus to people, so pet owners need not panic yet. 


We found that SARS-CoV-2 replicates poorly in dogs, pigs, chickens, and ducks, but efficiently in ferrets and cats. We found that the virus transmits in cats via respiratory droplets 



SARS-CoV-2 Infection in Children

Of the 1391 children assessed and tested from January 28 through February 26, 2020, a total of 171 (12.3%) were confirmed to have SARS-CoV-2 infection. Demographic data and clinical features are summarized in Table 1. (Details of the laboratory and radiologic findings are provided in the Supplementary Appendix, available with the full text of this letter at NEJM.org.) The median age of the infected children was 6.7 years. Fever was present in 41.5% of the children at any time during the illness. Other common signs and symptoms included cough and pharyngeal erythema. A total of 27 patients (15.8%) did not have any symptoms of infection or radiologic features of pneumonia. A total of 12 patients had radiologic features of pneumonia but did not have any symptoms of infection. During the course of hospitalization, 3 patients required intensive care support and invasive mechanical ventilation; all had coexisting conditions (hydronephrosis, leukemia [for which the patient was receiving maintenance chemotherapy], and intussusception). Lymphopenia (lymphocyte count, <1 .2="" 10-month-old="" 149="" 2020="" 21="" 4="" 6="" 8="" a="" admission.="" after="" and="" as="" been="" bilateral="" br="" child="" common="" condition="" death.="" died="" discharged="" failure="" finding="" from="" general="" ground-glass="" had="" have="" hospital.="" in="" intussusception="" liter="" march="" most="" multiorgan="" of="" one="" opacity="" patients="" per="" present="" radiologic="" stable="" the="" there="" total="" wards="" was="" weeks="" were="" with="">


Two COVID-19 infected children, aged 12 and 13, die in Belgium and UK

By Alasdair Sandford with AFP, AP • last updated: 01/04/2020

A health worker in the intensive care ward observes a COVID-19 patient at a hospital in Belgium, March 27, 2020. (AP Photo/Francisco Seco, File)

A 12-year-old girl in Belgium and a 13-year old boy in the UK infected with the novel coronavirus have died, authorities said.

They are believed to be the youngest victims of the disease in their respective countries.

The 12-year-old girl's death was announced during the daily news conference given by Belgium's health service, at the end of its regular update on casualty figures and hospitalisations.

“It's an emotionally difficult moment because it involves a child, and it has also upset the medical and scientific community,” said spokesman Dr Emmanuel André, visibly upset.

"We are thinking of her family and friends. It's a very rare event, but one which devastates us."

Another spokesman added that the child had had a fever for three days and had tested positive for the coronavirus. No other details were given of the girl's background.

Until now the youngest person to die from the virus in Belgium was a 30-year-old female nurse, according to Belgian media.

Just a few hours later, London's King's College Hospital announced that a 13-year-old COVID-19 patient had also died.

"Sadly, a 13-year old boy who tested positive for COVID-19 has passed away, and our thoughts and condolences are with the family at this time," a Trust spokesperson said in a statement.

"The death has been referred to the Coroner," it added.

An appeal posted on the GoFunMe crowdfunding platform by Madinah College, named him as Ismail and said that he didn't have "any pre-existing health conditions.

"Sadly he died without any family members close by due to the highly infectious nature of COVID-19," it added.

Ismail is believed the be the youngest victim of the disease in the UK.

Last week French authorities said a 16-year-old girl had died at a children's hospital in Paris. The death of the teenager, identified as Julie A. and described as otherwise healthy, has provoked strong emotions in France.

Coronavirus in France: healthy 16 year-old dies of COVID-19

Deaths from COVID-19 among people so young are exceptional. Health authorities have said previously that serious cases of the illness -- although predominant in older and more vulnerable age groups -- can occur in adults of any age.

Last weekend the US state of Illinois announced the death of an infant under one year old who had tested positive for coronavirus. The cause of death was being investigated. Medical reports on cases in China have documented the death of a 10-month-old baby and a 14-year-old boy.

A recent US study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) of 2,500 patients found no cases of deaths among people aged under 19. But it did find that people of all ages were liable to become seriously ill: more than a third of those hospitalised were aged between 20 and 54.

Coronavirus in Europe: Latest numbers on COVID-19 cases and deaths

The Belgian girl's death was included among the latest national figures released on Tuesday, confirming nearly 200 more deaths since the previous update. More than 700 people in the country have died from coronavirus since the outbreak began.

Hospitals in three regions have been particularly badly affected, the authorities say -- around Brussels, in Limburg in eastern Flanders, and in Hainaut in Wallonia to the west.

With 12,775 confirmed COVID-19 cases as of Tuesday, Belgium has the 10th highest number of infections among countries worldwide, according to data compiled by the US Johns Hopkins University Coronavirus Resource Center.


Purging the elderly and their votes

And, across the nation, according to a recent report in the Wall Street Journal, the coronavirus epidemic has affected more than 2,100 nursing homes and long-term care facilities, causing more than 2,300 fatalities. The article states that the official tally “almost certainly understates the extent of the epidemic, because not all states provide data.” As a further matter, a Time article suggests the number is at least 3,600 deaths. And on April 16, a report indicates that at least 5,670 nursing home residents have died from COVID-19.

This week state, county, and municipal officials have begun rectifying the problem of underreporting of COVID-19 deaths by adding to the tally deaths that have occurred at home or in nursing homes and are presumed to be caused by COVID-19.


Trump gop maga, “get back to work now” like leading sheep to slaughter... 

corvid-19 figures US;


corvid-19 map


snip...


President George W. Bush on Pandemic Flu in 2005


Trump disbanded NSC pandemic unit that experts had praised

By DEB RIECHMANN

March 14, 2020

WASHINGTON (AP) — Public health and national security experts shake their heads when President Donald Trump says the coronavirus “came out of nowhere” and “blindsided the world.”

They’ve been warning about the next pandemic for years and criticized the Trump administration’s decision in 2018 to dismantle a National Security Council directorate at the White House charged with preparing for when, not if, another pandemic would hit the nation.


CORONAVIRUS APR. 8, 2020

U.S. Intelligence Warned Trump of Coronavirus Threat as Early as November: Report

By Matt Stieb

We’ve removed our paywall from essential coronavirus news stories. Become a subscriber to support our journalists. Subscribe now.

One of the many, mutually exclusive excuses the Trump administration has provided for its profound delay in responding to the coronavirus is that they were fooled by reports of the outbreak coming out of China. “I will be very candid with you,” Mike Pence explained on CNN last week, “and say that in mid-January the CDC was still assessing that the risk of the coronavirus to the American people was low. … The reality is that we could’ve been better off if China had been more forthcoming.”

Pence, too, could have been more forthcoming about the information the administration was privy to, according to a new report from ABC News. According to two officials familiar with a report from the military’s National Center for Medical Intelligence, the White House was aware of a contagion which is now known to be COVID-19 as early as November. According to ABC News, the report, made up of data intercepts and satellite imagery, determined that the coronavirus was a potential threat to U.S. troops in the region. “Analysts concluded it could be a cataclysmic event,” a source told ABC News. “It was then briefed multiple times to the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon’s Joint Staff and the White House.”

Though Defense Secretary Mark Esper told ABC News on Sunday that the National Security Council was not briefed about the matter in December, the ABC News report says that the administration was aware of its contents as early as Thanksgiving:

The NCMI report was made available widely to people authorized to access intelligence community alerts. Following the report’s release, other intelligence community bulletins began circulating through confidential channels across the government around Thanksgiving, the sources said. Those analyses said China’s leadership knew the epidemic was out of control even as it kept such crucial information from foreign governments and public health agencies.

“The timeline of the intel side of this may be further back than we’re discussing,” the source said of preliminary reports from Wuhan. “But this was definitely being briefed beginning at the end of November as something the military needed to take a posture on.”

SNIP...


Atkinson’s removal is part of a larger shakeup of the intelligence community under Trump, who has long been skeptical of intelligence officials and information. Atkinson is at least the seventh intelligence official to be fired, ousted or moved aside since last summer.


Below is a timeline of Trump’s commentary downplaying the threat.

Jan. 22: On whether he was worried about a pandemic: “No, we’re not at all. And we have it totally under control. It’s one person coming in from China.”

Jan. 24: “It will all work out well.”


Trump reportedly dismissed January coronavirus warnings from Health Secretary Alex Azar as 'alarmist' 

Tom Porter 

Trump according to the Post was warned in a January intelligence briefing about the threat posed by the virus as well as by his health secretary, but in public statements for weeks continued to downplay the likely impact of the disease. 


A Navy captain tries to save his sailors, and gets fired in the process 

Navy secretary, in a transparent bid to appease President Trump, moves precipitously to relieve aircraft carrier captain of his command: Our view The Editorial Board USA TODAY 


COVID-19

4/18/2020, 12:38:37 PM

Total Deaths 157,400 

23,227 deaths Italy 

20,043 deaths Spain 

18,681 deaths France 

15,464 deaths United Kingdom 

13,202 deaths New York City New York US


''Please, please, we can’t win anymore'' 

Wednesday, February 5, 2020

Dangerous Pathogens introduction into the United States through smuggling of meat in air passenger luggage, a review 2020

Dangerous Pathogens introduction into the United States through smuggling of meat in air passenger luggage, a review 2020

Open Access

Published: 08 October 2019

Risk of African swine fever virus introduction into the United States through smuggling of pork in air passenger luggage

Cristina Jurado , Lina Mur, María Sol Pérez Aguirreburualde, Estefanía Cadenas-Fernández, Beatriz Martínez-López, José Manuel Sánchez-Vizcaíno & Andrés Perez 

Scientific Reports volume 9, Article number: 14423 (2019) Cite this article

Abstract

African swine fever causes substantial economic losses in the swine industry in affected countries. Traditionally confined to Africa with only occasional incursions into other regions, ASF began spreading into Caucasian countries and Eastern Europe in 2007, followed by Western Europe and Asia in 2018. Such a dramatic change in the global epidemiology of ASF has resulted in concerns that the disease may continue to spread into disease-free regions such as the US. In this study, we estimated the risk of introduction of ASF virus into the US through smuggling of pork in air passenger luggage. Results suggest that the mean risk of ASFV introduction into the US via this route has increased by 183.33% from the risk estimated before the disease had spread into Western Europe or Asia. Most of the risk (67.68%) was associated with flights originating from China and Hong Kong, followed by the Russian Federation (26.92%). Five US airports accounted for >90% of the risk. Results here will help to inform decisions related to the design of ASF virus surveillance strategies in the US.

snip...

In conclusion, results suggest that the risk of ASFV introduction into the US through smuggling of pork through air passenger luggage has increased substantially since the disease spread into regions of Asia and Europe in 2018 and 2019. Most of the risk appears to come from China (38.35%), Hong Kong (29.32%), the Russian Federation (26.92%) and Poland (2.43%). The majority of risk concentrates in five US airports and is higher in the summer. These results will help to inform decisions related to design of ASFV surveillance strategies in the US.



==========

Greetings Nature and urado, C., Mur, L., Pérez Aguirreburualde, M.S. et al, 

WOW, deja vu, many thanks for this study. i said this 17 years or so ago. 

here is my submission to ;

Terry Singeltary on Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002

Docket No: 02-088-1 

RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; [TSS SUBMISSION ON POTENTIAL FOR BSE/TSE & FMD 'SUITCASE BOMBS'] - TSS 1/27/03 (0)

Docket Management

Docket: 02N-0276 - Bioterrorism Preparedness; Registration of Food Facilities, Section 305 Comment Number: EC-254 [TSS SUBMISSION]

Subject: Docket No: 02-088-1 RE-Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2003 15:54:57 -0600 From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." To: [log in to unmask] Docket No: 02-088-1

Title: Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002; Possession, Use, and Transfer of Biological Agents and Toxins


Greetings,

i would like to kindly submit to this docket and warn of the potential for biological 'suitcase bombs' from civilian air-traffic populations from known BSE/FMD and other exotic animal disease pathogens coming into the USA.

please be warned;

Date: Thu, 21 Mar 2002 08:42:56 -0800 

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Sender: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." 

Subject: USA SEALED BORDERS AND THE ''USCS'' (unspecified species coding system) MORE POTENTIAL B.S.eee

Change in Disease Status of Greece With Regard to Foot-and-Mouth

[Federal Register: March 21, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 55)]

snip...

Under Sec. 94.11, meat and other animal products of ruminants and swine, including ship stores, airplane meals, and baggage containing these meat or animal products, may not be imported into the United States except in accordance with Sec. 94.11 and the applicable requirements of the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service at 9 CFR chapter III.

snip...

From an economic standpoint, the proposed rule would have little or no impact on U.S. animal stock and commodities. There are two reasons. First, the proposed rule would not remove other disease-based restrictions on the importation of ruminants or swine (and certain meat and other products from those animals) from Greece into the United States. Because bovine spongiform encephalopathy is considered to exist in Greece, the importation of ruminants and meat, meat products, and certain other products of ruminants that have been in Greece is prohibited.

snip...


========================

What are the U.S. imports of affected animals or animal products from the country?

Very few products that would be of risk for transmission of BSE were imported into the US from Greece during 2000 or 2001 (January - April). Due to the above mentioned import ban, no live ruminants, ruminant meat, meal made from ruminants, or other high risk products from ruminants were imported from Greece during this time period. In 2001 (January - April), 3000 kg of enzymes and prepared enzymes and 5 kg of medicants containing antibiotics for veterinary use were imported. The data do not provide a species of origin code for these products, therefore they may not contain any ruminant product.

Sources: World Trade Atlas

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country?

Approximately 185,000 direct flights from Greece arrived to US airports in fiscal year 2000. Also, an unknown number of passengers from Greece arrived via indirect flights.

Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring, 584 air passengers from Greece were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Of these passengers, 14 carried meat (non-pork) items that could potentially transmit pathogens that cause BSE; most passengers carried from one to two kilograms (kg) of meat, although one passenger in November 1999 carried 23 kg of meat in a suitcase. Florida, Massachusetts, and New York were the reported destinations of these passengers. None of the passengers with meat items reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm while in the US.

Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base


Greetings list members,

i just cannot accept this;

23 kg of meat in a suitcase (suitcase bomb...TSS)

The data do not provide a species of origin code for these products, therefore they may not contain any ruminant product.

what kind of statement is this?

how stupid do they think we are?

it could also very well mean that _all_ of it was ruminant based products !

Terry S. Singeltary Sr., Bacliff, Texas USA

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Slovenia?

There were no direct flights from Slovenia to the US in fiscal year 2000.

APHIS-PPQ’s agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring sampled 27 air passengers from Slovenia for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. One of these 27 passengers was carrying two kilograms of a meat item that could potentially harbor pathogens that cause BSE. This passenger arrived to Elizabeth, New York, in June 2000 and declared no intention to visit a farm or ranch in the US.

Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base


What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country?

A total of 45,438 passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from the Czech Republic in fiscal year 2000. It is likely that additional passengers originating in the Czech Republic traveled to the US on non-direct flights.

As part of APHIS-PPQ’s Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring, 238 air passengers from the Czech Republic were inspected for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Of these, 10, or 4.2%, were found to be carrying a total of 17 kg of items that could potentially present a risk for BSE. None of the passengers with items reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch while in the US.

Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base


What are the US imports of affected animals or animal products from Austria?

Between 1998 and June 2001, US imports from Austria included goat meat, animal feeds, and sausage. The sausage and animals feeds were from unspecified species.

Source: World Trade Atlas

snip...

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Austria?

A total of 168,598 passengers on direct flights from Austria arrived at US airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers from Austria arrived in the US via indirect flights.

Under APHIS-PPQ’s agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 565 air passengers from Austria were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Ten (10) of these passengers, or 1.7 percent, carried a total of 23 kg meat (non-pork) items that could potentially harbor the pathogen(s) that cause BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the US.

Source: US Dept. of Transportation; APHIS-PPQ


Greetings FDA and public,

if you go to the below site, and search all BSE known countries and check out their air traffic illegal meat they have confiscated, and check out the low number checked, compared to actual passenger traffic, would not take too much for some nut to bring in FMD/TSEs into the USA as a 'suitcase bomb'.

[[Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2001. Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.]]

if they were to have questioned the terrorist that bombed the Twin Towers with jets, if they were to have questioned them at flight school in the USA, i am sure that they would have said they did not intend to visit the Twin Towers as a flying bomb either. what am i thinking, they probably did ask this? stupid me.

[[In 1999 a small amount of non-species specific meat and offal was imported and a small amount of fetal bovine serum (FBS) was also imported. FBS is considered to have a relatively low risk of transmitting BSE.]]

more of the USA infamous 'non-species coding system', wonder how many of these species are capable of carrying a TSE?

snip...

A total of 524,401 passengers arrived on direct flights to the U.S. from Israel in fiscal year 2000. This number does not include passengers who arrived in the U.S. from Israel via indirect flights.

Under APHIS-PPQ's agricultural quarantine inspection monitoring, 284 air passengers from Israel were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2001. Seven of these passengers, or 2 percent, carried a total of 11 kg of meat items that could potentially harbor the pathogen that causes BSE. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the U.S.


Source: U.S. Department of Transportation and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base.

What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from Japan?

Approximately 6.84 million passengers on 29,826 direct flights from Japan arrived at US airports in fiscal year 2000. An undetermined number of passengers from Japan arrived in the US via indirect flights.

Under APHIS-PPQ's agriculture quarantine inspection monitoring, 801 air passengers from Japan were sampled for items of agricultural interest in fiscal year 2000. Of these 801 passengers, 10 carried meat (non-pork) items that could potentially harbor the pathogen(s) that cause BSE; most passengers carried an average of 1.7 kilograms of meat. None of these passengers from whom meat items were confiscated reported plans to visit or work on a ranch or farm during their visit to the US.

Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base


What is the level of passenger traffic arriving in the United States from the affected country?

A total of 3.3 million passengers arrived in the US on direct flights from Germany in 1998, although many of these passengers would not have originated in Germany. As part of APHIS-PPQ's Agriculture Quarantine Inspection Monitoring, 8,247 air passengers from Germany were inspected for items of agricultural interest. Of these, 198, or 2.3%, were found to be carrying a total of 304 kg of items that could potentially present a risk for BSE. Thirty (30) of the passengers with items reported plans to visit or work on a farm or ranch while in the US. Reported destination states of these 30 passengers were CA, CO, DE, FL, LA, MT, OH, VA, and WY.

Source: US Department of Transportation, and APHIS-PPQ Agricultural Quarantine Inspection data base


search archives at bottom of page of each BSE Country;


more on non-species coding system and TSEs and potential 'suitcase bombs';

To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy 

Subject: Re: POLAND FINDS 4TH MAD COW CASE/USA IMPORTS FROM POLAND/non-species coding system strikes again 

References:< [log in to unmask]> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Virus-Scanner: Found to be clean

Greetings again List Members,

let me kick a madcow around here a bit.

on the imports from Poland and the infamous USA 'non-species' coding system.

the USDA/APHIS states;

During the past four years (1998 - 2001), US imports from Poland included non-species specific animal products used in animal feeds and non-species specific sausage and offal products (Table 3). Given US restrictions on ruminant product imports, these US imports should not have contained ruminant material.

NOW, if you read Polands GBR risk assessment and opinion on BSE, especially _cross-contamination_, it states;

ANNEX 1

Poland - Summary of the GBR-Assessment, February 2001

EXTERNAL CHALLENGE STABILITY INTERACTION OF EXTERNAL CHALLENGE AND STABILITY

The very high to extremely high external challenge met a very unstable system and could have led to contamination of domestic cattle in Poland from 1987 onwards.

This internal challenge again met the still very unstable system and increased over time.

The continuing very high external challenge supported this development.

Not OK MBM-ban since 1997, but no feed controls. Reasonably OK Heat treatment equivalent to 133°C / 20min / 3 bar standards, but no evidence provided on compliance.

Not OK. No SRM-ban, SRM are rendered and included in cattle feed.

BSE surveillance:

Not sufficient before 2001.

Cross-contamination:

Lines for ruminant and non-ruminant feed in feed-mills only separated in time and no analytical controls carried out. Likely present since 1987 and growing.

see full text and ANNEX 1 at;


so in my humble opinion, the statement by the USDA/APHIS that ''these US imports _should_ not have contained ruminant materials, is a joke. a sad joke indeed.

* POLAND BSE GBR RISK ASSESSMENT


BSE ISRAEL change in disease status, AND THE DAMN NON-SPECIES CODING SYSTEM $$$

Subject: BSE ISRAEL change in disease status, AND THE DAMN NON-SPECIES CODING SYSTEM $$$ Date: November 1, 2002 at 8:03 am PST

[Federal Register: November 1, 2002 (Volume 67, Number 212)]

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

9 CFR Part 94

[Docket No. 02-072-2]

Change in Disease Status of Israel Because of BSE

AGENCY: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, USDA.

ACTION: Affirmation of interim rule as final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: We are adopting as a final rule, without change, an interim rule that amended the regulations by adding Israel to the list of regions where bovine spongiform encephalopathy exists because the disease had been detected in a native-born animal in that region. The effect of the interim rule was a restriction on the importation of ruminants, meat, meat products, and certain other products of ruminants that had been in Israel. The interim rule was necessary to help prevent the introduction of bovine spongiform encephalopathy into the United States.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The interim rule became effective on June 4, 2002.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dr. Gary Colgrove, Chief Staff Veterinarian, Sanitary Trade Issues Team, National Center for Import and Export, VS, APHIS, 4700 River Road Unit 38, Riverdale, MD 20737- 1231; (301) 734-4356.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

The regulations in 9 CFR parts 93, 94, 95, and 96 (referred to below as the regulations) govern the importation of certain animals, birds, poultry, meat, other animal products and byproducts, hay, and straw into the United States in order to prevent the introduction of various animal diseases, including bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE). In an interim rule effective June 4, 2002, and published in the Federal Register on July 18, 2002 (67 FR 47243-47244, Docket No. 02- 072-1), we amended the regulations in Sec. 94.18 (a)(1) by adding Israel to the list of regions where BSE exists due to the detection of BSE in a native-born animal in that region. Comments on the interim rule were required to be received on or before September 16, 2002. We did not receive any comments. Therefore, for the reasons given in the interim rule, we are adopting the interim rule as a final rule. This action also affirms the information contained in the interim rule concerning Executive Orders 12866 and 12988 and the Paperwork Reduction Act. Further, for this action, the Office of Management and Budget has waived its review under Executive Order 12866.

Regulatory Flexibility Act

This action affirms an interim rule that amended the regulations by adding Israel to the list of regions where BSE exists. The effect of the interim rule was a restriction on the importation of ruminants, meat, meat products, and certain other products of ruminants that had been in Israel. The interim rule was necessary to help prevent the introduction of BSE into the United States. The following analysis addresses the economic effects of the interim rule on small entities, as required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act. The interim rule's restrictions on the importation of ruminants and ruminant products and byproducts from Israel are not expected to have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities due to the fact that the restricted items are either not imported from Israel or are imported in very small amounts. There are three categories of imports that may be affected, but Israel's share of U.S. imports is small in each case. The first category of affected imported commodities is ``Meat and edible meat offal, salted in brine, dried or smoked; edible flours and meals of meat or meat offal.'' Average total yearly imports of these products by the United States over the 3-year period 1999-2001 were valued at $24.6 million. Imports from Israel in 1999 were valued at $26,000. No imports of these products from Israel were reported for 2000 or 2001. The second category of affected commodities is ``Preparations of a kind used in animal feeding.'' Average total yearly imports of these products, 1999-2001, were valued at $93.5 million. Imports from Israel had an average yearly value over this period of about $76,000. The final category of affected commodities is ``Other prepared or preserved meat, meat offal or blood.'' Average yearly imports of these products, 1999-2001, were valued at $101.2 million. Imports from Israel had an average yearly value over this period of about $2.7 million. It is apparent that Israel is a minor supplier to the United States of the ruminant products and byproducts affected by the BSE-related restrictions resulting from the interim rule. Therefore, we do not expect that the interim rule's restrictions on ruminants and ruminant products and byproducts from Israel will substantially affect any U.S. importers, large or small, of those commodities. Under these circumstances, the Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service has determined that this action will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

List of Subjects in 9 CFR Part 94

Animal diseases, Imports, Livestock, Meat and meat products, Milk, Poultry and poultry products, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

PART 94--RINDERPEST, FOOT-AND-MOUTH DISEASE, FOWL PEST (FOWL PLAGUE), EXOTIC NEWCASTLE DISEASE, AFRICAN SWINE FEVER, HOG CHOLERA, AND BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY: PROHIBITED AND RESTRICTED IMPORTATIONS

Accordingly, we are adopting as a final rule, without change, the interim rule that amended 9 CFR part 94 and that was published at 67 FR 47243-47244 on July 18, 2002.

Authority: 7 U.S.C. 450, 7711-7714, 7751, 7754, 8303, 8306, 8308, 8310, 8311, and 8315; 21 U.S.C 136 and 136a; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 42 U.S.C. 4331 and 4332; 7 CFR 2.22, 2.80, and 371.4.

Done in Washington, DC, this 28th day of October, 2002. Bobby R. Acord, Administrator, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service. [FR Doc. 02-27812 Filed 10-31-02; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 3410-34-P


greetings List members,

MORE OF THE INFAMOUS USA NON-SPECIES CODING SYSTEM.

as long as the exporting country and the importing country know not what they are exporting (play dumb/stupid), this non-species coding system allows potential BSE/TSE materials to be imported and exported freely and legally...

TSS

What are the U.S. imports of affected animals or animal products from Israel ?

The U.S. imported no live ruminants or ruminant meat from Israel since 1999. In 1999 a small amount of non-species specific meat and offal was imported and a small amount of fetal bovine serum (FBS) was also imported. FBS is considered to have a relatively low risk of transmitting BSE. Other imports from Israel during the period 1998-2001 included non-species specific preparations used in animal feeds and other non-food products of unspecified animals. For the category "preparations used in animal feeding, NESOI" that was imported into the U.S., it is possible that bovine meat or bovine byproducts could have been included in this category. However, the US Food and Drug Administration prohibits feeding of meat-and-bone meal to ruminants in the U.S....snip...end


snip...2019

***> Poland is Proof atypical BSE is NOT an old cow spontaneous disease...tss

we have seen the spontaneous BSE epidemic in France, what about the other HIGH INCIDENCE ATYPICAL BSE COUNTRY OF POLAND, another atypical spontaneous event of high incidence. how can this be blamed on a happenstance of nothing, i.e. old age? goes against all junk science to date on the spontaneous atypical BSE i.e.

> In 2015, the OIE determined that atypical BSE occurred spontaneously at a low rate in all cattle populations and would be excluded for BSE risk. ...

>Atypical BSE occurs in older cattle, usually 8 years of age or greater, and does not appear to be associated with contaminated feed. Like classic or sporadic CJD in humans, it seems to arise rarely and spontaneously. 

 POLAND ATYPICAL BSE AND SPORADIC CJD


we have seen the spontaneous BSE epidemic in France, what about the other HIGH INCIDENCE ATYPICAL BSE COUNTRY OF POLAND, another atypical spontaneous event of high incidence. how can this be blamed on a happenstance of nothing, i.e. old age? goes against all junk science to date on the spontaneous atypical BSE i.e.

> In 2015, the OIE determined that atypical BSE occurred spontaneously at a low rate in all cattle populations and would be excluded for BSE risk. ...

>Atypical BSE occurs in older cattle, usually 8 years of age or greater, and does not appear to be associated with contaminated feed. Like classic or sporadic CJD in humans, it seems to arise rarely and spontaneously. 

 POLAND ATYPICAL BSE AND SPORADIC CJD


Atypical status of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in Poland: a molecular typing study

Summary

The aim of this study was to analyze molecular features of protease-resistant prion protein (PrPres) in Western blots of BSE cases diagnosed in Poland with respect to a possible atypical status. Confirmed cases were analyzed by Western blotting with several monoclonal antibodies directed at N-terminal and core epitopes of prion protein (PrP). Most cases showed the classical glycoprofile characterized by the dominance of the di- over the monoglycosylated PrPres band, yielding di-/mono- ratios well above 2 and by reactivity with antibodies having their epitopes in bovine PrP region 110–242 (C-type cases). Surprisingly, seven cases of BSE were atypical. Six were classified as L-type based on a slightly lower molecular mass (Mr) of the non- glycosylated band with respect to C-types and a conspicuously low di-/mono- ratio of glycosylated PrPres bands approaching unity. One case was classified as H-type because of a higher Mr of PrPres bands on the blot when compared with C-type cases. A characteristic epitope of H-type PrPres occurred in the 101–110 region of PrP for which only antibody 12B2 had a sufficient affinity. The occurrence of atypical cases only in animals 9 years of age and older raises questions about the mechanisms of prion diseases and the origin of BSE.


Atypical status of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in Poland: a molecular typing study

M. P. Polak1, J. F. Zmudzinski1, J. G. Jacobs2, J. P. M. Langeveld2

1 National Veterinary Research Institute, Pulawy, Poland

2 Central Institute for Animal Disease Control (CIDC-Lelystad), Lelystad, The Netherlands Received 24 April 2007; Accepted 27 August 2007; Published online 26 September 2007 # Springer-Verlag 2007 

snip...

Clarification of whether these atypical cases represent genuine strains of BSE would be accomplished by transmission studies in mice. Such studies have already been performed in France, Germany and Italy [3, 5, 14, 15]. For H-type cases in France, successful transmission was achieved in both wild-type, and transgenic mice expressing bovine and ovine PrPC. In Germany, successful transmission of both an L-type and an H-type case to transgenic mice overexpressing bovine PrPC has been described. PrPres from those mice was identical to the inoculum used in the study, proving the existence of distinct strains of BSE. All atypical features of those isolates were maintained in the inoculated mice, indicating the existence of several prion strains in cattle, or alternatively a possible evolution to a single BSE strain, as suggested from data obtained by Capobianco et al. with wild-type inbred mice [15]. This second hypothesis could fit with data from the United Kingdom, where over 180,000 cases of BSE were diagnosed by passive surveillance. British and European experience based on tissue analysis from clinically affected animals showed consistent characteristics of BSE agent not only on histological sections from cattle brains but also when inoculating mice, pointing to the existence of one uniform strain of BSE. Therefore, it is possible that a sporadic form of BSE present in the cattle population at a very low rate in the past could have spread to naive animals via contaminated meatand-bone meals. Spontaneous BSE, if it occurs, must be a very rare phenomenon. However, data for Poland, where 14% of all cases comprised an atypical form of BSE, seems to be in contradiction to this hypothesis. But when the average age of all positive cases in Poland is taken into account, BSE is generally found in older animals (mean age of 7.7). Analysis of the age structure of cattle in Poland in the period of 2002–2006 shows that 56–60% of all animals were 7 years old and above. A much larger number of cattle should be tested to get better insight into the real prevalence of atypical BSE. However, current tendencies based on economic analysis point to a decrease in the number of tests performed rather than expanding this scheme any further. It would be sensible to maintain a certain level of testing focused on the older age group to distinguish between a stable, thus sporadic-based, situation of BSE, or alternatively a fade-out, thus epidemic-based, situation. Exploring the subject of spontaneous BSE in the cattle population may be ceased for economic reasons, and it may never be known while this answer is in our reach thanks to great financial efforts in recent years. 


Poland is Proof atypical BSE is NOT an old cow spontaneous disease...tss

Number of reported cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in farmed cattle worldwide* (excluding the United Kingdom) Country/Year 

Poland 

89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4f 5 11 19 10 9 5 4 2 1m 3 1 0 0 0


2019

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 04, 2019 

POLAND DETECTS BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY BSE TSE PRION 

Poland is Proof atypical BSE is NOT an old cow spontaneous disease...tss 


FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 01, 2019 

Poland Exported 5,500 Pounds of Meat From Sick Cows to EU, what about mad cow disease? 

Poland is Proof atypical BSE is NOT an old cow spontaneous disease...tss 


snip...see full text;

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 7, 2019 

The Nation Faces Long Standing Challenges Related to Defending Against Biological Threats


cattle, pigs, sheep, cwd, tse, prion, oh my!

***> In contrast, cattle are highly susceptible to white-tailed deer CWD and mule deer CWD in experimental conditions but no natural CWD infections in cattle have been reported (Sigurdson, 2008; Hamir et al., 2006). 

Sheep and cattle may be exposed to CWD via common grazing areas with affected deer but so far, appear to be poorly susceptible to mule deer CWD (Sigurdson, 2008). In contrast, cattle are highly susceptible to white-tailed deer CWD and mule deer CWD in experimental conditions but no natural CWD infections in cattle have been reported (Sigurdson, 2008; Hamir et al., 2006). It is not known how susceptible humans are to CWD but given that the prion can be present in muscle, it is likely that humans have been exposed to the agent via consumption of venison (Sigurdson, 2008). Initial experimental research suggests that human susceptibility to CWD is low and there may be a robust species barrier for CWD transmission to humans (Sigurdson, 2008), however the risk appetite for a public health threat may still find this level unacceptable.



2020

cwd scrapie pigs oral routes

***> However, at 51 months of incubation or greater, 5 animals were positive by one or more diagnostic methods. Furthermore, positive bioassay results were obtained from all inoculated groups (oral and intracranial; market weight and end of study) suggesting that swine are potential hosts for the agent of scrapie. <*** 

 >*** Although the current U.S. feed ban is based on keeping tissues from TSE infected cattle from contaminating animal feed, swine rations in the U.S. could contain animal derived components including materials from scrapie infected sheep and goats. These results indicating the susceptibility of pigs to sheep scrapie, coupled with the limitations of the current feed ban, indicates that a revision of the feed ban may be necessary to protect swine production and potentially human health. <*** 

***> Results: PrPSc was not detected by EIA and IHC in any RPLNs. All tonsils and MLNs were negative by IHC, though the MLN from one pig in the oral <6 5="" 6="" at="" by="" detected="" eia.="" examined="" group="" in="" intracranial="" least="" lymphoid="" month="" months="" of="" one="" pigs="" positive="" prpsc="" quic="" the="" tissues="" was="">6 months group, 5/6 pigs in the oral <6 4="" and="" group="" months="" oral="">6 months group. Overall, the MLN was positive in 14/19 (74%) of samples examined, the RPLN in 8/18 (44%), and the tonsil in 10/25 (40%). 

***> Conclusions: This study demonstrates that PrPSc accumulates in lymphoid tissues from pigs challenged intracranially or orally with the CWD agent, and can be detected as early as 4 months after challenge. CWD-infected pigs rarely develop clinical disease and if they do, they do so after a long incubation period. 

This raises the possibility that CWD-infected pigs could shed prions into their environment long before they develop clinical disease. 

Furthermore, lymphoid tissues from CWD-infected pigs could present a potential source of CWD infectivity in the animal and human food chains. 




Friday, December 14, 2012

DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012

snip.....

In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration's BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.

Animals considered at high risk for CWD include:

1) animals from areas declared to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones and

2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period prior to slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.

Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants.

The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES. It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011.

Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk protein is imported into GB.

There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these products.

snip.....

36% in 2007 (Almberg et al., 2011). In such areas, population declines of deer of up to 30 to 50% have been observed (Almberg et al., 2011). In areas of Colorado, the prevalence can be as high as 30% (EFSA, 2011).

The clinical signs of CWD in affected adults are weight loss and behavioural changes that can span weeks or months (Williams, 2005). In addition, signs might include excessive salivation, behavioural alterations including a fixed stare and changes in interaction with other animals in the herd, and an altered stance (Williams, 2005). These signs are indistinguishable from cervids experimentally infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).

Given this, if CWD was to be introduced into countries with BSE such as GB, for example, infected deer populations would need to be tested to differentiate if they were infected with CWD or BSE to minimise the risk of BSE entering the human food-chain via affected venison.

snip.....

The rate of transmission of CWD has been reported to be as high as 30% and can approach 100% among captive animals in endemic areas (Safar et al., 2008).

snip.....

In summary, in endemic areas, there is a medium probability that the soil and surrounding environment is contaminated with CWD prions and in a bioavailable form. In rural areas where CWD has not been reported and deer are present, there is a greater than negligible risk the soil is contaminated with CWD prion.

snip.....

In summary, given the volume of tourists, hunters and servicemen moving between GB and North America, the probability of at least one person travelling to/from a CWD affected area and, in doing so, contaminating their clothing, footwear and/or equipment prior to arriving in GB is greater than negligible... For deer hunters, specifically, the risk is likely to be greater given the increased contact with deer and their environment. However, there is significant uncertainty associated with these estimates.

snip.....

Therefore, it is considered that farmed and park deer may have a higher probability of exposure to CWD transferred to the environment than wild deer given the restricted habitat range and higher frequency of contact with tourists and returning GB residents.

snip.....


TUESDAY, APRIL 18, 2017 

*** EXTREME USA FDA PART 589 TSE PRION FEED LOOP HOLE STILL EXIST, AND PRICE OF POKER GOES UP ***


WEDNESDAY, JULY 11, 2018 

CONFIDENTIAL IN CONFIDENCE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY OF PIGS FDA EMERGENCY REQUEST FOR RULE CHANGE USA Section 21 C.F.R. 589.2000


TUESDAY, JULY 10, 2018 

CONFIDENTIAL IN CONFIDENCE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY OF PIGS 

*** ''but feeding of other ruminant protein, including scrapie-infected sheep, can continue to pigs.'' 

CONFIDENTIAL SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY OF PIGS 


***> NEW TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY TSE PRION DISEASE (MAD CAMEL DISEASE) IN A NEW SPECIES <***

NEW OUTBREAK OF TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY TSE PRION DISEASE IN A NEW SPECIES

Subject: Prion Disease in Dromedary Camels, Algeria

Our identification of this prion disease in a geographically widespread livestock species requires urgent enforcement of surveillance and assessment of the potential risks to human and animal health.



Wednesday, May 30, 2018 

Dromedary camels in northern Africa have a neurodegenerative prion disease that may have originated decades ago


***> IMPORTS AND EXPORTS <***

SEE MASSIVE AMOUNTS OF BANNED ANIMAL PROTEIN AKA MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA DECADES AFTER POST BAN


Thursday, August 1, 2019 

Camel prion disease detected in Tunisian camels



THURSDAY, AUGUST 08, 2019 

Raccoons accumulate PrPSc after intracranial inoculation with the agents of chronic wasting disease (CWD) or transmissible mink encephalopathy (TME) but not atypical scrapie


FRIDAY, JULY 26, 2019 

Chronic Wasting Disease in Cervids: Implications for Prion Transmission to Humans and Other Animal Species


MONDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 2019

MAD DOGS AND ENGLISHMEN BSE, SCRAPIE, CWD, CJD, TSE PRION A REVIEW 2019


THE USA FDA MAD COW FEED BAN OF 1997 WAS NOTHING MORE THAN INK ON PAPER, NEVER ENFORCED...terry

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 1, 2019 

FDA Reports on VFD Compliance

Before and after the current Veterinary Feed Directive (VFD) rules took full effect in January, 2017, the FDA focused primarily on education and outreach to help feed mills, veterinarians and producers understand and comply with the requirements. Since then, FDA has gradually increased the number of VFD inspections and initiated enforcement actions when necessary.


SATURDAY, DECEMBER 21, 2019 

In vitro detection of haematogenous prions in white-tailed deer orally dosed with low concentrations of chronic wasting disease


WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 05, 2020 

Wisconsin CWD TSE Prion 2019 to date wild deer 1317 positive and Captive Farmed Livestock Cervid CWD update


THURSDAY, JANUARY 23, 2020 

USDA Consolidates Regulations for NAHLN Laboratory Testing USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service sent this bulletin at 01/23/2020 02:15 PM EST


THURSDAY, JANUARY 30, 2020 

Docket Number: FDA-2012-D-0307 Recommendations to Reduce the Possible Risk of Transmission of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease and Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease by Blood and Blood Components; Draft Guidance for Industry Draft Guidance for Industry Singeltary Submission


FRIDAY, JANUARY 31, 2020

CJD TSE Prion Blood Products, iatrogenic transmission, Confucius is confused again, WHAT IF? Docket Number: FDA-2012-D-0307 Singeltary Submission 2


MONDAY, JANUARY 20, 2020

sporadic CJD one in a million, FAKE NEWS PEOPLE!

this myth has been incorrect for decades, and had been stated as such by a few, but again, the media is too lazy to do it's job and print the facts.

human tse prion, including 85%+ of all human tse, sporadic cjd, is now 1 in 5,000.



Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518